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**UNITY AND DIVISION : ASPECTS OF THE
HISTORY OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP
c. 1920 to c.1980**

THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORICAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

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DECLARATION

I, Drusilla Siziwe Yekela do hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is entirely my own work with the exception of such quotations or references which have been attributed to their authors or sources.

Dated at the University of Cape Town this 11th day of February 2011

D S Yekela

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ABSTRACT

The history of the abaThembu chieftainship in the twentieth century has been very little studied. This thesis is the first attempt to examine the chieftainship in detail. It shows how the chieftainship was deeply divided, yet survived socio-political assaults from both within and without. It focuses on the individuals who were successive paramount chiefs of the abaThembu, exploring how they helped shape the chieftainship over time, and on the impact on the chieftainship of state policy in the eras of segregation and then apartheid.

The first chapter is an exegesis on the rule of Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe, whose readiness to succumb to government legislation compromised his traditional profile and diminished the institutional image of the chieftainship. The thesis then moves on to interrogate the impact of a long drawn-out regency on the stability and legitimacy of the abaThembu paramountcy. The thesis then turns to an assessment of the inroads of the first piece of major apartheid legislation to affect the chieftainship directly, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, on abaThembu unity. In Chapter Four an analysis is made of how class divisions and economic factors in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts added to the resuscitation of traditional rule, within the context of government policy under apartheid and the development of the Bantustan system. The fifth chapter is in part a critique of the political environment in which the various forces that punctuated Transkei's road to self-government operated, and how these affected the crucial relationship between Sabata Dalindyebo and Kaiser Matanzima. Chapter Six attempts to portray the interaction of the forces that created a setting for the demise, and the later resurgence, of the Sabata dynasty.

The conclusion of the study highlights the central aspects of the story of the abaThembu chieftainship- from 1920 to 1980 -that explain the vicissitudes of abaThembu paramountcy in the post-Dalindyebo era. This study will, it is hoped, be the basis for further work on abaThembu history in the twentieth century that will set that history in a wider context.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC.....	African National Congress
BAA.....	Bantu Authorities Act
BCM.....	Black Consciousness Movement
CNC.....	Chief Native Commissioner
NC.....	Native Commissioner
DNA.....	Department of Native Affairs
DP.....	Democratic Party
LP.....	Liberal Party
NDP.....	New Democratic Party
SANC.....	South African National Convention
SNA... ..	Secretary of Native Affairs
TGC.....	Transkei General Council
TNIP.....	Transkei National Independence Party
TNPP.....	Transkei National Progressive Party
TOB.....	Transkei Organised Bodies
TPFP.....	Transkei People's Freedom Party
TTA.....	Transkei Territorial Authority
UBC	Urban Black Council
USNA.....	Under—Secretary Of The Department Of Native Affairs
UTTG.....	United Transkeian Territorial General Council

INTRODUCTION

This study explores a gap in the historiography of the Eastern Cape, for no previous scholar has focused attention on the vicissitudes faced by the abaThembu chieftainship in the period 1920-1980. This thesis examines the forces that shaped the changing concept of chieftainship among the abaThembu from the end of the first decade after the establishment of the Union of South Africa to the final decade of apartheid, before the transition began to a democratic state. It is, then, concerned with the eras of racial segregation and apartheid and considers how the abaThembu paramount chieftainship was stripped of its powers in order to broaden the role of lesser chiefs in rural governance.¹

The year 1920 was a watershed in abaThembu chieftainship for in April Paramount Chief Dalindyebo died.² With his death the relative stability of abaThembu paramountcy came to an end, ushering in a gradual process of implosion within the abaThembu chieftainship. The state attempted to rebuild African chieftaincy as a means of decentralizing power to a conservative rural elite.³ The methods employed by the National Party government, and the colonial authorities before it, reached a climax in 1980, in which year the historical abaThembu paramount chieftainship, which derived its legitimacy from the Great House of Mthikrakra through Ngangelizwe, Dalindyebo and Jongilizwe, was terminated. Chief Sabata Jonguhlanga was deposed, his own paramountcy abolished and that status simultaneously reinvented in the *Qadi* house, a junior household.

This thesis, then, is concerned with continuity and change, stability and instability, over a sixty year period. The deposition and abolition meant a drastic reversal of the public status of customary structures. The government had declared invalid, and thus permanently dysfunctional, a house that was considered by its subjects who followed natural laws to be the producer of rulers. This thesis will explore the forces at play, the factors in operation, the motives that informed the deposition and the political

environment at the time. Also examined will be the short and long-term effects of all these on the paramountcy, in the first instance, as a symbol of its incumbent and, in the second, as an office in the traditional hierarchy. In allowing the deposition of a national father figure the abaThembu custodians of custom publicly undermined and belittled their customary guidelines. Thus it was the previously venerated office of the paramount chief, rather than the disregard of customary protocol, that became the object of ridicule. The destructiveness of this action was fully demonstrated in the deposition of Sabata Jongilizwe Dalindyebo from the paramountcy of abaThembuland. After 1980 the abaThembu chieftainship assumed a different profile and image as in essence it had lost its original political significance. It was the break in the continuity of Sabata's paramountcy rather than the invention of a new line of rulers in another house which tampered the image of abaThembu paramountcy. Whilst the reburial of Sabata in 1989 provided a platform to resuscitate his paramountcy in the proclamation and subsequent installation of his son and heir, this was merely a renaissance of abaThembu paramountcy rather than the reversal of the effects of discontinuity. The current abaThembu Paramount Chief, Buyelekhaya, assumed on installation symbolism of the renaissance of Sabata's royal status rather than a position of successor to either Bambilanga or Zondwa.

This study primarily seeks to trace and analyse the events that slowly but surely brought about the dissolution of the kind of abaThembu paramount chieftainship that had at least outlived Dalindyebo. Much would depend on whether Dalindyebo had, during his paramountcy created a basis for continuity as a cornerstone for stability. The unpacking of the forces that were instrumental in the eventual deconstruction of the abaThembu paramountcy inevitably generates a wide range of questions: Did internal crises make the abaThembu chieftainship vulnerable from both within and without? Did the weaknesses that originated within the fabric of the Dalindyebo chieftainship attract destructive agents from without? What factors were involved in the making of Prince Sabata and how far did these contribute to his moulding as a future abaThembu Paramount Chief? How strong was the paramountcy infrastructure in the twenty-five

years prior to Sabata's accession? What were his strengths when he came to power? To what extent did he empower his opponents by playing into their hands?

The variety of problems that were manifest in the period of transition from Dalindyebo's paramountcy to Sabata's aborted term form a major basis of this study. An analysis of these problems should also expose the many forces whose impact made the abaThembu paramountcy so politically fragile. It will also discuss the extent to which the internal forces within the paramountcy complemented the catalysis produced by external elements, thereby threatening the institution's viability.

By filling in the missing links in the story of the chieftainship under investigation this thesis will attempt to address the above questions. An effort will be made to identify and close the major gaps that exist in the abaThembu historiography by putting in place in a single continuous narrative the pieces that complement the history of abaThembu chieftainship. The twentieth century saw the most critical years in the affairs of paramount chieftainship in South Africa generally. The abaThembu case was no exception. The last ten years of Dalindyebo's rule witnessed the dramatic transformation of South African chieftainship which caused dilemmas for both the coloniser and the colonized. The background to these will be examined to see how they threatened the strength of the colonized, in this case, abaThembu paramountcy.

After a regency of about twenty-five years, Sabata Jonguhlanga succeeded his father Jongilizwe Dalindyebo. Did he practise what he professed to be standing for? Did he champion the rights of indigenous rule? These questions are linked directly to what informed his decisions and his subsequent actions. Was his attitude to life and world affairs inspired primarily by his reading of national histories? Was he motivated by national politics or self-interest? To what extent was Sabata's thinking influenced by his personal priorities, such as a commitment to preserve his birthright with himself as a visible symbol of abaThembu indigenous heritage? Sabata's comprehension of his obligations to his predecessors and his responsibility to the abaThembu nation needs to be interrogated, and the extent to which the problems he encountered influenced his

modus operandi. Was Sabata able to comprehend the multiple challenges that awaited him in a throne that had functioned for a quarter century under successive regents? given the turbulent circumstances of his accession?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite over half a century of gradual assault on, and progressive tampering with the institution of chieftainship, it outlived the governments that had, at different historical periods, attempted to erode its image in order to accomplish specific objectives. Whilst Ntsebeza and Mamdani in their respective works, *Democracy Compromised* and *Citizen and Subject* condemn as wholly corrupted such chieftainship as had been modified by successive colonial laws there is a sense in which the institution survives even as residue. Testimony to the endurance of South African chieftainship finds its credibility in Nyamnjoh's assertion with regard to Botswana, namely, that Africans are far from giving up chieftaincy or making completely modern institutions of it. No one, it seems, is too 'citizen' to be 'subject' as well'.⁴ The essence of his argument is that the ability of the chieftainship to withstand and cope under changing material circumstances, be they pre-colonial, colonial and/or postcolonial, proves both its resilience and adaptability. It is also evidence of the extent to which the roots of chieftainship lie deep in the cultural and political fabric of traditional society. Nyamnjoh further argued that chieftainship owes its survival to its inherent strengths which have enabled it to withstand extinction, even though the appropriation of its essential features has left it nothing more than a 'residual' chieftainship. Nyamnjoh does not specifically identify the strengths that sustain the Botswana chieftainship but it emerges from his theory that the modern and the conservative acknowledge association with chieftainship even though this might be in varying degrees. Ngwenya in Oomen sums up the fundamental value of chieftainship to the cultural fabric of abaPedi society when he writes that 'traditional leadership is our culture, you can't run away from it, even though it must change. It's like a branch where you have to slice away all the bark and buds until you are left with a new lean walking stick'.⁵ Ngwenya acknowledges both the inevitability of change which the chieftainship cannot escape in a dynamic society as well as its utilitarian spiritualism but argues that it owes its permanence to its indigenous element which is its core.

Terreblanche claims that it was Sir George Grey who first curtailed the authority of the Cape Nguni chiefs. He did this by both intervening directly in the structures of chieftainship and by undermining the social and material basis of their authority and power.⁶ This power base lay in the chiefs' rights to levy judicial fees and fines and receive gifts as the arbiters of amaXhosa law and custom.⁷ Bundy confirms that Grey believed it was essential to the furtherance of his policies to keep in check the power and influence of the 'haughty hereditary chiefs----the major barrier to his intentions'.⁸ Mamdani summarizes in a condemnatory tone, the outcome of Grey's exercise by saying that in this way 'the social prerequisite of a single legal order was established in a colonial settler society, these being 'appropriation of land, destruction of communal autonomy, and establishment of the freedom of the individual to become a wage worker'.⁹ It emerges from the above excerpt that stripping chieftaincy, a 'political form which recalls pre-colonial society' of its pre-colonial economic, social and political attributes was to effect a transfer of the centre of power from traditional leadership to the 'civilizing' agents of the capitalist world.¹⁰ It emerges from the above theories that the fate of chieftainship was not one of Grey's primary concerns. It was simply a master tool in his scheme and without it his political designs would not be realised. An important observation as to Grey's socio-economic *cum* political experiment is that the target of his targets, the 'warlike and treacherous chiefs'¹¹ were neither prospective allies and accomplices, nor weapons, but 'silent' victims. In his naivety, Grey aimed at transforming the society, for the best and for its benefit 'through [the chieftainship's?] dismemberment and dispersal.'¹² Grey's experiment yielded 'direct rule' which, Glaser also confirms, consisted in weakening the chiefs and in monopolising authority by white magistrates who were assisted by African headmen.¹³ Les Switzer reaffirms that 'the headmen, the main instruments of the colonial surveillance system in the Ciskei's rural African locations'¹⁴ were answerable to the resident magistrate who selected them and paid their salaries. The headmen kept the magistrates informed about any African perceived as a threat to the colonial order in the countryside.¹⁵

It is apparent from the above that a typical chief emerged from Grey's integrationist policies with only a nominal and 'passive' chieftainship, and thus had temporarily lost his legitimate birthright. This was in contrast to what Nyamnjoh had endorsed because it hinged on the substitution mechanism in its promotion of the ascendancy of the headmen. The 'divide and rule' principle that is manifest in the Grey's bureaucratic hierarchy of 'headman versus chief' does not seem to have threatened the cultural value of chieftainship that Comaroff has defined with regard to the baTswana Tshidi chieftaindom, that its subjects 'conceptualise the chiefship as the centre of their political universe. The chiefship defines the political community; without it, the body politic would cease to exist.'¹⁶ It also does not invalidate Oomen's meaning of 'legitimacy of traditional leaders – an acceptance of the right to rule of the authority concerned, and a compliance that is more or less voluntary.'¹⁷ It remains debatable, however, whether the 'silent' chieftainship of Grey's era conforms with Weber's political equation about the traditional authority which, while resting on a 'web of verbal interpretation concerning the links with the past and the present'¹⁸ also allows for a wide range of *de facto* social adjustments to occur at the same time that it sustains a sense of continuity with the past.¹⁹ To what extent then, did the Greyan brand of chieftainship reflect continuity from the past and adaptability to the changes that evolved with time? Or could it be simply regarded as a static symbol, incompatible with change? There is a sense in which Grey's chieftainship which had neither precedent nor was one itself was static even within its protective cocoon.

The late 19th century annexations of the Transkeian Territories dealt chieftainship a further blow, though the annexations were, in a sense, a testimony to the failure of Grey's mid-century politics because resistance to colonial intrusion continued. Even the subtle ultimatum of 'submit to absorption or succumb' had failed Grey's attempts to integrate Africans into the colonial economy. It must however be noted that in reality Grey's authority never extended as far as the Transkei or abaThembuland, except for Glen Grey.

In Natal the Shepstone–inspired system of governing Africans through chiefs and African customary law rather than the magistrate and colonial legislation was favoured. It was from this ‘indirect rule’-premise that Shepstone warned the Cape Commissioners of 1883 that the wisdom of keeping the ‘natives’ under their own law was to ensure control of them.²⁰ In her exposure of the indirect rule limitations Shula Marks subtly nullifies the Shepstonian stratagem. She suggests that indirect rule had complex shortcomings which tended to offset the government plans. Any chief whose services were needed by the Natal Government, Solomon kaDinizulu, for example, could always exploit the ambiguity of his position to his advantage: ‘in Zululand, as in colonial states all over Africa, the existence of a centralized kingdom offered both advantages and dangers. Once conquered, the successful co-option of the existing ruling class—one, moreover, accustomed to exacting tribute- could lighten the burdens of a hard-pressed and thinly-manned colonial service. At the same time, the king provided an alternative focus of power’²¹ for his Zulu subjects of old. The tradition of political and ideological hegemony which the amaZulu royal family had successfully established in the course of the 19th century was presumed to be poised to prop up the authority of the king, should it be revived.

In South African chieftainship of the 1920s there was more than one example of a case where chiefs or paramount chiefs found themselves in compromised situations because of the political climate of the times. Marks’s statement that the colonial authorities were often compelled to pursue a course of ambiguity for fear that if they did not the outcome might be counterproductive, appropriately addresses the diverse cases : ‘Everywhere in Africa at this time, British colonial authorities were handling traditional authorities with far greater subtlety than at the turn of the century.’²² In certain instances the chiefs concerned adopted ambiguity for the sake of currying political favour with the colonial authorities at their wards’ expense.

It was probably the government orchestrated political weakness of the post-annexation chieftainship which made it receptive to the third mechanism of local government. This was the Council System, heralded by the Glen Grey Act of 1894. The council system of

government culminated in a federation of the various district councils to form the *Bhunga* (United Transkeian Territories General Council-UTTGC) in 1931.²³ Hammond-Tooke categorically states that the general council system was explicitly designed to encourage non-traditional leadership to participate in local affairs.²⁴ Such a system then, marginalised the chiefs. It must be noted, however, that the *Bhunga* was largely, in Mayer's words, a 'talking-shop' which deliberated on, and passed, ineffective resolutions. Administration still remained in the hands of the magistrates who continued to rule through the headmen, some of whom were chiefs in their subjects' eyes²⁵. Beinart endorses this view in his claim that after annexation the magistrates were to rule through government-appointed headmen - except for a few paramount chiefs who were allowed to exercise limited influence.²⁶ The lack of uniformity in the application of legislation often placed the beneficiaries in ambiguous positions which in certain cases cost them the wholehearted support of their peers and/or subjects. At the same time the ironic implosion of Grey's 'civilising' experiment was already in the early 20th century nurturing an Africanist thinking in favour of the revival of chieftaincy. The gradual imposition of progressive 'commoner headmen' on traditionalist communities, especially around Butterworth and related amaMfengu areas, speeded up the reversal of land imbalances and the restoration of communal rights. Nominal rather than indigenous chieftaincy suddenly became a preferred 'alternative to puppet headmen and councils under the direct control of the administration'.²⁷

Against this background must be understood the dilemma of some chiefs who saw in the Africanist-popular movements prospects for the restoration of their effective royal titles, yet at the same time they were unsure of the political correctness of unshackling themselves from their government-ordained 'inactivity'. Tile's crusade against colonial inroads and Dalindyebo's indecisiveness provide a relevant example here, as will be shown below. It is likely that, that turbulence prompted whites to rethink the question of goal-driven rural governance and thus the passage of the 1920 Native Affairs Act could have been regarded as an answer to the resuscitation of tribal bonds.²⁸ It was significant that the act introduced a uniform system of rural local government based on

the district council model in all former reserves²⁹ though in the end only Ciskei adopted the Transkei's model of the General Council.³⁰

It was the passage of the Native Administration Act of 1927, described by Evans as a 'watershed event in the course of Native Administration'³¹, which in its consolidation of the colonial policy of indirect rule in the 'native reserves' advanced to a greater degree the influence and power of the Department of Native Affairs (NAD). Significantly, the Act revived African customary law as a means of maintaining state authority over the disintegrating African society in the reserves as well as of controlling the rate of proletarianisation.³² Harries has referred to the erosion of chieftaincy in some Transvaal areas during the 1930s, and subsequently confirmed that people looked to other political institutions for leadership, focusing their interest on the institutions that were led by the rising petty bourgeoisie. He has singled out Zoutpansberg as one such area where the Native Commissioners were unanimously opposed to the detribalisation process on the grounds that chiefs 'were of great assistance in maintaining law and order.'³³ He claims that the South African War Office had, in 1905, articulated its concerns about the need to sustain chiefly authority as a way of checking its possible replacement by a wider and more unified political consciousness:

The breakdown of the chieftaincy system does not seem altogether desirable, for a general fusion of the hitherto antagonistic tribes would then be possible and this would constitute a far greater danger to the white community than is to be apprehended from any of the present tribes.³⁴

Ethnologists and evolutionist anthropologists, such as Henri-Alexandre Junod, also bought into the idea of retaining chiefly control as a way of arresting the proletarianization of the African population. Edgar Brookes, described by Harries as 'a liberal segregationist', also supported the creation of reserves in which Africans could 'develop along their own lines and under their own chiefs'.³⁵ In the same context must be understood the historical significance of Jack and Ray Simons's remark with regard to the National Party's objectives about the governance of the reserves. They confirmed Hertzog and Smuts's endorsement of the chiefs' empowerment when they condemned the neglect of tribal law by previous governments as well as the undermining of the chiefs' authority, thus inevitably depriving them of the power of restraining their young

men.³⁶ Hull has given credibility to the above claim by drawing examples from Kenya and Zimbabwe. There colonial authorities hoped to neutralise African nationalism by appealing to ethnic feelings while bolstering the traditional local authorities.³⁷ Beinart has also highlighted the threat that national political (extra-parliamentary) organisations posed to the government as another reason to empower chiefs so as to minimise the influence of such organisations.³⁸ Hull further claims that in the 1930s the method of direct rule was replaced by indirect rule which gave greater responsibility to the chiefs.³⁹ It clearly emerges from the above that the government's patronage of chieftainship in South Africa, with comparative examples elsewhere in Africa, was a mere token, for in reality the institution had become a self-destructing instrument after being coerced or manipulated by the various governments for their specific purposes.

Whilst the government's initiatives to thwart the ideas that were conducive to the development of popular chieftaincy did not always succeed, it must be conceded that the incompatibility of class interests sometimes worked in the government's favour. The 1927 Act effectively restored chiefs to their former power in the reserves, albeit operating under the 'Chief of Chiefs'.⁴⁰ Dubow appropriately describes the act as 'this throwback to the Shepstonian system of nineteenth century Natal [which] effectively granted the NAD unrestricted powers to govern the reserves by proclamations'.⁴¹ Dubow seems to suggest that to a certain extent the Act drew from previous colonial legislations. Evans confirms that the act leaned heavily in the direction of Natal's 'tribalist' model in its styling of the Minister of Native Affairs (MNA) as the Supreme Chief of all 'Natives' throughout the Union and also where it permitted the minister to devolve his vast powers to any administrative official.⁴² This again was evidence that the repugnant parts of customary law had been removed and the autonomic law distorted in the name of 'enlightened politics'⁴³ in order to realise the government's objective of inventing 'official customary law'. The significance of the 'Chief of Chiefs' clause was that such an important official would in time be superseded by his Bantustan counterpart. The implication here is that the new governors-general would be vested with the absolute power of disposal in respect of offences or acts of misconduct committed by anyone subordinate to the homeland presidents and their cabinet staff. It

becomes apparent that the 1927 Native Administration Act had visibly begun the process of co-opting chiefs as partners, thereby marking a departure from Sir George Grey's earlier scheme which had portrayed and treated them as condemned warmongers who were unworthy of chiefly office.

Mqoke argues that there was no real active participation by Blacks in the administration of local affairs between 1894 and 1951 except in the council systems and in the restoration of civil and criminal jurisdiction of the chief's court.⁴⁴ Against this background Mayer noted a major change in the system of local government in the reserves in the mid 20th century, in essence a change from direct rule to indirect rule as 'henceforth local administration was to be based on the tribal authorities headed by the chiefs'.⁴⁵ Mayer's statement must be understood in the context of Beinart's claim that in the early 1950s the Nationalist government sought to bolster and further increase the power of chiefs through the Bantu Authorities programme. The observation made here is that, whereas in direct rule the headmen exercised the chiefs' prerogative by the 'grace of the government's white magistrate', in indirect rule the chiefs' authority was to be restored to the gratification of their constituencies but under the guidance of the Governor-in-Council.

Ntsebeza has reinforced Hammond-Tooke's argument that the chiefs had gained in popularity during their 'do-nothing-period'. His argument also raises questions about some of the factors that informed the government's sudden decision to enlist the services of 'natural leaders' and dispose of the 'government's servants', the headmen: the erstwhile dispensers of unpopular orders who had earned the peasants' resentment. It appeared politically expedient to make use of the chiefs and their culturally legitimated authority rather than that of the headmen. This exercise would undoubtedly bring amenable chiefs closer to the bureaucratic hierarchy and also enable the government to control, through them, the rural communities in whose eyes the chiefs 'had the legitimacy which the newer authorities could not have'.⁴⁶ Costa's apparent identification of the limitation of traditional institutions in the colonial state's transformation of chieftainship into an intermediate administrative institution⁴⁷ exposes its intentions to

'abuse' chieftainship to promote its political interests. His upholding of both Sklar and Skalnik's argument that chieftaincy 'could provide the bedrock upon which to construct new mixed governance structures since chiefs serve as custodians of and advocates for the interests of local communities within the broader political structure',⁴⁸ also confirms the pliability and vulnerability of the chiefs.

According to Edwin Ritchken mid-20th century rural resistance was characterised 'by the creation of a number of seemingly anomalous alliances between various social forces, including traditional leaders such as paramount and ordinary chiefs, top Bantustan government bureaucrats, tribal authority councillors, traders and businesspeople, civil servants, landowners, migrants, women and the youth'.⁴⁹ This reinforces the idea that drawing the chiefs closer to the populace was aimed, inter alia, at preventing their rural constituencies from joining the radical fold. In so far as the new chieftaincy was a primary agency for community development, it was a modernised instrument. Oomen's statement that the 'Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 envisaged traditional leaders as embedded in Tribal Authorities, who would assist and guide the chief in the administration of the affairs of the tribe, and in the performance of his other functions',⁵⁰ endows the tribal authorities with legitimating powers. The question that arises here is of the capacity of the tribal authorities, the legitimacy of whose constitution had not been tested and proven, to legitimate the right of any one natural chief to rule.

What also transpires here is that the tribal authorities symbolised the core feature of the BAA, one that was to sustain the chieftainship it had authorised. In this context the tribal authority was a 'transforming *cum* corrupting' tool because the chieftainship it legitimated was 'official' rather than indigenous. This then was a distorted chieftainship which was neither completely traditional nor completely modern. Ritchken reiterates the above sentiment in his assertion that 'the implementation of the Bantu Authorities' system in the 1950s and early 1960s transformed chiefs into paid bureaucrats'.⁵¹ Mayer's argument that the salaried chiefs stood to gain in power and wealth and lose in influence and prestige, resulting in a weakening rather than a strengthening of the

position of the chief, seems valid. In many cases, however, such chiefs always emerged stronger even without the popular support because their positions were propped up by their patrons. Comments by isolated red-blanketed individuals in Mayer, to the effect that 'when chiefs are paid by the government it is sure to be bad. They will be the yes-men of the Europeans, and they will be harsh to us because they have the European government on their side', ⁵² is evidence that the rural communities eyed with distrust the chiefs not longer dependent upon their support as they had become government lackeys, which meant that they no longer served as a 'checks and balances' mechanism on the chiefs' *modus operandi*. This radical brand of indirect rule by chiefs was particularly acceptable to the educated individuals who were attracted by the political package it promised.⁵³ The divisive aspect of the Act is shown by the diverse responses it elicited.

The fact that the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was also intended as a means to co-opt the conservative rural elite and drive a wedge between them and the more militant black urban intelligentsia⁵⁴ generates questions about the 'purposive' chieftainship that was being rebuilt. The question of survival of chieftainship as an institution against the background of its having been rebuilt on the principle of dividing it from a section of its constituency creates ground for further debate. Beinart's reference to chiefs who initially did not commit to the government's scheme but later succumbed to overbearing pressure suggests that the BAA chieftainship neither reflected 'people's spirit' nor was responsive to it. Costa's perspective that 'chiefs often availed their services to both the colonial and post-colonial despotic State, thereby betraying their responsibility to their communities'⁵⁵ gives credibility to the above argument. It was a suitable tool at the disposal of individuals who would use it to serve their own and their patrons' interests. Nyamnjoh has referred to the revolutionary theorists' critique of chieftaincy on the basis that it was 'appropriated or created by colonial, apartheid and postcolonial states for various purposes, including repression and the confection of bifurcation into 'citizens' and 'subjects' '.⁵⁶ In that respect, and also because it had the potential to deconstruct and decentralise in its operational process, it ceased to be a national institution. That the chieftainship introduced by the BAA self-destructed is an

indictment of the Hertzog's National Party/Labour Party coalition government's passage of the Native Administration Act of 1927. The unlimited authority that was vested in the governor-general in terms of Act No.38 of 1927 later filtered through to the prime ministers and presidents to become an instrument of power that caused havoc in the South African chieftaincies.

Ritchken reiterates that the creation of Bantustans added a new dimension to the disintegration of traditional structures because it facilitated the formation of a bureaucratic elite. A factor of great significance is that the new class counted among its ranks chiefs, councillors, elected legislative assembly members and relatively well-educated technocrats who filled positions in the regional administrations. As to the chiefs, their exposure to new networks of patronage that had been opened by the Bantustan government within rural elites diminished their accountability at the local government level. Costa's reference to 'Higher-level chiefs' who built networks of patronage, through influence and/or control of appointments of their subordinates⁵⁷ complements Ritchken's argument. His view is that some chiefs failed to support the nationalist movement for fear of losing their lucrative positions while those who resisted colonialism and apartheid and colonial policies that subverted the interests of their communities were killed, jailed, or demoted for their political standpoints. This, he claims, exposes the governments' overbearing hegemony which was exhibited in its divide and rule policy. Costa proposes in this regard a comparative case of the exile of Kabaka of Buganda in 1953 who had defied a British governor. This is not to condone the collaborative stance of some chiefs, which is the argument that Holomisa seems to uphold in his statement that 'if the chiefs betrayed their responsibility to their communities by collaborating with the State, then the State was at the center of the problem.'⁵⁸ The dilemma of the chiefs was that whilst exclusion from networks entailed exclusion from resources, their diminishing role in local matters created a political vacuum which made their position appear ambiguous.

The extent to which the introduction of Bantu Authorities in the 1950s changed the system of government that had prevailed before remains a key question. Whilst a lot of

literature seems to suggest that chiefs were more oppressive than headmen, this does not seem to have been the case in the Transkei. Chiefs and headmen in the Transkei were pretty much the same people and the changeover to Bantu Authorities did not make a big difference to the ordinary person. It was in the way in which the chiefs related to each other that the BAA made a really big difference. Whereas all headmen were equal under the magistrate, and the paramount chiefs had very little direct responsibilities, the Bantu Authorities created hierarchies of status, as between paramount chiefs, heads of Tribal Authorities and ordinary headmen. It was the battle over status that in some cases sharpened the contest between legitimate and aspiring paramounts.

The second important change is that the chiefs acquired a higher profile vis-à-vis the apartheid state. The Apartheid or the Bantustan system needed and depended on chiefly support to boost its legitimacy. The rewards to co-operative chiefs were much greater than ever before, while punishment for non-cooperation was much harsher than ever before. The principal chiefs were therefore forced to commit themselves, such commitment being of great political importance. Both collaborators and non-collaborators could be found among the abaThembu chiefs of the last decades of the nineteenth century, albeit that some such collaboration was induced rather than voluntary, as was the case of Aliva Dalindyebo.

The preceding paragraphs portray a general picture of the vicissitudes of chieftainship and the factors and forces that have been instrumental in moulding the institution. While some of the examples proffered above relate to chieftainship as an institution it must be noted that each chieftainship is in the end and to a greater extent shaped by the challenges that confront it and in this regard abaThembu chieftainship is no exception. Whilst the theories discussed above seem to apply in varying degrees to the abaThembu paramount chieftainship of the period under investigation the extent of the damage to its core cannot be measured with accuracy. This is because the institutional survival has been interrupted by periods of discontinuity which in turn is a setback to all evolutionary processes.

Not much has been published on the history of the abaThembu, compared with the material on the amaXhosa and amaMpondo. There are only two published sources by Africans, neither of whom is an mThembu. J.H. Soga included a chapter on the abaThembu in his *The South Eastern Bantu* (1930).⁵⁹ W.D. Cingo's *Ibali LabaThembu* [A History of abaThembu] (1927),⁶⁰ is a mere presentation of interesting facts about *abaThembu of the House of Bhomoyi*, its location and that of its subjects. It does not venture beyond 1920, the year that has been identified as a turning point in the history of abaThembu chieftainship. Further, Cingo's work is not a product of archival research. Yali-Manisi's praise poems *Izibongo zeenkosi ZamaXhosa*-Eulogies of amaXhosa Chiefs (1952)⁶¹ includes a section on abaThembu chiefs. However, such artistic and literary sources always need to be authenticated and supplemented.

Ella Wagenaar's 1988 Ph.D. thesis⁶² is concerned with a period before that under investigation, though it does give an invaluable background to the political activities of the 20th century abaThembu chiefs. Wagenaar's work gives a critical analysis of the circumstances which led to the breakaway of Matanzima from Ngangelizwe in 1865. Joan Broster's *The Thembu* (1976),⁶³ deals exclusively with cultural aspects, especially beadwork. William Beinart and Colin Bundy in *Hidden struggles in rural South Africa* (1987)⁶⁴ only allude in passing to abaThembu history in the context where territorial legislation affected Transkeian Territories at large and (minimally) of the involvement of abaThembu in popular rural struggles, and do not deal with the survival of the abaThembu chieftainship between 1920 and 1980. Beinart's *The political economy of Pondoland 1860-1930* (1982)⁶⁵ and his *Twentieth-century South Africa* contain little on the abaThembu. Touching on the pre-colonial status of chieftainship in his *Twentieth-century South Africa*,⁶⁶ he alludes to the fact that the size and shape of African chiefdoms was not static, and further, that their localised responses to colonial encroachments were inevitably characterised by a lack of unanimity on the methods to be adopted. The only time he refers specifically to abaThembu chieftainship is in the context of K.D. Matanzima's involvement in the events leading to the granting, in 1963, of self-government to the Transkei, 'the flagship of homeland experiment.'

A Claassens and B. Cousins in *Land, Power & Custom* (2008)⁶⁷ deal largely with the diminishing role of chiefs in land administrative matters rather than with specific chieftainships. While their work contains a subtle warning to the would-be patrons of chiefly authority, it could well serve as a springboard for the study of abaThembu chieftainship. This is particularly so where land is a factor that is used to upgrade a chieftainship to give it corresponding jurisdiction. Land is thus used as the rationale for decentralizing a paramountcy, to the neglect and disregard of custom.

The advent of 'independence' for the Transkei, in which abaThembu politics of chieftainship played an important part, resulted in an upsurge in literature which touched on Thembu history without ever trying to understand chieftainship in terms of its own dynamics and those issues that directly affected it. W. Hammond-Tooke gives a reliable genealogical history of the abaThembu from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century in his *Tribes of Umtata district*. The fact that he highlights the universal paramountcy of Dalindyebo in abaThembuland is of great significance to the subject under investigation: he wrote that 'each one of the abaThembu clusters was under its own chief and was practically independent except that they, individually, recognized Dalindyebo as king'.⁶⁸ In his *Command or consensus*⁶⁹ Hammond-Tooke does not specifically deal with chieftainship, but his outline of the ascendancy of headmen over hereditary chiefs does include abaThembu chiefs. Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell Stultz in *South Africa's Transkei*⁷⁰ explore the mutual relationship between the apartheid and the Bantustan regimes and though they do not analyse the impact of homeland politics on abaThembu chieftainship, they particularly mention K.D. Matanzima as a visible Transkei spokesperson. Patrick Laurence succeeds in portraying K.D. Matanzima as a major facilitator in Pretoria's excision of the Transkei Bantustan.⁷¹ His account of events inevitably exposes the 'superficial' and, perhaps popularly acceptable, basis for Sabata's opposition to Pretoria's designs, and thus his parting of the ways with Matanzima, but that is only one aspect of the story of abaThembu chieftainship. Laurence's work does not cover the socio-political context within which Sabata operated which was bound to have an impact on his thought processes.

Ivan Evans makes reference to specific abaThembu chiefs in *Bureaucracy and race*,⁷² but only in so far as they were factors in the evolution of native administration in the Transkeian Territories. K.D. Matanzima's liberal use of the provisions of the Native Administration Act of 1927 later in the 20th century to harass and banish those he perceived as political opponents⁷³ is a relevant example here. Whilst the sour relationship between Matanzima and Sabata make them important factors in Evans's work, he focuses more on how the apartheid Government allowed the indigenous governance to be 'bastardised' or 'vulgarised' in the hands of collaborators of Matanzima's type.

Randolph Vigne has,⁷⁴ written about the varying fortunes in the political activity of the Liberal Party (LP) in the Transkei. He refers to abaThembu chiefs only in so far as they impacted on, or were influenced by, the LP's political activities. He mentions Matanzima's condemnation of the LP whose activities were anathema to him. Vigne confirms that Matanzima's attitude was in stark contrast to Sabata's, whose association with the LP was based on common opposition to the Transkei's march to self-government.

Roger Southall⁷⁵ also refers to a few specific incidents that involved prominent abaThembu chiefs, when he writes about Transkei political debates and activities before self-government. In his portrayal of Transkei's road to self-government and eventual independence, he demonstrates that Matanzima and Sabata both used their party bases to fight over the abaThembu paramountcy. Newell Stultz in *Transkei's half loaf* only hints at the prejudicial implications of the Bantu Authorities Act (BAA) for Transkei chieftainships without analysing the long-term political significance of the implementation of BAA on them. Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed⁷⁶ relate how the Matanzima brothers became self-appointed spokesmen for the Transkei without having a popular mandate and in the process, with Pretoria's connivance, unilaterally subdivided the abaThembu paramount chieftainship into two uneven multi-tribal blocks. W. Bellwood briefly depicts Matanzima and Poto's jockeying for control of the Transkei⁷⁷

and Mayer alludes to abaThembu chieftainship⁷⁸ in the context of the elections preceding Transkei's self-government.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela's autobiography is a narrative of his life and times in abaThembuland and in South Africa at large. His description of the circumstances around the appointment of Jongintaba Dalindyebo as regent reveals that his work has an important bearing on the 20th century abaThembu chieftainship. Some of the factors that had discredited Jongintaba as regent in 1920 were simply ignored in 1928. Mandela highlights other considerations, like Jongintaba's education, which Gadla Mandela upholds as an empowering factor for the prospective regent.⁷⁹

Lungisile Ntsebeza and Sukude Matoti have written a chapter entitled 'Rural Resistance in Mpondoland and Thembuland, 1960-1963' in the first volume of *The Road To Democracy In South Africa* (2004). Lungisile Ntsebeza, Luvuyo Wotshela, Thembela Kepe and Sukude Matoti have also contributed a chapter on '*Resistance and Repression in the Bantustans*' in the second volume.⁸⁰ Their emphasis in the latter is on both the radicalism of popular resistance to the implementation of the Bantustan policy and the reactionary and repressive response it drew from the South African government. In the context of Pretoria's unleashing the homeland leaders onto a recalcitrant populace, Kaiser Matanzima is depicted as a self-appointed spokesperson for South Africa's political designs in the Transkei. While Matanzima's consolidation of tribal authorities was necessary for both self-government and eventual 'independence' to take shape, the main focus of the chapter is on the evolving political landscape in the homelands and Sabata's response to it in the 'independent' Transkei, and how this in turn affected his party's political activity and the abaThembu paramount chieftainship. The authors succeed in portraying Matanzima's bureaucratically-sustained role in manipulating the situation, and the destabilising effect this has on both the political activity of the opposition and Sabata's paramount chieftainship.

Ntsebeza's 2003 thesis⁸¹ is a critical discussion of the interaction of forces that were involved in the laborious resuscitation and/or evolution of chieftainship under the

abaThembu paramountcy in the Xhalanga District. Though his study does not touch on all factors involved in the changing faces of the total abaThembu chieftainship, Ntsebeza refers to instances of Sabata's efforts to thwart Matanzima's aspirations to a chieftainship of a higher status. Ntsebeza's subsequent book *Democracy compromised*⁸² is a portrayal of the contradiction inherent in nurturing chieftainship within the context of democratic structures in a democratic South Africa. He devotes sections of his study to the socio-economic and political forces that hindered and/or retarded the resuscitation of chieftainship in the Xhalanga District. The amaMfengu resistance to the establishment of tribal authorities, which they did not regard as complementary to their social class, was one such force which interfered with the smooth implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act. On the other hand, Matanzima's initiative in facilitating the establishment of tribal authorities in Xhalanga made Sabata feel insecure, for he regarded the action taken by Matanzima as his prerogative. Against this setting, Ntsebeza contextualises the exacerbation of the ongoing power struggle between Sabata and Matanzima.

Shula Marks in her *The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa*,⁸³ depicts the dilemmas that confronted both the state and the individual in its interaction with King Solomon Dinizulu, John Dube, George Champion and, later, KwaZulu's controversial Bantustan leader, Buthelezi, whom she appropriately describes as a man who 'embodies in his contradictory position all the ambiguities of a Solomon, a Dube, a Champion'.⁸⁴ At the same time the government had strategically to forestall a threat of a confrontation with a united front. Marks's discussion of the 'politics of tightrope' is relevant to the narrative of the abaThembu chieftainship. This is, in itself, a narrative of dependence and of ambiguities that accompanied the various pieces of legislation, as much as one of interaction with forces that threatened to complicate relationships with the South African government.

Nicholas Cope in his *To Bind The Nation ; Solomon ka Dinizulu and Zulu Nation 1913-1933* has written about the role of the *successive Zulu monarchs* to colonial intrusion

and imperial forces. Though certain aspects of his work could be said to have parallels in the subject under investigation his focus is strictly on the vicissitudes of the Zulu monarchs. He highlights the fact that contemporary Zulu monarchs have demonstrated visible preference for politics of compromise above those of activism.⁸⁵

Machobane in his *Government And Change in Lesotho 1800 -1966 A Study of Political Institutions* gives an overview of the politics surrounding the accession of Prince Bereng as Moshoeshoe 11 after the death of Paramount Chief Seeiso Griffith on 26 December 1940. The role of Leabua Jonathan, previously perceived as a political nonentity but later revealing himself as a cunning and devastating politician, makes him a subject of comparison with K.D. Matanzima. Both men are portrayed resorting to secular positions and employing executive powers to bar or oust legitimate incumbents from their positions. Machobane's book is, however, exclusively a history of Lesotho chieftaincy which merely presents a parallel in the Jonathan and Chieftainess Regent Mantsebo versus Matanzima and Sabata case.⁸⁶

In a chapter entitled 'Chieftaincy and the concept of articulation : South Africa circa 1900-50',⁸⁷ Beinart shows how chieftainship during the apartheid era, in which the compliant chiefs were active participants, was a creation of the state. His reference to the government's strategy of increasing the power of the chiefs through the Bantu Authorities Act has a direct bearing on this study, because abaThembu chiefs responded variously to the act, and this, in effect, created division among them.

Barbara Oomen's book *Chiefs in South Africa* (2005)⁸⁸ deals mostly with the issues of late twentieth century chieftainship. Its relevance to this study is in its interrogation of issues that relate to comparative studies on chieftainship and other factors that conferred status on otherwise junior traditional leaders during the apartheid era. Mahmood Mamdani's exposition⁸⁹ of the politics of decentralised despotism and indirect rule also relates to the study of the abaThembu chieftainship, for abaThembu chiefs during the period under investigation operated under the rule of the Governor-General. Mamdani writes that under apartheid 'the administrative powers of the chief were

systematically strengthened but were made accountable to a new consensus, one that emphasized the state as the determiner of the consensus'.⁹⁰ Mamdani sees apartheid as a form of 'full-blown' indirect rule and this makes his work relevant to this study because apartheid provided a conducive political context for the moulding of abaThembu chieftainship.

In his 1989 thesis,⁹¹ Rulashe mentions the abaThembu only in the context of a wrangle that affected the Zweledinga community in the Whittlesea district, while that of Marala entitled 'Investigation into the Transkei's position as a sovereign independent state'⁹² is an examination of the criteria for sovereign statehood in the Transkeian polity rather than a study of abaThembu chieftainship.

Harold Scheub, Ruth Finnegan and Ngwabi Bhebe have all produced convincing testimonies on the role of oral histories as essential sources in the historical writing. But neither Scheub's book *The uncoiling python ; South African Storytellers and resistance*⁹³ nor Finnegan's *The Oral and beyond; doing things with words in Africa*⁹⁴ as well as Bhebe edited *Oral tradition in Southern Africa*⁹⁵ shed specific light on the subject under investigation.

In an unpublished manuscript, 'Out of court: the memoirs of a Black lawyer in apartheid South Africa 1950-1960', Wycliff Tsotsi characterises the harsh methods employed by K. D. Matanzima when he implemented the Bantu Authorities Act in those locations of Emigrant abaThembuland where there was resistance to it. Chief Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra's unpublished manuscript 'UKumkani USabata Dalindyabo Ah! Jonguhlanga!'⁹⁶ is a rather disjointed account of a few incidents that relate to Sabata's youth and later political life.

Only a few works, then, touch on the central question which this study seeks to address, namely a critical analysis of the forces that impacted and shaped the paramount

chieftainship of abaThembuland over a period of six decades from 1920. These works include Lungisile Ntsebeza's *Democracy compromised* (2006,) which addresses aspects of the Xhalanga phase of the power struggle between Sabata and Matanzima , and Lungisile Ntsebeza and Mcebisi Ndletyana's brief biography of 'Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo'.⁹⁷ which exposes interesting aspects of Sabata's youth and later political life. Both briefly portray some of Sabata's political experiences in the land of his birth, his subsequent death in exile and his double burial in abaThembuland.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This thesis deals with aspects of the history of the abaThembu paramount chieftainship between 1920 and 1980. It focuses on successive paramount chiefs, and the changing contexts in which they operated. Reference to other parties is made only in so far as they interacted with, impacted on, and even influenced, the development of events in the abaThembu chieftainship of the period.

The study begins by interrogating the paramount chieftainship of the Dalindyebo era in order to identify and scrutinise the bureaucratic and socio-political baggage it bequeathed to the evolving profile of the abaThembu chieftainship. It thus examines the impact of inconsistent customary procedures and anomalous practices on the operation of the chiefdom. Successive abaThembuland regencies and the legacy that they left for Sabata are studied. Such an investigation of chieftainship will identify the factors and forces, both external and internal, which impacted on and destabilised the chieftainship's institutional fabric. It further seeks to establish which of the shortcomings and inherent weaknesses of the abaThembu paramountcy were beyond the capacity and the control of customary structures. This makes it necessary to investigate phases of instability between 1920 and 1980. The provisions of the 1927 Native Administration Act will also be examined in order to shed light on whether or not it departed from the 1920 Native Affairs Act, and to determine how far its functionality influenced the passing of the Bantu Authorities Act.

Another objective is to compare and contrast the political philosophy and outlook of Sabata and Matanzima and analyse the significance of their perspectives on life for the future of the chieftainship. Did they influence each other's responses to the BAA, and inadvertently, for different motives and goals, help shape the other's actions? This will inevitably be linked to the 'budding' Matanzima paramountcy as well as the jockeying between Matanzima and Poto for the domination of the Transkei's political arena prior to its self-government. Also analysed are events beginning with the arrest, trial and deposition of Sabata, as well as the circumstances around the creation of a new line of rulers in the house of Paramount Chief Jongilizwe Dalindyebo. The abaThembu chieftainship during Sabata's exile will only briefly be touched upon. In conclusion, the study will attempt to establish the extent to which Sabata was, in relation to the abaThembu chieftaincy, symbolizing the end of the traditionalist struggle and the beginning of a new one, that of nationalism.

METHODOLOGY

A variety of sources was used in the research process. Archival material held in the government archives located in Cape Town, Pretoria, Bisho and Mthatha includes the correspondence between the Department of Native Affairs and the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories; letters from the Chief Magistrate of King William's Town; correspondence from the various magisterial districts of the Transkei and Ciskei which dealt with abaThembu affairs; files dealing with Transkei chieftainships and correspondence from the office of the Under Secretary for Native Affairs. Reports of government commissions into abaThembu affairs also fall under this category. Reports of various select committees on native bills; various government memoranda; reports and diaries of native commissioners; resident magistrate office records; records of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei; government publications such as those of the United Transkeian Territories General Council and a wide variety of newspapers are available for the first half of the twentieth century. Reports of more general government commissions (the Native Affairs Commission of 1921; the Fagan Commission of 1948 and the Tomlinson Commission of 1955; The Nhlapo Commission of 2003), newspapers and relevant journals on contemporary African studies have also been

utilised. The Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape proved to be a valuable repository of a wide variety of secondary sources on the history of the Transkei. The Centre's newspaper cuttings cover both the Transkei's pre-and post-independence eras.

Fieldwork and oral research were essential in all stages of this study. Interviews were a vital component of this project even though they were sometimes very difficult to authenticate and verify. Members of the abaThembu royal family from both the Dalindyebo region and its western counterpart were interviewed. Those interviewed included the customary uncles to the 20th century generation of abaThembu kings and chiefs, namely the Joyi brothers (Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene and their cousin Anderson Delagubhe Joyi) descended from the Great House of Ngubengcuka through Shweni. They were asked questions relating to the general abaThembu history of the early 20th century as well as their personal experiences as opponents of the Bantu Authorities Act. Bangilizwe Joyi shed further light on his activities as a member of the 'Joyi gang' (King Sabata's advisers), and on the events leading to their banishment while Anderson explained his role in the resistance to the self-government and eventual Bantustan status of the Transkei. He also tried to elucidate the factors that were involved in his appointment as acting King of the abaThembu just before and after King Sabata's reburial. Pumeza Joyi-Notununu, Bangilizwe's daughter who is passionate about chieftainship, was a valuable informant. Interviews, in some cases, yielded more than was expected. They are a source that can never be exhausted because sometimes a single interview opens possibilities for others. Although not all the information desired was got from interviewing sessions, most of the people identified as key informants on this subject yielded useful material.

The historically informed remnants of the Mandela (excluding Rolihlahla, whom it was not possible to meet) and Mbekeni families (including the now late Dr W. Kheyzana Mbekeni), descended from the junior house of Ngubengcuka, were asked questions about the death of King Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe and the criteria used in the nomination of a regent during his heir's minority. Mbekeni's input was particularly important

because he had personal experience of both Dalindyebo and Sampu Jongilizwe, though he was sceptical of Matanzima's power-hungry tactics. Rev J.E.B. Ndungane (now deceased) shared his experiences with Jongilizwe Dalindyebo in the initiation school. The living members of King Sabata's immediate family including his great wife, NoMoscow, and son, King Zwelibanzi (Buyelekhaya) Jonguhlanga, and Patrick Dalindyebo were able to clarify the circumstances surrounding the first burial of their husband and father. Nopenge Mgolombane, Sabata's sister from NoKapa Jongilizwe (now resident at Ncise) was asked questions relating to her father's schooling, his role as paramount chief and his last days.

The descendants of the House of Mvelase (T. M. Mbambisa, a Transkei Qhudeni mThembu who was named after the retainer of the Great House of Mthembu), M. Mpahlwa, M. Dlulane, B.B. Maphosa and elderly remnants of the Mangisa Family were eager to answer questions relating to their co-existence in the Transkei alongside their politically 'senior' cousins from the junior house of their common ancestor mThembu. Ngangomhlaba Matanzima was, and is, an important oral informant because even though he belongs with the old order of abaThembu chiefs he has lived to see the chieftainship of the new era, and is actively involved in the efforts to get the government to accord the *amakhosi* better recognition and more administrative responsibility. T. Tshunungwa (now deceased) revealed another dimension concerning Matanzima's unauthorised incorporation of the land of amaTshatshu baThembu in order to have his chieftainship elevated at their expense which, Tshunungwa argued, had as good a claim. Other contemporary chiefs from the Mgudlwa family and the co-operative bureaucratic chiefs were also interviewed. Chief Jonginyaniso Mthikakra of Tyhalara was an important interviewee because of his personal experience of most of the events referred to in the study. Mda kaMda's knowledge of matters of chieftainship and his interaction with Sabata has made him an invaluable informant. Major General Bantubonke Holomisa, who was head of Transkei at the time of the reburial of Sabata and is a mThembu subject, proved to be an indispensable informant in the compilation of this narrative. He provided much information on the initiatives and subsequent

consultations that took place between his office and the elders of the abaThembu clan before the exhumation and reburial of King Sabata's remains.

Other informants who have contributed in no small measure to this study are Nobantu Gobodo, H. M Tsengiwe, B. Mkumatela and Mandlakazi Jama (née Nonkonyane) as well as Wandile Kuse and his sister Nohayinje (Hygienia). They shed light, inter alia, particularly on the diverse responses of the Xhalanga people to the installation of community and/ or tribal authorities. Nomqondiso Malotana from Gqebenya Location (Lady Frere) also reported on the conditions that governed land holding in the Glen Grey District.

CHAPTERS

Chapter One discusses the socio-political state of abaThembu chieftainship from about 1920 until the death of Dalindyebo's heir in 1928. It analyses the forces that sustained abaThembu paramountcy during this period.

The second chapter interrogates the successive regencies of Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi to determine if, and how, the twenty-five year period from 1928 to 1954 secured or weakened the Dalindyebo paramountcy.

Chapter Three discusses the advent of the Bantu Authorities Act in abaThembuland in the 1950s. It also explains how the diverse responses to the implementation of the Act created fertile ground for the triumph of the forces that tampered with abaThembu unity.

The fourth chapter describes how socio-political and economic factors retarded or facilitated the revival of tribal authorities in the districts of Xhalanga and Glen Grey. It also shows how Matanzima presumptuously used the resuscitation of authorities as a base for the BAA to undermine the abaThembu paramountcy and to outwit Sabata.

Chapter Five analyses the aspects of the rivalry and jockeying for the control of abaThembuland between Sabata and Matanzima. It also portrays Transkei's attainment

of self-government as testimony to Sabata's first loss in his series of political battles with Matanzima. The chapter also presents the conferment of paramountcy on Matanzima as an event that ratified both the geographic and the political division of the abaThembu chieftainship. It is argued that the simultaneous operation of the two paramountcies pushed Sabata into fighting for the undoing of the decentralisation of his paramountcy.

Matanzima on the other hand utilised his state office, supported by his bureaucratic paramountcy, to push through Transkei's independence. This would enable him to silence the opposition from a position of power and thus methodically isolate Sabata.

Chapter Six focuses on the practical implications of the division reflected in the demise of Sabata dynasty and the simultaneous invention of the Bambilanga line of rulers, all in the House of Jongilizwe. It is argued that Matanzima's creation of the Bambilanga paramountcy implied a hierarchical gap between the two, and that this automatically conferred seniority on the Matanzima's paramountcy, as the office of the kingmaker.

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CHAPTER ONE

FROM DALINDYEBO TO JONGILIZWE c. 1920-1928.

INTRODUCTION

The abaThembu chieftainship has, over a period of almost two centuries changed cyclically. The evolutionary pattern reflected in the above process has made the subject of chieftainship an attribute of the pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and democratic eras. The abaThembu chieftainship throughout its history, has been naturally subjected to indigenous law and, subsequently, to various forms of what Sanders has described as 'distorted autonomic customary law.'¹ The contemporary abaThembu chieftainship has clearly outlived the colonial and apartheid regimes. Its survival has made imperative the analysis of the catalytic effect of the external forces on the internal processes of the subject chieftainship to determine the impact of the interactive operations on the historical institution.

This chapter discusses the image that the abaThembu chieftainship presented around 1920, and the extent to which its attributes were sustainable beyond the Dalindyebo era. It will be argued that Dalindyebo's rule reflected the 'benevolent paternalism----and purposive bureaucracy'² which according to Dubow was the government's ultimate goal with regard to chieftainship. The focus here is on how the political environment that prevailed during Dalindyebo's rule and the social and political situation within the abaThembu kingdom influenced and facilitated his modus operandi. The chapter also analyses Dalindyebo's legacy as is reflected in the transition from his paramountcy to the accession of his heir, Sampu Jongilizwe, in 1924. The chapter thus interrogates the ways in which the stability of the abaThembu paramountcy was nurtured during the Dalindyebo era and whether any measures were put in place to sustain it afterwards. Finally, the chapter examines the highlights of Jongilizwe's brief reign and the extent to which his term effected continuity following Dalindyebo's rule.

ABATHEMBULAND DURING DALINDYEBO'S PARAMOUNTCY

Dalindyebo was born into a kingdom that had long lost its political coherence as a result of a breakaway of his clan's founding ancestor, Bhomoyi, from Mvelase, the heir of Mthembu.³ This first recorded split took place in Northern Nguni territory. Bhomoyi's amaDlomo cluster eventually became assimilated into the Southern abeNguni unit, where they established themselves as a great house in their own right. E. J. Warner, a government agent with the Emigrant abaThembu,⁴ and J.G. Strijdom, the South African Prime Minister,⁵ have provided mutually corroborative testimonies about the establishment of Emigrant abaThembuland in 1865.⁶ Strijdom acknowledged that the colonial government was instrumental in the creation of the semi-independent chieftainship of the Emigrant abaThembu, under Rhaxothi Matanzima, claiming that:

These sections of the Thembu tribe thereafter regarded themselves as independent of the main body of the Thembu tribe, although they always acknowledged that the heir to the Great House was their senior, and therefore the paramount chief of all the Thembu.⁷

Dalindyebo was therefore destined to rule abaThembuland which, though contiguous, was not really politically consolidated. Furthermore, the colonial annexation of the abaThembu polity which coincided with his accession in 1885 implied the demise of that kingdom's genuine political independence. Dalindyebo was, however, still at the apex of chieftainship in a politico-traditional context, even though his paramountcy was inferior as a result of colonial meddling. The Department of Native Affairs's Secretary (SNA) spelled out Dalindyebo's nominal paramountcy in a letter wherein he warned against Dalindyebo being addressed as a 'paramount chief' as that title applied exclusively to the government.⁸ In this directive one senses an example of what Sanders has described as capturing custom and tearing it from its folk roots⁹ while also distorting autonomic law in the name of 'enlightened politics'.¹⁰ The bureaucratic instruction not to address Dalindyebo as king or paramount chief conformed to the dispensation with regard to the chiefs that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. The prestige and status he embodied as a paramount chief was demeaned once his title was downgraded: a move surely taken to strengthen the government's position and to entrench its prerogative to invent customary law.

Dalindyebo presented an interesting comparison with his predecessor, King Ngangelizwe, whose activities and experiences showed that his embrace of colonial law came about as a result of induced compliance. The induced consent brought forth benefits like the house that the government built for Ngangelizwe on the site of the Wellington Prison in Mthatha. A home in Mthatha gave Dalindyebo an invaluable opportunity to attend St John's Missionary School.¹¹ This arrangement also enabled the authorities to keep an eye on the activities of their wards, especially the major beneficiary, Ngangelizwe, who was known to be 'a man of ungovernable temper' ¹². Zwelodumo has confirmed that Ngangelizwe hoped that education would endow Dalindyebo with wisdom and logical thinking.¹³ It thus becomes clear that exposure to education nurtured expectations about the heir in Ngangelizwe as much as it gave the authorities a hint of a chieftainship with a difference. The question of whether Dalindyebo would choose to extricate the abaThembu crown from its colonial shackles, or comply, was a choice of great political significance for the future and autonomy of the abaThembu chieftainship.

GOVERNMENT REACTION FORCES DALINDYEBO TO DITCH TILE

The first threat to Dalindyebo's relationship with the colonial authority was posed by Reverend Tile, who otherwise symbolised the colonialist's traditional ally, the Christian church. Tile's factoring himself into abaThembu politics, as early as 1874,¹⁴ during Ngangelizwe's reign, had as its visible benefit spiritual gratification for the colonial government rather than genuine political gain for the non-christianized Ngangelizwe. His setting up of a Thembu Church in 1884 which he planned to have headed by Ngangelizwe implied a genuine invention of universal regal authority in abaThembuland. While the genuine motives for Tile's initiative are not clear, it is also an aspect of great historical significance that Ngangelizwe did not perceive the better educated Tile as a rival. A typical 19th century chief would have viewed with suspicion any visible proximity between his subjects and agents of Christianity. There was a political irony in the case at hand where political ties in an apparent national context were forged between a paramount chief and his subject, Tile. The question of personal vanity accruing to Tile

as a broker, perhaps a dishonest one from the government's perspective, cannot be ruled out. It must be assumed that the short-sighted Ngangelizwe thought he would, in the strength that Tile symbolised in his eyes, gain socio-political security, both important and immediate, as a counter to the government's political pressure. When the colonial erosion of chiefly power became a visibly progressive process in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the government changed tone and tune. Tile was suddenly viewed more as a rival authority than a pacifying agent. Tile's curious manoeuvres evoked the government's unease with what they perceived to be a malign influence. What the government feared most was that Tile's continued -perhaps domineering- interaction with the recently ascended Dalindyebo would, if unchecked, soak abaThembu chiefdom into an unprecedented union of customary ritual and indigenous Christian rites. The government grew even more jittery when Dalindyebo, their model chief, visibly threw his weight behind Tile, the self-appointed abaThembuland re-unifier. This could well have been seen by the abaThembu progressives as Dalindyebo's daring effort to break loose from the colonial restraints. The government then warned Tile to make the administrative and advisory services at Dalindyebo's court the exclusive prerogative of the magistrate. This was not an anomaly under a system in which the authority flowed downwards from the white magistrate who was answerable to the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories.¹⁵

The government's protests intimidated Dalindyebo to the extent of making him retract his support for Tile. This, coupled with Mvuzo Matanzima's insistence on the secrecy of his patronage of the meetings revealed Dalindyebo's lack of both territorial authority and political power to back Tile's initiative of re-inventing the politico-religious hierarchy in abaThembuland. It must also be noted that the Dalindyebo's missionary education meant that his and Tile's perception of the abaThembu nation's political predicament was compatible. Saunders bears testimony to Dalindyebo's apparent understanding of Tile's grand national designs in his claim that Tile initially enjoyed the 'full favour of the new, mission-educated Paramount'.¹⁶ Saunders further confirms that Tile acted as Dalindyebo's spokesperson before the chief magistrate, and also complained on his behalf about how the boundaries of the chiefdom had been drawn.¹⁷

Mvuzo Matanzima's express instruction- presumably to Dalindyebo- to keep as a closely guarded secret¹⁸ his attendance at Tile's meetings convened to discuss the resuscitation of abaThembu unity was of political interest. Dalindyebo was not likely to interrogate Mvuzo on account of his ingenuity, for though easily persuaded, he had not shown that he could be kept persuaded. One of these meetings had been convened in November of 1890 at the insistence of Dalindyebo for the express purpose of discussing 'ways in which the Thembu could again urge their demand for a united Thembuland'.¹⁹ Odendaal's emphatic description of Tile as a 'fervent Thembu nationalist',²⁰ rather than a religious reformer, draws attention to the two roles that Tile played in abaThembuland. It also inadvertently focuses attention on the motives that could have prompted Dalindyebo and Matanzima to attempt the restoration of the national abaThembu dominion to its former political status. The disentangling of abaThembu paramountcy from the religious tutelage of colonial origins was critical to any revival of its past glory. A fact of great historical significance in the politico-religious saga is that the interests of the various parties were incompatible. The restoration of the abaThembu chiefdom would surely impact upon Matanzima's almost half-century-old seniority in Emigrant abaThembuland. Any 'pontifical' prestige that would accrue to Tile, should the historical restorative restructuring materialise, would inevitably work against the government's grand objectives. Tile's proposal to have district magistracies abolished would have put Dalindyebo on a par with the chief magistrate. It would also have centralised the abaThembu territorial chieftainship and helped undo both the objectives and the benefits of the execution of the émigré' abaThembu settlement experiment of 1865. It is also politically significant in that the government's interests were better served in the perpetuation of the split between Ngangelizwe and the Rhaxothi Matanzima of the RHH of Mthikrakra.

DALINDYEBO'S EQUIVOCAL INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT

Dalindyebo's rule often placed him in critical situations in respect of his interaction with government. He compromised his popularity with his subjects when he deferred to the Mthatha magistrate's instruction to open abaThembuland to land surveyors, this despite

the abaThembu aversion to an exercise which would have a negative economic impact. Matanzima had barred land surveying in St Mark's District after witnessing its consequences in the neighbouring Glen Grey. He asked the interpreter to admonish the Cofimvaba magistrate thus, 'Mr interpreter, kindly tell the blue-eyed boy that abaThembu aren't ready yet for this imposed land-surveying process'.²¹ Dalindyebo's failure to support Matanzima's objection portrayed him as someone who lacked courage to exercise his own free will and inevitably endorsed, blindly, every government command at the expense of abaThembu patriotic spirit.

Dalindyebo's constitutional authority was, like that of the other chiefs in the region, limited by the policy of direct rule.²² His powers were further weakened by the government's appointment of location headmen, non-traditional stipendiaries who assumed, *inter alia*, the function of land administrators.²³ The new system had no room for hereditary chiefs who previously personified all administrative and executive authority.²⁴ Matanzima's letter of 1901 to the resident magistrate of Cofimvaba proves that the system of headmen was perceived by chiefs as both a threat and major political impediment to their authority. Mvuzo pleaded thus

I wish the magistrate could give me some ground solely for myself, that I should not be ruled over by headmen who are troublesome and quarrel for nothing, more especially now as they pay no attention to what I say, that is why I wish to be given a place of my own to live --- -- I believe I have been loyal to the government and hold a higher position than the headmen.²⁵

The above request must be seen in the context of earlier applications by both Dalindyebo and Matanzima for farms in the Ncihana valley (Elliotdale) and Qamata Basin²⁶ respectively. The applications were clearly motivated by the chiefs' desire to escape being subordinated to headmen who they regarded as commoners and therefore inferiors. Of great historical significance for the paramountcy of Dalindyebo was the reiteration by the SNA that the chiefs should not be allowed to own land and permit people to live on it. It was feared that should the forbidden practice be endorsed by granting land to chiefs, chiefly power which had been broken by conquest would be inadvertently restored. The Cape government wanted to prevent the chiefs from reviving

their power by turning government land grants into personal fiefdoms. The two chiefs were eventually granted farms²⁷ after the Cape Parliament had passed the Glen Grey Act which provided for a system of 'Native Councils'.²⁸

The above act paved the way for the inauguration in 1895 of the General Council of the Transkei (TGC) by the representatives of Transkei southern districts (Butterworth, Tsomo, Idutywa and Ngqamakhwe). Ntsebeza confirms that the chief magistrate of Mthatha presided over the TGC, a body that included the magistrates of the southern Transkei districts with their councils and eight members drawn in equal ratio from the four districts. The administrative framework of the future TGC developed into the UTTGC.²⁹ Dalindyebo's reign, with his active involvement, saw the establishment of the UTTGC,³⁰ appropriately named the General Council of abaThembu and the government magistrates.³¹ He was one of the three paramount chiefs reported to have attended the sessions of the Bhunga in its early years.³² This led Dower, an official from the DNA to commend Dalindyebo as 'a trusted member of the General Council, [who] has been a loyal and consistent supporter of the Government'.³³ Mayer's description of the *Bhunga* as a 'White-dominated talking shop in which the educated [*the likes of Dalindyebo and Jongintaba later*] were best qualified to take part'³⁴ raises questions about the negative impression such association created of Dalindyebo. It also brings to light the conflict of interests between the colonialist and the traditionalist as personified by the abaThembu paramountcy.

What endeared Dalindyebo to the government would surely invite prejudice towards him from both the traditional elements and extra-parliamentary quarters? This notion becomes implicit in Mbeki's interpretation of the origins of the Bhunga and the effect that body had on the political life and functioning of traditional governance. His affirmation that the Bhunga's installation of a pseudo local government was intended to shield the white government from any protest action³⁵ is corroborated by Odendaal. He has defined the Bhunga's objectives in training people to 'look to themselves, through their own elected representatives, for the redress of the wrongs they suffered'³⁶ as primarily an answer to the government's political concerns rather than a strategy to

enhance chiefly status. The Government's pretended condescension is also apparent in the remarks of some abaThembu chiefs about their perception of the Bhunga establishment. Anderson Joyi acknowledged during an interview that he and his brother, Ndabankulu, eventually prevailed upon their father Zwelibhangile to withdraw altogether from the Bhunga sessions. They asked him to provide examples of cases where learners demonstrated to their instructor how to teach them. The confrontation was enough to convince Zwelibhangile eventually that the UTTGC was indeed a platform where chiefs imparted to the white magistrates methods of governing the black communities.³⁷ Paramount Chief Dalindyebo's apparent patronage of a system that was progressively facilitating the assault on the chiefs' power base exposes him as one who was caught up in the politics of the ambiguities of dependence. His failure to be part of a patriotic, even national abaThembu front, also presents his critics with a political puzzle which further finds justification in a memorandum of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA). He commended Dalindyebo thus

Dalindyebo has been consistently loyal and very helpful to officers of the Government. His services are always requisitioned where any opposition is expected to be offered to the orders of Government or in the administration of laws. At the time of the annexation of Pondoland he volunteered to accompany Major Henry George Elliot with 15,000 men. During the outbreak of rinderpest he worked hard in order to induce his people to accept the advice of Government by inoculating their cattle. He thus incurred the sore displeasure of a section of his people by whom threats against his life were made.³⁸

Whilst it is apparent that the Government was more concerned about the accomplishment of its goals than with Dalindyebo's chiefly image, he also clearly failed to appraise his chiefship. Even though he presents a fair comparison with Solomon kaDinizulu in Marks's *Ambiguities of dependence* there still exists incompatibility of motives and methods between the two men. While Solomon was always ready to tender 'abject' apologies after each willful exhibit of insubordination,³⁹ Dalindyebo seemed to lack the power to take a visible stand against all that smacked of government orders. Yet the value the two men added to the colonial governance of their followers was, ironically, the reason the colonialists always strove to retain their loyalty. Dalindyebo failed to recognise his political worth to the government in the facilitation of their political designs, and perceived himself as someone able to attract and retain more benefits

simply by his blind co-operation. In Zwelodumo's words 'Dalindyebo chose to be a lone fighter for no reason. His focus was on the Government, his benefactor, and he preferred that the abaThembu should follow behind him. He was an egocentric ruler who always looked out for greener pastures for himself'.⁴⁰ Zwelodumo's comment confirms the government's preference for a man who was prepared to trade for anything that was likely to bring him personal gain.

DALINDYEBO IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE CHIEFS'S RESPONSES TO EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OVERTURES

Another political development that exposed Dalindyebo's indecisiveness was the apparent erosion or denial to the Blacks of political rights in the constitution of a unified South Africa.⁴¹ This was reflected in the release by the South African National Convention of its draft version of the South Africa Act which brought forth an historical African agitation. The Native Convention proposed amendments to the racial provisions of the draft South Africa Act.⁴² The TTGC also added its voice to the protests by forwarding a petition through the Governor of the Cape Colony asking for the expurgation of the 'colour line in the South Africa Act'.⁴³ Dalindyebo was one of the signatories of the UTTGC petition.⁴⁴ That all appeals went unheeded was evident in the draft act where relevant clauses remained unchanged. This meant that Paramount Chief Dalindyebo who had been publicly commended by the government for his co-operation was also not accorded the right to represent his own people politically. Mvuzo Matanzima and other abaThembu chiefs who had sided with the government in the amaMpondomise Rebellion of 1880-8 and amaGcaleka War of 1878-79 also reaped no political rewards. The government's insensitivity to African demands for a right to participate in the political process belittled and estranged the chiefs from their constituencies. Their compromised leadership catapulted them into the fold of the 'emerging African elite which was more than ready to assume leadership on behalf of their traditional compatriots in political challenges'.⁴⁵

Against this background must be understood the communication of Dalindyebo with Tengo Jabavu, Walter Rubusana, John Mafukuzela Dube and Solomon Plaatjie during

the first two years of the Union Government.⁴⁶ The return from abroad of Alfred Mangena, a former Vice President of the South African Native Convention, and his assumption of an advisory role to Dalindyebo, was expected to impact on the political inclinations of the paramount chief. It is also in this context, *inter alia*, that Dalindyebo's attendance at the Universal Races Congress of 1911 in London must be seen.⁴⁷ This was a multi-purpose exercise aimed at luring the chiefs into the fold of the extra-parliamentarians. It would also afford Dalindyebo an opportunity to interact and rub shoulders with the leadership of the radicals while he was being exposed to world politics. At the same time, as part of an intensive crusade to draw the chiefs into extra-parliamentary politics, Rubusana emerged as an adviser to Dalindyebo while Jabavu maintained regular contact with other Transkeian chiefs.⁴⁸

The Union Government's failure to accommodate Black people in its political dispensation exposed their political constraints to the traditional leaders. They soon realised that they shared common problems with the African community at large. They threw their support behind a radical leadership that promised to address their grievances and correct political anomalies. It is in this context that must be understood the symbolic reaction against the racial discrimination that was evident in the gathering in Bloemfontein of African leaders from all over Southern Africa on 8 January 1912. The delegates included leading members of the African elite and traditional chiefs among whom was Dalindyebo.⁴⁹ He was at the forefront of the initial responses of the abaThembu chiefs to overtures from extra-parliamentary organisations. He also became one of seven paramount chiefs who were recommended for adoption as Honorary Presidents of the SANNC.⁵⁰ The fact that his visible honours in the nascent struggle did not appear to be promising anything tangible must have disappointed all the constituencies that had hoped to lure him. Furthermore, Dalindyebo's failure to utilise his honourable positions and dignified profile to consolidate the struggle against racial injustices gives credibility to Zwelodumo's claim about Ngangelizwe's earlier assessment that Dalindyebo lacked firmness of character. This defect in his character, which his father had hoped education would correct, was complemented by egocentrism which dominated Dalindyebo's approach to everything. Thus it was clear

that he always looked for an opportunity to line his own nest, and thus abaThembu interests would always be of secondary concern to him.

Dalindyebo also witnessed the passing of the 1913 Land Act. Its core terms and application of, especially where it concerned the allocation and distribution of land- the basis of pre-colonial economies- challenged the chiefs' authority. As a consequence of the hardships brought about by the act, the chiefs were once more drawn towards members of the extra-parliamentary organisations who were more than ready to consolidate their support among them. This faction, it is presumed, did not anticipate any resistance to their objectives in abaThembuland whose Paramount Chief had directly participated in the inauguration of the Congress. Unfortunately the chiefs' obsession with land matters overrode all other issues of interest to the Congressmen. The leadership of these organisations, in fact, shared the chiefs' grievances over the loss of land, and welcomed their patronage because it brought with it the funds which the chiefs contributed to their cause.⁵¹ At the same time the Dalindyebo factor was of political significance as security against the indiscriminate destruction of the chiefly office, and for the 'to and fro' evolutionary history of the abaThembu chieftainship and struggle politics in South Africa.

Chieftainship was still of political significance in the tribal environment, and through it many an ordinary man could join the Congress. Unfortunately the chiefs were impatient and wanted an immediate undoing of the Land Act and all its implications for the communities of which they were guardians. It was this failure of the Congressmen to reverse the implications of the Land Act and its terms that subsequently put a damper on the chiefs' spirits and weakened their enthusiasm for extra-parliamentary politics.⁵² The government, on the other hand- expected them to co-operate by giving up their hereditary right to land, so as to complement its own objectives. The above analysis highlights the incompatibility of interests which the chiefs faced which was what possibly made an alliance with the Congressmen difficult. The failure of the abaThembu Paramount Chief and other chiefs to entrench their position within the Congress meant that they missed an opportunity to help forge a supra-tribal community of Blacks and it

raises an intriguing question. Equally significant was Dalindyebo's dilemma, evident in his failure to utilise his credibility with the government to take up the grievances that affected the chieftaincy generally. His attempt to appease the British government was evident in the message that he sent to the Governor-General of South Africa at the beginning of the First World War, namely :

I pray that the Dominions of His Majesty, on this side, and beyond the sea may be held in safety, and to this end I desire to declare that I and the people over whom I am placed will be faithful and true, and loyal in our service to His Gracious Majesty and will be peaceable and obedient to the law in all respects and we will be ever ready to assist the Government of His Majesty whether it be by maintaining peace within our borders or by rendering such services as we may be called upon to perform.⁵³

The First World War had pre-occupied the British government and made it vulnerable to anti-colonial protest. There had never been a more opportune moment for any colonial people to press their demands. Instead of making common cause with the extra-parliamentarians Dalindyebo,

the principal Chief of the Thembu tribe.....(with) a large following, larger than probably that of any other Native Chief within the Union....A trusted member of the General Council A loyal and consistent supporter of the Government and in receipt of a subsidy of £200 (R400.00) per annum.⁵⁴

showed his concern for external rather than domestic affairs. His annual allowance was too good- and appeasing- to forfeit for some abstract supra-national cause. It is very likely that some government official had a hand in the goodwill messages that Dalindyebo sent to the government in the light of Mbekeni's claim that Dalindyebo acted under very strict surveillance. He was obliged to be compliant towards the government so as to erase both the bad image and memory of Ngangelizwe.⁵⁵ Dalindyebo's apparent compliance, did not, however, produce guarantees from the government about the restoration of the abaThembu chieftainship to its former status. Soon after Dalindyebo had professed loyalty to the British government, he became one of fifteen signatories to a petition which requested the Governor-General to extend W. T. Brownlee's term of office as chief magistrate of Mthatha. The petitioners included chiefs David Mthikrakra, Gadla Mandela, Zilindlovu Mthikrakra, Mgubuli Joyi, Dumalisile and Sangoni :


By his large experience, Mr Brownlee ---is a man with a sharp eye, prompt in quelling any disturbance. Therefore the people of Thembuland implore the Government, most respectfully, that he may be pleased, during this time of evil, to let Mr Brownlee continue in the office of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories. We make this request because a new Chief Magistrate may be unknown to our people.⁵⁶

It was significant that the Governor-General acknowledged the receipt of the letter-*cum*-petition, but at the same time requested that he be informed about 'the (socio-political) standing of the signatories of the petition.'⁵⁷ The Supreme Chief could only have wanted information about the credentials of petitioners to gauge, monitor and even keep their influence in check. It must also be presumed that retaining Brownlee in the key position of magistrate would nurture old alliances and facilitate continuity in government policies.

MLINGO MATANZIMA BECOMES CHIEF UNDER DALINDYEBO'S PARAMOUNTCY

The conduct of affairs in western abaThembuland indicated that the Emigrant abaThembu were treating Dalindyebo's paramountcy as nominal and exploiting it by exercising an illegitimate autonomy. Mvuzo had been visibly pursuing this by reporting to the conniving government on the affairs of his Emigrant abaThembu community. What follows shows that while the Emigrant abaThembu appeared compliant, they were resistant to being beholden to more than one overlord, something that would contradict the terms of their inducement to split in 1865. The Cofimvaba magistrate's report must be understood against this background, namely, that 'Regent Nqwiliso [*son of Rhaxoti's brother, Duli*,], and other Thembu notabilities brought to the office Mlingo, son and heir of Chief Mvuzo for recognition as Chief of the tribe, he having now assumed that position at the request of the people.'⁵⁸ As chief and successor to Mvuzo who had died in October 1903, Mlingo adopted Mhlobo as his salute name.⁵⁹ The resident magistrate accordingly confirmed the chieftainship of Mhlobo over the emigrant abaThembu section of Dalindyebo's kingdom.⁶⁰

THE HOUSE OF RHAXOTHI MTHIKRAKRA



Kaiser Matanzima confirmed that Nqwiliso Duli did fill his father, Mlingo's, position during Dalindyebo's paramountcy because his father was only 13 years old when Mvuzo died. Nqwiliso, a cousin of Chief Mvuzo, was nominated as guardian and regent during the minority of Mlingo. Matanzima also affirmed that Nqwiliso was the legitimate choice because his father 'Duli was the younger brother of Rhaxothi having been born directly after him. He was a very unreasonable bully who continued to impose himself on Mhlobo long after he had officially withdrawn from the regentship'.⁶¹

Mhlobo had been chief for only five years when Magistrate Young complained about his excessive drinking which interfered with the discharge of his duty.⁶² As a result of his alcoholism Mhlobo missed meetings that were regularly scheduled with the magistrate. The administration in Mhlobo's location deteriorated and caused the magistrate's office great concern, judging from his remark, 'it is therefore obvious that the mal-administration of his location is likely to affect his neighbours---the time has come when the government must need to act drastically'.⁶³ Kaiser Matanzima (KD), an unrelenting teetotaler confirmed his father's hopeless alcoholism which, in his own words 'brought great suffering to our mother, Nogeiyiti'.⁶⁴ An interesting observation in respect of the

above is that Dalindyebo did not appear to participate in the dealings between the magistrate and the heavily-drinking Mhlobo. This was in contrast to the supervisory role that Jongilizwe later exercised in this region. When on a formal visit to the Cofimvaba District in 1927, Paramount Chief Jongilizwe found Mhlobo sick and indisposed and noted that his chiefly duties were neglected as a result of his deteriorating health. He immediately suggested to the magistrate that a substitute be appointed.⁶⁵

REGENCY FOR JONGILIZWE : SILIMELA PAVES THE WAY

At a point when the Department of Native Affairs (NAD) was undergoing transformation from 'a tradition of pragmatic paternalism'⁶⁶ to the practical implementation of a notion of 'protective segregation' that was embodied in the 1920 Native Affairs Act⁶⁷ Paramount Chief Dalindyebo died. Switzer has affirmed that until 1920 the NAD was manned by officials who viewed themselves as 'secular missionaries' whose duty was to protect Africans as wards of the state and act as their ombudsmen in matters relating to government.⁶⁸ Dalindyebo, an acknowledged state ward, died on 22 April 1920 while preparing to attend a session of the General Council in Mthatha. His death elicited the following tribute from the SNA :

Dalindyebo, Chief of the Thembus, a numerous tribe comprising the greater part of the population of the Umtata, Engcobo and Mqanduli Districts. The History of South Africa hardly furnished a finer example of a native chief than was Dalindyebo and his services were of great value to the Government and I therefore strongly recommend that his funeral expenses be met out of the public funds.⁶⁹

While the Secretary of Finance undertook on the government's behalf to finance the funeral of the Paramount Chief, a model for his office, he also emphasised the exceptional nature of the authorisation and warned against regarding it 'as constituting a precedent for applications of a similar nature in future'.⁷⁰ Welsh described the ceremonial procedure of the interment of Dalindyebo in his kraal after a Christian funeral service 'a happy compromise between the past and the future, typical of the present status Thembu'.⁷¹ The government's involvement in the funeral was, from a political perspective, a demonstration of both its colonial superiority and its obligation towards a subject people. It must however be noted, that what was interpreted as a happy compromise by the government was for Dalindyebo's critics evidence that he

was indeed trapped in the ambiguities of dependence on the government. The abaThembu paramountcy was at a crossroads because of Dalindyebo's reluctance to challenge the government in any way. While he could not be described as totally apolitical, he could also not be labelled even a moderate revolutionary. He left his successors a paramountcy that was hamstrung by an alien law, something he had not dared to challenge in his life-time.

When Dalindyebo died his heir was still a sixteen years old Lovedale scholar. This was Billy Joel Sampu the son of Nohajisi Makhaula, the Great Wife.⁷² The death of the Paramount Chief while the heir was still a minor meant that traditional procedures and customary guidelines had to be observed in the election of a regent. The issue of major importance in this case was the unanimity of the chieftdom in nominating a regent. A new and unexpected development - a cultural anomaly at the time - was the involvement of Nohajisi in the deliberations to nominate a regent for Sampu.

David Jongintaba Dalindyebo, Sampu's younger brother by custom, was nominated and rejected. The turning down of Jongintaba was informed by various factors: he was young and therefore lacking status; little was known about the steadfastness of his character; he was a persona non grata with the Great Wife.⁷³ He had previously been appointed an *umsengi* (milkier) son of the Great House, an appointment that conferred on him the status of a messenger to the Great Wife.⁷⁴ Nohajisi's supposedly wilful involvement in traditionally 'male' only domain, and considering the attachment of the abaThembu to tradition gives one an idea of how coveted and vulnerable Dalindyebo's crown was. Mbekeni confirmed that Nohajisi was indeed vociferously against the appointment of Jongintaba as regent for Sampu. Her objection was also borne out of her insecurity at the possible loss to the Jongintaba progeny of her son's natural right. She was particularly troubled by the fact that Jongintaba had gone abroad to fight in the World War 1, and had come back very boastful and arrogant about the military honours he had received.⁷⁵ Cingo, as if to justify Nohaji's fears, has confirmed that King George V had expressed gratitude to David Jongintaba Dalindyebo for his contribution, in one way or another, to the British military effort in securing a French harbour.⁷⁶ The following

excerpt captures the moment of the King's presentation, viz., 'to David Dalindyebo by Order of His Majesty King George V in recognition of outstanding services rendered in connection with recruiting for the South African Native Labour Contingent'.⁷⁷ It is therefore, obvious that Jongintaba's possibly exaggerated military glory, made the mother of the heir still in his minority feel anxious. She probably could not guarantee that such an accomplished military man as Jongintaba was now claiming, and publicly acknowledged, to be, would readily relinquish the throne when the time came for Sampu to take over.

The subtle but effective, and perhaps powerful, role of gender as symbolised by Nohajisi in the process of electing a regent for her son was acknowledged as a force in the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship. That her opinion was acknowledged can be seen in the fact that after she had died the grounds for her objections to Jongintaba's regency and his nomination were simply ignored or not upheld. Nohajisi had upheld her opposition to Jongintaba's nomination by affirming in a letter to the chief magistrate that the appointment of Jongintaba - in the context of custom younger than the infant heir - as regent was foreign to abaThembu customary practices.⁷⁸ She even declared her availability for regency in her anxiety to secure the throne for her son. While the magistrate endorsed her comment on the irregularity of appointing a son from 'a minor house to be regent for the Great Son or elder brother'⁷⁹ he expressly disapproved of the appointment of a woman as regent.

The feuding that became a feature among the wives of the deceased monarch in the royal household during the interregnum was bound to exclude Nohajisi for any leadership level because it revealed lack of unanimity in the royal household. In all instances of conflict the Great Wife emerged as the provocative, self-appointed manager over her partner widows. In one instance she removed furniture, money and stock from the Xhiba House of Nopalamente through the services of a stock inspector. This pushed Nopalamente to seek the intervention of the regent-in-waiting. In the context of the royal establishment the Xhiba wife was the most junior and customarily the fifth wife to be married, with no likelihood that she would ever be a mother to

practising chiefs.⁸⁰ Nohajisi's actions could, therefore, at best be described as lacking diplomacy and interpersonal skills, thus disqualifying her as regent. She later sent a certain Jack Mthikrakra to count the sheep and goats that belonged to noNayile, the Qadi wife of Dalindyebo, without noNayile's knowledge. This was another provocation, given the role of the Qadi House in the chief's establishment. Zwelodumo has confirmed that the Qadi House was a supporting house, one that was tasked to look after the physical needs of the Great House. This house had a duty to provide regents in the case of the minority of the heir. There was no likelihood of anyone from that house ever posing a threat to the Great House because of their awareness, and public acknowledgement, of their junior status.⁸¹ Nohajisi was now setting out to provoke her support base by her seemingly unwarranted actions.

Nohajisi later affirmed her reliance on Chief Silimela, 'the great son of the first Qadi to the Great House of King Ngangelizwe'.⁸² Zwelodumo, Silimela's grandson through Zwelihle, has confirmed that his grandfather indeed came from the house that supported the Great House of Ngangelizwe. Though he was older than Dalindyebo in years he was, by custom, a younger brother. Ngangelizwe had observed during Silimela's youth that he was endowed with natural wisdom, the gift of oratory and the dignity-*cum*-prestige befitting a royal. These attributes became conspicuous as he grew up and always drew comparisons between the heir and his counterpart from the *Qadi* House. It was Silimela's apparent diplomacy and strategic approach in the handling of the affairs of the kingdom, even as a young prince, that persuaded Ngangelizwe to send him to the Ngcobo District. In Zwelodumo's words 'Ngangelizwe called his Qadi House son in and informed him that the time had come to remove him to the Ngcobo District where his chieftainship would be installed.'⁸³ Ngangelizwe's action was motivated by a desire to forestall an unfair competition between Silimela and Dalindyebo who was evidently not the former's match in wisdom and eloquence.⁸⁴

Chief Silimela of Quluqhu in the Ngcobo District was ultimately unanimously recommended as regent. Silimela posed no threat to the heir of Dalindyebo, having

never previously given Dalindyebo any reason to fear him. The separation of the scions of Mthikrakra had worked well. It therefore made sense even at this time of crisis to fetch Silimela to come and officiate as regent for his brother's young heir. The abaThembu elders believed that the wisdom he had shown as a young man could only add great political value to the Dalindyebo paramountcy. It had been common practice, even earlier, to fetch him from Quluqhu, whenever there was a controversy.⁸⁵ Something that strongly counted in his favour was that he had previously acted for Dalindyebo during his visits to England for health (1910) and political reasons (1911)⁸⁶ He was the first from Ngangelizwe's Qadi house to be regent.⁸⁷ Some of Silimela's descendants, like Hlathikhulu from his Right Hand house, later acted as regents at Bumbane on occasion, and were chosen on the strength of an exposure to the legacy of wisdom of, and the grooming they were presumed to have received from, their predecessor. Mveleli Busobengwe Silimela acted as a Deputy Paramount Chief under Bambilanga in the mid 1980s. Mdanjelwa Silimela, Zwelodumo's youngest uncle acted as Paramount Chief just before the reburial of Sabata Jonguhlanga during 1988-89.⁸⁸

Silimela demonstrated his political astuteness when asked by the magistrate about his availability if an offer of regency were made to him. His response was that the government had first to explain why and how the nomination of Jongintaba was wrong and inappropriate.⁸⁹ It is presumed that his thinking was that abaThembu had to be convinced that the correctness of the choice of the regent derived from the correct application of the customary procedures. This would not only guard against the imposition of a regent over an unreceptive kingdom, but would also consolidate, rather than sabotage, Ngangelizwe's kingship. Silimela's response also demonstrated that he was sensitive to the possibility of a rift that was inherent in the choice of a regent for Sampu. His discretion portrayed him as someone who valued abaThembu unity more than the honour that the regency status, described by Jonginyaniso as very lucrative,⁹⁰ would confer on him.

Chief Silimela Ngangelizwe assumed the position of Chief Regent for abaThembuland on 1 October 1920. He would from now on draw two annual allowances, of £40 as

regent and a £60 allowance as headman in the Ngcobo District. The resident magistrate suggested that the whole salary be paid at one point for Silimela's convenience.⁹¹ Mbekeni confirmed that it was important that whoever was regent should add value to the position by maintaining the dignity and prestige of the abaThembu Paramount Chief. It was against this background that the regency allowance was calculated, so as to recompense the incumbent for services rendered and for expenditure incurred in maintaining the dignity of the Paramount Chief. These services included convening the meetings of the chieftom, liaising and consulting with the magistrate in Mthatha and overseeing the administration of the estate of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo.⁹²

SAMPU JONGILIZWE TAKES OVER FROM SILIMELA

Silimela performed his last important duty as abaThembu chief regent on July 1924. This was when he informed the resident magistrate that the abaThembu people had decided 'to ask the Government to allow Sampu to take over the duties of Paramount Chief of the abaThembus and permit Regent Silimela to return to his own location in the District of Engcobo'.⁹³ It is clear that the Regent's term had been too short for him to have made an indelible mark, given his reputation for wisdom and being well-spoken. It must also be understood that Silimela was regent during the heir's schooling years, a fact which makes it clear that four years was too short a time for Sampu to be available for mentoring, especially considering that during this period he was at school at Lovedale.⁹⁴ Silimela's goodwill and readiness to hand over the royal office to the legitimate heir supports the informants' testimony to his integrity. Bhakisizwe Mthikrakra endorsed Zwelodumo's claim that the reigning abaThembu King, Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi, has maintained a good connection with Silimela's house. He reports that the Silimelas are always invited to grace the royal occasions at the Bumbane Great Place. In Zwelodumo's words, 'Silimela's prestige star still shines at the *Tyhalasha* Great Place as is evident from their acknowledgement of his legacy - *intlantsi yobunganga buka Silimela isalayita nangoku koMkhulu eTyhalasha*'.⁹⁵

Now that Silimela was offering to step down as regent the magistrate was expected to recommend the abaThembu people's request to the government, and also seek its approval. This he did as he remarked to the chief magistrate that 'if my recommendation

is approved by the Government, it is the wish of the people that you should attend a meeting of the Tembus at the Great Place towards the end of September on the occasion of the customary formal installation of Sampu as Chief'.⁹⁶ Magistrate Young accordingly suggested 1 October 1924 to be the effective date for the accession of Sampu Jongilizwe. Young further ordered Silimela to attend a quarterly meeting that was scheduled for 26 August 1924, where he would elaborate on matters that were connected with Jongilizwe's appointment.⁹⁷ In September the magistrate's office confirmed in a letter to Silimela the government's approval of the appointment of Sampu Jongilizwe as Paramount Chief of the abaThembu people.⁹⁸ Of great historical significance for the changing faces of the chieftainship of the 1920s was the fact that the abaThembu elders sought the government's approval in the matter of Jongilizwe's accession.

That Young, in his capacity as a government official, was to sanction the coming to power of a natural ruler was proof that indigenous authority was progressively succumbing to national legislation. Government-imposed procedure was different in its application in the case of Jongilizwe from what had been the practice when his junior counterpart Mhlobo Matanzima came to power in 1914. Mhlobo's accession was an internal matter of the Emigrant abaThembu where Nqwiliso and some senior men simply presented their new chief to the magistrate as 'Chief of the tribe, he having now assumed that position at the request of the people'.⁹⁹ A credible explanation for this would probably be found in the different strategies that were employed in respect of the institution of chieftainship by the former Cape Colony and its successors in office, the Department of Native Affairs (DNA). The DNA was beginning to make a visible impact in the 1920's as against what had happened during the war years when government authorities were considerably pre-occupied with establishing the best method of governing the rural people.

Jongilizwe was the first abaThembu Paramount Chief to come to power under the aegis of the Native Affairs Act of 1920. Against this background Magistrate Herbst, acting on behalf of the prime minister sent the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories a

message that was to be read at the installation of Jongilizwe. The Governor-General subtly hinted at his overriding authority in the appointment of chiefs when he commented on Jongilizwe's inexperience for the responsible position he was acceding to. At the same time he remarked emphatically that they were, in this instance, merely conceding to the abaThembu wishes. There was an irony in the supreme chief's acknowledgement that

it will be a difficult post to fill for your late father was an exceptional man. He worthily earned high respect and gratitude of the Government by his consistently loyal and faithful services under all and every circumstances.¹⁰⁰

The Governor-General's concerns possibly arose from Jongilizwe's active involvement in a strike while at Lovedale,¹⁰¹ where angry students smashed everything that was in their way.¹⁰² While the Premier's message clearly obliged Jongilizwe to walk in the footsteps of his father, it also persuaded him to adopt his father's councillors, (grey heads'), as his advisers. It must be understood that the erstwhile councillors would not only facilitate the transition from the Dalindyebo era to the new one, but would also ensure a continuity from Dalindyebo's style of doing things. It was significant that Herbst offered the new Paramount Chief the best assistance from the magistrate's office in the event of any conflict arising between him and his father's 'greyheads'.¹⁰³ Under normal circumstances conflict would only arise if there were a lack of co-operation between Jongilizwe and his councillors on the question of the pursuance of Dalindyebo's approach to matters of chieftainship. Be that as it may, herein is to be found the germ that was to destroy both the autonomy and the limited democracy that was inherent in the indigenous authority, and also attack the system of checks and balances that had, from time immemorial, been the prerogative of the councillors. The government's stepping forward as a guarantor and guardian of Jongilizwe's chieftainship, given its extraneous import, was of historical significance for the perpetuation of Dalindyebo's type of paramount chieftainship. Its subsequent pledge to protect the abaThembu institution from being challenged and perhaps eaten from within, gives credibility to the overriding authority of the government.

Yali-Manisi has, in one of his praise poems, portrayed the accession of Jongilizwe as an occasion for the rebirth of the unity of the House of Mthikrakra. Time would tell how far Manisi's vision of Jongilizwe's reign would be realised. The following excerpt, which was preceded by a pronouncement of Jongilizwe as king of all *abaThembu*, is worthy of consideration:

Bukhulu bakho bugqithe naseluhlangeni;
Your greatness has transcended the national borders
Bubekiw'ezincwadini nanguRulumente;
It has been inscribed in the Government statutes
Ubekiwe nangamadun'akowenu;
You have been declared as King by your family elders
Ubekiwe nguJongintaba noDabulamanzi
You have been installed by Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi
Wakubek'uMhlobo noNqwiliso;
Hailed as King by Mhlobo and Nqwiliso
Babek'itholelendlu enkulu;
Proclaiming King the issue from the Great House¹⁰⁴

The reference and the apparent acknowledgement of Jongilizwe as the universal king of the *abaThembu* was historically significant, by reason of its bearing on modern day *abaThembu* chiefs' politics. It must be noted that those alluded to, Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi as well as Mhlobo and Nqwiliso, were descendants of King Mthikrakra through Ngangelizwe and Rhaxothi Matanzima respectively.

It is necessary to look at the factors that moulded Jongilizwe before elaborating on his actual rule. He, like all Ngangelizwe's descendants, acquired his lower primary education at St John's College Primary School.¹⁰⁵ He later proceeded to Lovedale where the authorities sometimes granted him leave of absence to enable him to attend the Bhunga sessions in Mthatha.¹⁰⁶ The early exposure to chiefly debates that were contextualised in the UTTGC was particularly valuable to the one worthy to succeed Dalindyebo, once a valuable member of that body. It was also while at Lovedale that Jongilizwe and the likes of the historical King Sobhuza of the *amaSwazi* got involved in a strike that led to their expulsion en masse. Jongilizwe's surviving daughter, Nopenge Mgolombane has confirmed that her father enthusiastically participated in a strike while at Lovedale. She described him as 'a brave and strong believer in personal experiences

in everything, never wanting to miss out on anything'.¹⁰⁷ In this way Nopenge subtly plays down Mbekeni's rather biased claim that Jongilizwe was influenced into joining the strike by older boys, including the likes of Buqaqawuli Mgudlwa and Sobhuza.

After the Lovedale strike of 1922, Jongilizwe was sent to the circumcision school where one of his fellow initiates and age mates was Reverend Bhekamandla Ndungane.¹⁰⁸ The last school that Jongilizwe attended before becoming a chief was Clarkebury Institution, which is historically regarded as the abaThembu national school, *isikolo sikaNgubengcuka*/ Ngubengcuka's school. King Ngubengcuka had granted William Shaw permission to establish it on his land in 1830.¹⁰⁹ It was while at this institution, in 1923, that Jongilizwe wrote to the magistrate, asking for £22 for the payment of school fees, his organ/piano teacher as well as his washerwoman.¹¹⁰ The princely pampering appears to have been a common practice with the children of royals in the 20th century. Phyllis Mabona confirmed that her former schoolmate, Ntombomhlaba Poto Ndamase, who subsequently became the mother of the present amaRharhabe chief, Maxhobayakhawuleza Sandile, had an attendant fellow student, *impelesi*, while a student at Healdtown.¹¹¹ It must be presumed that in the case of Jongilizwe the pampering was meant to instill in him a sense of prestige and awareness of his royal and superior status. This would hopefully help rehabilitate the prince's former behaviour and involvement in activism which did not befit a royal from Dalindyebo's household. The importance of extra-curricular exposure can also not be underplayed in view of the profile of the chieftainship during the period under investigation.

Soon after Jongilizwe was declared Paramount Chief, the DNA initiated a process of transferring Dalindyebo's farm to his ownership. Once the magistrate had confirmed the heirdom,¹¹² the Prime Minister's office recommended to the Governor-General the approval of the transfer of the 'Tyhalarha farm situated in the District of Umtata, Tembuland, from the estate of the late Dalindyebo, Chief or Headman of the Tembus, to Jongilizwe Dalindyebo.'¹¹³ There could have been no better reminder of the benefits of past compliance to Jongilizwe, the beneficiary of this transfer. Within hardly a year of Jongilizwe's becoming a Paramount Chief Silimela passed a motion declaring 'that this

Council recommends the payment to Councillor Chief Jongilizwe Dalindyebo, while attending the meetings of the General Council, of such additional allowance as may be considered reasonable, having regard to his position as Paramount Chief of Tembu people'.¹¹⁴ The motion was taken up by the DNA which accordingly recommended that :

Jongilizwe Dalindyebo, by virtue of his position as Chief of the Tembu, be granted a higher allowance than is ordinarily payable under the regulations to members attending meetings of the Council....The tribe is the largest and most important in the Territories and the allowance to the late chief was specially increased because of his influence in the interests of the Council movement and of the additional expense to which a native of his rank was put while staying in Umtata.¹¹⁵

In nurturing the UTTGC, the interests of the Government generally, and the DNA in particular, were served best. It must also be noted that, during the time under discussion, that is 1925, the DNA was processing the application for an increase in the subsidy for Paramount Chief Jongilizwe's mother, Headwoman Nohajisi of Sithebe Location.¹¹⁶ This was in line with the DNA's conciliatory approach to the House of Dalindyebo.

Jongilizwe demonstrated an approach in the execution of his duties that could at best be described as unorthodox or out of touch with regard to the prescriptions of government legislation. This could have been informed by the vows he made on his accession to restore the administrative role of the abaThembu chieftainship, which was perceived by critics to have slipped out of Dalindyebo's hands into government control. The procedure followed in the appointment of a certain Makhaula serves to illustrate his involvement in the appointment of headmen in the area under his jurisdiction. In 1925 the Paramount Chief Jongilizwe together with Headman Candilanga and some members of the Bhaziya community introduced Mvumbi (Vayeke) Makhaula to the magistrate and requested that he should be appointed headman of Location No.6 of Bhaziya.¹¹⁷ This was evidently a departure from the post-annexation practice, where the appointment of headmen was the prerogative of the government. Once on a formal visit to the Cofimvaba District Jongilizwe discovered that due to sickness, Mhlobo Matanzima's chiefly duties were neglected. He suggested to the magistrate that a substitute be appointed without nominating anyone in particular.¹¹⁸ Jongilizwe was

probably anxious that Mhlobo's manifest inefficiency would expose the *abaThembu* chieftainship to more manipulation by state authorities. Here again Jongilizwe's approach, a visible departure from Dalindyebo's unreactive policy,¹¹⁹ appeared to be in line with his intention to consolidate the authority of the *abaThembu* paramountcy. His fears were justified in view of the fact Mhlobo did not have a good record as chief.

There were other incidents which show Jongilizwe's sensitivity to the gradual and yet determined encroachment of the DNA on the terrain of *abaThembu* chieftainship. One such incident involved Chief Siphendu, a descendant of Chief Hlanga who had been deposed from kingship by Jongilizwe's ancestor some 200 years previously. Siphendu Bacela had sanctioned circumcision in his village during the mourning period following Silimela's death. When Jongilizwe accused (and subsequently summoned) Siphendu of breaking *abaThembu* law, Siphendu showed no remorse. Instead he contended that he was of the 'same blood rank as the Paramount Chief'¹²⁰ and that the latter had no right to dictate to him in matters affecting the economic conditions of his own people'.¹²¹ When Jongilizwe reported the conflict to the District Magistrate Norton, at the same time hinting that he intended to fine Siphendu for violating *abaThembu* law, Norton was quick to issue a warning to the effect that 'fining was a matter the Government would never sanction'.¹²² The inference to be drawn from this was that the government was not only abetting insubordination, but was also poised to protect Siphendu should Jongilizwe dare punish him. It must be noted that Siphendu was not to be protected for his own sake but rather as a reminder to Paramount Chief Jongilizwe of the status of his rank in relation to the Governor-General's office. It is also interesting to observe how in this case the government presented itself as both an arbiter and a court of appeal. The government's stance in this regard undermined the traditional hierarchy of the *abaThembu* chieftainship and the conventional observance which the institution prescribed. This would, in the long-term, damage the power base which sanctioned the ranks of the *abaThembu* chieftainship.

What was clear from the Siphendu case was that the government viewed all chiefs as equals among themselves, and that it presided above them as supreme authority with the sole prerogative to reward and punish where and when it deemed fit. The opposing stances of both Jongilizwe and the magistrate in the Siphendu case give credibility to a number of accounts of Jongilizwe's aspirations. While Nopenge unreservedly describes her father as someone who could exhibit contradictory emotions,¹²³ Mbekeni portrayed Jongilizwe as 'a fine, tall and stately fellow who was simply full of youth spirit rather than being carried away by his traditional status'.¹²⁴ Mbekeni also confirmed that Jongilizwe's greatest ambition on taking office was to improve on his father's administrative style and, if possible, make amends. Zwelodumo has endorsed this and gone even further to say that

King Jongilizwe had an intellectual gift of appreciating the value in chieftainship and in rule by consensus as if he had lived under our democracy. He was brave, fearless and endowed with unbelievable courage in a way that made him a contrast to his father, Dalindyabo, our fathers would always tell us.¹²⁵

From the moment Jongilizwe assumed the paramountcy he is reported to have warned his councillors that he was going to 'turn the clock backwards in an effort to return the abaThembu conduct of traditional affairs to what it had been: to selfless chiefly governance that was characteristic of abaThembu chiefs'.¹²⁶ He defined this as rule by consensus where he and the councillors would always take into account the people's needs, opinions and decisions, 'we are going to pronounce on people's decisions not mine'.¹²⁷ Zwelodumo remarked further that 'Jongilizwe spent the few years of his rule trying to heal the political rifts and blunders and also making amends for the shortcomings that had punctuated his father's rule'.¹²⁸

Jongilizwe's term also witnessed the dismissal of Gadla Mandela as a headman. The event in question also shows how the Union government law willfully bypassed the Paramount Chief and disregarded the hierarchical order in resolving matters that affected the chieftdom. The incident involved complaints made by some residents of Mvezo Location about Gadla Mandela to Amos Dinga, a Black constable. The complaints were considered to constitute charges of misconduct, and for that reason

were regarded as grounds for dismissal of the accused.¹²⁹ The charges brought against Mandela were evidence of irregularities when viewed from the perspective of Union legislation. His actions were otherwise acceptable in the normal application of customary law. While not condoning all charges, it must be pointed out that the application of Union law bore some politico-economic advantages for the ordinary man, and these had clearly been detected by some elements in Mvezo Location. The charges included the unauthorised allocation of arable land to individuals, some of whom were issued with, and others without, receipts (obviously because such grants had not been authorised by the office); ignoring unlawful land occupation and thereby exposing the occupiers to a later painful loss of land at the insistence of the government.

An examination of the following events will demonstrate how the 'tribesmen' exploited the loopholes that came about as a result of the incompatibility of the two administrative systems : A typical Union headman issued the applicant with a confirmatory note after he had received a beast pre-payment, and this note was to be produced at the magistrate's office. The next step was the official grant of land to the applicant. Instead of the process ending here some mischievous applicants demanded the pre-payment beast back from the headmen. A certain Mphekula admitted in his statement to have done this but he claimed that he never got his beast back. Mandela, on the other hand, viewed land distribution, and the revenue that came with it, as his traditional prerogative. He obviously viewed it as a task in the discharge of which he would not be guided 'by laws of the King of England, but by Thembu custom.'¹³⁰ As a result of the charges brought against him, after which he was also obliged to make a statement to Constable Dinga, Mandela was dismissed from the post of Headman of Mvezo Location with effect from 1 October 1926.¹³¹ The dismissal was decisive and final, as he was warned that he 'should attend at this Office immediately to draw the balance of pay due to you'.¹³² Peter Limb in his biography of Nelson Mandela has also commented on the squabbles surrounding Gadla's loss of his royal position. .¹³³ As early as 8 October a meeting of the residents of Mvezo Location was called where Ntabezulu Mthikrakra was unanimously nominated as a replacement for Gadla Henry Mandela. Ntabezulu was the son of the Qadi house of Ngangelizwe.¹³⁴

The termination of the Mandela royal headmanship spelled out clearly both the government's condescension towards, and its perception of, the dignity of the abaThembu chieftainship. The exercise showed the direction in which the government policy regarding the governance of the Blacks was moving. The single act of dismissal was one of many that was making ineffective the abaThembu chiefship. It must be noted that the Union magistrate did not consult with Jongilizwe prior to the execution of the dismissal order. Against this background must be understood that Jongilizwe had, coincidentally, become chief in the same year that Hertzog became prime minister. The latter held both the premiership and the portfolio of Native Affairs. It was, therefore, Hertzog's department that in 1925 had accused Mandela of misconduct and subsequently discharged him.¹³⁵

An event of historical significance occurring during Jongilizwe's reign was the visit of Edward, Prince of Wales, to the town of Mthatha in 1925. The Paramount Chief honoured Prince Edward by presenting him with thirty head of dehorned cattle. The beasts were in turn re-donated to Jongilizwe to generate income for the extension of the Sir Henry Elliot Hospital, the only health institution in the town.¹³⁶ Whilst there is no record of Jongilizwe's reaction to the Prince's gesture of cultural condescension it must be stated that the redonation is not a norm among the Southern *baNguni*. Dr Guy Daines has affirmed that the monies were used to pay for ornamental gates that still stand at the entrance to the hospital. Dr Welsh inaugurated the gates in 1927 in his capacity as medical superintendent.¹³⁷ These gates, ironically enough, not only symbolise Jongilizwe's contribution to the embellishment of the major hospital of the Transkei region, but are also a tribute and monument to his short-lived reign.

Another highlight of Jongilizwe's reign was the passing, in 1927, of the Native Administration Act of 1927 (NAA) by the Union Government. This act, a political landmark of Hertzog's government policy with regard to the Blacks, gave the Governor-General authority, inter alia, to constitute a new chiefdom and order the removal of the whole or portion of a chiefdom or an individual from one place to the other.¹³⁸ More

important for this study was the bureaucratic right the act gave to the Governor-General to 'recognize or appoint any person as a chief or headman in charge of a tribe or of a location'.¹³⁹

The impact of the NAA on the abaThembu chieftainship can only be understood when the political status of South Africa, a member of the British Commonwealth at the time of the legislation, is put into perspective. The Governor-General as supreme chief was a representative of the British crown, and thus exercised all the prerogatives vested in the King in respect of South Africa. When the country became a republic in terms of Act No.32 of 1961, the State President of South Africa superseded the Governor-General as supreme chief.¹⁴⁰ The application of the NAA would mean that the terms of the appointment of Jongilizwe to Paramount chieftainship and those of his successors would change.

After ruling for only four years, Jongilizwe (the first abaThembu Chief and, incidentally, probably the first chief in the Transkei region, to have owned a motor car),¹⁴¹ died of enteric fever on 6 July 1928.¹⁴² His daughter, Nopenge, attributes her father's death to a quarrel he had had with the members of a Kondlo family from the amaQoma clan. He fell ill after he had shot at his opponents, giving his family reason to believe that his death was a result of food poisoning.¹⁴³ Chief Jonginyaniso has claimed that Chief Jongilizwe's short reign is better remembered in *abaThembuland* for an incident which resulted in some families of the Mvulane deserting their village. This was subsequent to a quarrel between the Paramount Chief and a certain man involving a woman. Jongilizwe not only shot at his enemies but also banished them from his immediate vicinity (though not from *abaThembuland*). His illness and eventual death after this incident, is attributed by his family to the determination of his opponents to punish him for his high-handedness, rather than to enteric fever. Mthikakra has reported that those that he chased away found refuge in the Elliotdale district where they are still settled today. He also remarked that evidently Jongilizwe had inherited his grandfather Ngangelizwe's temper.¹⁴⁴ Chief Zwelodumo jocularly confessed that one trait that they all seem to have inherited from Ngangelizwe is short-temperedness.¹⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

This chapter has revealed three aspects about the abaThembu paramountcy of the period 1920-28. These are the somewhat varying leadership styles and their political value on the paramountcy, the criterion used by the authorities to gauge and measure, in particular, Dalindyebo's performance and lastly, the incompatibility of the indigenous and Union government's criteria in assessing performance. Dalindyebo has been portrayed in this chapter as someone who seemed to regard his leadership as a function of the office he held rather than an exercise that originated in his desire to be of service to his subjects. Jongilizwe's reign was unfortunately too short to be used as a fair basis for a comparison with his father's. He had, however, promised to improve on his father's reign and there is evidence that his death possibly interrupted a reign that had begun well.

The chapter has also described how the independence and autonomy of abaThembu chieftainship was compromised under Dalindyebo. It has been shown that the erosion of indigenous autonomy of the abaThembu paramountcy was a gradual process, orchestrated by both the authorities' bureaucratic policies and Dalindyebo's egocentricism. In the eyes of the government, Dalindyebo was a good chief who led by example. To his abaThembu critics, however, he paid little regard to the abaThembu interests and needs, preferring instead that his subjects should follow behind. This chapter has shown that in this respect Dalindyebo failed the abaThembu nation.

This chapter has shown that the political climate during Dalindyebo's rule favoured the white South Africa's interests. This was in the period that followed the annexations and at a time when Ngangelizwe's warlike activities were still remembered by his contemporaries. Mbekeni's remark about Dalindyebo being under strict surveillance reinforces the above thinking. It has been argued in the chapter that Dalindyebo's responses to the government overtures which earned him its commendations better reflected the criterion it used to measure the extent of his compliance than any other standard that could have been used to assess the performance of any chief. The

chapter has thus presented as a comparative study of personalities, and assessment of leadership styles and the influences that determined the attitudes of the various players.

The chapter has portrayed Dalindyebo to be both cowardly and timid in his willingness to curry favour with the government. His failure to back Reverend Tile's initiative and efforts to establish a national abaThembu church with himself as its head shows that he missed an opportunity to boost his paramountcy for the benefit of abaThembu nation. His responses and reactions to situations in which all that was expected of him was his spiritual support; his ambivalence in the conduct of the political business of the chieftdom; and his interaction with parties whose interests were incompatible, portrayed him as a weak-willed individual. It has further shown that the gravitas deriving from Dalindyebo's traditional status - which might have influenced the extra-parliamentarians to take up the aborted Tile-Dalindyebo consensus - was of little consequence. The chapter has revealed that because the much adored abaThembu Paramount Chief was unable to reconcile his obligations as a chief beholden to the government with his sympathy with the progressive cause he was unable to gain the support of either the apolitical or the progressive among his people. It is also shown that Dalindyebo's educational background cannot be ignored. The fact that he was educated inspired confidence in him and in his people, as it did in the government. He was considered by the state to be an enlightened chief who could be used as a bridge between tradition and the new dispensation. Members of the extra-parliamentary organizations are also presumed to have had faith in an educated paramount chief who could relay to his followers franchise issues and effect of legislation on land rights on them.

The chapter has portrayed Dalindyebo as someone who attracted to his person all factions none of whom could in the end boast of having won him over. He could at best be described as one who held a precarious balance, maintained a delicate equilibrium and in the end earned for his nation a good name in the government's eyes. He was easy to persuade but difficult to keep persuaded. The question asked, then, is who benefitted most from Dalindyebo's actions: the government, the abaThembu, or himself as paramount chief?

It has been made clear that by his active involvement in the establishment of the Bhunga, a body to which he gave up his very traditional status for that of a sub-chief in the pay of the government, Dalinyebo weakened the status of his chieftainship. His reaction to the implications of the Land Act and land surveying portray him as a leader that was not responsive to the needs of his subjects.

In fairness, however, it has been argued that Dalinyebo at least left his successors a stable chiefdom, albeit at a price. That he left behind an heir too young to succeed to the paramountcy was a weakness and a limitation, as well as being of political advantage for the chiefdom. It is shown that had Regent Silimela had a longer term the abaThembu chieftainship could perhaps have had a better future. The chapter has shown that the resolution of the regency crisis after Dalinyebo's death was one of the few instances which proved that customary law had mechanisms in place to move forward. The availability of Silimela for regency validated the traditional function of the *Qadi* House.

Finally this chapter has, by its allusion to Jongilizwe's promise when he came to power, hinted that his premature death possibly robbed the abaThembu of an opportunity to experience national renaissance.

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²Dubow: "Holding 'a just balance between white and black,'" *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 12, No.2 (April 1986). p. 218.

³ Broster : *The Thembu*, p. 2.

⁴The Rev. E.J. Warner Testifies : Report and Proceedings , With Appendices, Of The Government Commission On Native Laws And Customs (Cape Town, 1883), p.337.

⁵ J. G. Strijdom's Minute No.774 – Governor-General, File No 32/27(Cape Archives), 24 April 1958.

⁶ Wagenaar : "A History Of The Thembu" p. 97.

⁷ Strijdom's Minute No.774 – Governor-General, File No 32/27(Cape Archives), 24 April 1958.

⁸ N/A 673/F721, Secr(DNA) – Messrs Edgecome & Coy, (Cape Archives) File No 32/27, 10 May 1920.

⁹ Sanders : “How Customary is African Customary Law”, XX, *Comparative International Journal of Southern Africa*, (Unisa, 1987), p. 406.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 407.

¹¹ W. Mbekeni : Interviewed (*quoting his father Dikiso/ Dickson, a contemporary of Dalindyebo*) by D.S Yekela, 31 July 2004.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Zwelodumo Mthikrakra (a descendant of Silimela Ngangelizwe) : interviewed by D.S.Yekela, Ngcobo, 29 June 2009.

¹⁴ C. C. Saunders : “Tile and the Tembu Church : Politics and Independence on the Cape Eastern Frontier in the late nineteenth century” *Journal of African History*, XI, 4, (1970), p. 554.

¹⁵ D. W. Hammond-Tooke : “Chieftainship in Transkeian Political Development”, *the Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2, 4, 1964, p. 516.

¹⁶ Saunders : “Tile and the Tembu Church”, *Journal of African History*, XI, 4, (1970), p. 562.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Wagenaar : “A History of the Tembu”, p. 225.

¹⁹ Saunders : “Tile and the Tembu Church”, *Journal of African History*, XI, 4, (1970), p. 562.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ W. K. Mbekeni : quoting his father Dikiso(Dickson) Mbekeni, a contemporary of Dalindyebo, 20 November 2001.

²² J. Labuschagne : “Tradition, Modernization and the Transkei Constitution”, (Inaugural Lecture, Fort Hare University, 12th June 1975, p.13.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "The Transkei" (issued by the Department of Information, Pretoria, n.d.), p.8.

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²⁶ Chief Magistrate of Thembuland and Transkei (H. Scott) - J. Innes (Under Secretary for Native Affairs), (LND 1.726 (Cape Archives), 29 April 1895.

²⁷ H. Elliot (Resident Magistrate –SNA, (LND 1/726(Cape Archives), 24 March, 1897.

²⁸ Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa Vol. 10, (Cape Town, 1974), p. 561.

²⁹ L. Ntsebeza : "Structures And Rural Struggles" p.44-45.

³⁰ E. M. Sangoni : "Paramount Chiefs of Tembuland" BANTU 7(5) 1960 : 272-3, p. 272.

³¹ Cingo : Iballi, p.61.

³² D. Woods : "Transkei Independence ; South Africa's calculated risk": (Johannesburg, 1975) p. 204.

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⁴⁰ Z. Mthikrakra : interviewed by D.S.Yekela telephonically 13 June 2010.

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⁴³ Karis and Carter (ed.) : *From Protest to Challenge*, p.11.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ S. J. Ngqongqo : “Mpilo Walter Benson Rubusana 1858-1910” (Unpublished M.A thesis, In this background must be Fort Hare, 1997), p.142.

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⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 32.

⁴⁹ Maylam : *A History of the African People*, p. 155.

⁵⁰ Walshe : *African Nationalism*, p. 35.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 120.

⁵² Ibid., p. 211.

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59. K.D. Matanzima interviewed by D.S. Yekela, 9 September 1998.

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⁶⁸ Switzer : Power & Resistance, p. 220.

⁶⁹ NA 673/F721, SNA – Secretary for Finance Department (FINDEPT), Pretoria Archives, 673/F.721, F.11/12, 15/6/1920.

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⁷⁵ Mbekeni : interview, 21 November 2001.

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⁷⁹ RMO (Umtata – CMT, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 13/444, 26 June 1920.

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⁸² Cingo : *Ibali*, p.127.

⁸³ Z. Mthikrakra : interviewed by D.S Yekela, 29 June 2009.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ RMO (Umtata) – CMT, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 13/444, 26 June 1920.

⁸⁷ Z. Mthikrakra: interviewed, 29 June 2010.

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⁸⁹ RMO (Umtata) – CMT, Cape Archives. File 32/27, 13/444, 26 June 1920.

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⁹¹ RMO (Umtata) Norton – CMT, Cape Archives, No. 287.29/13528, 12 November 1920.

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⁹⁵ B. Mthikrakra : interviewed, 1 May 2010.

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¹⁰³ SNA (Herbst) – CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 22 September, 1924.

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- ¹⁰⁹ W.D. Hammond-Tooke : “*The Journal of William Shaw*,” (Cape Town, 1972) p.37.
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- ¹¹¹ Popi Lusu : conversation with (quoting Phyllis Mabona) (n.d. both deceased))
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- ¹²⁰ RMO (Mthatha) Norton – CMT, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 4 May 1926.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² Ibid.
- ¹²³ Nopenge Mgolombane : Interviewed by D.S Yekela , Tabase (Mthatha District) 2 September, 2005.

- ¹²⁴ Mbekeni : interviewed by D. S. Yekela , 5 May 2005.
- ¹²⁵ Z.Mthikrakra : interviewed, 13 June 2010.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid. .
- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
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- ¹³⁰ Mandela : *Long Walk*, p.6.
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- ¹³⁸ “Statutes of the Union of South Africa’ Vol. 1, 1927, p. 314.
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- ¹⁴¹ Sangoni ; “Paramount Chiefs” Bantu, p. 273.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE ERA OF REGENTS : ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP 1928-1954

INTRODUCTION

The death of Paramount Chief Dalindyebo came at a time when the institution of chieftainship was beginning to appear impermanent. He had served abaThembuland in a way that through him endeared the abaThembu to the authorities and eventually earned him political benefits through his equivocal diplomacy. It meant the government lost someone whom they had effectively used for short- and long-term benefits, and that it robbed them of a mediator through whom its peace was brokered with the abaThembu and their allies. Regent Silimela's term did not mark any significant departure from the socio-political systems that were in place during Dalindyebo's rule. This situation surely worked well for the image of the abaThembu chieftainship in the eyes of the government.

The question that might have confronted both the critics and admirers of Dalindyebo was whether his successors would be able to continue his interactive policy with the government. The kind of problems that surfaced after his death suggested that there was a potential for a long drawn-out conflict. Much was expected of Dalindyebo's heir, Jongilizwe. In the light of these great expectations, this chapter begins by examining the state of abaThembu paramountcy at the time of Jongilizwe's sudden death. It looks at both the leadership vacuum and the crisis that confronted a kingdom whose reputation in the past was that it had been ably led.

It is argued that certain forces woven into the abaThembu customary fabric threatened to complicate the succession to the paramountcy after the death of Jongilizwe. The chapter focuses on the nature of the problems that emerged, and explains the rationale for the procedures and measures that were followed to address the crisis that had no precedent in the recorded history of abaThembu chieftainship. The strengths and weaknesses that were inherent in the Union legislation and its customary counterpart

will be identified to see which of the two systems was of assistance to abaThembu paramountcy in regard to the problem of succession.

The chapter analyses the forces that were instrumental in the survival and endurance of the abaThembu paramountcy during the twenty-five year regency which inevitably brought about a long, though not lasting, disjointedness in the Jongilizwe dynasty. Aspects of both the indigenous and 'official customary law' - such as was legislated by the Union government - will be examined to see if there were any challenges to the smooth operation of the abaThembu paramountcy from 1928 to 1954. This analysis will be taken a step further by the interrogation of both political systems to see if their strengths and/or weaknesses inadvertently or by government design sometimes sabotaged the authority of the successive regents. The chapter further examines the extent to which either or both of these systems worked towards either strengthening or weakening the stability of the abaThembu paramountcy.

The final section of the chapter will deal with the unceremonious exit of Dabulamanzi, the last of the regents. It will be argued that the circumstances around the deposition of Dabulamanzi, the domestic politics involved in the exercise as well as the instruments used to effect it at the instance of the abaThembu elders and patriotic councillors were all evidence of the power inherent in indigenous law. The chapter will also explain the limitations of 'official customary law', as seen in the system's failure to veto the regent's dethronement. Finally, there will be an interrogation of the possible impact of these events on the future of the abaThembu paramountcy, and its readiness for the next incumbent.

CARVING A WAY FORWARD: ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP AFTER THE DEATH OF JONGILIZWE

The death of Jongilizwe created a unique problem in the history of the 20th century abaThembu chieftainship as a chief had died before taking a Great Wife. It also brought discontinuity, albeit temporarily, in the hereditary line of rulers descended from the House of Ngangelizwe. Against this background a meeting took place at the Bumbane

Great Place on 6 July 1928 for the sole purpose of nominating a regent.¹ This is an office which, by securing the rights of the house that produces heirs, perpetuates and upholds the principle of legitimacy. The abaThembu deliberations culminated in the nomination of David Jongintaba Dalindyebo for appointment as regent during the minority of the (as yet unidentified) heir.

The nomination of Jongintaba showed an inconsistency, and perhaps a non-adherence to or disregard of customary guidelines. On Dalindyebo's death, the regency of Jongintaba was opposed on grounds that seemed convincing at the time. These were based on political and customary considerations, the personal sentiments of the Great Wife as well as considerations of Jongintaba's social profile. Nohajisi's death meant that her objections were irrelevant. The other objections were now positively relevant and, perhaps, politically convenient. Mandela in his autobiography has described the controversy surrounding the appointment of Jongintaba to the position of Chief Regent. He claims that when the opinion of his father, Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa Mandela, (whom he has acknowledged as kingmaker and adviser) was sought in connection with the above appointment, he recommended Jongintaba,² on the grounds that the regent-designate 'was the best educated. Jongintaba.....would not only be a fine custodian of the crown but an excellent mentor to the young prince.'³ It would seem that Mandela's choice was informed more by a progressive spirit than by customary norms. The fact that during the 1920s, being progressive was synonymous with colonial thinking and/or indoctrination was in itself politically ironic. Jongintaba's only administrative experience was acquired while he was an ordinary headman of Mqhekezweni Village.⁴ This makes his competence as a prospective mentor for the prince rather questionable, while his lack of status would, ironically enough, make him an ideal choice as a disinterested custodian of the abaThembu crown. No evidence has yet been found to prove that Jongintaba ever lived with the heir at his provisional abaThembu Great Place. Had this been the case it would have demonstrated a step towards effective mentoring, as much as it would have created an uneasiness amongst all those who were jealously guarding the political interests of the Great House of Jongilizwe. This study argues that the endorsement of Jongintaba's appointment was a gross violation of the objections that

were raised against his regency in 1920. Other than disregarding the late Nohajisi's objections it became clear that Gadla Mandela's opinion was dominant. He recommended Jongintaba, not on the basis of customary criteria, but rather on the grounds of his educational qualifications.

Mandela has reported with some pride that his 'father's choice was ultimately accepted by both the Thembus and the British government'.⁵ Jongintaba was the first mThembu Chief to be appointed under the provisions of the NAA of 1927. Young emphasised the fact that the nominee 'was 42 years of age and his loyalty is [was] beyond question'.⁶ The fact that Jongintaba was a christianized chief was perceived by the government as a possible guarantee of his loyalty. Further, Jongintaba's Christian inclinations could well have qualified him a proper heir to the Dalindyebo legacy. This comment should not detract from Mandela's unselfish and patriotic intentions in the choice of the chief regent.

Young endorsed a recommendation for a payment of £40 a year as compensation to Jongintaba who would act as regent until a procedural appointment had been made at a meeting representative of the abaThembu and their chiefs.⁷ Welsh, as Chief Magistrate, supported the temporary appointment of Jongintaba pending the holding of a further meeting of the chieftdom to make a permanent appointment.⁸ In his August report to Welsh, Young confirmed that 'at a meeting of the Tembu people held at Bumbane on the 11th instant, which was attended by responsible Chiefs and Headmen of the Districts of Umtata, Engcobo, St Marks, Mqanduli and Elliotdale, David Jongintaba Dalindyebo was nominated unanimously as Regent'.⁹ Jongintaba's temporary appointment was, in this way, ratified.

JONGINTABA BECOMES CHIEF REGENT

The accession of Jongintaba led to the transformation of his household in the Mqhekezweni Village of the Mthatha District into the Great Place. Mandela has confirmed that for as long as Jongintaba was the Chief Regent Mqhekezweni was the provisional capital of abaThembuland.¹⁰ That there had been no vociferous objection to

Jongintaba's nomination was a positive sign which must have been an indication of the solidarity and cohesion of the abaThembu kingdom as regards this matter. Young, however, remarked pertinently with regard to Jongintaba's conduct prior to his regency, saying that 'during the past three or four years he has reformed and I feel sure that he will fill the post satisfactorily'.¹¹ Mbekeni, a contemporary of Jongilizwe, expressed a different view when he remarked that 'Jongintaba and Ndumiso [a cousin to the regent] were both careless, very mischievous and extravagant. Jongintaba did not find it easy to shed the stigma of extravagance even when he was regent. He did not disappoint those who knew him to be a lavish spender by shedding his old habits'.¹² While Mbekeni's claims appear to justify Ntsebeza and Ndletyana's findings about Jongintaba's well-to-do image which could not be matched by his successor, Dabulamanzi,¹³ their assertions seem to inadvertently validate Mbekeni's reports about his extravagant cousin. Magistrate Allison's remark to the chief magistrate to the effect that sometimes Jongintaba presented himself in the magistrate's office under the influence of alcohol¹⁴ also supports Mbekeni's claim.

The Chief Regent's primary task was to oversee the traditional process of designating the legitimate successor to Jongilizwe Dalindyebo. The declaration of the heir would, inter alia, also serve the purpose of conferring on the status of regency a practical and political image. The fact that Jongilizwe's premature death did not pre-empt a clear-cut succession by any one of the sons he had at the time of his death created a rationale for a political precedent which distinguishes the abaThembu chieftainship as unique. There was a pressing need to invent an ideal situation in order to regularize the predicament of a chieftdom without a designated heir. In this context it seemed logical to apply Comaroff's standard prescription which had, from time immemorial, governed succession procedures and processes among patrilineal societies. It was that 'the heir must be the eldest son of his father's principal wife'.¹⁵ This apparent political formula needed to be given a practical meaning in the context of the abaThembu chieftainship in order to keep in check any possible manipulation of the regal status by rival claimants and interested parties.

A paramount chief had died leaving behind four widows none of whom was designated a 'Great Wife'. While Jongilizwe lived it was a matter of public assumption that he was yet to take in a Great Wife'. Without the house designated the Great House for the Great Wife, the legitimacy of the heir was only a theoretical concept. There did not seem to have been political precedents of the kind that confronted the abaThembu in the post-Jongilizwe era. With the death of Ngubengcuka in 1832, without an heir, his Great Wife, Nonesi, imported Mthikrakra from the *Qadi* House and brought him up on her lap.¹⁶ Mthikrakra's heirdom was created in this way. The practical and physical aspect of the role of the Great House in validating the legitimate status of the heir was also demonstrated and made visible. The abaThembu custom of creating the heir by absorbing a child from the supporting house, *eQadini*, had been put into practice. A similar experiment is currently 'work in progress' with regard to the Great House of Silimela. The heir, Jonginyathi has no issue and this has forced the elders to invoke the custom by absorbing the first born male from Silimela's *Qadi* House, the house from which Chief Zwelodumo (an important informant in this study) originates through Chief Busobengwe. The created heir in this case, whose chieftainship is held by Zwelodumo at Quluqhu (Ngcobo), is Chief Zwelodumo's minor son, Kamvelihle.¹⁷

The predicament that existed in abaThembuland after the death of Jongilizwe called for a socio-political reconciliation between cultural practices and bureaucratic formulae. Otherwise the NAA as a prescribing instrument would have no room for application. What Crais describes as a 'cross-cultural encounter of a political kind'¹⁸ in the context of colonial conquest I qualify as a cross-politico-cultural encounter between the indigenous and colonial political systems in a rather inflexible setting. It must also be noted that the regency status of Jongintaba could only be legally prescribed after the heir had been declared. In this regard the customary practice must be seen to be both a fundamental and consummating factor which would give meaning to, and enable, the official customary law to take effect.

THE CHIEF REGENT PRESIDES AT THE GRADING OF JONGILIZWE'S WIVES

Jongilizwe had married NoNciba by whom he had two sons named Nxeko and Mthandeni as well as a girl named Nompumelelo. No-Ashiya, Jongilizwe's first wife had two sons named Matoti and Mvuyelwa. In NoKapa's house one girl, Nopenge, was born. The fourth wife, Novoti had a daughter called Nompucuko.¹⁹ Novoti was to give birth soon.²⁰ This fact was instrumental in the decision taken at the meeting of 11 August 1928 to shelve the proclamation of the heir until after Novoti's confinement. It must therefore be assumed that Novoti's giving birth to a baby boy on 28 November 1928²¹ was what brought to a close the exercise of designating Jongilizwe's successor. The birth took place in the early hours of the morning at Jongintaba's Mqhekezweni Great Place under the midwifery of No-England Jongintaba.²²

The delay in designating the heir was an anomaly in view of the fact that Jongilizwe had three sons from his other wives at the time of his death. This situation makes it imperative to interrogate the extent to which the ranks of the wives of King Jongilizwe prescribed the differing statuses of his male children. It was this latter factor which necessarily called for the re-ordering of the houses of Jongilizwe in relation to one another. This exercise, itself a political precedent in the 20th century history of abaThembu chieftainship, highlighted the importance of the hierarchy of the royal wives as a decisive factor in the ranking of the sons. A fact of great historical significance is that both the re-ordering of the wives and ranking of the sons would keep in check the conflict of claims of co-wives and regulate rival claims by Jongilizwe's sons at some future date. It must be noted that the definition of the regency was given a practical meaning in the identification of the legitimate incumbent. This would enable the abaThembu to uphold the regency, not just as a stop-gap to effect continuity in governance, but also as a consolidating factor. It was thus within the context of the authority vacuum that a meeting of the abaThembu notables in September 1929 must be seen.

As Novoti had given birth to a boy it was a matter of political urgency to finalise the grading of Jongilizwe's wives so as to complete the process of nominating his successor. The abaThembu unanimously graded the royal wives as follows: No-Ashiya, the first wife to be married,²³ a Poswa maiden from a commoner background was ranked as the wife of the RHH.²⁴ NoKapa was allocated the *Xhiba* House, (an independent house/the seed -bearer).²⁵ Nonciba, a Qiya maiden from the amaHlanga clan of Mqanduli was ranked the Qadi to the Great House.²⁶ Since it was customary for the Great Wife of a chief to be a non-mThembu and, if possible, of royal blood,²⁷ Nonciba was automatically disqualified on the grounds that she was a Qiya-Hlanga: 'Hlanga and Dlomo are the same thing. Her marriage with Jongilizwe out of which Nxeko and Mthandeni were born was found to have been incestuous.'²⁸ Novoti was the only one who met the requirements to qualify for the position of Great Wife when the abaThembu chieftdom met to establish the ranking of the four widows on 23 September 1929.²⁹ This daughter of Gwadiso Nogemane of the Khonjwayo clan, a junior chieftainship, was accordingly nominated the Great Wife.³⁰ The nomination as Great Wife of the last of Jongilizwe's wives to be married³¹ qualified her infant son Sabata, as the future Paramount Chief.

The historical significance of this meeting at which the widows were graded, itself a political precedent, derived from the fact that it fell outside the provisions of the 1927 Native Administration Act that legislated on, and/or legitimised chieftainships at the time. Yet it seemed to be an imperative customary and cultural dialogue without which the abaThembu chieftainship of the post-Jongilizwe era would not have been officially sanctioned.

The nomination of Novoti as Great Wife was, in Comaroff's prescription, the culmination of both the rationalization and explanation of the succession formula in the house of Jongilizwe.³² The declaration of the heir and successor to Jongilizwe was both an achievement and a tribute to the Chief Regent. The rationalisation of the process referred to above was reinforced by the further stipulation that if the heir (in this case, Sabata) were to die he would be succeeded by his brothers in order of seniority as

prescribed by the ranks of their mothers. The abaThembu were unanimous in their decision that 'the present children of----Jongilizwe must not be divided by any illegitimate children 'picked up' by his widows'.³³ This is how the rights of Jongilizwe's descendants were secured.

The nomination of Sabata as heir also conferred on the regentship a notion of definite impermanence and/or political limitation. As effectively regent from 7 July 1928, Jongintaba was paid £40 per annum in addition to the £30 subsidy he drew as the headman of Mqhekezweni Village. Over and above the £70 the regent would be in receipt of £500 per annum³⁴ 'as subsidy to the Chief of the Thembu Tribe-this amount is actually being paid for the support of the members of the family of the late chief'.³⁵ The above allocation shows clearly that the treasurer, in this case, the chief regent, received no incentive. The biggest slice was thus not for use by him as he pleased, even though there were no checks and balances to monitor his expenditure.

BROWNLEE RECOMMENDS INCREASE FOR JONGINTABA

Hardly a year after his appointment, Jongintaba requested, through the office of the magistrate, an increase in his allowance. The government in their response explained that it was not 'possible----to exceed that amount without special approval of Parliament'.³⁶ The implementation of the NAA (sic) of 1927 should be seen in the magisterial response. The parliamentary symbol that the SNA alluded to was that the Governor-General was actually supreme chief and the chief regent was merely an appointee. Mamdani reiterates that 'the Native Affairs(sic) Act of 1927 gave the Governor-in-Council an unqualified right to appoint whomsoever he considered suitable to a chiefship'.³⁷ Much as Jongintaba was a prince of blood, in his new position he was a government appointee by virtue of both the application and operation of the act at the time of his accession to regency. His period as regent illustrates best the extent to which the legislation of the early 20th century had restricted the abaThembu chiefs' source of revenue. The chief regent in turn found himself in a dilemma that had come about as a result of the incompatibility of the traditional law with the official customary law. The latter assumed a superior position to traditional law. This was evidenced by the

substitution of what Sanders calls 'autonomic law' by 'invented tradition' or 'official customary law' which was embodied in the Union government legislation.³⁸ The government's dilemma became clearly apparent in a letter that Magistrate Brownlee wrote to Herbst, the SNA, in which he wrote 'I hasten to ask you if you can in any way influence the Prime Minister to give this man a salary consistent with the high office which he holds'.³⁹ Brownlee went on to draw Herbst's attention to the size of Jongintaba's territory:

You know the Territories intimately and you know that the Ngubengcuka family are regarded as paramounts not only in the Umtata district but also in those of Mqanduli, Engcobo and Cofimvaba. The Tembu of Lady Frere district---recognize this family as that of their one time Supreme Chief. This position is no doubt one of great honour, it certainly is one of great responsibility, and no one now living knows better than I do the tremendous influence which the head of such a family can exercise over their people. Fortunately for us, in the last fifty years and more, that influence has been on the side of law and order, or in other words, has been on the side of the Government. That influence cannot be appraised in terms of money, for it is beyond all price---The Tembu is the premier chief of the Cape Province, but I think his salary is less than that of the Pondo chief, whose country was taken over from them against their wish and at a much later date than that of the Tembu. In the case of the Tembu and their chiefs, the obligations we owe them are enhanced by the fact that it was they who spontaneously requested the Government to assume their rule over them and their country. If you consider carefully what we have taken from these people and compare it with what we give them in return I think you will begin to realize how much we owe them materially alone.⁴⁰

Brownlee's plea reflected the behind-the-scenes manipulation of government's policies by former and incumbent bureaucrats. His confiding in Herbst the reasons for his personal interest in Jongintaba's case portrays the 'man on the spot', Herbst, as an official whose politically strategic position was such that he could make things happen.

Brownlee warned the government to guard against losing what they had 'unscrupulously' taken from the colonised, and advocated that they should rather adopt an appeasement approach when dealing with exceptional administrative cases. While he suggested that little increments such as the one requested by Jongintaba could never compare with what the 'Supreme Chief' had, over time, gained from the indigenes, he subtly pleaded for a concerted effort to retain with favour what they had,

and still hoped, to acquire. As an experienced official, Brownlee was aware that his government had not, over almost half a century, produced any law which had proved adequately equipped to regulate the socio-political and economic aspects of chieftainship. The government's failure in this regard made the assimilation of indigenous law into official customary law difficult, as a result of which the institutional chieftainship continued to pose a challenge to the successive administrative systems. It is clear that Secretary Herbst's office had at its disposal fundamental authority to influence major decisions by simply putting forward motivations and recommendations for his seniors to act on. This was the reason Brownlee 'hastened', without too much loss of time, to plead firstly with Herbst for preferential treatment and special concessions to be given to Jongintaba, the 'Premier Chief of the Cape Province'.⁴¹

Against this background Brownlee advocated the nurturing, at all costs, of the loyalty of co-operative chiefs like Jongintaba. His political domain was extensive and it was important that he be helped and encouraged to play and fulfil his role as 'national provider' satisfactorily. This would guarantee him the loyalty of his constituency while through him as a loyal chief, the Supreme Chief would rule the abaThembu. Rapport between government officials and the abaThembu chiefs, such as Brownlee was proposing, would be truly symbolic of the emerging political order of post-colonial abaThembuland. He was for 'pacification through concession' in order to produce a political environment that would be conducive to the creation of orderly systems of administration. If Jongintaba's allegiance to the government was nurtured at all levels of the administrative ladder the abaThembu kingdom would not only be easy to govern but would also be a model to be emulated by other Cape Nguni chiefdoms. The assumption was that the benefits that the government had bestowed on the abaThembu as a result of their good conduct and loyalty would be an incentive to the other chiefs. Jonginyaniso's reference to the extensive travelling that Jongintaba had to do almost on a daily basis, gives justification to Brownlee's plea to the government. The chief regent was expected to visit, on a regular basis, his customary mother, Nopalamente, at Dalindyebo's *eXhibeni* House. It was here that Novoti had been traditionally initiated as a newly-wed young woman."⁴² He also had to oversee the conduct of affairs at the

Great Wife's home and at the homes of the other three wives. The distance between the provisional Great Place and the Jongilizwe widows' homes at Tyhalara warranted a special travelling allowance.⁴³ Ngangomhlaba has praised Jongintaba as a great patriot and lover of his people who visited all the different corners of abaThembuland whenever an opportunity presented itself. If Ngangomhlaba's testimony is anything to go by, then Jongintaba deserved a sizeable allowance to be able to cover the great distance to Western abaThembuland. The crucial question was, however, whether the government preferred to govern abaThembuland as two separate entities or as one whole. This would reflect in their response to the application for an increase in subsidy, for, if the decentralised abaThembuland served the government's interests better, then Jongintaba's extended visits to Western abaThembuland would surely be regarded as an unwarranted expenditure.

An evaluation of Jongintaba's term as regent reveals on the surface that his execution of duty was greatly handicapped by either insufficient funding or his bad management of finances. In almost all correspondence with the Magistrate's office he was pleading for an increase to his subsidy. A number of factors could have precipitated Jongintaba's financial predicament. Whilst the failure to balance expenditure with income always has a negative impact on financial management, it is likely that his stipend as a headman, his subsidy as Chief Regent and his allowance for Jongilizwe's family were simply not sufficient to enable him to cover his many financial commitments. It was not within the ambit of the Colonial government to acknowledge or even to recognize some of these commitments. It must be presumed that among these was the obligation to pay back the favour of Gadla Mandela whose persuasive skills had won Jongintaba the position of regency. Nelson Mandela has testified in his autobiography that Jongintaba had not forgotten that it was due to his father's intervention that he had become chief regent.⁴⁴ 'In time, Jongintaba would return the favour in a way that my father could not then [in 1928] imagine.'⁴⁵ Jonginyaniso revealed in an interview that the chief regency was generally perceived as a lucrative position and for that reason it was always coveted.⁴⁶ This is not to say that Jongintaba was not culturally obliged to sustain members of his extended family. Thus it is argued here that the political presence of the state as

symbolised in regulatory legislation was both obstructive and destructive in the execution of cultural obligations which were vital and invaluable as a bonding factor in the indigenous community. Mandela has also claimed in his book that Jongintaba's household was later joined by Nxeko, the son of Jongilizwe from Nonciba's house.⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that Nxeko had an allowance that was paid on a monthly basis to his mother while he in fact was residing elsewhere. In addition to supporting some members of his extended family, Jongintaba also kept them clothed and paid for their education. Mandela has provided no evidence to the effect that he had a bursary or scholarship even when he studied at Fort Hare, and this suggests that Jongintaba possibly sponsored his university education. The chief regent was prevented by legislation from augmenting his income by unorthodox means because that was perceived as irregular practice which was characteristic of a 'barbarous people.'⁴⁸ He was therefore forced to abide by his dependency status. There was little likelihood, however, that the magistrate would have knowingly assisted him with material benefits of any kind, had Jongintaba solicited educational funding for the son (Nelson) of a man (Gadla Mandela) who had only a decade earlier defied the summons from one of his predecessors. Jonginyaniso further revealed that Jongintaba travelled frequently to Quluqhu (Ngcobo District) to consult with Chief Silimela.⁴⁹ Silimela's counsel was regarded as of great value in the House of Dalindyabo. There is no evidence to suggest that financial allowance was made available for these consultative journeys.

Jongintaba's poor financial management obviously embarrassed the government, some of whose officials wished to consider him as competent. It also made Novoti, the Great Wife, lose confidence in him as one who was capable and competent to manage the estate of Chief Jongilizwe and attend to the needs of his extensive family. In a letter written on 6 April 1932, the SNA alluded to a misunderstanding between Novoti and Jongintaba. The misunderstanding had apparently arisen from his failure to 'adequately discharge his responsibilities towards the family of the late chief'.⁵⁰ This was due to the fact that the regent had become seriously involved financially, firstly

by reason of the...debt for which the estate of the late chief (Jongilizwe) was liable and which had to be met from the subsidy paid to the estate, secondly, by reason of his own personal extravagance, and, thirdly, owing to the fact that he

was compelled to incur heavy expenditure in extending hospitality to visitors and in otherwise suitably maintaining the dignity of the Great Place.⁵¹

The SNA made it clear in his reply that 'out of the amount of £500 the £120 was for the support of the late Chief's family while the £320 was for the Chief Regent. The £60 was for the minor heir'.⁵² In one of his personal applications for increase in subsidy Jongintaba had stated thus his personal circumstances:

You are aware that I am a native, and as such keep no accounts of my expenditure, --- I maintain and support my late father's family, which is rather large, my late brother's family and my own. I have a son attending school at Healdtown Native Institution, for whom I pay £14 a year as school fees. In addition to the above, I have a great number of dependents, who look to me as head of the tribe, and according to Native Custom it is part of my duty to extend hospitality to visitors of the Great Place, which is in itself a heavy drain. I would respectfully beg that my allowance may be increased to £500.⁵³

The government's reluctance to address Jongintaba's complaints gave the impression that it was confronted with demands it had not anticipated and thus had not put systems in place with which to assess their validity. That the government underestimated the responsibility of sustaining a transformed abaThembu chiefship was also evident in their flat refusal to pay for the education of the 'heir apparent' and his brothers. They made it clear that "the Authorities of the institutions [Clarkebury in the case of Sabata and Healdtown in the case of Nxeko] must look to him for the payment of any costs incurred'.⁵⁴ Jongintaba's extravagance drove an uncle, Dikiso (Dickson) Mbekeni, to advise Ndumiso Mthikakra, the regent's cousin, to seek a job with a legal firm so as to be able to help pay back the debts. Ndumiso subsequently secured such work,⁵⁵ even though there is no evidence that he ever paid in full Jongintaba's numerous debts. Proof that the government wanted to see Jongintaba improving his overall management of finances and thereby earning his trust is evident in the letter that Magistrate Davidson wrote to the chief magistrate in 1929. In it Davidson remarked that 'I have most carefully observed the manner in which he has performed his duties as Chief Regent and have no hesitation in confidently stating that it has been most satisfactory and therefore recommend that his allowance be increased from £40 to £70 per annum from the 1st July 1929'.⁵⁶ Davidson's observation was not, however, vindicated by Jongintaba's on-going financial problems.

Jongintaba had also inherited Jongilizwe's old car. The extensive travelling made it necessary to send the car in for service on a regular basis, and this exhausted the regent's total allowance as much as it drained the government resources.⁵⁷ Against this background it must be understood that a subsequent application was made on behalf of the chief to the chief magistrate to provide a state car to enable the 'state chief' to execute his official errands. According to the information that Magistrate Lonsdale got from Jongintaba 'the Tembus had promised to contribute [money] to enable him to get a new car and it was necessary for him to purchase a new car to enable him to go round and hold meetings and collect the money.'⁵⁸ While passing on the regent's request, Lonsdale unequivocally stated that he was 'not prepared to recommend his application. With his last car he has not had competent drivers and the result has been very heavy debts for repairs'.⁵⁹ The following was a response to a letter written on 19 July 1934 the tone of which reflected great impatience on the part of Jongintaba:

I have the honour to request you to be good enough to forward and support my application for a car to enable me to carry out my duties and obligations both to the Government and the Tembu people. I wish to point out that the area occupied by the Tembus is a large one comprising immediately the districts of Umtata, Mqanduli, Elliotdale, Engcobo, St. Marks and Xalanga as well as Tembuland Proper and the district of Lady Frere down to the Border of Queenstown in Emigrant Tembuland. In addition the Tembus are also located in Indwe, Dordrecht and Burgersdorp where they will look to me as their head and who are dissatisfied that I have so far been unable to visit them. I feel that it is essential I should be in close touch with the people, visiting them, hearing their complaints and seeing the conditions under which they live and being present at the installation of Headmen, etc., so that I may be able truly to represent these factors to the Government and thus secure a contented people. I have heard complaints that I do not visit the people often enough and this leads to the people drifting away and being without a recognized head.⁶⁰

Correspondence between the Mthatha magistrate and his senior counterpart also reveals that Jongintaba's debts continued to dog him even after his death, to the extent that the government did not, initially, find it easy to fix the stipend for the regent who took over after him. The magistrate's office was unable to distinguish between official and personal debts as a result of Jongintaba's sundry expenses and reckless spending.⁶¹

JONGINTABA TRAPPED IN THE CONSTRAINTS OF DEPENDENCE

The period of Jongintaba's regency is best illustrated by the back-and-forth movement that was reflected in successive governments' policies. These policies were aimed at making the traditional governance conform to government's political interests. In this context Jongintaba was a chief by the grace of the Governor-General and thus was a stipendiary chief. Such a chief was, by virtue of the operation of the NAA of 1927, barred from accessing income from the formerly traditional sources of chiefly revenue. His needs were, as prescribed by Parliament, to be provided for in the stipend that he received from the 'Supreme Chief'. This was essentially a simple application of the 'cut-and-paste' kind. In this context the chief regent was an indispensable tool with an invaluable role in the political experiment of transforming the abaThembu chieftainship to a shape and political unit acceptable and amenable to the government. It was therefore unlikely that the government would allow even a man of Jongintaba's stature to accept contributions from his natural constituency for the purpose of buying a car. Such a step would be in direct opposition to the official objectives of transforming customary chieftainship into a civil institution. The dilemma that confronted the government here was that while it was replacing what it was destroying it also was learning it had to confront. This was the 'many-headed Hydra' that existed within an indigenous chieftainship.

Brownlee had displayed sensitivity and alertness to this fact in his earlier pro-Jongintaba plea to Magistrate Herbst. The abaThembu people's offer to help the regent pay for a new car, obviously a response to his earlier appeal, best reveals the options that were open to exploitation by someone who was suddenly confronted by restraints of the type appropriately described by Shula Marks as 'constraints of dependency.'⁶² At the same time the readiness of the abaThembu to contribute something towards the means of transport for their Paramount Chief supports Mayer's claim that in the eyes of their most conservative followers the natural chiefs had the legitimacy which the newer authorities [Supreme Chief] could neither have⁶³ nor comprehend. Mayer's so-called 'red followers' acknowledged Jongintaba primarily as a legitimate member of their ruling dynasty and secondarily as the paramount chief of the nation. The majority of them

might not even have been aware that their chief was a government stipendiary. It is even possible that those who did know did not think that the rigid stipulations of the 'Supreme Chief' were applicable to them. There was thus little likelihood that they would regard the government's involvement as either freeing them from their responsibility and obligation to their chief or removing from their natural leaders the aura they derived from their royal birth. It is argued that for ordinary abaThembu to help their chief purchase a car implied that they did not think that their chieftainship was supported by the White government's material resources but it existed by the good grace of the people themselves. Unfortunately the paramountcy of Jongintaba could not operate except within the political climate of its time. On the one hand the Governor-General-in-Council did not seem willing to meet Jongintaba's every need and respond to his persistent and sometimes repeated pleas for this and that. The same government could not easily abandon the abaThembu 'Paramount' who was an indispensable political figure in the Bhunga debates. Jongintaba's regency coincided with the time when the UTTGC was evolving politically. It was for this reason that the chief magistrate took the initiative in recommending Jongintaba's special allowance for attendance at the Bhunga sessions :

I have the honour to recommend that Regent Chief David Jongintaba Dalindyebo be paid an allowance of £40 for attendance at each General Council Session, and to request that ministerial approval be sought for this payment in terms of Section 3 of Chapter IV of the Regulations published under Government Notice No.1607 of 1927.⁶⁴

The government was committed to sustaining the thread that linked it to the abaThembu chieftainship. This can be seen in the fact that each time Jongilizwe's widow, Novoti, lodged a complaint about Jongintaba directly to the magistrate's office, she was advised to do so through the regent's office. This was obviously a means of entrenching Jongintaba's role as an indispensable and yet government-dependent link between the people and the Governor-General. It was imperative that the government should give Jongintaba a semblance of authority over the people, as well as confer on him, for them, the status of a mouthpiece, while it controlled him and through him the abaThembu at large.

There were other incidents that occurred during Jongintaba's regency which revealed the tension between official customary law and the abaThembu traditional law. One example was an insult by a certain Palo of Qamata to the dignity of both Jongintaba and Dalubuhle, the acting regent during Kaiser Matanzima's minority. Both chiefs admitted that 'their custom had been outraged'⁶⁵ but the constraints of the official customary law, their guiding principle, were evident in the following comment in chief magistrate's letter. He remarked that Jongintaba and Dalubuhle 'would have had no difficulty in dealing with the man according to their custom but they had decided to leave the matter in the hands of the magistrate to bring him to his senses'⁶⁶ because it was the Governor-in-Council's prerogative to punish wrong-doers. Further, as Lacey says, to keep his position and the support of his fellow tribesmen, 'a chief had to bow to greater control by white officials acting in the name of the white Parliament.'⁶⁷ The above comment was further evidence of the extent to which the legislation had undermined the autonomy of the indigenous law as well as its success in compromising its autonomic authority.

Jongintaba's impatience and apparent suspicion of the government's every move manifested itself more clearly during his last years as chief regent. Clearly these were years of disillusion, ironically, for both the traditional authorities and government. That they were probably also years of political improvisation for the authorities who did not seem to have brought forth a workable and an ideal form of government for the Black majority cannot be denied. The twelve years of Jongintaba's regency had clearly shown that the government's efforts to modify indigenous chieftainship were not a properly calculated exercise. The chieftainship of Jongintaba's time comprised different elements of imposed legislation which were unrelated to the customary institution. Added to this, it had difficult issues to address. It had survived the onslaught of the 1920 Native Affairs Act. It was undergoing a re-inventive process under the NAA of 1927. It was, at a local government level, operating under the auspices of the UTTGC which was a corollary of the 1920 NAA. All these legislative pieces were presupposed to have an inherent competence to transform the indigenous chieftainship to a 'particularistic' Blacks-only governmental institution which would symbolise their 'non-involvement in the white-dominated world'.⁶⁸ That Jongintaba was a major factor in transforming chieftainship,

albeit that he was unaware of that fact, can be seen in the letters of officials like Brownlee who pleaded, in vain, that his grievances be addressed.

After ten years in the office Jongintaba probably realised that the government was not going to concede anything. His harangue to the magistrate at a quarterly meeting held at Mthatha on 21 July 1941 for chiefs, headmen and ordinary people must be seen in the context of a paramount chief who was losing touch with his constituency. The government's tardiness to improve Jongintaba's financial situation led him to perceive the 'Supreme Chief' to be the author of his financial woes which were bound to affect his political standing. His expression of displeasure at the Governor-General's visit to certain abaThembu regions without prior consultation with him must be seen in the light of his desperation to unite and rally the abaThembu behind his person. He viewed the 'unofficial visit' not only as 'customarily unofficial' but also as a political threat and a slight to his authority. Hence his protest to the 'Supreme Chief' that he and his officials were 'dividing the Tembus and undermining my authority'.⁶⁹

The government's disregard of his pleas for increase of allowances robbed him of regular contact with his constituency. He justifiably viewed his subjects' loss of enthusiasm in matters of the chieftdom, which was reflected in their poor attendance at tribal meetings, as ominous for the survival of the abaThembu paramountcy over a united kingdom. Whilst he knew how to enforce the attendance of meetings by employing customary law, his government-derived authority was circumscribed by the political prescription of the Governor-General. 'The power of compulsion, *uswazi*, to compel people to attend the Chief Regent's meetings'⁷⁰ was not included in the provisions of the NAA of 1927. Jongintaba desperately needed *uswazi* and thus blamed the magistrate for withholding it from him. His invocation of customary weapons to address a lack of co-ordination, revealed the varying strengths of official legislation and customary laws. It also showed his absolute confidence in the effectiveness of the indigenous law to address culture-related matters as against the restraints that limited the scope of the 'official customary law' that he was now subject to. Lacey's comment that 'weakening the chiefs' role had made administration less efficient'⁷¹ comes across

as an apology for Jongintaba's action in the above regard. It must be noted that non-attendance at meetings during his regency was more an indictment on the ineffectiveness of the weapons of the 'Supreme Chief', and thus the inability of his office to sustain the remnant of the chief regent's authority. The chief's reaction also proved the correctness and relevance of Comaroff's statement that 'chiefs are not impassive observers in the process of their own evaluation'.⁷² Jongintaba could not afford to see his authority slipping through his fingers. The incompatibility of the two versions of customary law comes out in the wrangle over *uswazi*. It seems that once Jongintaba realised that the government was neglecting him, he desperately drew closer to his natural constituency. After all, his leadership over them was primarily prescribed by birth even though officially and secondarily it was sanctioned by the 'Supreme Chief'. This was a way of pursuing traditional avenues of self-strengthening once he realised that the official chieftainship was incapable of empowering him politically. There was little likelihood that the abaThembu would reject him because in their eyes he was a chief by birth irrespective of the Government's option not to vote him into a position of power by granting him authority to employ *uswazi*.

Jongintaba's insistence on *uswazi* was aimed at sustaining the rapport between the ruler and the ruled, something that would not counterbalance the established legitimacy of any chieftainship. The problem confronting him was that the Governor-General, in the words of Sanders, 'lacked independent knowledge of African customary law'.⁷³ At the same time Jongintaba's insistence on *uswazi* was not likely to be acceptable to any authority that was committed to abolishing customary practices and institutions which were regarded as repugnant to its laws. It was thus obvious that the government's failure to properly provide for him, as reflected in his letters, made it impossible for him to fulfill some of his obligations. This recognition of his helplessness drove him to extremes. He missed meetings and important appointments, ostensibly due to sickness,⁷⁴ and these, apparently, were indications of his disillusionment with a system he had earlier patronised. He was also disappointed when the chief magistrate could not arrange for him to visit the mineral baths at Caledon for the treatment of his rheumatism".⁷⁵

When Jongintaba died on 19 August 1942 he was still negotiating with the government to help him resuscitate his chiefly dignity. This the Government had not done after 14 years of Jongintaba's regency during which period various appeals were made to that effect, some from renowned Government officials like Brownlee. It cannot be said that Jongintaba made no mark during his term. Bennie credits Jongintaba for ruling abaThembu wisely and for his encouragement of the establishment of clinics in abaThembuland. Claims that he co-operated with the missionaries of all denominations⁷⁶ bear testimony to Mandela's claim that 'at Mqhekezweni religion was part of the fabric of life....The regent took his religion very seriously'.⁷⁷ Jonginyaniso confirmed that the legacy that Jongintaba, an important member of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, left the abaThembu of the Tyhalarha Village where the Great Place is located, was a church. The villagers still worship in the church that Jongintaba built less than a kilometre from King Ngangelizwe's grave.⁷⁸ Jongintaba died, leaving behind Sabata, the heir, who was still a scholar at Clarkebury.⁷⁹

DABULAMANZI SUCCEEDS JONGINTABA AMID CONTROVERSY

The death of Jongintaba left abaThembuland once more without a ruler. The abaThembu custom which had earlier excluded from the status of an heir the heir's elder brothers did not specify whether they could hold the regency for him. The nomination for the position of regency fell on Dabulamanzi, the son of Dalindyebo from the RHH. Soon after his nomination, Chief Sipendu Bacela raised an objection in a letter to the chief magistrate. This was on the grounds that the abaThembu custom did not sanction the election of a regent from the RHH while⁸⁰ 'we [abaThembu] still have a son in the Great House. This kind of election is out of our custom and creates a great inconvenience among the people.'⁸¹ It is significant for the history of the abaThembu chieftainship that Sipendu pleaded with the government 'to grant [abaThembu at large] permission to investigate and solve all native customs according to their tribes [customs prescribed by specific chiefdoms]'.⁸² Sipendu argued that Headman Melithafa Mthikrakra, a descendant from Dalindyebo's Great House, should be considered.⁸³ His request, if granted, would probably have been diametrically opposed to the government's plan. The government's response was evasive, namely : 'the matter was

fully discussed at the meeting ---- and it was there decided that it was not contrary to custom for the heir in the Right Hand House to act as regent for his nephew- the heir. The position would be different if he was chosen to act for a brother in the great house'.⁸⁴ The grounds for Sipendu's objections were politically valid, especially in the light of the testimonies from the current abaThembu chiefs. Melithafa's mother's status was not clearly defined and this fact affected his eligibility for regency. Further, unbeknown to most custodians of abaThembu crown was the fact that the nomination of Dabulamanzi was also influenced by Jongilizwe's wives. They voiced their complaints about Melithafa's autocracy and cruelty to Meligqili, Dabulamanzi's younger brother, and were outright in their preference for Dabulamanzi who they were convinced was meek.

Jonginyaniso has further confirmed that Dabulamanzi's nomination was not sanctioned by custom. His argument is that 'the offspring of the RHH are excluded from regency because they are perceived as a threat because they always put forth claims, *kuba bayabanga*, and they are never willing to hand over to the heir when the time has come.'⁸⁵ He explained further that 'usually the RHH wife is the one who is married first, and very soon afterwards she is given her rightful share of everything, and provided with a home of her own so that she has no excuse, whatsoever, to focus on the estate of the Great House'.⁸⁶ Zwelodumo has also given an account of how bitter his father's eldest brother, from the Silimela's RHH was, when he had to hand over the crown to whom it belonged. He recorded that : 'Hlathikhulu came up with all sorts of stories claiming that after all he was also of royal blood and the eldest of all Silimela's sons'.⁸⁷

This statement does not dispute the claims of the Nhlapo Commission with regard to the RHH ranking second in importance to the Great House.⁸⁸ It only serves to highlight that Dabulamanzi's choice was both ill-conceived and a violation of custom and traditional norms. Whilst Jonginyaniso mentions that Melithafa Mthikrakra was not preferred by the abaThembu on the grounds of his bad temper, it is very likely that the reasons that according to custom disqualified Dabulamanzi accounted for the government's preference for him. A government committed to modifying, transforming and

entrenching customs and traditional institutions was more likely to prefer an individual whose candidature was questionable. The likely complications and/or disputes that had been hinted at in Sipendu's protest and Jonginyaniso's comment would hopefully be resolved in a manner befitting a bureaucratic chiefship.

Ultimately the nomination of Dabulamanzi was confirmed in a letter of 18 November 1942 from V. M. de Villiers to the Chief Magistrate. The letter endorsed the unanimous nomination of Dabulamanzi as Regent at a meeting that was held on 7 November 1942 at the Bumbane Great Place. The meeting was attended by Chiefs, Headmen and the abaThembu people of Mthatha, Engcobo, St Marks, Mqanduli and Elliotdale.⁸⁹ Soon after the ratification of the appointment, the SNA processed the conferment on Dabulamanzi,

in terms of Section 12 of the Native Administration Act No.38 of 1927,of jurisdiction to hear and determine civil claims arising out of Native Law and Custom brought before him by Natives against Natives resident within the area of his jurisdiction.⁹⁰

The above notice, which appeared in the SNA's minute of 29 October 1943 must be regarded as having validated the regency of Dabulamanzi on the basis that it was official in terms of the official customary law. The chief magistrate informed Mears that Dabulamanzi 'has now assumed the important office of Regent of the Tembu Tribe with its attendant responsibilities and is residing at the Tribal Great Place on the Tyalara Farm'.⁹¹

THE VICISSITUDES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP UNDER DABULAMANZI

As chief regent, Dabulamanzi inherited the responsibility of Jongilizwe's family and that of the regent who had just died. Other than the fact that he was the second chief of the abaThembu people to operate under the 1927 NAA, his regency had no precedent. This was both in terms of the circumstances surrounding his appointment as well as his responsibilities. He also had to contend with an heir (then 14 years of age) who was fast approaching his majority. This latter factor called for more vigilance on the part of Dabulamanzi as mentor of the future paramount chief. The existence of the 'rotating

Great Place' did not seem good for the reinforcement of its dignity and prestige, even though Dabulamanzi's residing not far from Novoti's place was an advantage as far as mentoring the heir was concerned.

The government had, in the regency of Dabulamanzi, a politico-administrative challenge to correct some shortcomings in certain aspects of Jongintaba's rule. The government's refusal to 'accept legal responsibility for the settlement of claims lodged against the estate of the late Jongintaba Dalindyebo, who was paid a substantial allowance both in his personal capacity and as regent' was an indictment of the Supreme Chief. His office had failed to put stringent measures in place to monitor how Jongintaba spent the allowances and subsidies he received. It must be presumed that the experience that the Governor-General's office had with Jongintaba as regent gave it an idea of what parts of the customary practices and institutions were repugnant to the legislation, and thus needed to be outlawed and/or abolished. It was possibly this state of affairs that partly contributed to the passing, in 1951, of a much refurbished Act as the Bantu Authorities Act (BAA).

The immediate problem for the new chief regent was the liquidation of the debts of his predecessor, a matter that was soon taken up with the DNA. Hemming, a Native Representative in Parliament recommended financial assistance for Jongintaba's widow in a letter to the SNA.⁹² This is how he presented the case for No-England:

I have no quarrel with the Statement on which that refusal (by the Government to grant No-England financial assistance) was based knowing that the facts are correct, but I would ask you to approach her request from a different angle.... I would remind you that Chief David Dalindyebo served in South West Africa and later proceeded to France with the Native Labour Contingent and that he acted as Chief Regent for a period of approximately 14 years. There is no sympathy for her in the heart of the present Regent owing to unfortunate divisions among the Tembu people. I would point out that during the lifetime of the late Chief David, his wife would be regarded as in the position of the mother of the people. It would not look well that upon the death of Chief David, particularly in view of his services to the Government when he was in better health, that his widow should be, as I believe her to be, in actual want. On the other hand I feel it would strengthen the position of the Department if some regular assistance however small could be given to her.⁹³

Hemming's reference to the cold relationship between No-England and the chief regent is credible in view of the fact that Dabulamanzi had earlier lost the regency position to Jongintaba, No-England's late husband. No-England desperately wanted the government to pay her a pension grant, and had expressed her wish thus to Mears 'my late husband was Chief Regent of Tembuland----but since his death I have no pension of any kind and I am in great distress as a result'.⁹⁴ The government was adamant that the widow's plight did not justify a grant. No-England reported that the magistrate's response to her 'was that the government had been sympathetic in that it had agreed to pay off the debts owed by my late husband and that he [the magistrate] could not now make further representations on my behalf'.⁹⁵ It is interesting to note that when the government wanted to veto No-England's application for a pension grant, it justified its refusal to accede to her request by drawing on the common practice of traditional family life. Magistrate Clarke remarked in a letter to the chief magistrate that in accordance with accepted Native ideas he (Justice, No-England's son) will doubtless look after and care for his mother and there is no reason to suppose that she will ever be in any actual need as regards either food or clothing'.⁹⁶ The government was not, therefore, about to be persuaded to grant No-England pension as the following remark testifies: 'no provision is made by the Government for the payment of a pension to you and there would consequently be nothing gained by making representations through a member of Parliament'.⁹⁷ The magistrate obviously felt slighted by the idea of No-England addressing her problems to individuals rather than through the representative of the Governor-General. No-England, for her part, was caught up in a 'no dialogue political encounter' which impelled her to exploit whatever options that seemed available to someone in her plight. What transpires in Hemming's plea was that the former allies of the government, such as Jongintaba, were qualified perpetual beneficiaries. Their entitlement to government favours was dictated partly by services that had been rendered and partly by uncertain expectations of what might be.

Whilst there was a whole host of officials who imparted the same message to different people, and sometimes communicated different messages to the same person, Crais's

contention that 'their [the officials'] mission was to establish areas of control, if need be to 'pacify' their new subjects, and to create orderly systems of administration among 'barbarous people'⁹⁸ seems to hold ground in the 'Mears versus Hemming and Hemming-No-England versus Mears' uneven dialogue. What the administrators failed to do in mid 20th century abaThembuland was to effect a reconciliatory dialogue between colonial theory and indigenous practice so as to forestall a race for power between officials and/or individuals. Race for power was manifest in the practice of authority, and once people like No-England, whose focus was on short-term gains, discerned it they utilised it to their advantage. In the process they were unjustifiably hurt, more by the consequences of the 'power race' than by their well-conceived initiatives the aims of which were material rather than stakes in the new political dispensation. The apparent lack of co-ordination between the offices of the SNA, the Governor-General and its satellite departments, was reflected in Mears' reaction to No-England rather than in the response to Hemming. This was destined to work against the legitimacy that the 'Supreme Chief' intended to bestow on its new brand of chiefly authority in abaThembuland.

Correspondence from, and about Prince Sabata also reflected that the regent's indifference to him had become public knowledge. Sabata, who had possibly noticed the Regent's uncaring attitude at a critical age in his physical and social development, did not seem to be settled and stable. The SNA had earlier also expressed concern about the chiefly attention that Sabata was accorded by his peers 'he is too near to his people and that many of the scholars at Clarkebury belong to his tribe and accordingly give him the extreme respect paid to a chief'⁹⁹ when, in fact, he was a learner among other learners in a learning environment. It was against this background that Mears even recommended that Sabata be sent to a school outside the Transkei where he would be treated like any other learner.¹⁰⁰

The aura of natural chieftainship that is always ingrained in people's minds really landed Sabata in what could be called a royal trap while at Clarkebury. This was evidenced by the fact that many abaThembuland scholars accorded him, most likely out of their own

volition, the dignity¹⁰¹ that befitted his princely status in the larger community, albeit in a so-called inappropriate environment. A claim by N. Dana that she was also an attendant, *impelesi*, of the late Stella Sigcawu at the Healdtown Institution is proof of the government's indecisiveness in regard to the treatment of young royals at the institutions of learning at that time.¹⁰² It was also significant that after so many years of regency rule in abaThembuland, during which period none of the regents resided at the home of the Great Wife, the political status of the future traditional father of the abaThembu was known even by the youth. The only thing that stood between Sabata and paramount chieftainship was his minority, rather than political votes. The government officials justifiably feared that if Sabata were made conscious of his chiefly status he might not focus on the primary purpose of his being at an educational institution. For the government an educated Sabata would not only take what had been achieved by his predecessors a step further but would also facilitate their objectives even more. That an accomplished Sabata would match up to, and be complemented by his Western abaThembuland junior counterpart, K.D. Matanzima, was another consideration of the Supreme Chief's staff.

Sabata's change of schools continued to make his education a cause of great concern to those interested in his welfare. His school life history traces him to Lovedale, Clarkebury, Healdtown, Bensonvale (Sterkspruit), a school in Kroonstad where Mr D.W. Cingo was principal. Magistrate Mears expressed thus the concerns of abaThembu about Sabata's apparent apathy to education:

These people are most anxious that he should ultimately receive an advanced education and that he be not less qualified than Kayser Matanzima, the present head of the RHH. They fear that when Sabata takes over he may be dominated by Kayser unless he learns to stand on his own (mental) feet.¹⁰³

The Methodist Parsonage personnel's offer must be seen in the above light. They voluntarily helped facilitate Sabata's education. In December 1945 Rev C. C. Harris confirmed in a letter to the Mthatha Magistrate, Mears, that Rev E.W. Grant had, with the approval of the Chief Regent, agreed to be the guardian of Sabata.¹⁰⁴ Sabata's alleged wayward social activities are reflected in Harris's comment to Mears, that

Sabata 'is a chip off the old block and is already growing 'gay' and has reached the stage of a "show off" before the girls. He will grow out of this of course. But I expect complications'.¹⁰⁵ Harris, obviously reflecting on Sabata's presumed good background went on to say that 'he is made of good stuff and should be able to take his place worthily in the tribe after a bit'.¹⁰⁶ Concern was always expressed by the educated abaThembu, like Dr Xuma, whose communication with Reverends Harris and Grant through the SNA was aimed at facilitating Sabata's education and ultimate placement at Healdtown in 1946.¹⁰⁷ In a subsequent letter, he pledged to Dr Xuma that he would administer the £5 per month allowance on behalf of the Magistrate.¹⁰⁸ Xuma subsequently wrote to the missionaries to thank them for their 'prompt action on the above-mentioned matter. It has brought great relief to many a mind that was concerned. I highly appreciate your kind cooperation and assistance in the matter'.¹⁰⁹ By 1949 Sabata seemed not to have settled at school. A letter written by the SNA to Yates reported that Sabata was in Cape Town collecting school fees from his 'tribesmen' because Dabulamanzi was indifferent to his plight and neither could he be available to countersign cheques¹¹⁰ presumably for payment of school fees.

The place the Government seemed to be according education in the mentoring programme of the heir was an interesting feature of the evolving official chieftainship in abaThembuland. Though education had not been an essential requirement in the indigenous chieftainship of Southern Nguni the government expressed a commitment to expose Sabata to more education than his predecessors had acquired. The government did not only view education as a complement to good character and conduct, but also as a tool to inculcate a measure of flexibility in the minds of those who had been exposed to it. This would be shown in the abaThembu chiefs' continuous amenability to official customary law and all that went with it in a cultural sense. A successful transformation of traditional governance depended greatly on the enthusiastic contribution by the chieftainship agency itself. Whilst the government's objective in encouraging chiefs of this era to avail themselves of educational opportunities was an established fact, it is also clear that there was incompatibility between the aims of the benefactor (government) and beneficiaries (chiefs). For the

educated chief, education could be either a ladder for reaching greater heights in power or a tool to resist the government's inroads into their political terrain. Education could also be a weapon to uphold, counteract and oppose or offset unacceptable ideology. In this latter context therefore, uneducated or poorly educated chiefs would not be properly equipped to stand their ground in the early 20th century which was a crucial period of 'chieftainship in transition'.

Mears also reported on the existing fears in abaThembuland as to whether Dabulamanzi could be trusted to have the capacity to instil into Sabata a sense of the value of education. There were certain individuals who were anxious 'lest Dabulamanzi, the Regent, who is not a progressive man and lacking in education, may somehow or other stand in the way of Sabata's educational progress'.¹¹¹ These concerns seemed justified. He had failed to pay fees for Nompumelelo, the daughter of Nonciba Jongilizwe, when the former was at Indaleni Industrial High School in Natal. He was also not regular with the £2 payments of allowances to Nopenge, the daughter of Nokapa Jongilizwe. Albert Nxeko, the eldest son of Nonciba, was at Healdtown and his school fees were also in arrears.¹¹²

While the atmosphere was not clear around the abaThembu paramountcy there was, as subsequent discussions will prove, better stability in the Western division of abaThembuland. Practical historical factors were instrumental in the apparent political imbalance of the abaThembu Great Place. Jongintaba had succeeded Silimela as chief regent, and Paramount Chief Jongilizwe who ruled briefly between the two regencies had died before he could make a lasting imprint. This had a negative effect on the fluidity of legitimate governance in the principal domain of abaThembuland. It also made for an inevitable comparison of regencies because their regimes were so vastly different. Whilst Jongintaba appeared on the one hand to be a carefree patriotic lover of his people who was criticised by some for not doing enough, Dabulamanzi was hardly praised by anyone for anything. A government committed to modernising the institutional chieftainship seemed to have become particularly sensitive to the sentiments of the traditionalists who felt that an uneducated chief regent would possibly

stifle the government's objectives in wanting to educate Sabata. The question of whether the regency, a stop-gap in monarchical governances, is a successful exercise or not in the politico-traditional context does not seem to have been answered by the regency of Dabulamanzi.

As chief regent, and thus acting as paramount chief of all the abaThembu, Dabulamanzi was always invited to attend meetings to nominate chiefs and/or headmen for the various locations and/or villages of abaThembuland. In this regard by 1951 the magistrate's office saw it fit to regulate the expenditure of the chief regent. The magistrate's correspondence reflects that the chief regent's travelling allowances were calculated on the basis of distances covered, ‘

the distances shown [on the claim form] are the correct distances for the direct routes from Tyhalara to the points (Quluqu, 18 March 1950, Silimela's domain, for the nomination of a successor to the late Chief Busobengwe Mthirara); (Qumanco, 1, March 1950, for the nomination of a successor to the late Chief Zamiwonga Mgudlwa); (Nkondlo, 22 June 1950, to participate in the enquiry into the conduct of Sakela Dalasile) in the districts mentioned and are considerably less than if he had travelled by main road via Umtata.¹¹³

It must be presumed that the magistrate's monitoring of Dabulamanzi's financial expenditure somehow impacted on the chief regent's payment of school fees for Jongilizwe's children. Further, the visible lack of communication between the chief regent and the heir to the throne, which was ominous for the unity of abaThembu chieftainship, seemed to aggravate an already emotionally charged situation. Whilst Sabata did not seem to be settled in any one of the schools [that] he was sent to, it is also a fact that official correspondence reflects complaints originating from him or his mother about the continued irregular payment or non-payment of his school fees. This was always due to either the failure of Dabulamanzi to sign the cheques for payments or simply unavailability of the same to give an explanation for his slip-shoddiness. Mear's letter of 17 February 1949 to J.J. Yates had reported on Sabata's going about 'soliciting contributions'¹¹⁴ towards the payment of school fees. He subsequently remarked thus 'Sabata should not be wandering around like a commoner in this way'.¹¹⁵ Sabata had called at the Cape Town office of the SNA in the company of certain

followers 'as an act of courtesy. He is at Langa collecting money from his tribesmen to cover the costs of furthering his education at Kroonstad at Mr W. D. Cingo's school'.¹¹⁶ In a subsequent memorandum of the interview of 23 December 1949 between the chief regent and the magistrate, Dabulamanzi admitted knowledge of Sabata's visit to Cape Town but stated at the same time that the object of Sabata's visit was unknown to him. 'He (Sabata) did not inform the Chief Regent of the purpose of his visit to Cape Town and has not written to him since leaving'.¹¹⁷ The above excerpt shows that there was neither a father-son relationship nor a regent-heir communication between Dabulamanzi and Sabata. Even though Dabulamanzi confessed to having provided Sabata with an escort (*Mvulayehlobo Mthikrakra, Zwelibangile Joyi, Zitulumane, Bangindawo*) for his 14 days' visit to Cape Town¹¹⁸ obviously to monitor and protect the heir, it can be argued that the idea of such an elderly company made up of abaThembu elders definitely made Sabata more conscious of his status as their paramount chief-in-waiting than as their school-going ward. Such sense of self-importance as he probably felt was not likely to incline him towards school. Reasons that would have made the elders readily accompany the heir on a visit, the purpose of which had not been properly spelled out, were either political obligation or uneasiness and/or perceived indifference of the chief regent to the paramount chief-in-waiting.

Dabulamanzi agreed to the chief magistrate's suggestion to write to the Cape Town Native Commissioner to arrange for Sabata's return from Cape Town. He went on to say that Sabata has been influenced by others to take over the tribe and this is the reason for him not wishing to return to school'.¹¹⁹ Whilst Dabulamanzi's piece of information was possibly an eye-opener to the White official who had neither the ability to gauge the chief regent's personal ambitions nor the wisdom to predict such ambitions, his comments generate more questions. The timing of the regent's statement is questionable. It came at a time when all who were interested in the welfare of Sabata were concerned about the regent's visible lack of interest in the heir's academic advancement. What kind of a mentor would allow such an important ward to undertake trips for unspecified purposes? Did he view the trip to Cape Town as a way of getting Sabata away from the presumed bad influence? Did his actions justify fears in those

alleged to be influencing Sabata? Was Dabulamanzi entrenching his position and thus clinging to power? Was he genuinely interested and/or committed to Sabata's education or did he see it as a ploy to take the heir's mind off his abaThembu paramountcy? The comment of the chief magistrate on Dabulamanzi's remarks was of great historical significance. He pointed out 'that there were certain conditions governing Sabata's appointment as Paramount Chief of the Tembus. For instance, he had to be married and have attained the age of 25 years. He also had to be considered suitable for appointment'.¹²⁰

The magistrate's suggestion of age in numerical terms as one of the conditions was of little relevance to the Southern Nguni custom and thus not applicable to Sabata's case. This is not to say the correctness of the argument and the universal application of the requirement are to be disregarded *in toto*. The overriding factor is that the attainment of maturity in traditional society was signalled by going through specific rites of passage (circumcision in the case of males) rather than by calendar days. Colonel Maclean's claim that there was no specified period at which circumcision was to take place other than the marks of puberty supports the above claim. It was thus a cultural milestone which if and when delayed, practically put the individual's socio-political development and occupation of public office on hold.

Maclean has identified circumcision as a 'national rite, venerable for its extreme antiquity'¹²¹ and prevailing amongst all the tribes of South Eastern Africa. 'As respects the significance of the rite, it bears a strictly civil character, being the rite by which the youth of the male sex are introduced to the rank and privileges of manhood'.¹²² 'Being a man meant that one knew how to conduct oneself in all circumstances, was able to bear the responsibility of being the head of a family and could endure any amount of hardship'.¹²³ The above views therefore nullify the magisterial condition of calendar age and marriage status as effectively preventing Sabata from assuming his political position. Stapleton rebuts this view in his claim that Jongumsobomvu Maqoma's reason for delaying Sandile's passage into manhood (at age 17 in 1837) had a lot to do with his wanting to cling to the paramountcy.¹²⁴ The magistrate's contention (that any paramount

chief-in-waiting had to have a stable character) smacked of the government's intention of phasing out indigenous chieftainship so as to make way for the government's version of it.

While the government's apparent intentions to make Sabata an educated chief were good superficially, it is doubtful if the import of its so-called well-conceived objectives were the same as those of Dabulamanzi. In the same context, while Dabulamanzi's prodding Sabata to go to school could have been a simple execution of duty and responsibility on his part, it can be argued that factors that maintained his status and extended his term were technically opposed to the forces that were likely to act as a check on his 'indefinite period' type of regency. The prolongation of Sabata's education inevitably extended Dabulamanzi's term in office, making it possible for him to entrench his position of chieftainship among his subjects. The government's inconsistency on the question of conditions governing accession to chieftainship did not, however, have practical models in abaThembuland. Sabata's father, Jongilizwe, who was sent to circumcision school in 1922 at age 18, acceded to the chieftainship in 1924, at age 20.¹²⁵ Notes of an interview between the SNA and Sabata with other abaThembu men on 23 February 1949 reflect that the relationship between Sabata and Dabulamanzi was not one of father-son, Sabata accused the chief regent of not being interested in

my education. He has refused to collect my allowance regularly. It is true that I was given £40 to come here [Cape Town], but it was not enough because I had just left circumcision school and had no clothes. I am going home [from Cape Town] on the 12th and I am going to do private studies as no arrangements have been made for me to go to school. I was late for Lovedale last year because I only came from circumcision school in March, 1948.¹²⁶

Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have quoted Mda Mda's testimony that the abaThembu demanded that Sabata be installed after he had been hurriedly sent to the circumcision school in 1948.¹²⁷ The meeting that followed must be seen in the light of the developments alluded to above. At a meeting held in the chief magistrate's office on 24 June, 1949 prominent abaThembu chiefs made it clear that the time had come for Sabata to take over as king. Chief Justice Mthikrakra's opening remark on the subject was simply that 'it was a great day in the life of the Tembus-it was a day upon which

they had to decide what to do with the Chief Elect. They had now come to the end of things-the young chief now wanted his father's "blanket"-his late father's position as Paramount Chief of the Tembus.¹²⁸ Chief Mthikrakra also made the magistrate aware that 'there were difficulties ahead and the results would be bad. They - the Tembus - had now come to him to help them, to sympathise with them and to help by having Sabata installed as paramount chief of the Tembus.'¹²⁹ Chief Zwelibhangile Joyi echoed Mthikrakra's sentiments, 'according to custom the chief could take control at this present age (at 21 years). He would not rely on himself. The chieftainship really vested in the older men and the other chiefs who advised him in all matters. They also relied on the experienced magistrate and native commissioners'.¹³⁰

Harold Ngqangqeni who spoke after Joyi made it clear from the start that the abaThembu had surrendered their country peacefully to the government, but that being under the government did not mean that their customs had changed. 'He is their King - no vote need be taken - he is born their King. The vote of the people is only taken in connection with the appointment of a Headman, and only in the case of a Headman is the age of man taken into consideration.'¹³¹ His further remark that 'Sabata will go to school but he must first be appointed Chief so that he need not look back',¹³² was significant when viewed in the context of abaThembu politics of chieftainship at the time. His implicit suggestion that as soon as Sabata had been appointed he would nominate one of his councillors to act for him, and only then would he be able to 'devote all his time to his studies'¹³³ was also significant because it reflected a national sentiment that education was of secondary importance. When a councillor, Bangindawo Baso, spoke he dwelt on the apparent neglect of the homestead at the Bumbane Great Place and cited this as the reason why Sabata needed to be home. He challenged the chief magistrate to visit Bumbane, and summed the situation up by remarking that 'it (Bumbane) had improved considerably since Sabata had returned (from school)'.¹³⁴ Chief Vululwandle Mthikrakra was the last to speak and he also echoed the sentiments of the other speakers, adding further that Sabata's uncles would assist the government officials in the task of looking after him.

The unanimity of opinion that wanted Sabata to be given chieftainship gives the impression that the abaThembu elders were trying to forestall a possible replay of the Ndlambe-Ngqika tussle of the early 19th century.¹³⁵ Ngqangqeni's suggestion that Sabata would, once appointed, choose a caretaker-councillor was not only an indication that the current regent should step down but also an announcement that Dabulamanzi's subtle ambitions could no longer be tolerated. If Sabata's claims about Dabulamanzi's lack of interest in the affairs of the Great House were anything to go by, then Dabulamanzi's motives with regard to Sabata were indeed suspicious and a cause for concern.

A subsequent meeting held on 15 September 1949 revealed that there was more to the mud-slinging between Sabata and his uncle/ political father. Vululwandle Mtikrakra accused the chief regent of keeping them in the dark in so far as the affairs that affected Sabata were concerned. He substantiated his accusations by mentioning that the

the Tembus were not aware that Sabata was not at school [at some stage]- the Chief Regent had never called them together and informed them of this fact. In the second place they had not been told that Sabata had been circumcised. They had looked to Dabulamanzi to make these events known. In the third place they had heard rumours that Sabata was ill-they had not been informed of this fact by Dabulamanzi. When he had been appointed, he had been told to notify the Tembus of happenings affecting Sabata.¹³⁶

In defense of Dabulamanzi, it is puzzling that he was accused of keeping Sabata's circumcision to himself in view of Mda's authoritative claim that an abaThembu faction first had the prince circumcised and then called for his installation.

The sensitivity of Vululwandle's reference to the abaThembu people being kept in the dark about, inter alia, Sabata's circumcision (March 1948)¹³⁷ is better understood and perhaps justified when relating it to Ngxamngxa's explanation of the ritual that is attendant upon the circumcision of the royals. He has affirmed that among isiXhosa speakers, 'a prescribed order must be followed when the operation is performed on the son of a chief....Among the Thembu *usosuthu's* son [presumably the chief] is the second to be operated upon, for the rust on the assegai must not be cleaned off on

him'.¹³⁸ The amaXhosa followed the same pattern but their rationale was that the blood of the chief's son, who is the second to be circumcised, falls upon that of the first initiate. The reasoning here was that the previous soaking of the earth with blood would destroy the possibility of contamination of the blood of the chief's son. In the same vein the blood of the subsequent patients would fall upon the prince's and 'prevent sorcerers harming him by means of contagious magic'.¹³⁹ The amaBomvana followed the same pattern, with the 'wiper of the blood of the chief' *isula legazi lenkosi*, preceding the prince in the operation. In the light of the above, the abaThembu seemed to have had a valid grievance against Dabulamanzi, because the customary procedures that Sabata had undergone in the circumcision process were not only the regent's prerogative, but a national obligation.

Dabulamanzi's claim that 'the Chief Magistrate had suggested that Sabata go back to school---he was not of age for the appointment as Chief yet, and also because by being educated he would be more able to tackle the big job of Chieftainship'¹⁴⁰ was thus both irrelevant and questionable. The abaThembu's pledging that Sabata will go to school made Dabulamanzi's concern seem unimportant.¹⁴¹ This is not to say that the government did not have specific expectations from the products that they were grooming. It is clear that the sentiments of the chief regent and the government reflected socio-political incompatibilities. The above perception becomes clearer when viewed in the light of the following remark that was made at a meeting held to further discuss Sabata's schooling. 'The Tembus had then asked and expected Chief Dabulamanzi to lead them, to suggest something.'¹⁴² Dabulamanzi then reserved his opinion on the most expected 'suggestion' which had been mooted at earlier meetings, and this was the accession to chieftainship of Prince Sabata. Instead he reiterated the chief magistrate's suggestion that 'Sabata should go back to school'.¹⁴³ Dabulamanzi's failure to substantiate his motives for wanting the heir designate to go back to school were not based on the belief that education would benefit him and it raised questions about his political intentions. Chief Jonginyaniso states categorically that 'Dabulamanzi simply did not want to relinquish the paramountcy to Sabata. He brought forth all sorts of stories like, he might as well be king because he was Dalindyebo's son, an elder one,

for that matter, who was even older than Jongilizwe, Dalindyebo's son from the Great House'.¹⁴⁴ Joyi also claims that Dabulamanzi's only achievement was 'to occupy the regency seat, he was a very lazy person who derived great satisfaction from simply being known as a King and he wouldn't let go'.¹⁴⁵

It was also significant that in his testimony at the meeting, Dabulamanzi admitted to having called Chief Daliwonga Matanzima to discuss the issue of Sabata's schooling. His summoning of, and subsequent interview with, Matanzima was of historical significance in view of the fact that the latter was the son of Mhlobo, his counterpart from Western abaThembuland. His regency, provided he had no ulterior motives about the Great Place, was politically strategic for the reason that it enhanced the centrality- and dignity of the principal Great Place. At the same time his apparent indifference to, and indecision in, matters that affected Sabata was reason to fear a replay of the Maqoma-Sandile power struggle. It must be noted that the chief regent operated from the Tyhalarha Farm, a situation that had the potential to induce both ease as well as uneasiness if the incumbent was suspected of being very ambitious. Whilst Bumbane was a home for Sabata, it was also the historical and political headquarters of abaThembuland, and for that reason Sabata's future palace.

The fact that Dabulamanzi solicited the RHH (Matanzima's) opinion to resolve the problem of the abaThembu Great House could have been regarded as indicative of the unanimity of the House of Mthikrakra and, therefore, a positive sign. Be that as it may Dabulamanzi's arrangement of a two-man conference between himself and Matanzima had the potential for making the patrons of the GH agitated on justifiable grounds. Whilst Dabulamanzi was perceived to be devising every trick to cling to power, it was unlikely that Matanzima, whose RHH chieftainship was to a great extent entrenched, would discourage Dabulamanzi from doing the same. Matanzima who was slowly but surely embracing the politics of chieftainship could only strengthen the case of the RHH to split and re-invent its autonomy, and in that way re-invent the abaThembu laws of succession to kingship if Dabulamanzi's suspected ploy were to work. Such a move would have been nothing short of a justification for prospective splits and vindication for

similar breakaways in the past. It would also de-stabilize the abaThembu paramountcy. Jonginyaniso confirmed that Daliwonga Matanzima was wiser, and also demonstrated amazing cunningness when Dabulamanzi indicated that he would want to settle in Western abaThembuland if and when he had handed the chieftainship over to Sabata. Matanzima would not accept him because he saw him as a threat.¹⁴⁶ His fears were justified because in 1949 his descent from the RHH of Mthikrakra was old and thus entrenched, as against that of Dabulamanzi which, though it was new, was an inherent threat in the fact that it (his descent) was directly from the Great House of Mthikrakra. Dabulamanzi was also senior in terms of age and political influence. Daliwonga's RHH chieftainship was from the fourth generation and dated back to the mid-19th century, but, his rank had not been appreciated for almost a century. His aspiration for dominance in the area of St Marks was resisted by the strong custodians of customary law. Dabulamanzi's overtures had the potential to destabilise abaThembu chieftainship, simply by subtly trying to help establish the authority of Right Hand Houses in a region where their junior status was not celebrated.

At the meeting of 15 September 1949, it became clear that to a group of abaThembu who considered themselves 'the near relatives of Sabata'¹⁴⁷ the main issue of the meeting was not Sabata's schooling but the return of the throne of Jongilizwe to his Great House. The report referred to claims that

the Chief Regent had told them [abaThembu Chiefs who were invited to the meetings purportedly called to discuss Sabata's schooling] that if they wanted to have Sabata appointed Paramount Chief they must go before the Chief Magistrate and discuss the matter with him--- The unanimous decision of that meeting had been that Sabata should be appointed Chief now.¹⁴⁸

OFF-SADDLE! THE POWER INHERENT IN INDIGENOUS LAW UNSEATS DABULAMANZI

The impatience of the abaThembu elders was demonstrated when they employed a traditional interdict to force Dabulamanzi to vacate the regency in favour of the heir: 'he had been made to off-saddle outside the Great Place and to walk in [while attending the meeting of 15 September 1949 at Bumbane]. Chief Vululwandle [Jonginyaniso's uncle] had stopped him from entering on horseback".¹⁴⁹ Notununu claims that according

to abaThembu custom no one is allowed to enter the gate of the Great Place on horseback except the chief. Under exceptional circumstances a councillor could be allowed to enter the chief's premises on horseback.¹⁵⁰ Entering the Great Place on horse-back would have implied that Dabulamanzi had the freedom of the premises and that no one was higher than him. On the other hand dismounting outside the palace gates clearly meant that his business at the Great Place was simply to attend the meeting like the other guests. It was at this point that the chief regent expressed his willingness 'to hand over the Chieftainship to Sabata.'¹⁵¹ On the insistence of the attendee councillors and chiefs that Sabata must be given his place, 'He, Dabulamanzi, had informed them that he was not refusing Sabata the chieftainship but that the matter was in the hands of the Chief Magistrate.'¹⁵² Dabulamanzi's hinting that his relinquishing of the crown would be of no effect because

it was not for Chief Regent to appoint Sabata. The Governor-General, who was the Supreme Chief of the Union had to appoint Sabata.....he (the Chief Magistrate) thought the people, Sabata and the Chiefs could put it out of their heads that Sabata would be appointed before he attained the age of 25 years¹⁵³

showed his pretended ignorance about his own culture. This comment had already been addressed by Zwelibhangile earlier when he said that 'the chief was born old - he was never a child in their eyes'. As far as the Tembus were concerned there was no age limit.¹⁵⁴

Whilst the government emphasised the age factor as an important condition in the matter of Sabata's accession it also became evident that there was a collision between the two political systems – the Union government's and traditional - during the years preceding Sabata's accession.

The last years of Dabulamanzi's regency were a time of discontent among his subjects. There were complaints that Dabulamanzi was selling the land of abaThembu to the Whites, and a song was coined to that effect. It ran thus 'who is the chief that is selling our land? it is Dabulamanzi'.¹⁵⁵ Jonginyaniso's testimony about Dabulamanzi's waning popularity is also supported by Ntsebeza and Ndletyana's mention of some of the factors that impacted on the chief regent's management of socio-political relationships

in abaThembuland. His accession at a time when the state was introducing the Betterment Schemes was, on its own, bound to set him on a collision course with his constituency. The culling of the stock which was an important aspect of the Betterment Schemes was an attack on the economic system of the rural communities. The fact that Dabulamanzi escorted the magistrate during the tours that were undertaken to market the unpopular measures portrayed him as an enemy of those whose welfare and property had been entrusted to him for protection. His vain pleas of neutrality combined with his unwavering and strange backing of the magisterial pronouncement that Sabata had first to acquire a good education before assuming the paramountcy made him appear equivocal indeed. His playing second fiddle to Botha Sigcawu when he let him hand over the 'golden scroll', a welcoming gesture, to the British Royal family traded off the abaThembu monarchical prerogative in a way that inadvertently elevated Botha to prime paramountcy. To the patrons of the abaThembu paramountcy, Dabulamanzi had clearly demonstrated that he was unable to rise to the expectations of a solid paramountcy and therefore unfit for the position he continued to hold. The fact that Sabata was already officiating as an uncrowned paramount chief¹⁵⁶ was bound to make Dabulamanzi's paramountcy uneasy. Dabulamanzi was evidently seen as both a threat and a source of both belittlement and insecurity to the abaThembu paramountcy. There is an extent to which the inception of the quarter century regency, its operation and particularly its ending neither symbolised nor presaged stability in the future abaThembu chieftainship.

CONCLUSION

The post-Jongilizwe chieftainship demonstrated in the conduct of affairs in the interregnum and during the 'era of regents' the shortcomings of instituting rulerships in a setting where there is neither standard practice to adhere to, nor criteria to serve as models. It has been shown that the minority of the heir was one of the key limitations in a traditional society where the opinion of the mother could be heard and still not be upheld.

The chapter has shown that while the eventual election of Jongintaba appeared to be the result of a unanimous decision, albeit upheld and endorsed with the seal of White authority, that of Dabulamanzi came across as an ill-conceived political experiment whose execution defied abaThembu custom altogether. In this context the visible use of selective norms in the nomination and election of both abaThembu regents has been highlighted. It has been shown through Dabulamanzi's regency that domestic conflicts had a potential to be more dangerous to the unity of the House of Dalindyebo than government authority. The chapter has also shown that the unchecked involvement of the colonial factor in abaThembu affairs sometimes served as a catalyst. The election of both Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi, one after the other, has been shown to have been not customarily regulated, and this was ominous for the unity of the House of Dalindyebo. The apparent discord which sometimes threatened to surface could hardly be expected to help resuscitate the unity of the House of Mthikrakra.

The chapter has shown as political irony Dabulamanzi's upholding of the Governor-General's exclusive prerogative in the matter of appointing Sabata to the chieftainship, and his eventual dethronement by the application of traditional instruments. It has been shown that the dethronement of Dabulamanzi was proof of the power that is inherent in customary law. The chapter has also demonstrated that there was a point beyond which the official customary law could not go. It could not rescue Dabulamanzi from the application of traditional methods of deposition as in the 'off-saddle' instruction the finality of whose meaning he, rather than his government benefactors, knew. The chapter has therefore shown that there were cases in which the Union legislation was limited in its application. It was significant that there was no provision in this legislation to undo or even reverse what had been done. Though Dabulamanzi continued longer as chief regent after 15 September 1949, he was more of an office holder than a reigning monarch.

The chapter has, in the methods of operation and government reaction to certain incidents during the regencies of Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi exposed certain aspects

of abaThembu paramount chieftainship which had a potential to weaken its institutional fabric and challenge its stability.

Through the evaluation of the impact of the Black Administration Act of 1927 on abaThembu chieftainship the chapter has hinted at the defects of the legislation and thus the rationale for an improved bureaucratic instrument to mould chieftainship into a shape that would hopefully conform to the political designs of the government.

¹ Magistrate (Young) - Chief Magistrate (CMT) (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 July 1928.

² Mandela : *Long Walk*, p. 5.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Magistrate (Young) - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 July 1928.

⁵ Mandela : *Long Walk*, p. 5.

⁶ Magistrate (Young) - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 July 1928.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Magistrate (Young) - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, , 2/14/1, 22 August 1928.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Mandela : *Long Walk*, p.15.

¹¹ Magistrate (Young) - CMT, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 July 1928.

¹² Mbekeni : interviewed, 12 August 2001.

¹³ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo" p.1.

¹⁴ Magistrate - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2 February 1929.

¹⁵ J. L. Comaroff : "Chiefship in a South African Homeland", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 1, Number 1, (October, 1974), p. 38.

¹⁶ Cingo : *Ibali*, p. 31.

¹⁷ Z. Mthikrakra : interviewed, 13 June 2010.

¹⁸ C. Crais : “Chiefs and Bureaucrats in the Making of Empire : A Drama from the Transkei”, South Africa, October 1880 (The American Historical Review), Vol. 108, No.4, (October 2003), p.4.

¹⁹ Magistrate (Young) - CM (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 2/14/1, 7 July 1928.

²⁰ Magistrate - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 22 August 1928.

²¹ Magistrate - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, , 2/14/1, 22 August 1928.

²² Ntsebeza and Ndletyana : “Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo”, p. 5.

²³ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra : interviewed: 16 March 2006.

²⁴ Magistrate (Davidson) (nomination of the heir to the late Chief Jongilizwe Dalindyebo)-CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 24 September 1929.

²⁵ Jonginyaniso : interviewed: 16 March 2006.

²⁶ Magistrate (Davidson) - CM (Mthatha) Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 24 September 1929

²⁷ Hammond-Tooke : *The Tribes*, p. 46.

²⁸ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra: interviewed: 16 March 2006.

²⁹ Hammond-Tooke: *The Tribes*, p. 46.

³⁰ Magistrate(Davidson) - CM (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 24 September 1929.

³¹ Jonginyaniso: interviewed: 16 March 2006.

³² J. L. Comaroff : “A Case Study of the Tshidi Chieftdom of Bophuthatswana” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 1, Number 2 (1 October 1974), p. 40.

³³ Magistrate (Davidson) - CMT (Mthatha) Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 24 September 1929.

³⁴ CMT (Welsh) - SNA (Pretoria), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 23 August 1928.

³⁵ SNA - Chief Jongilizwe Dalindyebo, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 12 August 1929.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Mamdani : *Citizen And Subject*, p. 55.

³⁸ Sanders : “How Customary is African customary law”? XX, *Comparative International Journal of Southern Africa* (Unisa, 1987), p. 407.

³⁹ J. J. Brownlee (Butterworth) – Herbst, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 June 1929.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra, interviewed, 16 March 2006.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 16.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁶ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra, interviewed, 16 March 2006.

⁴⁷ Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 17.

⁴⁸ Brownlee (Butterworth) - Herbst, Cape Archives, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 17 June 1929.

⁴⁹ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra, interviewed, 16 March 2006.

⁵⁰ SNA - CMT (Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 6 April 1932.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² SNA - CMT (Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 31 August 1933.

⁵³ David Dalindyabo (Mqhekezweni) – Magistrate, Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 5 December 1933.

⁵⁴ SNA - CMT (Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 2/14/1, 20 January 1934.

⁵⁵ Mbekeni : interviewed, 12 August 2001.

⁵⁶ W. J. Davidson - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 30 May 1929.

⁵⁷ Native Commissioner and Magistrate (Mthatha) - CMT (Mthatha) (Liquidation of Debts: Chief D. Dalindyabo), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 18 July 1933.

⁵⁸ Lonsdale - CMT(Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 30 July 1934.

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- ⁶⁰ Chief Regent (David Dalindyebo) - Magistrate, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 19 July 1934.
- ⁶¹ Magistrate – CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 16 March 1944.
- ⁶² S. Marks : “The Ambiguities of Dependence : J.L.Dube of Natal” *Journal of Southern African Studies* Volume 1, Number 1, (October 1974), p. 180.
- ⁶³ Mayer : The Tribal Elite in *The New Elites*, ed. Lloyd, p. 288.
- ⁶⁴ CMT (Mthatha) - SNA (Pretoria), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 29 May 1929.
- ⁶⁵ CMT (Mthatha) - Minutes of the meeting in Magistrate’s Room (Cofimvaba), Cape Archives, File No. 3/320/24, 4 June 1932.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Lacey : *Working For Boroko*, p. 109.
- ⁶⁸ Mayer : The Tribal Elite in *The New Elites*, ed. Lloyd, p. 289.
- ⁶⁹ Allison - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 21 July 1940.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ⁷¹ Lacey : *Working for Boroko*, p. 107.
- ⁷² Comaroff : “ a Case Study of the Tshidi Chiefdom of Bophuthatswana”, *Journal*, p. 41.
- ⁷³ Sanders : “How Customary Is Customary Law?” *Journal*, p. 407.
- ⁷⁴ Magistrate (Mthatha) (report on Chief Regent David Dalindyebo) – CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 21 July 1941.
- ⁷⁵ Chief Magistrate – Magistrate, Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 10 March 1942.
- ⁷⁶ Sangoni : “The Paramount Chiefs Of Tembuland” Bantu, pp. 272 - 273.
- ⁷⁷ Mandela : *Long Walk*, p. 17.
- ⁷⁸ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra: interviewed, 16 March 2006.
- ⁷⁹ Magistrate (V.M. de Villiers) - CMT(Mthatha), Cape Archives, I/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/2, ref 2/2/2/-2/17/2, 2/14/1, 27 August 1942.

⁸⁰ Sipendu Bacela (Elliotdale) - CMT (Mthatha) Cape Archives, 1/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 9 November 1942.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Magistrate (V. M. de Villiers) - C MT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 18 November 1942.

⁸⁵ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra: interviewed, 16 March 2006.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Z. Mthikrakra : Interviewed, 29 May, 2010.

⁸⁸ Nhlapo Commission, «Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies » p.16.

⁸⁹ De Villiers – CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 18 November 1942.

⁹⁰ Notice from the Minute of the SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 29 October 1943.

⁹¹ CMT (Mthatha). – G. Mears, Esq. (DNA), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 14 April 1944.

⁹² G. K. Hemming (House of Assembly, Cape Town) - SNA, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 5 April 1943.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ No- England - Mears, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 8 October 1944.

⁹⁵ Clarke (Magistarte) – CMT (Mthatha) Cape Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/118, ref N1/1/, 22 October 1945.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ G. Mears - No- England Dalindyebo, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 21 November 1945.

⁹⁸ Crais : “Chiefs and bureaucrats in the making of empire : a drama from the Transkei”, p. 4.

⁹⁹ Mears - CMT (Mthatha, V.N. de Villiers), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 6 December 1945.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Daily Dispatch, Wednesday, May 10, 2006, p.4.

¹⁰³ Mears (SNA) - Rev C. Harris, Mears - CMT (Mthatha, V.N. de Villiers), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 6 December 1945

¹⁰⁴ Rev C.C. Harris - Mears, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 10 December 1945.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ SNA - Dr A.B. Xuma, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 19 December 1945.

¹⁰⁹ Xuma - SNA (Mears), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 31 December 1945.

¹¹⁰ SNA – Yates, (CMT) (Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 17 February 1949.

¹¹¹ Mears - CM (Mthatha, V.N. de Villiers), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 6 December 1945.

¹¹² G.K. Hemming – Magistrate (Clarke), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 12 June 1944.

¹¹³ Magistrate (Ngcobo) - Magistrate (Mthatha), 1/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 13 March 1951.

¹¹⁴ Mears (SNA) – CMT (Mthatha) Yates, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 17 February 1949.

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¹¹⁷ Memorandum: Interview of Chief Regent Dabulamanzi with the Magistrate (Mthatha), and Chief Magistrate, Cape Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 23 February 1949.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. .

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Colonel Maclean : “Compendium of ‘Kaffir’ Laws And Customs” (Mount Coke, 1858), p.157.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ H.W. Pahl (ed-in-chief) : *The Greater Dictionary of Xhosa*, Vol 3, (UFH, 1989), p. 724.

¹²⁴ T. Stapleton: *Maqoma*, (Johannesburg, 1994), p. 117.

¹²⁵ Sampu Dalindyebo – CMT (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, 18 April 1943.

¹²⁶ Note of an interview between the Secretary for Native Affairs and Sabata Dalindyebo and seven others, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 24 February 1949.

¹²⁷ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana : “The Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo”, p.5.

¹²⁸ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate’s Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 24 June 1949.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ S. J. Ngqongqo : “The Attack On Grahamstown, 1818-1819” (Honours Research Project, Fort Hare, 1992), p.56.

¹³⁶ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate’s Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 15 September 1949.

¹³⁷ Note of an interview between the SNA and Sabata Dalindyebo and seven others, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 24 February 1949.

¹³⁸ A. N. N. Ngxamngxa : “The Function of Circumcision among the Xhosa-speaking Tribes in Historical Perspective” in E. de Jager (ed) : Man Anthropological Essays (Cape Town, Struik, 1971), pp.187-188.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate’s Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1 15 September 1949.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Jonginyaniso, interviewed, 16 March 2006.

¹⁴⁵ B. Joyi, interviewed, 3 April 2006.

¹⁴⁶ Jonginyaniso, interviewed, 16 March 2006.

¹⁴⁷ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate's Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 15 September 1949.

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¹⁵⁰ P. Notununu (nee Joyi), interview, 27 May 2006.

¹⁵¹ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate's Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 15 September 1949.

¹⁵² Ibid.

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¹⁵⁴ Notes of the meeting in the Chief Magistrate's Office, Mthatha Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, 24 June 1949.

¹⁵⁵ Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra : interviewed, 29 May 2006.

¹⁵⁶ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana : "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo", p.4.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1951 AND ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP

INTRODUCTION

The effective application of indigenous procedures to bring about the vacation of abaThembu paramountcy seat was a culmination of a long drawn-out and subtle feud between the paramount chief in-waiting and the chief regent. The uncle-nephew contest itself portrayed the tension between the state's legal system and traditional law, and also the failure of the dialogue between the two political systems. Evidence of the inherent weakness of state law became conspicuous in the operation of dual chieftainship under Dabulamanzi and Sabata even before the prince was legally installed by the government. That Sabata was apparently privy to the government messages which he then disseminated to the community, as did the chief regent whose prerogative it was, was further proof that the state system had unplugged leaks.¹

This chapter then begins by examining the impact on Sabata's accession of the wrangle over the abaThembu paramountcy. It seeks to determine whether the unceremonious stepping down of Dabulamanzi precipitated or reinforced the division within the House of Dalindyebo or consolidated the paramountcy. It is argued that while the deposition cleared the way for Sabata, and thus appeared to be a pre-emptive crisis resolution, the turbulent atmosphere that characterised it did not augur well for the future of the paramountcy. The chapter then looks at the political image that the abaThembu paramountcy projected following the emotionally charged mood of the dethronement. This, it is suggested, became a real threat to the consolidation of the abaThembu paramountcy.

The fact that the abaThembu invested their hopes in Sabata as the one who would restore the paramountcy to its pre-Dabulamanzi image² tended to blind them to the problems that affected the institution. The chapter interrogates the celebration of Sabata's accession well before the event in relation to the Government's indifference to the pressure to have him installed. The chapter comments on what awaited Sabata on

accession. There is no doubt that Sabata inherited a paramountcy that was threatened with an infrastructural instability. Dabulamanzi's acquiescence to the government, reminiscent of Dalindyebo's paramountcy; the rift between the chief regent and his subjects which was a result of their displeasure with Dabulamanzi's support for the government schemes; and the government's biased involvement in abaThembu affairs – all of these were symptoms of that instability.

The chapter demonstrates that while Dabulamanzi's dethronement revealed the limitations of the official customary law, the subsequent statutory ratification of Sabata's accession exhibited the insuperable authority that the Governor-General derived from the latest purpose-designed Bantu Authorities Act (BAA).

The chapter hints at the difficult choices Sabata had to make once he occupied the paramountcy seat. It exposes the divergent forces whose reconciliation was crucial for the continued stability of abaThembu paramountcy. If Sabata chose to pursue Dabulamanzi's collaborative policy he stood to alienate his subjects some of whom had taken up cudgels for him by unseating his predecessor. Should he decide to demonstrate a departure from Dabulamanzi's pro-government stand, he would surely attract the government's displeasure. In this context the chapter portrays Sabata's consultative approach in governance as proof that he was a worthy successor to Dabulamanzi, one who would close the gaps that had emerged between the ruler and his subjects, and in this way eventually secure the throne for the GH of Jongilizwe.

The chapter also explains the destabilising impact of KD (Matanzima) on Sabata's nascent paramountcy. KD had cunningly turned down Dabulamanzi's posting to the Glen Grey District despite Sabata's endorsing the idea. He had obviously watched with self-interest the uneasy atmosphere that pervaded the abaThembu paramountcy and possibly identified the loopholes to be exploited for personal and political gain. This chapter has shown KD's responses to the BAA to be dictated more by his personal interests and political ambitions than by a desire to be a government stooge.

Finally, the chapter analyses Sabata's dilemmas, and locates his major problem in his inability to juggle his interests as a national father with his obligations as a chief by the grace of the Governor-General. It is argued that the narrative of Sabata's paramountcy can be found in his vain efforts to prevent the national office that the abaThembu paramountcy symbolised from being stripped of its autonomy by the DNA through the BAA; to defend his birthright from being politically diminished at the instance of K.D. Matanzima; and to forestall Matanzima's efforts to outwit him wherever and whenever an opportunity arose. Matanzima's manoeuvres were aimed at imposing his illegitimate right to senior chiefship, and this, itself, was interfering with the abaThembu traditional hierarchy and was, therefore, a destabilising factor. The chapter concludes by explaining how the BAA accomplished the government's objectives, thanks to Matanzima's facilitating role, and how it made the abaThembu paramountcy vulnerable by indirectly but methodically undermining Sabata's authority whenever possible.

ABATHEMBU CHIEFS'S RELATIONSHIPS ON THE EVE OF THE BAA

The unseating of Dabulamanzi was clearly in the context of a 'House of Dalindyebo divided', and in this way it was ominous for the paramountcy. On the other hand the celebratory mood surrounding Sabata's imminent takeover seemed to hush it all up. Mbekeni confessed that in the atmosphere of exultation and great expectations he also named his first-born son Zulu-Liyazongoma - *It is thundering in abaThembuland the king's installation is imminent*.³ The eventual installation document was to read thus, 'Chief Sabata I now in the name of the Government install you as Paramount Chief of the Thembus and will later ask you to come forward to receive your letter of appointment'.⁴ A month later the secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, H.F. Verwoerd, confirmed Sabata's appointment 'in terms of section 2(7) of Act No. 38 of 1927 as Paramount Chief (King) of the Thembu Tribe of the Natives resident in the districts comprising the area known as Thembuland, including Emigrant Thembuland and Bomvanaland, with effect from the 1 July 1954'.⁵

At this point it is necessary to locate the Government's sentiments in the 'exit *versus* entry in the uncle-nephew episode'. The exiting chief regent symbolised for the

government the maturity that befitted the rank of a paramountcy because he bore, in his person, prospects for the maintenance of the status quo in the continuity of the implementation of the government's schemes. Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have highlighted the notorious Rehabilitation Scheme which included the detestable culling of stock,⁶ and which, paradoxically, endeared Dabulamanzi to the government and recommended him as a model paramount chief. The abaThembu complaint that the socio-economic status that he projected was not in keeping with the traditional esteem of their paramountcy was probably of little concern to the government if his standpoint promised to serve its objectives well. Further, it was probably his knowledge of his poor socio-economic standing in the eyes of the abaThembu that prompted Dabulamanzi to hold on to a paramountcy that the government sanctioned. This was for his own good during the period when the Governor-General was both supreme and kingmaker. It is therefore argued that the above situation, by putting in practice Marks's theory of the 'ambiguities of dependence' bore great significance for the future of even the partial autonomy of the abaThembu paramountcy. In fact, Dabulamazi's towing of the magistrate's line - which earned him the government's favour- rendered him as a traitor in the eyes of the patrons of the abaThembu paramountcy.

The installation of Sabata aroused different perceptions from different quarters. The government was not expected to be enthusiastic about the accession of a man who was being thrust on it by a pressure group which wilfully disregarded the procedures and methods prescribed by the terms of the NAA of 1927. An important clause in the act stipulated that the Governor-General had the bureaucratic right to 'recognize or appoint any person as a chief or headman in charge of a tribe or of a location'.⁷ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have hinted at the lukewarm response of the magistrate at the idea of Sabata's becoming a king and this attitude confirms these negative perceptions while also raising questions. Sabata and the rest of the Jongilizwe family were without doubt associated with Dabulamanzi's critics. A situation such as the above was enough to cause disquiet in government circles at a time when another phase of reforming the institutional chieftainship, the BAA, was in the offing. The question of whether the exit of Dabulamanzi was the everlasting solution it purported to be in the apparent opportunity

it proffered for both the return (of the abaThembu paramountcy to the Great House of Jongilizwe) and restoration (of the same to the image it had projected before the Dabulamanzi era) would be answered in the progressive unfolding of events. In another context the question of whether Sabata's take-over secured the paramountcy for Ngangelizwe's dynasty and/or made it vulnerable to forces from without and within the House of Mthikrakra was a matter of speculation at the time. It is enough to mention that the assumption of the paramount chieftainship by Sabata resulted in the abaThembu elders, interested critics and overbearing bureaucrats focusing on the abaThembu paramountcy. His accession brought about hope of the transformation of chieftainship generally and the rebirth of the abaThembu paramountcy in particular.

Well before Sabata's accession, but at a time when his restlessness was already manifest, the government crafted and introduced a new piece of legislation.⁸ This was the BAA of 1951, which, as its constitutional mandate revealed, was purpose-designed, even though it purported to be a natural successor to the NAA of 1927.

THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1951: RATIONALE, TERMS AND OBJECTIVES

Change in continuity was implied in the administrative reforms which were primarily aimed at restructuring the governance of the Blacks. The socio-political context for the evolution of the BAA was located in a combination of determinant influences which also informed the factors that prescribed responses and reactions the act elicited. These were the post-World War II popular reactions to the Betterment projects,⁹ which, in Evans's analysis, the DNA had compounded with the act.¹⁰ Another factor was the Bhunga's bureaucratically imposed political impotence¹¹ and its subsequent readiness to phase itself out of rural governance. This political gesture facilitated the smooth introduction of the innovative legislation in the BAA.¹² The inability of the Native Representative Council (NRC) to extricate itself from its dysfunctional role,¹³ was also a crucial factor, because in its disempowerment was located the empowering element for the white minority. The National Party's victory at the polls in 1948 influenced them to think of the NRC as a political threat to the Verwoerdian primary plan of keeping the

National Party in power.¹⁴ Against this background must be seen their 'cut and paste' policy which saw the NRC being replaced by the BAA.

Mayer has defined this instrument as a chief-dominated structure in which traditional leaders would wield power in their natural domains, and where there would be neither jockeying for franchise rights between black and white nor a 'swamping' of the white minority by the African majority.¹⁵ Carter, Karis and Stultz have summed up Verwoerd's principal objective of the proposed law as being 'the restoration of the prestige, the authority of Native law and custom, which would be achieved by providing the Bantu Authorities with administrative, executive, and judicial powers'.¹⁶

Therefore the urgent need to promote party goals gave the new government a rationale for devising new bureaucratic instruments that would methodically stifle potential opposition to its grip on power. Oomen has proposed the need to spearhead a developmental revolution in the rural areas as another factor that formed the reason for the BAA legislation. Against this background must be understood the concept of a modernised chieftaincy which suddenly came into play as an apparatus that would complement the efforts of the 'technocratic officials clutching development manuals and spouting a rhetoric of betterment, modernity and development'.¹⁷ Oomen's comment that

It was only after the National Party's victory in the 1948 elections that the *volkekundiges* at the Native Affairs Department decided unequivocally to invest in traditional authority as the major mode of rule in the reserves, and to unleash the latent power of the Bantu's own system....to play a leading part in the programme for the development of the Bantu community¹⁸

reinforces the idea that the NP's victory influenced government's reasoning, dictated its modus operandi, and blindly focused it on its singular goal, namely the acquisition (and retention) of power as the ultimate prize. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* as quoted in Marala, has outlined the Bill and its provisions thus :

The Bantu Authorities Bill, implementing Dr Verwoerd's announcement, was introduced in the Senate on June 5 1951. It made provision for the abolition of the Native Representative Council, and empowered the Governor-General to establish three Bantu Authorities. These were a tribal authority consisting of the

headman or chief of the tribe or community, constituted with due regard to native law and custom, and a joint tribal authority for any number of tribes or communities; a regional authority chosen from chiefs, headmen, and councillors or tribal authorities, and exercising control over two or more areas for which tribal authorities had been established; and a territorial authority, chosen from members of regional authorities and exercising control over two or more areas for which regional authorities have been established.¹⁹

Maylam has also endorsed this, and added that in between the tribal authority and the territorial authority was the regional authority, which was a conglomeration of tribal authorities.²⁰ Oomen has added that the

BAA of 1951 envisaged traditional leaders as embedded in Tribal Authorities, who would assist and guide the chief in the administration of the affairs of the tribe and in the performance of his other functions, which are to maintain law and order, disperse unlawful assemblies, and ensure the enforcement of regulations.²¹

REACTION AND RECEPTION: ABATHEMBU CHIEFS' RESPONSES TO THE BAA

The NP delegated the DNA officials to unveil the BAA. Against this background must be understood the central argument of Eiselen, the SNA, in his presentation to amaZulu Chiefs at Eshowe in December of 1951. In an apparent apologetic and yet manipulative tone that seemed to justify the NP's retreat from direct involvement in the administrative affairs of the indigenous communities, Eiselen endorsed the NP's about-turn. He argued that

the task of the chief could never be undertaken with complete success by a stranger like a Native Commissioner or any government official who cannot live and grow with and develop together with the people. The stranger, more often than not, wants the Bantu to jump to a new form of life. He is apt to cut the roots of the Bantu plant while he applies the fertilizer of civilization.²²

Eiselen's Eshowe presentation appeared to be an appropriate introduction to the interview that Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, and Young, the Under-Secretary of Native Affairs, subsequently had with the leading Transkeian chiefs. The chiefs heard it confirmed that the council system was henceforth to be substituted by the Territorial Authority which was 'a Body of chiefs and leaders of the people of the Transkeian Territories....a constitutional one.....constituted on the principles of Bantu Authorities'.²³

The Minister gave the chiefs freedom to choose between being represented by a white member of parliament as the chief's point of contact with the government 'through whom he would speak to, and make his wishes known to the Government'²⁴ and a system in which a black person would be treated 'as a child with a separate personality, to give him opportunity to develop into a separate person'.²⁵ Verwoerd condemned the former on the grounds that it bound the chiefs and their constituencies to the Union Parliament 'where you can never gain full development'.²⁶

Verwoerd's offer talked to group leaders as much as it talked to group sentiments. The potential of the presentation to be divisive could be seen in the different interpretations and perceptions it conveyed to his audience with its diverse goals and ambitions. The fact that the government had doubted Sabata's fitness for the regal position²⁷ was historically significant in its hint at the little confidence they had in the abaThembu paramountcy. Ntsebeza-Ndletyana's claim can be seen to be credible in Magistrate Yates's blaming of other abaThembu royals for Sabata's seeming instability,²⁸ while at the same time he conceded that 'outweighing these considerations to my mind, is the fact that he is the rightful successor by birth to the Paramountcy and the people are unanimous in desiring his installation.'²⁹ This thesis argues that were the government to have its way, it would have disqualified Sabata from the paramountcy, and that it did not was again proof of the strength inherent in indigenous law.

The eventual installation of Sabata Jonguhlanga as abaThembu paramount chief automatically conferred on him the prerogative to respond to the government proffers on behalf of the composite abaThembu cluster. It must be noted that the headquarters of all the abaThembu tribal authorities, prior to the advent of the BAA, was at the Bumbane Great Place, the seat of both their paramountcy and Regional Authority. The question of traditional hierarchy was thus a factor of great historical significance because it reinforced the concept of both the seniority and prerogative to sanction or not to sanction the implementation of the act in abaThembuland. Of similar importance was the fact that the BAA was the first government enactment that Sabata's office had to deal with, and it was an elucidation of the principles that would guide his rule. It is

important to mention at this point that Sabata was still entrenching his person and authority in his new paramountcy.

K.D. Matanzima, in the meantime, had been installed as amaHala chief in 1940. This fell short of his ambitions for recognition as regional chief of Emigrant abaThembuland.³⁰ He had entered and re-entered the Bhunga, under whose auspices the chiefs' power was visibly declining. An arrangement that guaranteed increased authority for the chiefs via the BAA was a bait to which KD was not least susceptible.³¹ Mandela, who by his own admission, looked up to KD Matanzima as both his mentor and role model during their student days at Fort Hare, has admitted that his efforts to dissuade his customary nephew from embracing tribal politics were in vain. Mandela's insistence that the Bantu Authorities was a retreat from democracy in its emphasis on rights prescribed by birth as in chieftainship was rejected by Matanzima. Mandela who hoped that Matanzima's intelligence could be better invested in the national struggles was grieved by his failure to win his role model over to his political sentiments.³² Laurence has confirmed that Verwoerd made the act optional in order 'to dangle it before the chiefs, with its intention of bringing them back into the administrative system and its promise of greater powers as the bait'.³³

Young read the original draft of a 'Notice of Motion' which gave a clear picture of the Transkeian Territorial Authority (TTA) as

constituted as to be fully representative of the people of the Transkeian Territories, (through the Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs and leaders of the Tribes residing therein), ... approves in principle that it is the proper medium without the intervention of intermediaries for direct contact with the Government, as represented by the Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs, in all matters affecting the political, material, social and economic life of the Natives in these Territories, and requests the Government to devise ways and means in which such direct contact can best be effected.³⁴

Kaiser Matanzima saw it fit to 'jump the gun' at Verwoerd's presentation of the act. He immediately welcomed the new dispensation in which he probably identified an empowering factor, commenting that 'it looks as if under the Bantu Authorities system we are going to be given back our powers.... We have lost a lot of our powers as

Chiefs. In the older days we had enough power to combat the hooliganism in our tribes with the result that we have had very few hooligans.³⁵

Evans has confirmed that the Transkei was initially not very enthusiastic about what the architects of the BAA claimed was to be a chief-dominated system. Matanzima was an exceptional chief in that he expressed both a positive interest and enthusiastic anticipation of the act. He was particularly impressed with the prospects of an elevated chieftainship that were implicit in Verwoerd's plans.³⁶ His insistent petition for more power for the chiefs revealed him to be a traditional exclusivist who saw in the implementation of BAA a guarantee for the security of his personal power within the context of a universal chieftainship that was endowed with unrestrained authority. Bangilizwe Joyi's remarks are proof of Matanzima's greed for power, namely that 'Daliwonga adored chieftainship passionately. He viewed it as a ladder that would help him climb high in order to rise above others and rule over them, the one thing he wanted most'.³⁷ Matanzima's response to the government's presentation was obviously the kind that Verwoerd most wanted to hear. 'Hooliganism' could mean anything for Matanzima, including extra-parliamentary political activities which were already becoming a visible nuisance to the NP government. His clear vision about the need for testing the flexibility of the parameters of power in order to satisfy the whims of individuals is revealed in his suggestive remark. He argued against the appeal from the court of the 'tribal' authority to the court of the Native Commissioner. 'This is not to our liking', he remarked. '[t]he appeal should be first to the regional Chief and thereafter to the court of the Native Commissioner'.³⁸

It is hard to believe that Matanzima would have argued for the devolution of additional authority to the regional chief if he did not entertain hopes of being one in the near future. His arguments portrayed him as a self-appointed spokesman for all the chiefs amongst whom he probably felt more important and superior intellectually perhaps by virtue of his university education. It was apparent in his response that he already had a vision in which a properly networked hierarchy of authority, dominated at the apex by chiefs as the Government-approved representatives of the people (for which he himself

was an aspiring spokesperson), would be self-supporting. Such self-sustaining and efficient chieftainship would not warrant any interference by the government except as the ultimate court of appeal for the people. It was significant that Matanzima in his presentation of the case for the chiefs, disregarded protocol in his failure to either caucus or consult with the other chiefs, particularly the paramount chief, on an issue that was not his prerogative. His presumptuousness in this regard vindicates once more Joyi's comment about his customary nephew to the effect that

Daliwonga's greed for chieftainship of the highest order blinded him to the fact that when whites want to tackle an enemy inside its domain they first split it within its ranks so as to undo the unity of opposition, and in that way gain easy entry.³⁹

Sabata responded thus to the BAA presentation '[i]f there are people who are a nuisance the Paramount Chief should have the right to remove them from his area',⁴⁰ as if to say that his kingdom did not need the BAA or any other political structure to resolve its problems. This comment which was presented as a response also purported to be a warning to Matanzima's subtle and yet preposterous plea for power.

Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have confirmed that Sabata immediately opened up the issue of the BAA for debate in the true indigenous tradition of rule by consensus. Mda's remark that Sabata did something that was unheard of in [the 20th century] abaThembuland portrayed the new paramount chief as a progressive chief:

He not only gave us [Transkei Organised Bodies] an audience, but called meetings for us to speak. He gave us a platform to speak, knowing that we were going to say things that were anti-government. He wanted people to hear what we came to say, and then decide what they wanted.⁴¹

It became clear from the beginning that Sabata's consultative approach to the government overtures on BAA differed from Matanzima's dictatorial style.

Anderson Joyi attributed the intensification of disunity in his ancestral house of Ngubengcuka to the advent of the BAA in abaThembuland, 'it was in the proposition of that Act that the unity in the House of Ngubengcuka disintegrated well nigh irretrievably'.⁴² He explained how the government went about approaching the Transkei


chiefs through the office of the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, offering elevated chieftainships as rewards for those who accepted the BAA. Sabata made it clear that abaThembu would have to decide if they 'do not want the new law their word must prevail, I cannot override them even though I am their King'.⁴³ Mda Mda's submission at the Nhlapo Commission has confirmed Sabata's vehement opposition to its introduction within the area of his jurisdiction. Mda has referred to an 'all Transkei' meeting that was held at the instance of the paramount chief to discuss the BAA. The meeting, which included Matanzima, unanimously refused to commit the Transkei to the implementation of all forms of repressive laws. Matanzima is believed to have accepted the BAA following the government's campaign to sell and disseminate its new policy through its information officers. According to Mda this came about only after Young had conferred with Matanzima and the sequel to this development was the establishment of the Tribal Authority of Western AbaThembuland at Qamata.⁴⁴ Matanzima's jurisdiction at the time covered only 22 amaHala locations.⁴⁵ Streek and Wicksteed have confirmed that after he had taken over from Dalubuhle⁴⁶ he initially displayed a reluctance to commit himself to the acceptance of the BAA, but later capitulated and accepted the new act in principle. Joyi has claimed that his response was swift and positive especially when the magistrate confronted him for the second time with the fact that his chieftainship, which corresponded to the district status, was not anything to boast about.⁴⁷ Clearly in the acceptance of the act by anyone with Matanzima's ambitions for chieftainship there were visible prospects of the acquisition of additional power. It is not, however, clear what senior chieftainship Sabata would have been in line for, considering the fact that he alone in the whole of abaThembuland was, both by birth and customary prescription, already at the apex of the traditional hierarchy. Joyi confirmed that the enthusiasm of an educated person like Matanzima for chieftainship surprised them, and the magistrate was most likely aware of Matanzima's personal vanity. The magistrate's offer promised territorial and personal aggrandisement, and that and other benefits were indeed irresistible for anyone who held a junior chieftainship.

The differing responses of Sabata and Matanzima on the question of the implementation of the BAA were significant. In this regard the reasons for the reactions of the two most important chiefs in abaThembuland were of utmost importance. Sabata believed that the abaThembu input was invaluable in the deliberations that would determine their response to the government proposals. The same government had, earlier on, reluctantly agreed to install him as paramount chief. Sabata knew very well that it was due to the pressure exerted by the custodians of the Dalindyebo paramountcy that he had eventually been installed. He would thus have found it hard to disregard the wishes of abaThembu, especially because he was aware that Dabulamanzi had come under fire for his apparent support of the government measures. The advent of the BAA therefore exerted pressure on Sabata to take a stand for either the abaThembu cause or the promotion of the Governor-General's bureaucratic goals.

MATANZIMA ENTRENCHES HIS AUTHORITY IN THE COFIMVABA DISTRICT

Matanzima had already in the early fifties in a typical egotist manner assumed the role of spokesman for the Matanzima family. His nomination of Mlimandlela Matanzima as a replacement headman for his deceased father, Mzola, must be seen in the context that 'it is the wish of the people of Ncora Flats location that Manzamdaka Sabata, brother of Mzola, be appointed to act as headman with effect from 9/6/1950 while their nominee, Mzola Matanzima, is away at work earning money to pay his father's debts'.⁴⁸

MZOLA IN THE RHAXOTI FAMILY TREE



Matanzima also felt slighted when Magistrate Norton failed to notify him about a meeting he had arranged to discuss the appointment of a headman for the Lower Qitsi Location. Norton subsequently remarked that 'Chief Matanzima took exception and appears as a result to have established, so far as that location is concerned, that he is the senior Chief and as such must be referred to in such matters'.⁵⁰

In other instances Matanzima's intervention sowed dissension between father and son. This was the case when he recommended that Ntabezwe Nyikima Matanzima be replaced by his son Velile arguing that '[h]e [Velile] is a responsible man and it is our wish that the acting headman should be one whom we can respect. He was brought up amongst us by Ntabezwe and he is a man who will control the people and earn their respect'.⁵¹ The magistrate, taking a cue from Matanzima, instructed 'Velile to take over the Acting Headmanship, subject to confirmation by the Government'.⁵² When Nyikima showed displeasure with Matanzima's divisive interference in his family matters Matanzima saw fit to demonise him further

I wish to invite your attention to the conduct of Nyikima, who is trying to disturb the proceedings (Nyikima has retired into the distance and his voice can be heard talking to himself). He is drunk and there are others like him who should be replaced by men with a sense of responsibility.⁵³

This was clear evidence that Matanzima was establishing a compliant socio-political infrastructure for himself and a solid launching pad from which to impose his authority beyond his immediate surroundings. His clamouring for recognition and his condescending attitude showed that he already saw himself as a vital link between the government and the people of Cofimvaba. He was already in a position of strength in his home base when the BAA became a factor in the abaThembu chiefs' politics. It was from this consolidated position that he set out to expand his original amaHala domain after unilaterally embracing the BAA. Most local headmen had been turned into his henchmen, with him as their spokesman. He presumptuously confirmed that the BAA had been accepted by all and sundry in his district, 'after discussing it at length at the Qamata Great Place'.⁵⁴ This was supposed to have taken place at a meeting convened at the instance of the Cofimvaba magistrate, Thorpe. It was significant that the

correspondence made no reference to Sabata's opinion in both the sanctioning of the meeting and its key deliberations. Matanzima's bold announcement provoked Sabata to summon him to his court and in that way directed him to the local magistrate. Thorpe, in turn, advised Matanzima to ignore the summons and warned Sabata to refrain from obstructing the administration of government.⁵⁵ When Sabata advised Matanzima to observe indigenous protocol in his conduct of affairs, he was reprimanded for interfering with the execution of government orders. Sabata's aim was to thwart Matanzima's facilitating role in the implementation of the abhorrent act and any action to the contrary was a defiance of his authority.

It became clear that there was collusion between the government and Matanzima, who was emerging as the government's 'man on the spot'. True to Mda's claim, K.D. was thus launched on a course of disobedience to his Paramount Chief.⁵⁶ The government's subtle acknowledgement of the importance of Sabata's compliance in the smooth implementation of the BAA was revealed in Young's letter to Eiselen. He hinted that a reconciliation between Sabata and Matanzima was a prerequisite for the introduction of Bantu Authorities in Thembuland, saying that 'until the Tembu trouble is settled, the Bantu Authorities will be retarded'.⁵⁷

Evans highlights the fact that the rivalry between Sabata and Matanzima over the leadership of the abaThembu people predated the 1950s. The events of the mid-twentieth century which were characterised by Matanzima's 'crisscrossing the Transkei urging the acceptance of Bantu Authorities'⁵⁸ were merely evidence of the escalation of the long-existing rivalry. Evans makes the different responses of Matanzima and Sabata to the BAA a phase in their civil feud which eventually pushed Sabata into a leadership role amongst opponents of the new policy while Matanzima emerged as the champion of the government schemes. Evans's condemnation of the government's interventionist role which favoured the cooperative chiefs to the extent of abetting their recalcitrance and disregard of custom complements his earlier claims.⁵⁹ Against this background must be understood the negative perception given by the government's apparent encouragement and condoning of what Evans has described as the 'thuggish

behaviour' of Matanzima's supporters. They assaulted opponents, destroyed property and violently broke up public meetings that were held by anti-government elements. It must be borne in mind that the anti-government elements were naturally associated with anti-Matanzima forces, and this situation gave Matanzima an excuse to fight personal opposition under the guise of enforcing an acceptance of government measures for the long-term benefit of the people. It was in the latter context that headmen Damane's complaint about Matanzima's gatecrashing and subsequent assault of attendees at a meeting held at his Ncora Location elicited a partisan response rather than the help he had asked for from the Chief Magistrate:

As headmen now come under tribal authorities, Headman Damane would be wise to obey and cooperate with Chief Matanzima who is the head of the tribal authority and a responsible man who will not victimise Damane for the past opposition to Chief Matanzima. You should support Chief Matanzima's authority.⁶⁰

Matanzima's next move was to replace, with the government's connivance, amaMfengu headmen in the St Marks District with his hand-picked individuals. In this context must be seen the subsequent confirmation by the resident magistrate to the chief magistrate that Matanzima had been granted civil jurisdiction over No.18 Ngxwabangu Location in the District of St. Marks. This communication signified the expansion of Matanzima's area of jurisdiction as well as the progressive incorporation of the amaMfengu communities into his amaHala domain. The gradual incorporation of these historical non-baThembu communities was done despite the fact that they professed their loyalty to the House of Ngangelizwe, for 'as the Fingos [amaMfengu] are not a clan of the Thembu tribe, but live in Tembuland, they are to be regarded as falling direct[ly] under the Paramount Chief, the other local chiefs having been appointed as chiefs of the respective clans'.⁶¹ J. C. Qongqo had been appointed to be the presiding abaMbo chief by the communities from the following locations the Ngxwabangu No.18, Ngqwaru Hills No.7, Ncora School No.14, Ngcaca No.16, Mtshanyane No.17 and Mahlubini No.38. These communities in concert opposed all moves to merge them with the amaHala group, arguing that their case was similar to that of amaGcina, amaBomvana, amaQwathi, amaTshomana, amaNqabe, who had their chiefs but were otherwise

abaThembu under Paramount Chief Sabata.⁶² While the abaMbo communities were vehemently opposed to absorption by the amaHala Tribal Authority, Matanzima was boasting throughout the Cofimvaba District that his influence was prevailing in areas that were outside his domain. The truth of Matanzima's claims became evident when on 5 July 1956 Thorpe informed Headman Pinzi that "Chief Matanzima has been requested [presumably by the same official] to hold a meeting in your location to explain the importance of stabilization to people."⁶³ The government's encouragement of Matanzima's violation of custom and disregard for Sabata's authority is exposed in the Magistrate's follow-up letter to Headman Pinzi which advised him 'that Chief Kaiser is to hold a meeting in his[your] location'.⁶⁴ The paramount chief naturally expressed his dismay at this development of events because his opinion and permission had not been sought prior to the holding of a meeting by Matanzima in Pinzi's amaMfengu location.

It was thus becoming clear that Matanzima was gradually assuming the position of an unqualified government agent in his self-co-option as a facilitator of the implementation of the BAA in abaThembuland. Evans has given credibility to the above claim in his comment that 'Matanzima emulated his administrative superiors and denied any connection between Bantu Authorities and development plans. The conflation, he claimed was due to agitators in the AAC and the ANC;----- Matanzima assured the patently sceptical and agitated chiefs that the Bantu Authorities is not rehabilitation'.⁶⁵ His insistence on the latter was, however, contradicted by people's experiences⁶⁶ and this convinced them that developmental schemes were an essential part of the BAA package. The case of Headman Ntliziyo of Nobhokhwe Location in the Cofimvaba District also confirms the collusion between the government and Matanzima in the promotion of government's measures. The government did not, in principle, oppose Matanzima's desire to be present at the installation of Ntliziyo even though Nobhokhwe Location was outside his domain. Whilst the Nobhokhwe community was looking forward to joining Matanzima's amaHala Tribal Authority as soon as it was established, they were vehemently opposed to stabilisation, an essential settlement-related component of the BAA, and as Evans has confirmed, Matanzima's trump card. In another context Thorpe confirmed in a letter to the Chief Magistrate that 't]he chief

[Daliwonga Matanzima] has publicly declared his support for this scheme and is prepared to use his influence to persuade the people of Nobokwe and other locations to accept the scheme'.⁶⁷ Matanzima's stance in this respect was perfectly in line with the government's plans, and was possibly instrumental in the Cofimvaba Magistrate's recommendation that Matanzima's desire to attend Ntliziyo's installation be honoured, as an 'invitation to attend the installation ceremony at Nobokwe at this stage would be tantamount to official recognition of his [Matanzima's] jurisdiction over this location. A refusal on the other hand would certainly lead to antagonism and non-co-operation on his part'⁶⁸ at a time when his assistance was so essential. Proof that the magistrate was aware of the irregularity and impropriety of allowing Matanzima to assume Sabata's prerogative at the installation of Headman Ntliziyo was his assurance that 'recognition of his [Matanzima's] authority at this stage will not embarrass the Department or encroach upon the rights of the Paramount Chief'.⁶⁹ Thorpe at the same time asked for approval from the chief magistrate, to accede to Matanzima's request.

It gradually became clear that the extension of Matanzima's power base to the locations that previously paid allegiance to the paramount chief was gradually trimming Sabata's political domain. This unwarranted assault on Sabata's prestige and authority forced him to fight a two-frontal battle to resist the implementation of the BAA and to check the threat to his paramountcy. The BAA appeared as a weapon that the government had made available for Matanzima to carve his climb to a senior status in the traditional hierarchy, and this objective, if realized, would inevitably offset Sabata's prime position in the ladder of power.

Also of great significance was the Governor-General's equivocation in his censuring of Matanzima. In public the government condemned his presumptuous actions but in their official correspondence, which was not accessible to the public, they encouraged his recalcitrance. When Sabata's legal representatives reported to the chief magistrate that Matanzima continuously belittled Sabata with his life-threatening remarks, 'telling people that the Paramount Chief has no right to set his foot in Cofimvaba and has even gone so far as to say that if he did so there would be bloodshed',⁷⁰ the government did not

appear concerned about the negative implications of the rumour and the need to redress it in a way that would guarantee Sabata free and safe passage in the region. In another incident a Mfengu headman, de Wet Mateta, came under pressure from the pro-Matanzima elements in the Cofimvaba District. He had been deposed on the recommendation of Matanzima who subsequently replaced him with a headman of his choice. Sabata's challenge to Matanzima's overbearing action on the grounds that the proposed replacement was obstructing the execution of the government-sponsored Betterment Schemes did not effect the reversal of the ill-conceived appointment.⁷¹ The only reason the government could have upheld the choice made by Matanzima would have been to limit Sabata's influence in the area and entrench Matanzima's image as the paramount chief's counterpart. Such a victory would have symbolised progress in the government's political exercise as well as the extension and expansion of Matanzima's power base. It is clear that once the rival candidate, in this case KD's choice, was in place the way would be open for him to incorporate Mateta's community into his amaHala 'Tribal' Authority at the expense of Sabata's political influence.

Two years later a certain Whindus Qongqo once more challenged the fact that the abaMbo community of Ngqwaru Hills whose founders included his ancestors, was suddenly treated as if it was part of the amaHala Community. The community in question had, from time immemorial, readily and willingly paid allegiance to King Ngangelizwe. He articulated his community's complaint by declaring that it 'is one of the most difficult and painful problems to suddenly turn to another authority which has been newly introduced by Bantu Authority Act just a few years'.⁷² Qongqo's comment was based on the fact that his forebears had been friendly with King Ngangelizwe, to the extent that when taxation was introduced they gladly made their payments at Ngcobo,

there being no such thing as Cofimvaba then. Cofimvaba had been introduced after the arrival of the Emigrant Tembus The ancestors of the Emigrant Tembus found us already firmly established in this location which gained its name after my ancestor, Mqokwana Location under Chief Ngangelizwe.⁷³

Qongqo contended that if the BAA was aimed at reviving 'ancient Bantu life and living'⁷⁴ its application had to be seen to be upholding the regulations that governed the

founders of the Nobhokhwe community. Qongqo's message was that King Ngangelizwe had provided for, and nurtured the loyalty of, his family to the House of Ngangelizwe. These gestures obliged the Mqokwana Community to make it their lifetime commitment to pay homage to Sabata. Unbeknown to Qongqo was the fact that the logic of arguments was not a strong enough factor to be weighed against the worth of what Matanzima was likely to deliver on a platter to the government if the latter organization connived with him in extending his power base. Proof that Qongqo's petition was in vain is that eventually all the abaMbo communities in the Cofimvaba District fell under the amaHala Tribal Authority.

The other area where the government appeared to be poised to back Matanzima's local 'imperialistic' tendencies was in the amaGcaleka village of St. Marks. The forebears of this community had been settled in the village long before the coming of the Emigrant abaThembu. The amaGcaleka not only rejected Matanzima's chieftainship over them but also reacted 'violently' to the idea of incorporation into the abaThembu cluster. Their rejection was based, inter alia, on the fact that their customs differed in some respects from those of abaThembu.⁷⁵ The amaGcaleka were greatly disturbed by the closeness of their headman, Mfebe, to Matanzima, and they alleged that he was 'selling out to the Tembus'.⁷⁶ The government seemed to be convinced, not without justification, that Matanzima had to be made chief of the subject village for the implementation of the BAA to be effective. To this extent they considered 'curb[ing] Kitchner Bantom, an influential mGcaleka who 'would have nothing to do with the Bantu Authorities unless they have a head of the Gcaleka royal blood nominated by the Gcaleka Paramount Chief'.⁷⁷

The Chief Magistrate, Ramsay admitted in his letter to the SNA that he had 'definitely refused to recommend'⁷⁸ a mGcaleka head for the subject amaGcaleka community, obviously because he would resist Matanzima's authority and the BAA. Eventually the amaGcaleka Community which had been legitimately ruled by successive descendants of King Sarhili also became part of the amaHala unit. Even when Salakuphathwa Sarhili was made chief over the amaGcaleka the Government insisted that amaGcaleka chiefs

in the St Marks District should be under Chief Matanzima. This was to be the case despite the reports to the effect that '[p]eople there fear[ed] they would lose their identity as a tribe if they have no one of amaXhosa Royal Blood over them'.⁷⁹ That the present chief of the amaGcaleka in the St Marks region is a member of the Matanzima family is of great historical significance in the story of the evolution of Daliwonga Matanzima's paramount chieftainship. It proves that Matanzima's political ambitions were upheld above those of the national sentiments of amaXhosa clan. These developments implied that the subchieftainships under Matanzima had increased, and this factor was also used later to justify the appointment of Matanzima to be the head of the whole of Western abaThembuland.

It soon became clear that the Cofimvaba District was both in a political and physical sense an impenetrable westward line which Sabata was forbidden to traverse. The above perception was reinforced by the reports that reached Sabata which confirmed Matanzima's life- threatening remarks against him were he to set foot in Cofimvaba. An article that appeared in *Imvo Bantu* [*Imvo zabaNtsundu*] revealed that

the Government has prohibited the Paramount Chief from going to Cofimvaba. The Paramount Chief suspects [and had reason to] that these articles have been inspired by Chief Kaiser. Chief Kaiser styles himself the Chief of the Emigrant Tembus despite the fact that the Authorities have informed him that he is not such a chief but only a chief of the 22 Hala Locations in the District of Cofimvaba.⁸⁰

The twenty-two amaHala locations which made up Matanzima's original Tribal Authority had progressively expanded to cover the whole of the Cofimvaba District. With Sabata's apparent prohibition from showing his presence in Cofimvaba, all indications were that abaThembuland was slowly splitting into two power blocks. The government's calculated reluctance to bring Matanzima to order gave him leeway. The seemingly unhindered expansion of his territorial base in the Cofimvaba must be seen in this context.

At the same time the Governor-General's universal authority was partially and ingeniously factored in the efforts to reduce Sabata's immediate jurisdictional area. The reports that reached the Bumbane Great Place alluded to a meeting which the Elliotdale magistrate held in his office with the amaBomvana delegation. The amaBomvana were, as reported, informed by the magistrate that 'they did not come under the [jurisdiction of the] Paramount Chief'.⁸¹ This was paradoxical in view of the fact that the government had recently backed every effort by Matanzima to impose his authority over the abaMbo and amaGcaleka communities of Cofimvaba. This appeared to be an assault on Sabata's jurisdictional authority than a case of excising a cluster for the purpose of placing it where it belonged. When the legal representative of Sabata questioned the SNA about the legality and customary appropriateness of the gathering, the government went to great lengths to justify and prove the ultimate goodness of the objectives of the meeting; as it would reveal the origin and the historical identity of the amaBomvana and undo their subjection to the abaThembu cluster:

Only a person with an abysmal ignorance of Transkeian tribal history would write of the Bomvanas as being a section of the Tembus – that is the Bomvanas of Elliotdale. During the last century the Bomvanas were being harried by the Pondos and fled South. The Tshezi section broke away from the main tribe and placed themselves under the Thembu [*sic*] chief who settled them in what is now Mqanduli District. They are loyal to the Thembu Paramount Chief. The main body of the Bomvanas fled to into Gcalekaland (now Willowvale) and "bought themselves in" by paying cattle to Hintsa. The Gcaleka Chief settled them in what is now Elliotdale District. During the last Gcaleka-Thembu War these Bomvanas fought with the Gcalekas against the Thembu. Bomvanaland was ceded to the Cape Government by its own Chief Moni quite independently of the cession of Thembuland and at a different time.⁸²

The government's approach to the amaBomvana problem did not address the irregularity of a government official holding a meeting with Sabata's subjects without his knowledge. Neither did it condemn the engagement of individuals-with neither a mandate from their group nor permission from their paramount chief-in an affair that affected the abaThembu chiefdom at large. It also did not censure the violation by the whole exercise (whose aim appeared to be to methodically diminish Sabata's territorial authority) of Sabata's dignity. It once more became clear that Sabata's power base was being eroded, his political authority challenged and the geo-physical fabric of his

kingdom tampered with. The Elliotdale affair was evidence that indeed while the endorsement of the BAA would hopefully bring prospects of recognisable chieftainship for some individuals for others it could well justify territorial truncation to achieve the opposite. Furthermore, Sabata was called upon to withstand, if he could, the piecemeal excision of the tribal authorities in his region if his paramountcy was to remain consolidated.

SABATA STALLS YOUNG'S ORDER TO CREATE REGIONAL CHIEFTAINSHIP FOR MATANZIMA

It was obviously in a bid to announce his person as the legitimate paramount chief of the whole of abaThembuland that Sabata visited the Cofimvaba District with the approval of the resident magistrate in December 1955. At a meeting Sabata specifically told chiefs, headman and other attendees, of his intention to appoint for himself a deputy chief who would serve the Cala and Cofimvaba districts. He announced that that 'I have come here to tell you that as there is no chief in this district I am going to appoint a deputy to myself and will make an announcement of my appointment later'.⁸³ Sabata's announcement simply meant that all chiefs in abaThembuland were expected to rule in his name as a 'chief above all chiefs'. An educated Matanzima probably sensed a slight in Sabata's seemingly patronising visit and unexpected, and perhaps uncalled for, message. His response could best be interpreted as a subtle mobilisation of his constituency against Sabata's intent. To this effect Sabata's meeting was quickly followed by a similar gathering on 23 December 1955 at the Qamata Great Place. At the meeting Matanzima explicitly called upon his constituency to discuss and make comments with regard to the motives and professed intentions of Sabata's visit to Cofimvaba..⁸⁴

Matanzima clearly took advantage of being a 'man on the spot' and made the people at the meeting look up to him as their sole chief. It was unlikely that anyone person could marshal enough courage in an atmosphere so life-threatening to profess loyalty to anyone other than him. While it cannot be said for certain that Sabata's approach lacked diplomacy and tact, it is clear that on the day in question he lost his foothold in Cofimvaba. Most speakers condemned Sabata's presumed unprecedented visit.

Others, like Mankayi, upheld the independence of Western abaThembuland. Mankayi argued that when Dalindyebo Ngangelizwe opened his country to land surveyors Mvuzo (the son of Rhaxothi Matanzima) chose not to.⁸⁵ The surveyors would thus have understood fully well that Dalindyebo's not strictly confined their activities to Dalindyeboland. Mankayi's reference to this exercise was obviously a reminder that Dalindyebo's opening his land to surveying was a unilateral decision, the wisdom or foolishness of which would continue to justify the division of abaThembuland.

Gqada Mbandezi remarked that Sabata had no right to appoint his so-called 'deputy chief' there-'because we have our hereditary Chiefs'.⁸⁶ Daniel Letlaka, a local teacher, immediately proposed that a delegation be appointed for the purpose of reporting the 'Sabata incident' to the Native Commissioner (NC) as well as to furnish him with minutes of the Qamata meeting. He also charged that 'it is clear that our progress in Emigrant abaThembuland is being retarded. It is because we are supporting the policy of the present government. Chief Daliwonga and his people have accepted the Bantu Authorities Act. Chiefs who do not support the Government are hostile towards Chief Matanzima'.⁸⁷ Letlaka's comment, which confirmed that Matanzima was a government symbol is supported by Southall's claim that Chief Daliwonga's 'star was rising fast in the official firmament because of his zealous support for the Bantu Authorities system and separate development in general'.⁸⁸ George Matanzima stated that 'the heir of the Great House cannot enjoy the property of the Right Hand House ---- Chief Daliwonga is being attacked because of his acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act'.⁸⁹ Matanzima's uncle, Chief Dalubuhle declared that the 'Government should warn Jonguhlanga [Sabata] to remain in his own country. We know that he is a Paramount Chief of his own country but he should not interfere with Matanzima's loyalty to the Government'.⁹⁰ Edward Nonyondla's comment that '[w]e have led a very loyal and peaceful life here, and we do not wish our loyalty interfered with. Chief Daliwonga is our Chief in Emmigrant Tembuland',⁹¹ was a clear declaration that they neither recognised nor acknowledged any one who claimed seniority over Chief Matanzima. Indeed the degree of patronage for the latter that reflected in the above remarks was equally matched by the level of antipathy towards the House of Dalindyebo. This supports Anderson Joyi's

claim that in the BAA is to be found the germ that led to the disintegration of the House of Ngubengcuka. Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have also endorsed the fact that the BAA sparked contestation over the paramountcy of abaThembu, with the central question being the legitimacy of Sabata's authority over Emigrant abaThembuland.⁹²

The positive outcome of Sabata's visit to Cofimvaba was that it persuaded Matanzima to hold an 'in-house referendum' which in turn afforded him an opportunity to measure his popularity. He was also able to test his support in his home base against that of the Sabata. It is possible that his submission about Cala to the Native Commissioner of Cofimvaba was made round about this time. The recent assurances given, whether extracted or voluntarily, empowered him to approach, with self-interest, any questions that would impact on his position and role as a recognisable chief among abaThembu chiefs. After all, his Cofimvaba constituency had made it clear that his chiefship above them was unrivalled even by Sabata. In his submission he included Cala on a list of districts (Mthatha, Elliotdale, Mqanduli, Ngcobo, St Marks) that 'are under the control of some recognised Chiefs of Chiefs under the Paramount Chief of Thembuland'.⁹³ Matanzima further questioned the fact that Cala was regarded as having no Chief controlling it, and argued that 'my submission is that I am the Chief recognised by the people of Cala to whom they pay allegiance in succession to my father Mhlobo'.⁹⁴ He cited the collection of money by the Emigrant abaThembu (St Marks, Xhalanga-of which Cala was part-and the Glen Grey) in 1948 for the purpose of erecting his tribal office at Qamata as a 'clear proof of [the Cala] peoples's loyalty to him;'.⁹⁵ He further supported his claim for recognition as chief of the Emigrant abaThembu by claiming that Cala people had approached him in 1945 to have a school established in Xhalanga : 'they voluntarily agreed to collect a tribal fund for that purpose. All the moneys collected were handed over to me and I opened up a Trust Account with the Native Commissioner's Office in Cala'.⁹⁶

In the light of the developments alluded to above, the impact on Sabata of Young's order which authorised him to appoint 'Kaiser Matanzima as Chief Of Emigrant Thembuland'⁹⁷ must be presumed. The notice came after Matanzima's pronouncement

of the acceptance of the BAA which Sabata would neither endorse nor sign before conferring with 'leading subordinates and people of the two districts of Cofimvaba and Cala'.⁹⁸ There was indeed violation of custom in a case where the government authorised Matanzima's appointment without prior consultation with Sabata whose prerogative was to ratify the customary legality of such a political exercise. This not only reflected the contradictions that were inherent in the government's bureaucratic procedures, but also the methodical and systematic erosion of Sabata's authority by a government that had given itself a mandate to resuscitate chiefly authority through the BAA. Anderson Joyi has affirmed that for the status of any chief to be elevated to a higher rank the incumbent had to present an ox as an emblem to his superior. In the latter context Matanzima would present Sabata with an ox. The name of the ox would be bestowed on the house whose chieftainship was being upgraded. Matanzima deliberately ignored this customary practice, and instead claimed that the token stick he had earlier received from the Prince of Wales entitled him to senior chiefship. Joyi strongly refuted Matanzima's claim on the grounds that if the 'stick' was of any traditional significance in the political context the chiefs Ndarala (of amaNdungwane), Stokwe (of amaQwathi), and Tyhopo (of amaGcina) who had also been recipients of the 'foreign' political symbol would have equally qualified for the rank that Matanzima was claiming for himself.⁹⁹ Sabata went ahead and convened a meeting for 9 June 1956 at his Bumbane Great Place. Matanzima was invited to attend the gathering to present his case and explain his position to the paramount chief in front of other chiefs¹⁰⁰ as prescribed by customary law. Chief Matanzima did not attend the meeting despite his undertaking to the chief magistrate and Young to do so.¹⁰¹ Matanzima's failure to attend the Bumbane meeting without giving an excuse was a slight to the Sabata's 's dignity and obviously unacceptable. His defiance of the 'Authorities' in this way warranted disciplinary action against him by the government. Instead his recalcitrance did not deter the Government from appointing a commission to investigate the legitimacy of his claims to supreme chieftainship in Emigrant Thembuland. This was in disregard of the fact that the validity of such claims would have legally derived from the status of Matanzima's predecessors at the time of the split from the main abaThembu body.

Young followed up by holding separate interviews with Sabata and Matanzima in an effort to draw them closer to each other. These could well be the same interviews that Anderson Joyi mentioned earlier, which the DNA officials held with Sabata and Matanzima to, *inter alia*, tout for the BAA. Ramsay, drew up an agreement which he expected both chiefs to sign. He later claimed that Matanzima was ready to sign this agreement while Sabata when alone gave the impression that he would sign only to backtrack and pay heed to his advisers when they were with him. It was believed that Sabata's advisers persistently persuaded him 'first to hold a meeting of all Thembu [*sic*] Chiefs and elders to discuss the matter of the implementation of the BAA'.¹⁰² Matanzima's readiness to sign would surely expedite his upward climb in the ladder of chieftainship. This document, which anticipated a meeting that had been postponed because of Sabata's illness, was essentially an exhortation 'of chiefs, headmen and people to accept Bantu Authorities and assist the officials in every way in establishing tribal units'.¹⁰³ Young later confirmed in a letter that at a subsequent meeting Sabata and his patrons had asked for an adjournment so as to be able to present the issues affecting abaThembu to a gathering of abaThembu at large. While the BAA presented an ideal weapon to accomplish the objectives peculiar to both chiefs it is not easy to believe that Young would have retracted his order if Sabata had changed his mind and embraced the controversial act.

On 3 August 1956 Ramsay wrote a letter in which he expressed disappointment at the fact that the envisaged meeting of the abaThembu Chiefs and Headmen had not taken place

owing to the bad state of Chief Sabata's health. He is almost continually sick and unable to function as a chief. In several cases chiefs and headmen are ready to form tribal authorities but wish to consult the chief first and are unable to see him ...The chief's illness is inherited alcoholism and consequent complications.¹⁰⁴


Sabata's illness could be perceived as both an advantage and a disadvantage because it afforded them an opportunity to find an amenable substitute. The chief magistrate's remark, based as it was on a doctor's findings, that 'unless Sabata can receive institutional psycho-pathological treatment, his expectation of life is very short'¹⁰⁵ was a

prejudiced pronouncement from both the doctor and the government official about a man who lived for another thirty years after this date. The latter remark is also suggestive of the futility of perceiving a physically unfit Sabata as neither a threat nor an obstruction to government's plans. Ironically, Sabata's illness was a political setback of great historical significance for the history of abaThembu paramountcy. Since he was chief by customary law his assent was essential if the government were sincere in its intentions of honouring the chieftainship. The chief magistrate required a doctor's written confirmation of Sabata's sickness to be able to justify finding a substitute for him. There was already a plan in government circles to convene a meeting of all abaThembu Chiefs and royal headmen with a view to nominating 'a regent or deputy' to carry on the business of the chieftom. It was to be expected that the government would use its influence to identify a government-disposed candidate for regency. The apparent inappropriateness of the BAA as a tool to revive chieftainship is clearly revealed in the chief Magistrate's claim of disappointment at the obstructiveness of abaThembu custom, saying 'Tembu custom does not permit of a *'locum tenens'* for a paramount chief while the chief is alive and in possession of his faculties'.¹⁰⁶ It must be noted that in the case in hand the abaThembu custom, with all its seeming obstructive features, served to secure for all times, Sabata's position as paramount chief.

THE BANISHMENT OF JONGUHLANGA'S ROYAL COUNCIL AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE DEPORTEES

The security of the centrality of abaThembu paramountcy could not be guaranteed now that Matanzima was being earmarked for regional chieftainship. The BAA on its part appeared to be losing its direction as Sabata tried pull together his kingdom backed by an inner 'Royal Council' constituted by the chiefs Bhalisile Nkosiyané, Thwalimfene and Bangilizwe Joyi, and McGregor Mgolombane. The implementation of the BAA in abaThembuland had since degenerated to a power struggle which translated into a Sabata's abaThembu paramountcy versus Matanzima's aspirations for the St Marks centred regional chieftainship. While Matanzima's most powerful ally was the DNA personnel Sabata depended for advice on his 'royal advisers' men who were chiefs by virtue of their being descendants of Ngubengcuka. They all shared Sabata's sentiments

with regard to abaThembu affairs. One of these prominent royal councillors, Nkosiyane, was a former civil servant, who acted as Sabata's secretary, editing and interpreting all his correspondence.



Bangilizwe confirmed that their strategy was that the 'King should adopt all possible delaying tactics and avoid an outright rejectionist response to the government-imposed 'Authorities'. They hoped that things would sort themselves out without the offensive legislation being applied in abaThembuland'.¹⁰⁸

The apparent indecisiveness of Sabata put his 'Royal Council' in a bad light. The government and some elements from within abaThembuland accused the 'Royal Council' of denying all access to Paramount Chief Sabata, who himself was accused of playing double standards. Ramsay also remarked in a letter that it 'is quite clear that Sabata is trying to run with the hares and chase with the hounds ... He is admittedly in a very difficult position and is not strong enough to take a stand on his own'.¹⁰⁹ Sabata would argue that consulting with the abaThembu people through these councillors on matters affecting his chieftdom was in keeping with the custom. It must be noted that the tribal authority was at the bottom of the hierarchy of authorities. Against this background therefore it made sense that the formation of such a body should demonstrate, as much as was possible, visible participatory democracy by, and for, those it was intended to serve rather than those (the government) whose political interests it was designed to promote. A fact of great historical significance in this regard was that the condemnation

of the chiefs that made up the 'Joyi gang' (Royal Council) because of their stand on the BAA was evidence of the act's divisive impact in the abaThembu chiefs' ranks.

The affidavit of Ephraim Neyi Sangoni of Qokolweni Location (Mqanduli- Mthatha) must be understood in the light of both the diversified responses of abaThembu chiefs to the BAA and the divide and rule approach of the government in abaThembu affairs. Sangoni's report, based on personal observations at a meeting held at Bumbane on 22 March 1958, confirmed Sabata's harsh condemnation of the people who reported his activities to the magistrate's office. He claimed to have been singled out as a 'spy and renegade'. 'There are people here who will run to Umtata and say all I have said but I do not care',¹¹⁰ Sangoni reported, adding that many at the meeting spoke against the acceptance of the nomination of any mThembu to a 'Bantu' Authorities body. These included the Joyi brothers who were the main speakers against the BAA. Thwalimfene, of 'Joyi gang', in show of confidence in his king, was reported to have remarked, that they would 'not nominate any members, you are our chief ... people nominated by the government will never be able to come here to the Great Place. They'll have to remain in their kraals'.¹¹¹

Thwalimfene's sentiments were endorsed by Masebenza Sandlana who remarked that they could 'never have two rulers—the Chief magistrate and the Paramount Chief. The Chief Magistrate must go. He's not born here and the Paramount is'.¹¹² This was an indication of abaThembu rejection of, and resistance to, the imposition of imported political systems and their associated practices. Sabata for his part was reported to have stated that he would not express his opinion on the BAA for fear of being victimised by the C.I.D. members, some of whom might have been present at the meeting. Sangoni also reported that the attendees at the meeting elected a delegation which was to report to the magistrate that the abaThembu rejected the BAA and were in disagreement with the government's policy. The delegation which consisted of Sabata's nominees included the controversial Ephraim Sangoni, Thwalimfene and Bangilizwe Joyi, Rev Cuba, Gebenga Sasa, David Makongolo, Masebenza Sandlana, Ngangelizwe Mkhangelisi and Justice Mthikrakra. Sabata led the delegation.¹¹³ Its composition

appeared to refute the issues that were, at that time, polarizing the abaThembu people. It exhibited a symbolic unity and appeared to present a united front to the magistrate. In the light of the above events must be contextualised a report believed to have originated with MacGregor Mgolombane (of the Joyi gang) which claimed that the 'Mthatha Natives Racial groups' had rejected the BAA. Ramsay's letter contained a report which noted that the act had been repeatedly rejected on 10 December 1956, 14 September 1957, 18 November 1957 and 22 March 1958.¹¹⁴ Matters were made worse by Sabata's anti-government remarks to journalists from *New Age* and *Imvo*, his comments at the Bumbane Great Place meetings, as well as his verbal attacks on the government during a recent visit to the Reef,¹¹⁵ all of which attracted the attention of the security police. His remarks were a factor behind the government's decision to delay the ratification of his appointment to paramountcy¹¹⁶ in accordance with the BAA.¹¹⁷ It was also noteworthy that the chief magistrate acknowledged in a letter to the SNA that he had recommended that 'in view of his [Sabata's] past record and recent conduct, that the appointment be withheld until such time as he shows that he has turned over a new leaf'.¹¹⁸ In the same letter Ramsay admitted that his recommendation was not in accord with the fact that 'the time had come to appoint Sabata as Paramount Chief [King] of the abaThembu chiefdoms residing in the districts of Mthatha, Mqanduli, Ngcobo, St Marks, Xalanga and Elliotdale'.¹¹⁹ Though the government had reluctantly installed Sabata in 1954 it became clear that his rejection of the BAA caused uncertainty about the future status of his paramount chieftainship. The situation was fuelled by rumours (which Mgolombane claimed to have got from 'reliable sources') that Sabata's rejection of the 'Authorities' might cost him his paramountcy. Mgolombane took it upon himself to verify the validity of the rumours with the Chief Magistrate's Office, noting that he 'was rather surprised to learn from reliable sources the rumour that if Paramount Jonguhlanga does not carry on nominations for the rejected above Act he is to be dismissed as Paramount'.¹²⁰ Ramsay denied the rumours on the basis that the 'Bantu Authorities Act is not enforceable unless the people concerned agree----dictatorship has been abandoned in the latter Act'

Other than Sabata's opposition to the act, a detailed account of the abaThembu objections to the implementation of the BAA, and the reasons for such opposition were expressed in an unpublished document entitled 'Memorandum on the Difficulties and Tensions Arising from the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Tembuland'.¹²² The co-authors of the memorandum were Nkosiyané, Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene Joyi and Mgolombane.¹²³ Tsotsi has written thus about some of the reasons for the condemnation of the BAA, and the opposition to its implementation as reflected in the abaThembu memorandum

The implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Tembuland ... had strengthened the hand of those who had always opposed it as a fraud, a divide-and-rule measure for the purpose of exploitation. So far from strengthening the position of the Paramount Chief of the Tembus and preserving the unity of the Tembu Nation, the Bantu Authorities Act in operation had proved to be a source of weakness and disunity. It was primarily for this reason that at several representative meetings of the Tembu Nation the Bantu Authorities Act (not only its implementation) had been roundly condemned and rejected. This had placed the Paramount chief, who had at all times been ready and willing to co-operate with the Government, in an embarrassing and invidious position and has made him an easy target of those careerists who see in his discomfiture prospects for their own promotion.¹²⁴

The memorandum was presented to the C.B.Young's one-man commission which sat in Umtata from 4 to 6 March 1958.¹²⁵ The presentation was made at a meeting that Young had convened to investigate reasons for the abaThembu rejection of the BAA.¹²⁶ Mda has added that Matanzima's claim to senior chieftainship was another brief of the commission.¹²⁷ Tsotsi, expressing the dilemma in which Sabata found himself said: 'the Paramount Chief sided with the people's representatives in his heart, but was naturally reluctant to come out openly against his employers to whom he owed his very rank'¹²⁸ in terms of the NAA of 1927. Earlier the Mthatha magistrate had required the Great Place to submit the names, occupations and addresses of people who wished to make representations at the enquiry, together with the main points of such representations.¹²⁹ This instruction possibly originated in the office of the Minister of Bantu Development and Administration, De Wet Nel, who had initiated the appointment of the 'one man commission'. The state owed it to Young that Matanzima had accepted

the BAA and this fact strengthens Mda's claim that the 'Commission was designed to achieve a predetermined goal'.¹³⁰

Young's commission was arranged without the knowledge of, or consultation with the Paramount Chief. In his letter to the Mthatha magistrate Sabata remarked that

[y]ou told me in your office that the inquiry is to be held consequent[ial] upon the deputation (referring to the Joyi gang who had presented the memorandum to the SNA in Pretoria) that went to Pretoria about the Bantu Authorities Act ... I must know the full Agenda of the inquiry The Tembus are also requesting humbly that the said inquiry should be conducted at the above place (Great Place, Bumbane) which is their Palace.¹³¹

The mandate of the commission was to determine the reasons for the rejection of the BAA by the abaThembu,¹³² even though reasons for opposition to the measure were clearly specified in the memorandum. It must also be noted that the government's interrogation of the rejection of the BAA contradicted its earlier undertaking via Ramsay that the act was not by any means to be rammed down people's throats without their consent.

A testimony by Sangoni recorded in Ramsay's letter reflected the perception that Nkosiyané, Mgolombane and the Joyi brothers, were regarded as agitators from whose hands Sabata needed to be rescued. Ramsay recorded that at meetings at his [Sabata] Great Place he does not favour Bantu Authorities, but when interviewing officials he does. He brings Sangoni and Justice to the Magistrate but at home favours the Nkosiyané gang and rebukes these two councillors'.¹³³ A 'native clerk' by the name of H.V.O. Mgudlwa, and an interpreter, F. Poswa, were also not viewed favourably by the government. The magistrate's office staff had a strong, though unverified, suspicion that the two had passed official and confidential information to Sabata and his advisers, for use in their fight against the implementation of the BAA. Ramsay made a point to the SNA 'that mention is made in the account, of the memorandum, which would appear, accordingly, to be not from the Tembus but from Mgudlwa, Nkosiyané, Joyi and Attorney Tsotsi'.¹³⁴ Poswa, was described as only an 'interpreter clerk', yet his name was frequently mentioned alongside those of the enemies of the government in the correspondence about the BAA. The telex report of 18 July 1958 from the Under-

Secretary of Native Affairs to the SNA confirms that Young's enquiry, which was attended by all abaThembu chiefs, important headmen and over 300 abaThembu, embraced various aspects of abaThembu tribal affairs and political structures. Items of the commission that impact on the subject under investigation relate to the allegations by the 'Joyi gang' against the Chief Magistrate Ramsay; the dispute between Paramount Chief Sabata and Matanzima; Sabata's jurisdiction; the position of the amaBomvana chiefdom in relation to the abaThembu paramountcy; and the alleged subversive elements in the abaThembu chiefdom.¹³⁵ Tsotsi claims that Young was more interested in hearing the chiefs express their views, and for this reason he did everything he could to muzzle the authors of the memorandum.¹³⁶

At the time when the findings of Young's commission were made public all the members of the 'Joyi gang', had been banished. It had become clear well before the deportations that something was going to be done to them. In Young's minute of 17 April 1958 to the chief magistrate he drew attention in his memorandum to the removal of four persons from the Transkei in terms of section 5(1) (b) of Act No. 38 of 1927'.¹³⁷ The Nhlapo Commission has endorsed Tsotsi's confirmation that the banishments to the Northern Transvaal were a sequel to the Young Commission and, further, that the deportees were the opponents of Matanzima's claim to independence from the legitimate abaThembu paramountcy.¹³⁸

The banishment of the authors of the abaThembu memorandum revealed the high-handedness of the government. No one deserved to hear the results of the commission more than those who had written the memorandum on behalf of, and for, the abaThembu cause. Young's report expressed his satisfaction at the banishment of those he believed were the stirring elements behind the abaThembu rejection of the BAA. He made it clear that the abaThembu delegation had, by visiting his Pretoria office, forced him to institute an inquiry so as to establish the identity of the opponents of the Government measures in abaThembuland. He stated that Sabata needed to be protected from those who posed as his advisers and mouthpiece when in fact they were undermining his authority. While Young reiterated the obligation of the people to love

their chief, he condemned all the members of the 'Joyi gang' for forcing his hand to banish them.

Who came to see me in Pretoria? And who thought I would accept the statements without the fullest inquiry? "I did not banish them. They banished themselves by their own actions, Could anyone imagine that these people could think that they could control the Tembu Tribe?"¹³⁹

Young further emphasised that his actions were prompted by his desire to protect Sabata's confidence from being abused by the people who pretended to love him. The actions of such people, if uncurbed, would eventually destroy chieftainship and thus the whole abaThembu nation

The chief is the symbol of the Tribe. The chief is the spirit of the forefathers of the Tribe. He is the candle, the lamp, the light. What happens when the candle dies to the life of the Tribe?----The fact that certain people have been banished is not unreasonable. It is in the interests of the Tembu Tribe.¹⁴⁰

The deportation of the four chiefs on 30 May 1958 before the commission's findings were made public diminished the weighting of Sabata's constituency; undermined the democratic principle involved in the election of the 'Royal Council' as an abaThembu national advisory body; and damaged almost irreparably the relations between the South African Government and the Great House of Dalindyebo.

A cousin of the deportees, Anderson Joyi, broke the news to Attorney Tsotsi when he reported that catastrophe has befallen the House of Joyi, last night the police invaded our home and took away my two brothers, Bangilizwe and Thwalimfene. You must help us.¹⁴¹

Joyi also made it clear that his kin had been banished to unknown destinations. Bangilizwe confirmed that they were sent to different regions all of which were beyond the Cape's northern borders. Nkosiyanane was sent to Soekmekaar, while Thwalimfene and Mgolombane (who took his wife with him) were banished to Kuruman. Bangilizwe was sent to a village in Louis Trichardt where he worked in a creosoting compound. They had to survive in their various villages as the villagers did, or be content with an allowance of £2 per month. While Bangilizwe Joyi commended the attitude and hospitality of their fellow villagers, he became emotional when talking about the pain of

trying to survive so far from home where each and every one of them was made to feel as if he had chosen to abandon his family. Bangilizwe also expressed amazement at the docility and apoliticalness of his fellow-villagers in Louis Trichardt. He further confirmed that they had virtually no contact with each other in their respective areas of exile, except for Thwalimfene, who sometimes served as Mgolombane's herdman. At the end of 1959 the deportees were suddenly secretly removed by the ANC messengers who took them to Maseru in Lesotho. Here all three men were accommodated by Messrs Tyhali and Tyeku, while Nkosiyanane was taken to Qachas Nek. It was during this time that Mgolombane secured a temporary debanishment order on the grounds that the letter that authorised his deportation had been addressed to Ngombane (rather than Mgolombane). Very soon Bangilizwe was accommodated at the home of Mr W. M. Tsotsi, who had since sought asylum in Basutoland.¹⁴²

Legislation that was intended to bring about indirect rule through chiefs ended up polarising the abaThembu chiefs and removing some to environments they were not familiar with. In 1960 they were in Basutoland, a country of relative freedom at the time where the ANC's Letele looked after their welfare. Bangilizwe confesses that his sojourn in the baSotho country afforded him the opportunity of regular visits to his family in the Bhaziya village of Mthatha District. He recounted with a sense of satisfaction at how, for the duration of his banishment and sojourning in abaSotholand, he successfully evaded, on a regular basis, the instruments of 'apartheid system'. On several occasions he would arrive home towards midnight and disappear before the next day dawned. Sometimes he negotiated his way by mingling with the village herds as the herdboys drove these home in the early evening. 'My clever wife would never exhibit any visible excitement at seeing me, and this guaranteed me safety during my clandestine visits'.¹⁴³

The other three deportees were further surprised in December 1963, by the receipt of debanishment letters from the government. Bangilizwe claimed that he only received his in April 1964, and the explanation given for the delay by government officials was that the government did not know anything about him. On the return of the deportees, the BAA had been entrenched in abaThembuland, albeit that it was still resisted by

progressive thinkers, and had become a tool that was utilised to make and unmake abaThembu chiefs.¹⁴⁴

The ‘give and take’ exercise that was applied by the government to both the political ‘conformist’ and ‘non-conformists’ as punishment or reward as each case deserved is what caused the BAA to be considered a divisive weapon in abaThembuland. To illustrate the above argument the letter from the General Secretary of the Transkei Organised Bodies Attorney Canca, to the Editor of the *Daily Dispatch* is cited. In his letter Canca defended the deportees against the accusation that they were ‘causing tribal strife and assuming the prerogative of the Paramount Chief. Would the Chief Magistrate care to quote instances to prove this charge? The evidence at our disposal reveals that, so far from causing tribal strife, the deportees fought zealously for the promotion of Tembu tribal unity’.¹⁴⁵ Canca also extracted from the Mthatha magistrate’s letter to the amaBomvana chief, Gwebindlala, wherein an account was given of how Gwebindlala had lost his chiefship as a result of opposition to the BAA. Gwebindlala’s sin was his failure to attend Young’s inquiry session at Bumbane Great Place. At the inquiry the chief would be required to present two speakers who would, in turn, veto the abaThembu claim that the amaBomvana chiefdom was part of abaThembuland. The two speakers would then argue from this premise in favour of the BAA Proclamation: ‘in view of the fact that there is a strong agitation amongst the Tembus against the Proclamation and that you [Gwebindlala] yourself are against it and capital might possibly be made from this fact by the Tembus’.¹⁴⁶ The failure of Gwebindlala to respond to the magistrate on the above issues exposed him to threats of possible charges for disobeying the magistrate’s ‘lawful order’. He would also be prosecuted if he failed to ‘attend the meeting at Bumbane, which is in the interests of the many thousand people of the Bomvana tribe who you [referring to Gwebindlala] represent’.¹⁴⁷ Canca has testified in his report that Gwebindlala was subsequently deposed from the chieftainship for failing to comply with the instructions of the magistrate. His empathetic remark about Sabata is also worthy of note :

[t]he Paramount Chief was also in danger. On several occasions, the Chief Magistrate’s admonishing finger was pointed at him. On the

contrary the star of the collaborationist Captain Kaizer Matanzima ascended from nowhere to a pinnacle hardly distinguishable from that of the Paramount Chief himself. Then the deportees began to sound alarm for which they were deported.¹⁴⁸

It is evident from the above account that the struggle to preserve abaThembu paramountcy had become linked to the whole issue of implementation of the BAA. The question of retaining it intact or living with a decentralised paramountcy was pivotal to towing the government's line. Further, the government was anxious that if the abaThembu paramountcy was to be decentralised this needed to be justified. This would be done by making sure that the paramountcy indeed exhibited a dual-tribal block in the progressively budding Emigrant abaThembuland which was gradually being matched by the diminution of original territorial paramountcy of Sabata.

THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR DALIWONGA'S CLAIM TO REGIONAL CHIEFTAINSHIP

It had also become clear in Young's report that the Government endorsed Matanzima's claim to regional chieftainship. Ramsay had hinted to the SNA that next to the acceptance of BAA by chiefs, headmen and people, and the subsequent establishment of 'tribal' units, Matanzima's desire to be recognised as chief of Emigrant Tembuland¹⁴⁹, presumably a well-deserved reward from his benefactor, was the only outstanding matter.

The DNA's backing of Matanzima's claim to the regional chieftainship was clearly politically linked to his acceptance of the BAA. In the same vein Sabata's loss of favour with the government had something to do with his opposition to the government's schemes and his subtle rejection of the BAA. The government's opinion about him is made clear in Ramsay's letter to the SNA :

Sabata's misdemeanours are widely known, particularly his opposition to Bantu Authorities and his statement that he will fight Bantu Authorities to the last drop of blood. The meetings at his Great Place at which the agitators fulminated and the lives of loyal headmen and councillors were threatened were held in his presence and under his chairmanship ... The Chief's attitude towards Bantu Authorities etc. changed only when Mr. Young arrived to hold the inquiry when he suddenly became apprehensive regarding his own

position. Up to that time Sabata was publicly flouting the authorities.¹⁵⁰

In a subsequent letter the SNA recommended an increase in Matanzima's stipend, "the second most important chief in Tembuland".¹⁵¹ The Government's habitual practice to demonise Sabata was matched by their orchestrated enthusiasm to shower Matanzima with praises. The following excerpt shows that in the government's eyes, Sabata was no match for Matanzima, on whom the SNA had earlier heaped lavish praise.

Although lower in rank he is nevertheless a chief of considerable importance with a number of sub-chiefs under him. He is moreover a mature man of outstanding character and ability as well as good education e.g. he holds a B.A. degree. He is the traditional leader of the Natives in the St. Marks and Xalanga districts (also known as Emigrant Tembuland) and it is foreseen that the Natives in the Glen Grey district of the Ciskei will also elect to fall within his arm of jurisdiction when Bantu Authorities have been established for that area. Steps are consequently being taken to have Daliwonga Kaizer Matanzima appointed by the Governor-General as Chief of the Natives in Emigrant Tembuland comprising the districts of St. Marks and Xalanga.¹⁵²

The government had clearly assumed the prerogative to make and sustain chieftainships. Young further explained the government's position in relation to chieftainship:

while it was the tradition of the people to love their chief it is the duty of the Government to recognise that chief, it is the duty of the Government to nominate that chief, it is the duty of the Government to ensure that he represents that tribe. Some chiefs are good, some are not so good. It is not the person who is a chief, it is the blood/candle lamp.¹⁵³

This was not surprising considering that an important outcome of Young's inquiry related to the legitimacy of the chieftainship of Matanzima, who, in Young's words, had

produced a great deal of evidence. You will also recall that his reply to a question from me made a very significant statement. He said that he recognises Sabata as the Paramount Chief of Tembus. He also said that all he wants is the recognition of the traditional status of his own forefathers. He will recognise Sabata as the Paramount Chief but he [Sabata] must not interfere in his own area of jurisdiction and the conduct of his own domestic affairs. There is no one

who will deny that Chief Matanzima is a man of standing. He is a man of education. He is a man of example. He has proved his loyalty¹⁵⁴

It must be noted that Sabata as abaThembu paramount chief had every legal and customary right to be involved in the district affairs of any corner under his territorial jurisdiction. Therefore the extension of Matanzima's authority inevitably diminished Sabata's political domain. The government substantiated Matanzima's claim even though Sabata had repudiated it several times. Matanzima's enthusiasm in complimenting Young's commission on its achievements must be seen in the background that it had, to his gratification, made his dynasty a senior factor in the abaThembu traditional hierarchy. The government's failure to check this development at the time of its inception continues to complicate the line of kingships in the house of Mthikrakra.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has shown that the NP government used the BAA to entice Matanzima and to exploit his greed for power, and that in unleashing him it nurtured his self-interest. It has been argued that the whole process of implementing the act in abaThembuland gave Matanzima a position of power which drew attention to himself as a self-interested champion or agent of the NP government, albeit that he did not have a mandate from the territorial chiefs. It is doubtful if the proponents of the act would have applied the legislation effectively without the facilitating role of the internal disciple that the compliant Matanzima turned out to be.

The chapter has further shown that the ongoing disagreement which had become a feature in the relationship of Sabata and his junior cousin prior to the implementation of the act served as a stimulant to its implementation. It urged Matanzima to do whatever was objectionable to Sabata with vigour and zest so as to portray him as the worst government opponent, and in this way earn the Government's favour. The chapter has revealed Matanzima as someone whose subsequent actions proved beyond doubt that he saw Sabata as a major stumbling block to his acquisition of power in the same way that he saw the BAA as his personal ladder to acquire more territorial and eventually

political authority. He therefore blindly fought Sabata to rid himself of the political impediment than to promote the application of Government measures. The BAA was, for Matanzima, a means to an end.

The chapter has demonstrated that Sabata's stalling of the implementation of the act provided Matanzima with an invaluable opportunity to systematically map out his ascent with the government's connivance. His manipulative skills were exposed, tested and proven effective in the short term, and in the end he was furnished with a political instrument that would enable him to outwit Sabata at every turn. The question of what course the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship would have taken, had Sabata readily embraced the BAA, will always confound the researcher. In the same context the political irony that was implicit in Sabata's strategic shilly-shallying on the question of the BAA which inadvertently made Matanzima run into luck generates questions. These are about whether Matanzima was a short-sighted opportunist or a somewhat naïve and excitable collaborator who, according to Laurence once confessed to his entering the 'Bhunga in order to destroy it'¹⁵⁵ and in that way to make room for the so-called 'chiefship power-booster' the BAA. The chapter has also shown that the banishment of the 'Royal council' was counterproductive in that it inadvertently internationalised the politics of abaThembu chieftainship in a way that the government would have least predicted and desired. How the deportation of the 'Royal Council' nurtured resistance to the BAA instead of intimidating the opponents to the act has also been revealed in the chapter.

The chapter has portrayed Matanzima as someone who exhibited by his actions that he saw the BAA, on the one hand, as an instrument with which to provoke the obstructionist Sabata. This was evident in his assumption of the prerogative of a paramount chief in instances where he imposed informally and illegitimately his influence in areas of abaThembuland that were outside his tribal jurisdiction; when he betrayed Sabata to the South African government by facilitating the implementation of the BAA in abaThembuland despite the King's strategy of stalling the introduction of the offensive legislation; when by his manoeuvres, he precipitated a division not only in

greater abaThembuland but in the immediate neighbourhood of Sabata (as was the case in amaBomvanaland). The chapter has shown that, in the end, Matanzima's self-seeking actions in the short term helped entrench in a strong position of power the House of Mhlobo, his father's house, rather than that of Rhaxothi Matanzima.

¹ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo", p. 6.

² Ibid.

³ Mbekeni: interviewed, 23 July 2006.

⁴ Installation Of Chief Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyebo, Paramount Chief Of The Thembu Nation, Bumbane Great Place (Umtata) Cape Archives, File 32/27, ref 11/189, Wednesday, 30 June 1954.

⁵ The Minute of The Secretary of the Treasury (Pretoria), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, N1/1/3/1, 20 July 1954.

⁶ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo", p. 6.

⁷ Index to the "Union Government Gazette" (Vol.LXZ11) January, February and March 1927 (Pretoria 1927), p. vii.

⁸ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo" p. 8.

⁹ Evans : *Bureaucracy And Race*, p. 202.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 252.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 192.

¹² Ibid. pp.251-252.

¹³ Mandela ; *Long Walk*, p.115.

¹⁴ Evans : *Bureaucracy and Race*, p. 61.

¹⁵ Mayer : The Tribal Elite in *The New Elites*, ed. Lloyd, pp. 289-290.

¹⁶ G.Carter, T. Karis and N. M. Stultz : *South Africa's Transkei* (London, 1967), p. 48.

¹⁷ Oomen : *Chiefs*, p. 127.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Marala : "An Investigation Into The Transkei's Position " pp. 14 -15.

²⁰ Maylam : *A History of the African People*, p. 167.

²¹ Oomen : *Chiefs*, p. 128.

²² A Speech delivered by Dr W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, at the opening of a Conference of Zulu Chiefs (Eshowe), Pretoria Archives, Ref N1/1/1, Vol 6/1/119, 12 December 1951, p.1.

²³ "Notice of Motion" read by C.B.Young at the interview between the Minister of Native Affairs And the Leading Transkeian Chiefs on 7 October 1956, Pretoria Archives. .

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo", p. 6..

²⁸ Magistrate (A.C. Yates) (Chieftaincy of Tembuland) – Chief Magistrate, Cape Archives, File No. 3/10, N.1/1/3/1, 11 January 1954.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Laurence: *The Transkei*, p. 5.

³¹ Laurence: *The Transkei*, p.31.

³² Mandela, *Long Walk*, pp,215-216.

³³ . Laurence: *The Transkei*, p.30

³⁴ "Notice of Motion" read by Young at an interview between the Hon. The Minister of Native Affairs and Leading Transkeian Chiefs on 7 October 1958, Pretoria Archives.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Evans : *Bureaucracy and Race*, pp.249-250.

³⁷ B. Joyi : interviewed, 25 June 2003.

³⁸ "Notice of Motion" read by Young, 7 October 1956.

³⁹ B. Joyi : interviewed, 25 June 2003.

⁴⁰ Notice of Motion" read by Young, 7 October 1956

⁴¹ Ntsebeza and Ndletyana: "Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo", p. 9.

⁴² A. Joyi : Interviewed, 21 April 2004.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Nhlapo Commission, Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies » pp.29-30

⁴⁵ Knopf Solicitors (Meaker, Van der Spuy & Knopf) to the Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Cape Archives, 3 August 1956.

⁴⁶ Streek and Wicksteed : *Render Unto Kaiser*, p. 111.

⁴⁷ A. Joyi: Interviewed, Yekela.

⁴⁸ R. S. Mundell (Magistrate Cofimvaba) - CMTT, Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(4), 23 June 1950.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Magistrate Norton (Cofimvaba- on headmanship of Lower Qitsi Location, District St Marks) – CMTT, Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(4), 20 October 1953.

⁵¹ Minutes of meeting at Tsakana School, nomination of a headman for the Tsakana Location, Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(4), 10 February 1954.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ S.E.L. Thorpe, Magistrate and Native Commissioner, Minutes of the Quarterly Meeting of Chiefs, Headmen and People held at Cofimvaba, Cape Archives, File N.4/11/1, 24 January 1956.

⁵⁵ Nhlapo Commission, Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies , p. 31.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Under-Secretary of the Department of Native Affairs – SNA(Eiselen), Pretoria Archives, No.32/27, N.2/11/3/6, 19 April 1956.

⁵⁸ Evans : *Bureaucracy And Race*, p. 253.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 255.

⁶¹ Walker Pinzi (Ngcaca Location, Ncora) - SNA (aBambo Community Group : B.A.A. No.68 of 1951), Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 1 July 1956.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Magistrate Thorpe (Cofimvaba) - W. Pinzi, Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 5 July 1956.

⁶⁴ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3 August 1956.

⁶⁵ Evans : *Bureaucracy And Race*, p. 255.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Thorpe (Cofimvaba) to the Chief Magistrate (Mthatha), Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(6), No. 3/320/7, 31 July 1956.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Thorpe (Cofimvaba) to the Chief Magistrate (Mthatha), Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(6), No. 3/320/7, 31 July 1956.

⁷¹ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), N.1/1/5(6),
3 August 1956.

⁷² W. Qongqo (Ngqwaru Hills) - Chief Magistrate (Transkei Territorial Authority), Cape Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 6, June 1958.

⁷³ Ibid. pp. 2-3.

⁷⁴ Ibid. , p. 3.

⁷⁵ Ramsay (CMTT) - SNA, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 15 July 1958.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Magistrate (Willowvale – CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 3 March 1961.

⁸⁰ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister Of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3/8/1956.

⁸¹ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister Of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3/8/1956.

⁸² Ramsay - Editor of *Daily Dispatch* (East London), Cape Archives, File No. 68/F, 11 September 1958.

⁸³ Minutes of a meeting held at the Magistrate Office, Cofimvaba, Cape Archives, 8 December, 1955.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Minutes of a meeting of abaThembu resident in the St Marks Distirct, Qamata, Cape Archives, 23 December 1955.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ R. Southall : *South Africa's Transkei* (New York, 1983), p. 105.

⁸⁹ Minutes of a meeting of abaThembu resident in the St Marks District, Qamata, Cape Archives, 23 December 1955.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ntsebeza and Ndletyana : "The Comrade King Sabata Dalindyebo ", p. 4.

⁹³ K. D. Matanzima (Qamata) - Native Commissioner (Cofimvaba), Cape Archives, (n.d.)

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3 August 1956.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ A. Joyi : interviewed, 21 April 1996.

¹⁰⁰ Knopf Solicitors - Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3 August 1956.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ramsay - SNA (Eiselen), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 3 August 1956

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Cingo : *Ibali*, p. 34. (confirmed by Chiefs Jonginyaniso Mthikrakra, Zwelodumo Mthikrakra and Anderson Delaghuba Joyi)

¹⁰⁸ Bangilizwe Marhelane Joyi : interviewed, 25 May 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Ramsay - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File No. 66/24/1, N.11/1/2, 14 April 1958.

¹¹⁰ A Report on the meeting held at the Bumbane Great Place, Cape Archives, 1/UTA, Vol. No. 6/1/118, ref N1/1/2, 27 March 1958.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² A Report on the meeting held at the Bumbane Great Place, Cape Archives, 27 March 1958.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ramsay - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, ref 3/24/2/1, 12 March 1958.

¹¹⁶ Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", p. 50.

¹¹⁷ Masiza Mhlati : interviewed by D.S.Yekela (Mthatha) 26 June 2010.

¹¹⁸ Ramsay- SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, ref 3/24/2/1, 12 April 1958.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ramsay - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File No. 66/24/1, N.11/1/2, 14 April 1958.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", p. 50.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 59.

¹²⁷ Nhlapo Commission, «Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies » p. 33.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Magistrate (Mthatha, Inquiry Into Thembu Affairs By USNA) - Magistrate (Ngcobo), Cape Archives, 21 January 1958.

¹³⁰ Nhlapo Commission, «Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies » p. 33.

¹³¹ J. S.Dalindyebo (The Great Place, Bumbane) - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 1/UTA, Vol No. 6/1/119, ref N1/1/3/1, File No. 3/24/2/1, 28 January 1958.

¹³² Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", p. 55.

¹³³ Ramsay (CMTT) - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File No. 66/24/1, N.11/1/2, 14 April 1958.

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Telex from Young - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, DK 26, 8 July 1958.

¹³⁶ Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", p. 59.

528 The Under Secretary, B.Young (Unrest In Tembuland : Removals under Section 5/1/ (6) - CMTT, Cape Archives, File No.32/27, 17 April 1958.

¹³⁸Nhlapo Commission, «Determination On Matanzima And Dalindyebo Paramountcies » p. 34.

¹³⁹ Report On the Findings Of C.B. Young's Commission Of Enquiry,Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 11 June 1958.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", pp.59-60.

¹⁴² B. Joyi; interviewed, 25 May 2003 .

¹⁴³ Ibid. .

¹⁴⁴ Ibid..

¹⁴⁵ R. S. Canca ; "African leaders deprted" to the Editor, Daily Dispatch, Cape Archives, File 68/F, 11 June 1958.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ CMTT - SNA, Pretoria Archives, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 3 August 1956.

¹⁵⁰ CMTT - SNA, Pretoria Archives, Pretoria Archives, N.1/1/5(6), 14 May 1958.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² SNA - Secretary to the Treasury, CMT - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 19 April 1958.

¹⁵³ Report On the Findings Of Young's Commission Of Enquiry, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 11 June 1958.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Laurence :*The Transkei* , p. 30.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1951 IN THE XHALANGA AND GLEN GREY DISTRICTS

INTRODUCTION

The implementation of the BAA of 1951 in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts appeared to be a test of the potential of the act to revive, mould, modify and, in some cases, invent institutional chieftainship. In this context must be understood the procedures which the architects of the legislation had to follow to make sure that the 'Authorities' in the two western abaThembu districts would be properly anchored.

Mqeke's remark that the tribal authority, a body that wielded power over a conglomeration of locations, was an indispensable infrastructure for the BAA,¹ hints at its extra-ordinary importance as a dual-purpose organ. Against this background the chapter looks at the extent to which the political infrastructure, if any existed in the subject region, was administratively mature enough for the 'Authorities' to thrive on. The chapter talks to the concepts of change and continuity which were implied in the transformation of rural governance and subsequent implementation of the act in the two districts.

The level of receptiveness of the communities in these districts to the new legislation, and the reciprocal role of the internal factors to the manoeuvres by external elements is analysed. The focus is on the examination of the social and political factors to determine the extent to which their very diversity and incompatible interests retarded or facilitated the installation of the BAA. It is argued that the class and social divisions attracted Matanzima's pro-government intervention which, in turn, accelerated the resuscitation of the Gecelo-Stokwe chieftainships as well as those of Manzezulu and Zwelihle. The chapter identifies this acceleration in the above process to be the complicating factor in the installation of the 'Authorities', as was Matanzima's proactivity. In this context the application of the act purported to be a rationale for reinforcing and complementing the

tribal government, when, in fact, the NP found in it the logical basis for resuscitating or even instituting tribal rule in the need to anchor and support the rule by 'Authorities'.

The chapter portrays Matanzima as an unqualified successor to the Governor-General as he dangles incentives in imitation of his erstwhile benefactor and successfully splits the ranks of amaMfengu. It analyses the role of material and political benefits in determining amaMfengu responses to the legislation and the extent to which these factors retarded or facilitated the installation of the 'Authorities'. The chapter discusses the irony implied in the fear of both the rejectionists and embracers of 'Authorities' in the impact of chiefly rule on their continuing class status and material benefits. In this context the chapter reveals the BAA as an instrument which Matanzima conveniently used to revive the chieftainships of amaGcina, amaQwathi and amaHala in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts and to paralyse amaMfengu cultural sentiments.

The chapter further shows that the contiguity of Matanzima's and Xhalanga-Glen Grey areas afforded him exclusive visibility and regular visits in the area and, in this way, accelerated the installation of the 'Authorities'. Matanzima is identified as a force that was instrumental in compromising the original objectives of the act once the 'Authorities' were in place. It shows how the BAA outlived its purpose particularly once it was used openly to empower Matanzima and emasculate Sabata by delegitimising his authority in the western periphery of abaThembuland. Sabata's failure to entrench his authority in Xhalanga-Glen Grey is discussed, as is the methodical way in which his 'defeat' by Matanzima was to prove calamitous for the abaThembu paramountcy.

The chapter reveals Matanzima as an unqualified, yet presumptuous advisor to the local magistrate in the installation of 'Authorities' in the recalcitrant Mnxe Location. It reveals that in his locally assumed Governor-General's position Matanzima successfully turned Msengana and Mrwetyana into his allies and the technical opponents of their fellow amaMfengu. The chapter also reveals his incomparable role in the restoration of the indigenous rule in Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts. It shows that Matanzima's initiative in facilitating the installation of 'Authorities' in these districts was prompted by his

realisation that it was the only route to acquiring what he most wanted - the supreme chieftainship. The chapter demonstrates how his initiative earned him political rewards in the westward expansion of his jurisdictional area against Sabata's whose uneasiness at Matanzima's proactivity is seemingly informed by his attempts to make sure that his paramountcy remains unshackled.

VICISSITUDES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP IN THE XHALANGA-GLEN GREY DISTRICTS PRIOR TO THE BAA

The respective roles that Matanzima and Sabata played in the implementation of the BAA in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts were very crucial because they either promoted or thwarted the attainment of the government's objectives. In this way they transformed the exercise of implementing the BAA into a milestone in the continuously unfolding history of abaThembu chieftainship. In the case of Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts where there was no support base for the 'Authorities' it was imperative to create an ideal situation. The socio-economic and political environment in the region appeared to be neither receptive nor conducive to the new legislation because chieftainship had been dysfunctional for about 100 years.

This dated from Sir Harry Smith's unprovoked annexation of Mthikrakra's country in 1847.² The annexation violated the king's land rights in the area that was bounded by the Ndwe River in the east, and the Klaas Smit and Black Kei rivers in the west and south-west respectively. It also pushed the chiefs Gecelo (of the amaGcina), Ndarala (of the amaNdungwane), Gungubele (of the amaTshatshu) and Stokwe Ndlela (of the amaQwathi) into the anti-government camp in the subsequent Mlanjeni War. Queen Nonesi's dissociation with the warring chiefs earned her both the government's approval and the right to establish her Great Place at Gqebenya in the Glen Grey District. The status of the abaThembu paramountcy was, from the time of the establishment and recognition of Gqebenya Great Place, circumscribed by Colonial authority and thus compromised. Nonesi's colonial prize because of her benevolent neutrality in the Mlanjeni War estranged her from her constituency of minor abaThembu Chiefs. This estrangement was disadvantageous to the unity of abaThembu nation. Further,

Nonesi's forfeiture of Mthikrakra's country to the government conferred on her a nominal, rather than practical, status because she had lost her subject's national home. The subsequent landlessness of the abaThembu chiefdom negatively affected the prestige and influence in respect of the status of Nonesi's ruling house. She did not have sufficient land to offer to attract, or even retain petty chiefs as a way of consolidating her following, and had thus lost political control over them.

The mid-nineteenth century Cattle-Killing episode also revealed a challenge to Nonesi's authority in its division of abaThembu between those who refrained from killing and those who ignored her pronouncements against it. Her visibly waning authority and decline of her prestige as a national symbol manifested impotent leadership which was ominous for the central authority of the abaThembu paramountcy.

In the light of the events alluded to above it is clear that the potential for implosion within abaThembu polity was great when Rhaxoti Matanzima led his breakaway faction in 1865. A desire for individual autonomy was supreme in Matanzima's motives. A fact of relevance to this study was that when Gecelo and Stokwe settled in Xhalanga after the split they carried with them chieftainships that were imported concepts whose practical meaning derived more from their colonial benefactor than from the loyalty of their so-called subjects. These make-do colonial chieftainships were further dealt a fatal blow following Gecelo and Stokwe's active involvement in the Gun War. Ntsebeza has similarly shown that the Gun War and the subsequent Commission of Inquiry 'gave the colonialists an opportunity to formally abolish chieftainships in Xhalanga'.³ The loss of chieftainship status left the two houses with truncated territories in the farms that they each subsequently received from the government.

Gecelo's descendants still retained the Mbenge Farm on the eve of the implementation of the BAA. Ntsebeza has hinted at the ambivalent position of the Government in Gecelo's case, where land ownership entitled him as the landlord to exercise authority over people whose primary need was simply habitable land. It would appear that Gecelo's possessory status over the farm also justified his official headmanship over the

tenants. The government's conferring of an official title on the landlord in order to justify their recognition and legitimation of his natural authority, as well as its tax exactions on the Mbenge Farm tenants,⁴ all implied indirect control on both parties. Dubow's concept of 'purposive bureaucracy'⁵ would probably apply to the case at hand, where the colonial authority confirmed Gecelo's authority by infringing upon it. It must be noted that investing Gecelo with 'government headmanship' tampered with his autonomic authority; made Mbenge Farm tenants beneficiaries of 'benevolent paternalism' ; and also usurped Gecelo's prerogative by depriving him of the revenue that was his right. Significantly, the government's factoring itself in the governance of the Mbenge Farm would also well anticipate its political objectives with regard to the subsequent application, terms and conditions of the BAA in the Xhalanga District. The very endorsement of Gecelo's headmanship implied colonial conscription, and this fact automatically pre-empted the rule by 'Authorities'. An advantage for the government was that a people residing on Gecelo's property were not likely to defy his authority and escape punishment which it was his natural right, rather than the government's, to mete out . It was thus deemed necessary by the government to first conscientise Headman Gecelo about his politico-official position in the hierarchy of 'Authorities' to enable the Supreme Chief's authority to filter down through him to the tenants. Proof that both the government and the headman were trapped in a semi-feudal arrangement was reflected in the chief magistrate's letter to the SNA. In it Ramsay reiterated that the government did not have the authority to strip Ngonyama Gecelo of overlordship over his personal property 'as he is the owner of the farm which comprises the location'.⁶

In the case of Stokwe's widow, Emma, the government appeared to have been persuaded to consider her person (perhaps also as a daughter of King Sandile of the amaRharhabe) than her rather insignificant status as Stokwe's widow. Stokwe's chieftainship had never been on par with Gecelo's and thus it had never been solidly grounded. Emma also did not have a spokesman to take up her cause and this situation put her at the mercy of a government that was intent on consolidating its administrative authority over the affairs of Blacks. Ntsebeza has claimed that the apparent reason the government gave Emma a farm at Ndwana was mainly on humanitarian grounds after

the Commission had found that she was marginalised following her ostracisation. There was also the factor of not wanting to alienate the dethroned chiefs or their families, on the grounds that they still had supporters.⁷ This contention is credible, especially when viewed against the socio-political vulnerability of the two ex-chieftainships. Their resuscitation would surely provide an infrastructure for the implementation of the BAA in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey area.

It is thus clear that the government had both an advantage and a disadvantage in the case of Xhalanga where it stood to win the loyalties of Gecelo and Stokwe should it revive their chieftainships. What spelled disaster was that it could not guarantee any established following for the two chiefs in whose areas homogeneity was non-existent. The DNA was thus called upon, as a matter of urgency, to effect such changes in rural governance as would facilitate the continuity of the implementation process. The chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe were thus recognised, albeit passively, and, had to be seen to be supported from below or by the communities at the headmen level. It was at this point that the juxtaposition of the otherwise divergent elements in the Xhalanga District presented challenges that were born out of the statistical composition of the chiefdoms under discussion. The subtle incompatibilities that were symbolised in the division threatened both the establishment and survival of the envisaged Gecelo-Stokwe chieftainships, even though these institutions posed as melting pots for the competing outlooks of their otherwise culturally diverse subjects. Whilst it is true that the two chiefdoms could boast of numerical strength from their reinforcement by other clusters such strength was not necessarily a sign of political stability because it was devoid of cultural essence and unity. This lack of unanimity in the Xhalanga community was a dynamic socio-political clash. The irony of Xhalanga's political situation was that the compatibility between the pre-colonial socio-cultural practices and the indigenous political system had a parallel in the mutually complementary relationship that existed between the missionary's Christian religion (as symbolised in the amaMfengu outlook on life) and the colonial government.

The compatibility which seemed peculiar to each of the two otherwise divergent socio-political systems could not reconcile them. Instead it portrayed the Xhalanga situation with regard to government's objectives as a clash of politico-cultural attitudes. In the context of the progressive conflict there was the age-old perception of amaMfengu cluster as the unenthusiastic patrons of the Southern abaNguni chieftaincy. It was, however, imperative that chieftainship be revived to create the necessary infrastructure for the BAA, and for this purpose the amaMfengu needed to be enlisted as group. It became necessary, therefore, to have in positions headmen from all social groups whose conduct was amenable to the government's objectives. This was to help reinforce the hierarchy of 'Authorities' by propping up the prospective Gecelo-Stokwe chieftainships. The execution of these government objectives was exactly what the Mnxe amaMfengu villagers objected to because they viewed the government's measures as generally oppressive.

Magistrate Mundell of Cofimvaba had hinted at the importance of enabling the headman's office to function under the authority of a chief rather than two or more independent petty chiefs, so as to allow for the smooth functioning of the 'Authorities' at tribal level.⁸ Mundell's remark could only be complemented by Matanzima's initiative because he had earlier made a submission to have himself recognised as a 'chief of chiefs' over Xhalanga. This was in 1953, when with the help of his attorney brother, George Matanzima, he made attempts to have his area of jurisdiction extended to cover the whole of Cofimvaba and Cala. At the time the paramount chief designate, Sabata, was becoming impatient at Dabulamanzi's apparent reluctance to vacate the paramountcy seat. Matanzima, who possibly saw a loophole in the apparent uneasiness between Sabata and Dabulamanzi, decided to exploit the situation by pushing his personal agenda. He made various claims in his bid to have his jurisdiction extended to Cala. At the meeting where Matanzima put forth his claims the chief regent confirmed that while the abaThembu (amaNdungwana, amaJumba) were amaHala because of their descent from Chief Hala, Kaiser Daliwonga was chief of only the amaHala of St Marks District. He reiterated that the districts of Xhalanga and Lady Frere (Glen Grey) did not fall under Matanzima's jurisdiction. Dabulamanzi also disputed

Matanzima's claim that the Cala people had called upon him in 1945 to help establish a school in their district, saying further that he did not know why the school was named after Daliwonga Matanzima. In response to Matanzima's insistent claim of Cala, Dabulamanzi pointed out that 'Cala had been the kraal of Chief Dalindyebo and that if they wished they, of the Great Place, Umtata, could appoint a Chief and take him to Cala. Cala fell under the Great Place at Umtata and not under Kayser'.⁹ The implication was that Cala was an outpost, *ithanga*, which, as an extension of the Great Place, carried a status that was inferior to the Great Place. This appeared to imply that even if Matanzima incorporated Cala he would not by any means qualify for seniority. Dabulamanzi summed up by making the following comments when called upon to explain Kaiser Matanzima's position as a chief

The Chief [Regent], was of Dalindyebo's Right Hand House and Kayser was subordinate to him.¹⁰ Ngangelizwe had been the eldest son and heir and Matanzima son of the Right Hand House. Dalindyebo was the son and heir of Ngangelizwe and therefore the Right Hand House of Dalindyebo would be superior to the Right Hand House of Matanzima. He, the Paramount Chief [Regent] was of Dalindyebo's Right Hand House and Kayser was subordinate to him.¹¹

The above message with regard to Matanzima's ambitions about Cala was of great historical importance for the politics of abaThembu chieftainship.

The Xhalanga District in particular became the ideal testing ground for various reasons. As indicated above there was the proactive disciple that Matanzima was in the execution of government schemes. In addition Xhalanga bore visible symbols of the erstwhile indigenous government in the nominal chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe. The government was pushing vigorously for the resuscitation of the two chieftainships which were believed to have a measure of political influence. Against this background must be understood Ramsay's acknowledgement that for any piece of land to qualify for inclusion into the 'Authorities' on the basis of Proclamation 180 of 1956 it had to have a 'location' status, as well as his subsequent proposal that the Mbenge Farm be declared 'a location for tax purposes'.¹² It was therefore clear that the government intended to

use Gecelo's headmanship as a stepping-stone to the imposition of the BAA in Xhalanga.

The episode concerning Headman Vumazonke's Ndwana residents' must also be regarded to have pre-empted the 'Authorities'. Vumazonke had, in 1950, demarcated sites for some people who emerged from the Glen Grey and Ndwe farms. Nxazonke of Ndwana and his fellow petitioners complained to the chief native commissioner (CNC) about Vumazonke's demarcation of sites on land designated as commonage for the residents of Ndwana Location 17, thereby 'blocking the way for our stock [Nxazonke et al.] going to and from the commonage'.¹³ Vumazonke had, by distributing land without proper authorisation assumed the prerogative of a magistrate. That the so-called magistrate's prerogative was in the context of rural governance, the chief's right cannot be overemphasised. Vumazonke obviously intended to augment his income from fees the 'newcomers' would pay him. This should serve to explain why some headmen in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts were ready to join forces with any crusade that was anti-chieftainship. Being a 'mischievous' headman of Vumazonke's type,¹⁴ according to Nohayinje,¹⁵ in a position that would have been held by a chief, entitled the holder to turn the office into a lucrative post. Vumazonke's conduct was not only condemned by the magistrate but he was also instructed 'to remove and deport to their homes, all the people we are [have] petitioned against from the commonage'.¹⁶ When the magistrate fined Vumazonke for his administrative irregularities he retaliated by imposing even harsher rule on his Ndwana Location petitioners. It soon became clear that there was nothing the victims could do in a system where the headman was the only one accountable to the magistrate.

It must be assumed that the complainants were obviously not reconciled to the idea of land that had belonged to their forefathers being allocated to strangers without their approval. Nohayinje Kuse has confirmed that his grandfather was one of the people on the receiving end of Vumazonke's unauthorised land allocation. She affirmed that the problem was not so much one of land shortage at a time when that commodity was so plentiful in Xhalanga. Rather it was a predicament that was brought about by attitudes.

The beneficiaries of Vumazonke's allocation were looked down upon and also viewed with suspicion because they came from the farms, a fact which earned them the name *oomaBhulwini*, the *boere* people, the new-comers. They brought with them livestock in big numbers as well as dogs. The allocation of land to this category of strangers aroused the jealousy of the Ndwana Location residents who claimed to have been born and bred there, 'borners'. Their farming activities were focused mainly on agriculture even though they practised small scale pastoral farming. They had their small gardens the sizes of which were not limited by land shortage. They now saw the land which they had regarded as their sons' being given to *oomaBhulwini* who had brought along such ill-behaved children who, together with their fathers, were master thieves. Vumazonke stood to get more than he had bargained for from the newcomers who quickly made their sons available as his diligent herdboys, while their fathers made him a beneficiary of the many skills they had learnt on the farms. The newcomers never hesitated to augment Vumazonke's livestock on a regular basis and the 'borners' believed, with reason, that whatever the new-comers channelled to Vumazonke they replenished by stealing from the local farmers like themselves. They even made use of their children who were skilled in work but also ingenious thieves. Kuse also affirmed that Headman Vumazonke offered no resistance to the implementation of the rule by 'Authorities', and instead co-operated with Matanzima when the latter was seeking to revive the chieftainships of Gecelo and Stokwe in Xhalanga. His proximity to the prospective chiefs and to Matanzima made him privy to the government schemes while he continued to retain his pseudo-chieftainship over the recently augmented Ndwana community. His compliance enabled him to play an indispensable role in the eventual establishment of BAA in the Xhalanga District and his home was one of those that served as stopovers for Daliwonga (Matanzima) during his visits to Cala.¹⁷

DALIWONGA HELPS INSTALL 'AUTHORITIES' IN XHALANGA AMID SOCIAL DIVISIONS AND AMAMFENGU RESISTANCE

In the context of establishing the political infrastructure for the establishment of 'rule by Authorities' the rejection of, or resistance to, 'Authorities' took place in the Xhalanga District. While the population of Xhalanga was somewhat cosmopolitan, the social

division threatened any prospective success of the government's plans. The division of the Xhalanga community, between the educated Christian 'progressives' and uneducated patrons of all traditional norms, threatened to obstruct the installation of 'Authorities'. Gecelo and Stokwe and their respective wards were aligned with the traditional camp with whom they were on par culturally and otherwise. The chiefs' plans to boost their numbers by absorbing all and sundry suggest the political imperative of converting amaMfengu to the idea of the 'Authorities' to make the chieftainships viable. Across the visible social division there was a tendency to split between those who supported the government objectives and those who publicly professed their non-collaboration stance even among the amaMfengu.¹⁸ Ironically the traditionally unaffiliated neutral amaMfengu were ideal candidates to boost the numerical image of any chieftaincy but this did not necessarily imply there were prospects of unity. The fact that they had been excluded from decades of tribal affiliation in the 19th century did not offer a political advantage for any evolving, budding or reviving chieftainships like those of Gecelo and Stokwe. The incorporation of amaMfengu elements, was, therefore both good and bad in the long and the short term. What is of historical significance is that some of the long-term negative consequences were actually grounded on short-term positives. This social dividing line threatened the stability of the abaThembu community and was ominous for the implementation of any chief-centred government legislation. Further, the divisive social inequality between the two groups was a slight to the dignity of the prospective chiefs, Gecelo and Stokwe, who would obviously patronise and be patronised by one or the other of the two factions in their lands.

As has been indicated earlier, Matanzima had expressed a self-interest in the incorporation of Xhalanga. It was not, however, clear how he would handle meetings held to replace or appoint headmen, especially in the case of amaMfengu candidates, because such meetings were always politically charged. It must be presumed that resignations and deaths provided opportunities to appoint people who would not defeat the government's plans. It must also be noted that the amenability of certain individuals from the amaMfengu faction to the government's legislation did not stop others from preventing the appointments, and even filling positions that were complementary to the

hierarchy of the 'Authorities'. An example of this was the retirement of Headman Gagela of Mchewula Location No.10 whereupon the name of Turvy Foloti was proposed.¹⁹ Foloti's candidature was rejected by the residents on the grounds that 'he is heathen and uneducated, and that he is therefore not likely to advance the interests of the location generally'.²⁰ Of great historical significance for the history of revival of chieftainship in Xhalanga was that Foloti was appointed anyway over a community that was divided in their acceptance of him. His lack of formal education was possibly what made him an ideal candidate for the purpose and mission of a government that was intent on making use of local and co-operative human resources to promote the establishment of rule by 'Authorities'. Any candidate that was not acceptable to the community due to his inferior educational standard was likely to execute, with utmost loyalty to his mentoring chief, the government instructions, even to a people who were averse to all forms of traditional rule. Foloti's acceptance of a placement in the hierarchy of 'Authorities' was undoubtedly to help the government in its bid to restore the old powers to the chiefs while also delegating additional powers to them. While his social status could not compare with Msengana and Mrwetyana's who probably perceived themselves as second-in-command to Matanzima in Xhalanga at least, they were all essential organs in the hierarchy of political instruments that were at the disposal of government.

Another relevant example relates to the resignation of Headman Alfred Tsengiwe, after which Edmund Zengetwa was immediately appointed to act in Tsengiwe's place. The magistrate made it clear that Zengetwa would act until an appointment to fill the vacancy had been made.²¹ The magistrate's letter of 23 November to the chief magistrate confirmed the recommendation and subsequent appointment in a permanent capacity of Robert Msengana, 'a married man of 37 years who had passed standard eight'.²² Msengana's appointment was, according to the new dispensation, administratively procedural because it conformed to the terms of section 2(8) of Act 38 of 1927. The government sanctioned Msengana's appointment, irrespective of whether it was acceptable or not to his wards. It must be noted that while the position of headman was indispensable in the hierarchy of 'Authorities', in the case of Xhalanga the

incumbents' expectations from the office were different from what the government expected its appointee to deliver with regard to its objectives. Ntsebeza highlights the case of Msengana, who, though, he was a headman by governmental approval, did not necessarily embrace chieftainship.²³ This aspect brings in an interesting dimension to the contradictions that characterised the evolution of 'Authorities' in the amaMfengu locations of Xhalanga. Msengana's case seems to be classic in its portrayal of the compatibility of his and the government's interests which did not necessarily imply an agreement as to two parties' motives and goals. What was significant was that Msengana's acceptance of headmanship, even though he was not a patron of chieftainship, would crown with success the government's aims of imposing the BAA, the core of which was chieftainship. It must also be noted that any outward rejection of the headman's position and visible opposition to the government's measures was surely unwise for anyone who had his eyes on politico-economic advancement. The possible loss of material and other benefits was what in some cases tempered opposition to the whole package of chieftainship.

Tyeku has confirmed that individuals of Msengana and Mvinjelwa's thinking were primarily lured by power that was vested in the positions they had accepted. He reiterated that headmanship of a 'Community Authority' carried with it an immediate socio-political status. It is further argued that government legislation was informed by the NP's goal of maintaining and monopolising political power in a non-competitive environment. Similarly, in the context of the BAA, the government promised power to the prospective bearer of the chieftainship. Matanzima's desperation for official power inevitably drew him into the web spun by the Nationalist Government. He seemed determined to again thwart Paramount Chief Sabata's naturally derived authority in Xhalanga and Glen Grey, two areas where his was questionable. The amaMfengu headmen who preferred to sacrifice their patriotic sentiments were, to a great extent, also enticed by power. It might have seemed for a while that the exercise of implementing the BAA afforded the parties who had a stake in the process opportunities to trade in, and bargain for, more power. Anyway, the acceptance and entrenchment of

the legislation on 'Authorities' in Xhalanga and elsewhere was, primarily, to serve the interests of the ruling class.

It must also be noted that the amaMfengu cluster took into account different considerations in the selection of a headman, even though the appointment was in the end made by the magistrate's office. While the government expected its headmen, as its loyal servants, to facilitate its policies to the best of their ability, a typical amaMfengu headman was not only expected by his constituency to advance their interests but also to represent their sentiments at all hierarchical levels and to be their spokesman. These roles made up their criteria in the choice of an office-bearer who would be distinguished from the rest. Msengana's acceptance of the headman's office from the 'Authorities' portrayed him as both a dissenter and a sell-out of the amaMfengu sentiments. There is a sense in which his subtle political ambivalence justified his apparent pro-government stance while it also came across as having been an apology for the amaMfengu aversion to the 'Authorities'. While Msengane's position was informed by the prospects of material gains from his benefactor, his fellow amaMfengu- who condemned his choice of political office - were intimidated by the possibility of losing economic benefits should the application of the BAA be given a go-ahead. They also feared that the socio-political status which their Christian education as well as rule by White magistrates had bequeathed to them would be eroded if chiefly governance, which was associated with intellectual backwardness, was introduced. Whilst Ntsebeza's claim of social and class divisions which mirrored the Xhalanga community reinforces the above explanation, schisms born out of individual interests, ambitions and the aspirations of individuals with self-interests also threatened to undermine the consolidated amaMfengu resistance to the implementation of rule by 'Authorities'.

Msengana's availability for a community authority headmanship seemed to help realise Magistrate Mundell's formula of enabling the headman's office to function under the authority of a chief. Such a chief was obviously Matanzima who would have enticed Msengana by the power inherent in the most senior position in the community, an honour no amaMfengu community had, thus far, seen fit to bestow on him. Whilst it

could be expected that his appointment would win over the amaMfengu to the government's measures, it would also afford Matanzima an entry point into Xhalanga local politics. There was therefore a sense in which Msengana's headmanship symbolised an instrument that was at the disposal of Matanzima which could thus be used to smother Sabata's voice. Kuse has claimed that Matanzima cleverly offered all sorts of incentives to attract anyone he could use to gain access into Cala affairs.²⁴ An interesting development was the fact that at a Bumbane meeting which Matanzima did not attend though invited to explain his claim for chieftainship of Emigrant abaThembuland, certain groups from Cala and Cofimvaba openly rejected him. The Cala group was reported to have informed their magistrate on the day of the meeting that 'they, representing the majority of Cala headmen, did not want to be under Chief Kaiser at all'.²⁵

There was also evidence that Matanzima's self-assertiveness was tampering with the traditional norms that prescribed the hierarchy and seniority of chiefs within the ruling house. His moves to incorporate Cala were believed to be obstructing Sabata's moves to secure placements in Xhalanga for his three brothers, Matoti, Nxeko and Mvuyelwa. This was so despite the customary stipulation that 'the brothers of the Paramount Chief cannot be appointed Chiefs over the 22 locations in Cofimvaba over which Kaiser is Chief but they can be appointed as Senior Chiefs to Kaiser in the areas outside these 22 locations'.²⁶ Young admitted that it would count against Matanzima's chances of incorporating Xhalanga (Cala) District into his district if the three brothers were brought that close. It is also a fact that it would give Sabata safe passage in what Matanzima regarded as his terrain and invariably obstruct the implementation of BAA if Sabata's influence prevailed.

It thus became clear that the installation of 'Authorities' in Xhalanga was politically linked to Matanzima's personal interests. In this light must be understood the question of pursuing the upgrading of his chieftainship in the context of implementing the 'Authorities'. To this effect the chief magistrate had also requested the Cala magistrate to gauge the popularity of Daliwonga among the location headmen of Xhalanga. When

the results turned out to be unfavourable for Matanzima but favourable for Sabata Ramsay confessed that the government intended to use the regional authorities as a weapon to thwart the wishes of the Xhalanga people. The government's interests would be better served had they preferred Matanzima over Sabata, which was not the case. The government would make use of Matanzima in all instances when its plans were being obstructed. Ramsay remarked that

I am not perturbed at present over the position. When regional authorities are established it will be seen whether Xhalanga wishes to link up with St. Marks in a separate regional authority for Emigrant Tembuland authority or whether it will side with the Paramount chief's Tembuland authority. It would be paradoxical were Matanzima to be recognised as chief of St. Marks and Xhalanga and then later Xhalanga decided not to throw in its lot with him, so it is just as well that the matter of jurisdiction should await the formation of regional authorities.²⁷

In the Mnxe location No.11 the government had no luck in its efforts to bring about compliance. Efforts to put in place an amenable infrastructure for the establishment of rule by 'Authorities' were counterproductive. Instead of the desired outcome being produced, friction flared up between those who were opting for the government proposals and their opponents. An interesting development of this phase in Xhalanga politics is how the local divisions cut across the amaMfengu faction without necessarily implying that the dissenters were embracing chieftainship. The disagreement in Xhalanga over the acceptance or rejection of the government's legislation had a very negative impact on abaThembu chieftainship. It however, became a groundbreaking event that afforded Matanzima the point of entry into the Xhalanga's local affairs either as broker for government policies or an arbiter with self-interest. It also opened a political vacuum that inadvertently served as a testing ground in the jockeying for power between Sabata and Matanzima. While the disagreement reinforced the existing split it also revealed a new dimension to the material factors as a primary force that determined the amaMfengu resistance to, or acceptance of, the government measures.

An interesting observation that is made here is of the extent to which Matanzima was enabled by the internal developments in Xhalanga to exploit the factionalism to boost his image in the government's eyes. This he did by manoeuvring a stalemate for the

advantage of both the government and his ultimate personal benefit. One case related to the death of Headman Manzana, who was presumed to be a supporter of the government. In correspondence with the chief magistrate, the magistrate revealed that 'Manzana, the Headman in question, maintains that the complaints against him are made because he is in favour of stabilization whereas many in his location are bitterly opposed to it'.²⁸ Manzana's death was a propitious event for the people of Mnxe for obvious reasons, but it soon appeared that it was of advantage to the government as well. Manzana's Mnxe Village quickly submitted their candidate's name to the magistrate for appointment in an acting capacity. This was Jonas Mntungwa,²⁹ a recognised opponent of chieftainship.³⁰ The government went ahead and appointed Solomon Mrwetyana as acting Headman of Mnxe Location 11³¹ and in this way ignored the choice of the villagers. Mrwetyana was a compliant headman who had 'already shown himself to be a loyal supporter of the government and Matanzima'.³² His preference for the retention of Gecelo as amaGcina Headman was also hinted at in the resident magistrate's letter to the chief magistrate. It must be noted that Mrwetyana's appointment was going to strangle anti-government sentiments and dampen the amaMfengu opposition to the government. This appointment did not only mark an assault on the core opposition to the government's measures, but it was also evidence of its ability to manipulate opposition. Magistrate Wronsley confirmed in a letter to the Chief Magistrate that it was 'the Egolombeni Community Authority, in consultation with Chief K.D. Matanzima... [that] appointed Solomon, as Acting Headman of Emnxe Location No.11, with effect from 29th August 1958, pending the appointment of a permanent successor to the late Manzana'.³³

This obstructive resistance to the ongoing implementation of the BAA in Xhalanga is further reflected in the minutes of the 27 February 1959 meeting between the Mnxe delegation and the Cala magistrate. The meeting took place in the magistrate's office and clearly revealed that the attitude - either negative or positive - of the Mnxe Location residents to government-appointed headmen was to be a decisive factor in the establishment of rule by 'Authorities' in the Xhalanga District. Whereas the government had, in 1958, appointed Mrwetyana over the choice of the Mnxe people a certain Ben

Tyeku had, at the meeting held in February, expressly stated that his Mnxe Location was vehemently opposed to the headmen appointed by the community authority. When a question was put to him by Marsberg, the Native Commissioner, as to whether they would accept a headman appointed by a community authority, Tyeku's response was 'the Location will not accept him if he is appointed by the Community Authority'.³⁴ Marsberg further put it to Tyeku that the 'law prescribed that the Community Authority must appoint a headman'.³⁵ In an apparent effort to draw the attention of the Mnxe Location's representative to the implications of their stand with regard to the issue of the headman in question Marsberg remarked 'that in terms of the Law the Community Authority must appoint a Headman, and what you are telling me means that the Emnxe people won't accept the law. Is that correct?' Tyeku's response to the Native Commissioner's question was also direct, "[y]es, that is what the people say. They will not accept the law'.³⁶

It was clear that in the Mnxe Location the community authority was regarded as an extension of the government. It appeared that any headman appointed by any office regarded as an arm of the government was viewed as a facilitator in the execution of the 'Government measures like stabilization'.³⁷ The Location residents regarded the community authority as an instrument of the DNA to be used to prop up chieftainship and in turn to be used by the the same institution to prop up the hierarchy of the 'Authorities'. It became clear from Tyeku's interview that the process of establishing the BAA in the Xhalanga District was, in fact, the application of the government's law to a people, some of whom dreaded the consequences of what they perceived to be a grossly undemocratic exercise. H. M. Tsengiwe confirmed that the Xhalanga communities opposed chieftainship and any infrastructural bodies that purported to lay the foundation for it. They preferred rather to hide behind the magistrate and policemen as their rallying points.³⁸ It must be noted that preference for the above offices was evidence of the duration and extent of colonial inroads upon indigenous law. From a critical point of view, the above situation was a political rebound which reflected an irony of the government's 'to and fro' policies. N. Gobodo also endorsed Tsengiwe's testimony and added, further, that the opponents of the 'Authorities' believed that a

headman appointed by the magistrate would be neutral and therefore good for all communities in the region. She stated that people were suspicious of the choice of a community authority because they believed that such a candidate would bring about clashes among the diversified communities. In such clashes the stronger faction which would have been backed by the government for upholding its policies would win against the weaker one.³⁹ Given the fact that the stronger party would have been one of loyal supporters of the government it thus becomes clear that the choice of the community authority would be a 'divide and rule' exercise.

When he was interviewed by Marsberg Tyeku confirmed that his opinion was informed by the Mnxé resident's fear of manipulation by the chiefs' if the community authorities were given a right to appoint headmen. The amaMfengu cluster feared that a headman chosen by the community authority in consultation with a chief would be open to bribery by factions who were more interested in favours, particularly land favours.⁴⁰ This is not to say that no other clans held land in Xhalanga. Kuse has confirmed that her grandfather, a member of the abaThembu clan, would boast of the vastness of the land he owned when he moved from Tarkastad to settle in Xhalanga in 1865.⁴¹ Any form of meddling with land allocation would obviously impact negatively on the amaMfengu because they were the major landowners in the Xhalanga District. This state of affairs raises the question of the role of landownership status in retarding, thwarting or promoting the implementation of the BAA in Xhalanga. In addition, there was the question of benefits to be gained which would only be determined by the roles that the interested parties played in the government's exercise. The government sought a politically convenient method of governing Blacks in the reserves, and therefore was depending on the chiefs to perform this task and absorb and diffuse the tensions. No chief who put himself first would deny himself the semblance of power so long lost to their predecessors which the government offered him. There was an anticipation this time around that the institution would endure because it was being restored by a government that had proved its political might in 1927 when it tampered with the authority of chieftainship. In the light of the above the government saw some prospects for the success of its political mission in its empowerment of the community authorities.

Matanzima saw in the community authorities a way of accessing power for himself and also a systematic means of defeating Sabata.

The enthusiastic involvement of Matanzima in the appointment of a headman for Xhalanga's Mnxe Location was obviously a means to an end, to help him acquire more power than he was entitled to, while the government was interested in the execution of its objectives. The appointment to headmanship of Mrwetyana, 'regarded as an extremely loyal supporter of the Government and its policy'⁴² appeared to address both Matanzima's quest for land-based political power and the government's apparent impatience at the stalling of implementation of 'Authorities' in the Xhalanga District. While Matanzima appeared to be ready for whatever reward his new bargaining position promised to offer, Mrwetyana also seemed ready, like Msengana before him, to sacrifice the amaMfengu interests for his personal benefit. That these cultural interests did not promise any benefits in the long term justified their being disregarded for the time being.

Whilst the Mnxe Location No.11 rejected any headman that was appointed by the community authority (the Eqolombeni Authority in the present case) there has been reference to prominent amaMfengu individuals who availed themselves of the headmanship of community authorities simply because it appeared to be a lucrative position. A letter of 29 February 1959 from the Cala magistrate to the chief magistrate confirmed Mvinjelwa to be 'the best headman in this District (Xhalanga)' who had been threatened with assault on account of his support for the BAA - to the extent of being forced to leave a meeting in which the Mnxe people had taken part. What was meant to be the implementation of rule by 'Authorities' in the Xhalanga District resulted in a rift between the opponents and supporters of the BAA. Those that worked against the law's implementation like Jonas Mntungwa, Swelindawo Vena, Mabanga Mboyiya and Ben Tyeku were considered troublemakers. The magistrate, speaking for the government, appeared committed not to give the so-called trouble-makers any sense of victory over the community authority. He would not give in to their demand to have a headman appointed by the Cala magistrate. The vocal opposition to the community authority

justified the removal of 'troublemakers' from the Xhalanga District. The magistrate's reference to the roles of Mntungwa and Vena in the 'disturbances which arose at the installation ceremonies (Stokwe, Gecelo) at the Matanzima Secondary School last August'⁴³ and their subsequent conviction was evidence that opponents of the government's schemes were kept under surveillance. In a letter to the chief magistrate, Matanzima endorsed the appointment of Mrwetyana who had earlier expressed a wish to step down in the face of opposition from people who wanted a headman appointed by the magistrate by saying 'ijt will be against the interests of good government in that Location (Mnxe) if Mrwetyana should be deposed as a result of the agitators of this political clique'.⁴⁴

The implementation of the rule by 'Authorities' in Xhalanga seems to have contradicted Mayer's statement that in modern democratic societies 'groups that become elite will tend to attract some political power and groups that have political power will tend to attract some elite status'.⁴⁵ Instead, Mrwetyana's case reflected a separation between social prestige, which influenced the amaMfengu to scoff at chieftainship, and the self-interest, which informed Mrwetyana's positive response to the government's overtures. That the Mnxe Location residents were not prepared to back down in their demand was seen in a deputation to Chief Magistrate Ramsay of Mnxe people led by Tyeku. They demanded that a permanent headman be appointed by the Magistrate: '[t]hey would not accept one appointed by the community authority and -- would not have a headman who was in favour of stabilisation'.⁴⁶ While Ramsay solicited Matanzima's opinion on the recalcitrance of Tyeku's delegation he proposed that the Mnxe people 'be left without a headman at all'.⁴⁷ Matanzima's response to Ramsay's report was *confrontational* for he viewed the Mnxe crisis as a test of strength between himself as 'the man on the spot' and the government. His attitude was evident in the following remark to the Chief Magistrate :

If the people of Emnxe have any reasons to oppose the appointment (of Mrwetyana in terms of Section 11(8) of Proclamation No.180 of 1956 as amended) they should consult the Eqolombeni Community Authority in the first instance and if dissatisfied with that Authority's decision they should come to

me. If they adopt neither of these two courses the Department should not consider their complaint seriously.⁴⁸

Matanzima was obviously ready for a conflict with the opponents of the BAA in Xhalanga. The longer they took to comply, the longer it would take for his chieftainship to be upgraded. His advice to the government to ignore the Mnxe crisis if its villagers chose to ignore his options was an indication that in his mind he had already incorporated Xhalanga into St Marks. He was clearly putting himself forward as an ally of the government as well as delegating his person to deal with the case of Mnxe headmanship. It seemed that in the end he would restore the authority of chieftainship with himself as the incumbent at the expense of the government authority. That this was the kind of naturally evolved 'Native democracy' Verwoerd had, according to Nugent, conceived need not be over-emphasised.

It must be noted that the government's methods were employed to yield long-term results in which White superiority would be permanent. In this regard to re-invent a chieftainship that would be continuously nurtured in a 'proper native democracy' became the Nationalist Government's primary objective. The government did not, however, have proper criteria for the institution they were recommending except to guarantee that government by 'Authorities' was the ideal political environment for the envisaged chieftainship. What they omitted was to put in place measures which would preserve, guarantee and safeguard the political remnant of what at that point in time was left of the abaThembu chieftainship. The failure of the Nationalist Government in this regard created fertile ground for a power struggle between Paramount Chief Sabata and Matanzima. The feud inevitably, and in an ironic twist of events prepared the ground for the DNA by enabling it to implement the BAA in an abaThembuland whose chiefly office was progressively becoming polarised. Against this background must be understood the events, referred to in the previous chapter, which occurred as a consequence of Sabata's meeting in the office of the Cofimvaba magistrate in December 1955.

In the Xhalanga District Matanzima was again the primary target of opposition together with a minimal tolerance of a titular chieftainship of the House of Ngangelizwe as a compromise. With the advent of the BAA Gecelo and Stokwe became primary candidates for chieftainship in the Xhalanga District. The two individuals were at best pawns in the hands of both Matanzima and the government and at worst an inadvertent threat to the socio-economic rights and political freedom of their so-called amaMfengu subjects. They were part of the reason the amaMfengu cluster preferred magisterial rule, both as symbol of uniform treatment and an equalising factor among the amaQwathi, amaGcina, amaXhosa, abaThembu and amaMfengu. In the determination of each of the above parties to promote and advance its own interests and objectives is to be found the major obstruction to the application of the BAA in the Xhalanga District. Matanzima's arranging to have the two men installed at Matanzima Secondary School, was both to showcase his prospective subchiefs and to impose them over the recalcitrant amaMfengu. Ntsebeza puts the installation of Ngonyama Gecelo and Jamangile Stokwe as sub-chiefs of Xhalanga on 12 August 1958 at Matanzima Secondary School.⁴⁹ The magistrate's description of events reports on Matanzima's arrangements to have Stokwe and Gecelo installed at their Great Places on the 20th and 27th September 1958 respectively. Matanzima explained that 'the intention of these ceremonies is to preserve the tradition of introducing the chief to his people and to caution him in their entire presence and also to caution the tribes'.⁵⁰

The major involvement of Matanzima in the installation of Gecelo and Stokwe, and the fact that the ceremony was, according to Ntsebeza's informant, held at the Matanzima Secondary School, a place in which Matanzima possibly considered himself to have a free passage, makes Matanzima appear an architect of the two chieftainships. Ntsebeza claims that the event turned out to be a major demonstration against chieftainship (presumably much against the intentions of the DNA strategists). It is argued here that what the installation of indigenous rulers at what public premises like a school symbolised was a cultural slight to the institution of chieftainship except to the person of Matanzima. A successful installation could only but reflect the extent of

Matanzima's power in making things happen according to his political designs. The school premises lacked the aura and dignity that befitted any chief's installation. This immediately, in mind and in actuality, stripped the chiefships concerned of the naturalness of the institution and conferred on it the characteristic artificiality of official customary law. Further, the choice of the Matanzima Secondary School as a venue for the installation was subtly provocative and confrontational in more than one way. The amaMfengu cluster, which publicly denounced chieftainship, formed the bulk of the 'school people' and had taken the initiative in the establishment of the school. It is doubtful if they would have consented to the use of their educational symbol as a makeshift traditional site. The installation ceremony at the school at Matanzima's instance would, as it certainly did, split the Xhalanga community between those in favour of the institution and those that opposed it. What was of primary importance to Matanzima was the extension of his influence which a ceremony of that kind implied irrespective of where it took place. Chiefs installed at his instance would pay him, rather than Sabata, fealty.

THE GOVERNMENT EARMARKS DALIWONGA FOR SENIOR CHIEFTAINSHIP

The installation of Gecelo and Stokwe meant that the 'Authorities' were established in Xhalanga and further, that Matanzima's efforts had been rewarded. This had been preceded by an earlier announcement by the SNA to the effect that 'His Excellency the Governor-General has been pleased to appoint Kaizer Matanzima as Chief of the Natives of Emigrant Tembuland comprising the Districts of St Marks and Xhalanga'.⁵¹ A little earlier the SNA had pin-pointed the delimitations of the areas of jurisdiction of both Sabata and Matanzima:

Sabata's regional authority will comprise the districts of Umtata, Mqanduli, Engcobo and possibly a portion of Elliotdale, while Matanzima's regional authority will comprise the districts of St Marks and Xhalanga (Cala) with the possible inclusion later of Glen Grey as well. As soon as this has been done-an [*sic*] event which it is expected will be realised during the next month or two, a [*sic*] recommendation will be made to the Governor-General to authorise Daliwonga Kaizer Matanzima to assume the title of paramount chief by reason of the extent of his area of jurisdiction, the responsibilities attaching to his office, the chiefs subordinate to him and the Native population residing in the areas under his control.⁵²

That the 'Matanzima affair' was intended to be a ceremonial event of celebration by the state is shown in Young's remark to the effect that 'the installation of Matanzima should be a festive occasion attended by at least a member of the Native Affairs Commission. Sabata can crown him and he in turn can perform the same on the two newly appointed subchiefs-all on the same day'.⁵³ The Nhlapo Commission has confirmed that Paramount Chief Sabata was instructed to install Matanzima as chief of the whole Western AbaThembuland on 11 June 1958.⁵⁴

Telegraphic correspondence received from Pretoria confirmed that the installation of Matanzima was scheduled for 16 July 1958.⁵⁵ It was to be a realisation of a dream about their protégé whom the government had nurtured for so long. Matanzima had, with the connivance of the government, flouted the 'Authorities' and treated Sabata with disrespect. The government blamed Matanzima's insolence and ill-conceived impatience on their failure to reward him accordingly, and they used this as a rationale for condoning his behaviour: 'His continued use of the title [*paramount chief*] is may be due to a sense of frustration that his value and worth is not recognised and that he is not being given the full measure of judicial and executive powers allowed for by law'.⁵⁶

The suggestion that Matanzima would install other chiefs, and in this way assume Sabata's prerogative, so soon after he had himself been made an intermediate chief by the same, would make Sabata's seniority irrelevant in Matanzima's districts. Such an exercise would presumably highlight the equality in status of Sabata and Matanzima. If this suggestion were anything to go by, the installation of Matanzima, it seemed, might well be the first and last honourable function that Sabata was to perform in the so-called Emigrant abaThembuland, and during his entire paramountcy. This would surely signal the beginning of the decline of Sabata's supreme authority, a political irony of the first magnitude. It is through incidents like these that the disunity, destruction and division that the BAA wrought in abaThembuland will continue to be judged by the history of chieftainship in this country generally. An event of even greater historical significance for the history of abaThembu chieftainship and the house of Ngangelizwe in particular

was that the official announcement ratifying Sabata's paramountcy was made to coincide with the one that related to Matanzima. The notice read as follows: 'I[t] is hereby certified that His Excellency the Governor-General has been pleased to appoint Sabata Dalindyabo as Paramount Chief of the Thembu and tributary tribes resident in the districts of Elliotdale, Engcobo, Mqanduli, St Marks, Umtata, Xalanga and Glen Grey.'⁵⁷ The SNA's reference to the inclusion of St Marks, Xhalanga and Glen Grey seemed more of a bluff than a reality. Subsequent correspondence from the SNA to the CNC of Mthatha confirms this:

[a]s regards Sabata and Kaizer it is felt that Sabata, although appointed paramount for the whole of Tembuland, should not be given civil and criminal jurisdiction over the districts of St Marks and Xalanga. The reason for this is of course that Matanzima will probably be the head of a regional authority comprising the districts of St Marks and Xalanga and that he will then be authorised by the Governor-General to assume the title of Paramount Chief in terms of Section 102 of Proclamation No.180 of 1956. Such an arrangement would prevent Sabata from interfering in Matanzima's area although it would not affect his recognition as the titular head of all the Thembus who would owe an allegiance to him.⁵⁸

It was thus clear that Matanzima's meteoric rise was carefully and systematically mapped out by the DNA in Pretoria. This was evident from a letter that Ramsay wrote to the SNA advising against any suggestions that Matanzima should pay tribute to Sabata's regional authority. Ramsay was acting on Matanzima's advice against the levying of taxes by the 'Authorities' on the grounds that such a move would break up the whole Bantu Authority system.⁵⁹ What Matanzima feared most was the contact between Sabata and the Emigrant abaThembu which would come about if the Paramount Chief or his advisers were afforded social interaction with the people he considered his subjects. It must be assumed that Sabata would not have been reluctant to levy taxes on a people he wanted to look up to him as their sovereign. Ramsay himself justified the latter thought when he remarked that 'Matanzima would probably protest that he is being singled out to pay tribute which is not required of other subordinate Tembu chiefs'.⁶⁰ There was at the same time suggestion that Matanzima might soften Sabata's heart by making an annual contribution towards his maintenance. Ramsay also remarked that such an arrangement might only work satisfactorily if Sabata was tactful

and statesmanlike in his dealings with Matanzima, a suggestion that the latter had to be bribed to do the proper thing.

THE CHIEFTAINSHIP IN GLEN GREY ON THE EVE OF THE BAA : A THREAT TO LOCATION BOARDS

The implementation of the BAA in Glen Grey also initially brought to the surface issues that were peculiar to the socio-political situation in the district. Chieftainship in the area had been phased out after Gungubele and Stokwe took up arms against the government. The end result was that from about 1880 until about 1955 Glen Grey was ruled by individuals other than chiefs. The 'pseudo chiefs' were accountable to the Location Boards and after them the District Council.⁶¹ The political structure of Glen Grey as it existed in the mid-20th century was thus not compatible with the government's designs because it had no 'tribal organisation'. For the BAA to be anchored in the Glen Grey District it was essential that there should be infrastructural affiliation to a specific chieftainship.⁶² The abolition of the chieftainship in the area at the time when it was done, the need to resuscitate chieftainship as the exigencies and politics of governance in the mid-20th century dictated, reflected, in a multiple pattern, the ricocheting of government experiments. The CNC reinforced the above statement in a letter that he wrote to the SNA. He remarked at the time that

it is the declared policy to revive Chieftainships and there appears to be no reason why it should not be implemented in this case. When the Act 38 of 1927 was promulgated the then Chief Native Commissioner asked that the Chieftainships in Lady Frere should be revived but the Department refused this application as the policy at the time was to eliminate chieftainships as far as possible.⁶³

The region under discussion, whose chieftainship Sir George Cathcart had given to Nonesi, was constituted by two groups of amaHala under Rhaxothi and Mfanta respectively, amaNdungwane under Ndarala and amaGcina under Tyhopho.⁶⁴ The irony of the first magnitude was that the Location Boards which were once perceived as effective weapons with which to thwart chieftainship, were now proving to be obstacles. It thus appeared that the restoration of chieftainship in the Glen Grey District indeed presented as a gamble. Yet such a gamble was very desirable to help resolve the

seemingly minor problems, some of which had been threatening to plague the abaThembu chieftainship for some time. One of these was the status of the ex-regent, Dabulamanzi Dalindyebo, whose future was uncertain now that he had vacated the paramountcy seat. Dabulamanzi had expressed a desire to be given a place elsewhere outside the Dalindyebo territory. The chief magistrate put it thus 'what he (Dabulamanzi) had in mind was that he be allowed to settle amongst the Tembu people in the Lady Frere District and that he be granted a Headmanship there'.⁶⁵

Sabata had arranged to have Dabulamanzi, transferred to Glen Grey. This seemed a good plan because all the stakeholders appeared to be receptive to the idea.⁶⁶ The remark by the CNC, who favoured Dabulamanzi's candidature, expressed clearly in a letter to the SNA that 'in this connection it seems to me that Dabulamanzi Dalindyebo the ex-regent of the Tembus---is the most suitable person for the appointment in question'.⁶⁷ The DNA was confident that Dabulamanzi's settlement in the Glen Grey District would create a fealty between him and the people and would facilitate the government's plan to promote the implementation of the BAA.⁶⁸ This must also be understood in the light of ex-regent's readiness to bask in the light of the magistrate when he held the abaThembu paramountcy.

It appears from the above exposition that the placement of the ex-regent in the Lady Frere District, in particular, was likely to expedite the execution of the government objectives and to give Sabata a sense of security. It might also revive the patriotism of the Glen Grey abaThembu who had long been separated from their kinsmen by colonial law, and thwart the resistance of the Location Boards to the revival of identity of abaThembu chieftainship. The Location Boards were now criticised for obstructing progress as seen in their failure to promote rehabilitation: 'these Boards have done nothing to justify their continued existence.....their abolition will bring about a complete change in the attitude of the people'.⁶⁹ The proposed dispensation-the core of which was chieftainship- was expected to smother the boards. The CNC reported that the 'Boards will, in any case, have to disappear when Bantu Authorities are established as it will be undesirable to have the latter's powers restricted in any way'.⁷⁰ The board members

were also criticised for assuming the duties, powers and privileges of headmen, while the headmen were criticised for lacking personalities. Chieftainship was suddenly commended as both a unifying factor and a force that promoted respect for the old by the young and in that way nurtured a familiarity with recognised custom. The NC remarked in an apparent touting exercise for the revival of chieftainship

This disinterested state of affairs on the part of the people immediately struck me on my arrival at this station and it occurred to me that if they had a chief whom they could respect and could take pride in their membership of the Tembu tribe would do a lot to restore their self respect.⁷¹


The NC had earlier written to the CNC and pleaded for caution in the canvassing for tribal authorities in Glen Grey. His pleas were informed by his fear of the steadfast opposition of communities in Glen Grey to the rehabilitation proposals. His unwavering commitment to the execution of government policies is reflected in his advice against 'the application of compulsion unless the Tribal Authority can be supplied with a police force sufficiently strong to enforce its will against the whole populace'.⁷²

The predominant clusters in the Glen Grey District were the amaHala who were presumed to be under the *Qadi* to the Great House of Mthikrakra, Mfanta, amaNdungwane under Ndarala and amaGcina under Tyhopho.⁷³ The nomination of the ex-regent as a candidate for chieftainship in Glen Grey would accomplish the extension of Sabata's political authority without altering the geographical boundaries of the Glen Grey abaThembu. The possible extension of the abaThembu political authority beyond its geographic confines would obviously be a feature peculiar only to the abaThembu chieftainship. The standard practice in this case would have been the absorption of the Glen Grey communities into the political systems of their geographical context, in this case the cis-Kei, though it is doubtful Matanzima would have backed down.

The government also had an option to engage and consult with the local 'Authorities'. It was politically significant that they avoided employing the services of an amateur chief in their commitment to the execution of their aims. At the same time the response of the Glen Grey community to the possible posting of Dabulamanzi to their district and the

implementation of the BAA reflected different viewpoints that influenced the government's thinking. The members of Location Boards were resistant because accession of 'Authorities' inevitably meant loss of power. The Glen Grey community was divided into clans of amaHala and amaGcina, a state of affairs likely to complicate matters should a chief affiliated to one of the two clans be appointed without a counterpart for the other clan. The NC for Lady Frere had also expressed doubts about the wisdom of such an initiative; 'I have felt for some time though that there is not much to be gained by appointing a chief for the Hala unless a chief can also be found for the Gcina which is a larger clan'.⁷⁴ It was in the light of the situation alluded to above that the question of resident headmen surfaced and posed a competition to Dabulamanzzi's candidature. The candidates that were identified for chieftainships in the area were Manzezulu Mthikrakra and Ngqungqushe Vulindlela Tyhopho.

THE POSITION OF MANZENZULU IN THE HOUSE OF NDABA



The two royal headmen were aligned with the Glen Grey clans. It soon appeared that the appointment of chiefs for the Glen Grey District from the Glen Grey community

would find favour with Matanzima whose Great Place at Qamata was reasonably nearer than that of Paramount Chief Sabata.

Indications at a meeting that subsequently took place at Manzezulu's Mbinzana Great Place gave good prospects and possible success for the government's objectives. On that day, 23 July 1955, the people of the Glen Grey District who paid allegiance to Manzezulu met at the Great Place, Mbinzana, and after careful deliberation unanimously accepted the BAA.⁷⁷ Resolutions taken at the same meeting appeared to rule out chances that Dabulamanzi might ever be posted to the Glen Grey District for any purpose. If the posting of the ex-chief regent should fail in favour of a candidate other than Sabata's choice the already fragile politics of abaThembu chieftainship could only be aggravated. The meeting recommended that the proposed 'Authority' should take over the functions and duties previously performed by the district council. They further requested the government to recognise Manzezulu as chief under the Native Administration Act of 1927. At the same time they proposed that he should be head of the 'Authority' of the abaThembu in the Glen Grey District. Of the 28 councillors that the meeting proposed, 24 were to be nominated by their chief, Manzezulu 'from amongst the people's representatives, to be distributed as far as possible, all over the district'.⁷⁸ The remaining four councillors were to be nominated by the NC in consultation with Chief Manzezulu. The suggested seat of the 'Authority' was Mbinzana location where Manzezulu's home was. The final proposal that 'Civil and Criminal jurisdiction be conferred on Chief Manzezulu' was to rubber-stamp the obvious, the crowning of Manzezulu as the overall chief of the Glen Grey District,⁷⁹ this irrespective of the diversity of clans resident in the district.

Manzezulu's candidature was justifiable because he was not a stranger to the community. From the government's perspective any one prospective chief of the Glen Grey District who pledged to facilitate the implementation of the BAA would be its best bet. The professed acceptance of the BAA by the Glen Grey people, even as a subtle conditionality, was more than the government had bargained for in its bid to resuscitate chieftainship in the region. On the one hand nomination of any other individual for the

vacant chiefship over the paramount chief's candidate (Dabulamanzi) would deprive him of access into a district that had not learnt either to appreciate chieftainship or any particular holder of such a title. The endorsement of either the headmanship or chieftainship of Dabulamanzi over Glen Grey would surely threaten Chief Matanzima. Tsotsi has suggested that the reasons why Manzezulu approved of the BAA, included the moral and material support that he received from both the local Bantu commissioner and Chief Matanzima 'who claimed that the Glen Grey District was part of Tembuland and therefore subject to his authority'.⁸⁰ The minimal compliance in Manzezulu's Mbinzana Location against resistance in the greater Glen Grey was attributable, inter alia, to the government's repressive measures and Matanzima's overbearing influence and proximity.⁸¹ Native Commissioner Blakeway had earlier pointed out that amaHala of Glen Grey recognised Matanzima even though he had no jurisdiction over them.⁸² The appointment of his candidate would work in the government's favour because it would complement his visible efforts in the Xhalanga District where he was manouvering the strategic appointment to headmanship of individuals who were amenable to government's measures. After Blakeway had met the amaHala of Bholotwa and Mbinzana he was clear that the amaHala constituency of Glen Grey was more interested in the recognition of Manzezulu as their chief than in the so-called benefits that would be bestowed by the 'Authorities'. It also emerged at the subsequent meetings that in other locations other than Mbinzana and Bholotwa most people in the Glen Grey District 'were satisfied with the system of the Glen Grey Act and would not trust themselves to Government by fellow Natives [as was implied in government by 'Authorities']'. Many stated that they would require the European officials to control them until doomsday'.⁸³ What was transpiring here was that the government's canvassing for the BAA was dividing the amaHala from their kinsmen depending on whether they accepted or rejected the BAA.

The case of amaGcina appeared more complex because of rival claimants to the chieftainship. The contest was between Ngqungqushu and Zwelixelile, both of whom were believed to be aspiring for the chieftainship of the Glen Grey amaGcina. Whilst the two candidates focused on chieftainship, the government, as has been said, was mainly

interested in the implementation of Act. That the processes involved in the implementation of the BAA were leading to the flaring up of old issues, some from unexpected quarters, serves to unravel the complex forces that served to mould the abaThembu chieftainship.

There were two factions that constituted the amaGcina cluster of Glen Grey and each of these had their preferred candidates. It must be borne in mind that if any of the amaGcina contestants were appointed to chieftainship, the chieftainship of the Glen Grey would no longer be a sole prerogative of Manzezulu as the secretary of the chief's council, W.M. Time had endorsed. The NC had informed the CNC in a letter that it was visibly clear that 'Manzezulu has no influence beyond Mbinzana and Bolotwa Locations [and for that reason] it would be unwise to accede to their proposals'⁸⁴ of making Manzezulu a chief of the Glen Grey District where more than half the population were amaGcina.

WE *KHONZA* (PAY ALLEGIANCE TO) SABATA, BUT WE *HLONIPHA* (RESPECT) MATANZIMA : MATANZIMA OUTWITS SABATA IN THE GLEN GREY DISTRICT

While Matanzima and Sabata jockeyed for the control of the Glen Grey District Blakeway had, in the meantime, identified the main clans in the district as the amaGcina and amaHala. He was quick to point out that the amaHala of Glen Grey recognised Matanzima even though he had no jurisdiction over them. As early as 1934 Whitfield, in his capacity as NC, tried in vain to have Manzezulu and Valelo Mhlontlo recognised as chiefs by their respective communities.⁸⁵ Young later remarked to the NC about the likelihood of Sabata and Matanzima being 'at variance as to who has the biggest claim to the right to appoint chiefs, sub-chiefs or deputies in Glen Grey.'⁸⁶ Against this latter background must be understood the Government's sudden about-turn, and opposition to the promotion of Sabata's interests in the Glen Grey region. Van Heerden, reporting on Sabata's insecurity, wrote :

It would appear that Sabata who has no following in the Glen Grey [district] fears that Matanzima who is extremely friendly with the Halas is undermining his position. This fear is not without foundation but this jockeying for positions by them is certainly not in the interest of good administration and the early

establishment of Bantu Authorities. Interference in the affairs of the district by people beyond its boundaries is at this stage not advisable and for the time being it would be best not to complicate matters by representations such as those now made by Sabata.⁸⁷

This was a subtle vetoing of Sabata's plan of imposing Dabulamanzi over the Glen Grey amaHala. The subsequent claim by Van Heerden that "the candidate for the amaHala Chieftainship, Manzezulu Mthikrakra is much under the influence of Chief Kaizer Matanzima whose great place is only about five miles from his location"⁸⁸ was surely reason enough to cause Sabata insecurity, as much as it was a hint at other forces that were likely to influence the situation for the government's political benefit. The chief magistrate's remark that Matanzima, 'by virtue of his senior position in the structure of the Thembu [*sic*] 'tribal' complex and his personal prestige, would be the natural mentor of nearby Hala groups'⁸⁹ could only be conceived by Sabata as one more example of the government's determination to endorse Matanzima's senior chieftainship at the expense of his authority. On being interviewed, Manzezulu and Ngqungqushe, the candidates for chiefship in the area, gave a clear picture of how they perceived their relationship with Matanzima and the paramount chief. Manzezulu described it thus; 'we *khonza* Sabata (serve the person of Sabata) but we *hlonipha* Matanzima (respect Matanzima). Ngqungqushe, the senior Gcina candidate ... also described his position thus.⁹⁰ This was to say Sabata was an acknowledged political head than an effective ruler. This situation could have come about as a result of the distance between Sabata's Great Place and his constituency in the Glen Grey district. On the other hand, Matanzima's physical proximity and his overbearing influence, made it impossible for the subject communities not to regard him as a practical father.

The implementation of the BAA in the Glen Grey District eventually saw the intensification of the polarisation of the abaThembu chiefs. It was in this district that the final phase of the conflict between the great and the RHH of Mthikrakra was fought and won. In 1959 at a session of the Transkeian Territorial Authorities Matanzima caused a motion to be introduced which called for the incorporation of Glen Grey into the Transkei. Sabata angrily questioned Matanzima's initiative and expressed concern that

his exclusive right to initiate such political matters was not upheld. This was after Matanzima's Councillors, A. Mgudlwa and George Matanzima had seconded their leader's motion. When the question of the transfer of Glen Grey from the cis-Kei to the trans-Kei was mooted the government's stance was one of 'wait and see'. The NC made it clear that if the controversial region was to be transferred to the trans-Kei and subsequently joined to Matanzima's domain 'it will be asking for trouble to appoint Sabata's nominee'⁹¹ in the Glen Grey District. This was another example of how far the government was prepared to support Matanzima at the expense of Sabata's interests.

While it was public knowledge that Matanzima had no hereditary right in the region, he admitted earlier to the NC that he wielded considerable influence in the Glen Grey District. In the same letter Van Heerden mentioned that Manzezulu and Ngqungqushu, the candidates for chieftaincy in the area, both acknowledged Sabata's right to appoint chiefs in their area under customary law. Suddenly, however, ill-feeling developed between Manzezulu and Chief Sabata, and it became clear that the Paramount Chief's nominee would not be acceptable in the Glen Grey District.⁹² The delaying tactics adopted by the SNA in the appointment of Sabata's brother, Albert Nxeko (Bambilanga), as chief over the Glen Grey abaThembu must be understood in this light. While the SNA shilly-shallied he, nevertheless, acknowledged Sabata's reasons for choosing Nxeko Dalindyebo, commenting that 'the Paramount Chief is of the opinion that such an appointment will facilitate the establishment of Bantu Authorities and the transfer of the Glen Grey District to the Transkei'.⁹³ He was, however, careful not to accede to Sabata's request before he had heard the views of the CNC 'in regard to the various consequences which are likely to eventuate if Sabata's request is granted'.⁹⁴ This approach reveals both the government's unwavering commitment towards Matanzima's interests, and its level of mistrust for Sabata's implicit motive for recommending Nxeko as an appointee in the Glen Grey District.

In time the government officials threw their support behind Manzezulu and it became clear that he was working behind the scenes to undermine Sabata's authority in the

whole of the Glen Grey District. The subsequent conferment of civil and criminal jurisdiction on Sub-Chief Manzezulu Mthikrakra by the Minister of Native Affairs and Development 'under Section 20 of the Native Administration Act of 1927 as substituted by Section 1 of Act No. 13 of 1955'⁹⁵ was an exercise that was singularly pushed by Matanzima with government connivance and without any form of consultation with Paramount Chief Sabata.⁹⁶ '[I]t was' according to Dennie, 'Matanzima's active collaboration with the South African Government in furthering these designs [producing chiefs more willing to bend to Pretoria's will] which precipitated the conflict between himself and Dalindyabo'⁹⁷. Evans also reinforces Dennie's claim where he refers to Ramsay's lavishing praise and support on Matanzima in defiance of popular support for Sabata and states, further, that the DNA's biased actions were designed to forment ill-will, for '[s]plitting Thembuland into two regions to accommodate Matanzima's claims to authority in districts that had historically fallen under the Paramount Chief's domain was certain to incite dispute'.⁹⁸ The eventual installation without consulting Sabata by Chief Daliwonga Matanzima of both Manzezulu⁹⁹ and Ngqungqushu on 21 July 1958 and 14 May 1959 respectively¹⁰⁰ was proof of the government's political obligation to Matanzima. The CNC confirmed that Sabata felt undermined and insulted by the disregard of his status at a time when he was looking forward 'to being inducted in Glen Grey and thereafter installing other chiefs'.¹⁰¹ The feeling of humiliation was aggravated by the fact that one of the newly installed chiefs, Manzezulu Ntshiza Mfanta, was descended from the Great House of Mthikrakra, and therefore genealogically closer to Sabata than to Matanzima.¹⁰²

CONCLUSION

The application of the the Bantu Authorities Act in abaThembuland created a set of circumstances that served as a catalyst for the development of events that affected the relationships among the abaThembu chiefs. It is against this background that the chapter has portrayed the BAA as a piece of legislation that had the potential to destroy and restore, re-invent, and self-empower.

The chapter has shown the BAA to be a justification for the revival of the indigenous rule in the Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts; the major weapon in the gradual assault on

the authority of Sabata; the tool behind the upgrading of Matanzima's chieftainship; and, eventually, the major destabilising factor in relations between abaThembu chiefs.

The chapter has exposed the political irony implicit in the fact that the DNA presented the BAA as an instrument that was designed to restore and refurbish chieftainship to its original status. In the case of Matanzima, though, educational qualifications were used, inter alia, as reasons that qualified him, and proved his competence, for a senior chieftainship. The chapter has also interrogated the folly revealed in Matanzima's failure to use education and the innate wisdom which came with it to preserve the intactness of abaThembu national institution.

The chapter has also shown that the BAA was an ideal apparatus for accomplishing both the political and geographical extension of the boundaries of abaThembuland. It has demonstrated that Matanzima's pro-activity rewarded him, as in the end he became the sole beneficiary of an extended abaThembuland.

The chapter has also exposed the great significance of the role of the amaMfengu in the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship in Xhalanga as well as the divisive role cultural and social factors played in the evolution of 'Authorities' in Xhalanga. It has also demonstrated that the co-option of certain amaMfengu individuals in the hierarchy of the 'Authorities' helped erode the core of indigenous rule and thus make it more 'official' and bureaucratic than was necessary in traditional governance. The chapter has revealed that the uncompromising rejection of the 'Authorities' by amaMfengu elements inadvertently provided Matanzima with both the political vacuum, rationale and opportunity to demonstrate his potential to manoeuvre, manipulate and play one party against the other. The chapter has demonstrated the rewards of his efforts in the successful installation of 'Authorities' in Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts and eventual creation of an additional paramountcy in Emigrant abaThembuland with him as the benefactor.

- ¹ Mqeke ; “Consensus and Conciliation “ p. 72.
- ² CNC – (King William’s Town) –SNA, Bisho Archives, File N11/2/2 4 October 1957.
- ³ Ntsebeza : Democracy, p. 57.
- ⁴ Magistrate (Cala) : - CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 15/2/34, 27 June 1930.
- ⁵ Dubow : “Holding ‘a just balance,“ *Journal*, p. 1.
- ⁶ CMTT (Mthatha) - SNA, Pretoria Archives, 3/327/20, 4 November 1938.
- ⁷ Magistrate (Xhalanga) – CMTT (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 12 November 1946.
- ⁸ Magistrate (Cofimvaba) - Chief Magistrate, Cape Archives, File 32/27, 16 August 1952.
- ⁹ Minutes of a Meeting held in the Office of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories at Mthatha, Mthatha Archives, File 32/27, 21 October 1953.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² T. D. Ramsay - Magistrate (Cala), Cape Archives, File 32/27, 3/27/3/20, 18 December, 1956.
- ¹³ W. Nxazonke (Askeaton) - CNC (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, File 3/327/17, ref 2/1/3/17, 18 November 1950.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Nohayinje Kuse : interviewed by D.S.Yekela, Cala , 24 November, 2006.
- ¹⁶ Nxazonke (Askeaton) - CNC (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, File 3/327/17, ref 2/1/3/17, 7 February 1951.
- ¹⁷ Hygienia Kuse : interviewed, 24 November 2006.
- ¹⁸ Ntsebeza : *Democracy*, p.63.
- ¹⁹ Mundell (Magistrate, Cala) - CMTT, Cape Archives, File 66/27, 1 March 1945.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Magistrate (Cala : Xhalanga) - Chief Magistrate, Cape Archives, File 3/327/18, No. N1/1/5/18, 18 November, 1954.
- ²² Chief Magistrate(Wronsky) - Magistrate(Cala), Cape Archives, File No. 18/30, No. N1/1/5/18, 4 December, 1954.

²³ Ntsebeza : *Democracy*, p.136.

²⁴ N.H. Kuse, Interviewed, 24 November 2006

²⁵ Knof Solicitors-Private Secretary of the Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria Archives, 3 August 1956.

²⁶ C.B.Young's Memo – Eiselen, Pretoria Archives, Ref. No. 932) N.11/1/2, 26 April 1956.

²⁷ CMTT-SNA, Pretoria Archives, 3 August 1956.

²⁸ Magistrate (Xhalanga) - CMT (Mthatha), N1/1/5/11, Mthatha Archives, 2 February, 1956.

²⁹ Magistrate (Cala) - CMT(Mthatha), N1/1/5/11, 8 September, 1958.

³⁰ Ntsebeza : *Democracy*, p. 177.

³¹ Magistrate (Cala) - CMT (Mthatha), N1/1/5/11, 8 September, 1958.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Minutes of a meeting held at the Magistrate's Office (Cala), on the 27th February 1959 in connection with the Headmanship of Mnxe Location No.11 Xhalanga District, Cape Archives, No. 3/27/3/11, C.5. in File 42/27.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ H. M. Tsengiwe (Queenstown), Interviewed, 14 April 2007.

³⁹ N. Gobodo (Cala) Interviewed (telephonically) 20 February 2007.

⁴⁰ B.M.G. Tyeku (Cala), Interviewed (telephonically) 20 February 2007.

⁴¹ Hygienia Kuse : interviewed, 24 November, 2006.

⁴² Magistrate (Cala) -CMT (Mthatha), Cape Archives , N1/1/5/11, 8 September, 1958.

⁴³ Magistrate (Cala) - CMT(Mthatha) Cape Archives, No. 2/27/3/11, C.5 in File 42/27, 28 February 1959

⁴⁴ K.D. Matanzima (Qamata) – CMT(Mthatha) Cape Archives, 3/27/3/11, 28 February 1959

⁴⁵ P.Mayer:"The Tribal Elite " in *The New Elites* ed. Lloyd, p.28

⁴⁶ CMT(TD Ramsay) - KD Matanzima, 2/27/3/11, 9 March 1959

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ KD Matanzima (Qamata) - CMT(Mthatha) Cape Archives, 3/27/3/11, 28 February 1959.

⁴⁹ Ntsebeza : *Democracy*, , p. 133.

⁵⁰ Magistrate (Wronsley) (Cala/Xhalanga) - CMT (Mthatha), , Cape Archives, File Nos.3/27/2/1 and 3/27/3/20, N.1/1/2, 27August, 1958.

⁵¹ SNA –CMT(Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File Nos. 3/24/2/1 and 3/112/32, 7 May 1958.

⁵² SNA - Secretary to the Treasury, Pretoria Archives,File No.32/27, 19 April 1958.

⁵³ "Head Office Views About Certain Matters", Pretoria Archives, Young (n.d.)

⁵⁴ Report of the Nhlapo Commission:"Determination on Matanzima and Dalindyebo Paramountcies, p.34.

⁵⁵ Secretary, Bantu Administration and Development to the Chief Native Commissioner (Mthatha), Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, 8 June 1958

⁵⁶ Ibid.,

⁵⁷ SNA - CMTT, Pretoria Archives, File Nos. 3/24/2/1 and 3/112/32, 2 May 1958.

⁵⁸ SNA- the Chief Native Commissioner, File Nos. 3/24/2/1 and 3/112/32, 7 May 1958.

⁵⁹ CMT(Mthatha)T - the SNA, Pretoria Archives, 14 May 1958.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Native Commission (Lady Frere) - Chief Native Commissioner, N.1/1/2, Bisho Archives, 26 March 1955.

⁶² Chief Native Commissioner (King Williamstown) - SNA, 4 October, 1957.

⁶³ CNC (King Williamstown)-SNA (Pretoria) File 32/27, No. 1/1/3/1, Pretoria Archives, 4 November, 1957.

⁶⁴ CMTT - CNC (King William's Town), Bisho Archives, 16 January 1958.

⁶⁵ CMTT-SNA, (file no. 32/27), (N1/1/3/1 1/UTA) Pretoria archives, File 32/27, 3/10, 20 June 1953

⁶⁶ SNA-Chief Native Commissioner, Pretoria archives, File 32/27, 3 November 1955

⁶⁷ CNC (King William's Town – SNA, Pretoria archives, , File 32/27, 12 April 1955.

⁶⁸ SNA-CNC, Pretoria archives, , File 32/273, November 1955

⁶⁹ CNC-SNA (Pretoria) N.2/11/2, Pretoria archives, 27 September 1957

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² NC (Lady Frere(Glen Grey) - CNC (King Williamstown), Bisho Archives, N.11/1/2, 21 March 1956

⁷³ CMT(Mthatha) - CNC (King Williamstown) Cape Archives, 16 January 1958.

⁷⁴ NC (Lady Frere(Glen Grey) - CNC (King) N.1/1/2, Boshu Archives, 26 March 1955

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Hammond-Tooke : *The Tribes* , p. 36.

⁷⁷ NC (Lady Frere) - Acceptance of Bantu Authorities Act-Glen Grey District CNC (King) N.11/1/2, Cape Archives, 12 June 1956.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Tsotsi ; "Memoirs", p.108.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² NC (Lady Frere(Glen Grey) - CNC (King), Bisho Archives , N.1/1/2, 26 March 1955

⁸³ NC (Lady Frere)-CNC (King Williamstown) N. 11/1/2, File No. 7/23, Bisho Archives, 21 March 1956

⁸⁴ NC (Lady Frere) - CNC, Bisho Archives, N.1/1/2, 26 March 1955.

⁸⁵ Ibid. .

⁸⁶ Young - Chief Native Commissioner, Pretoria Archives, No.(32) N.2/11/2 of 27/9/57, 30 November 1957.

⁸⁷ Chief Native Commissioner (J.A.C. Van Heerden, Eastern Cape) - SNA, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, ref (32) N.11/1/2, 17 November 1958.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ CMT(Mthatha) - Chief Native Commissioner (King William's Town), Bisho Archives, 16 January 1958.

⁹¹ Native Commissioner (J.A.C. Van Heerden) - Bantu Authorities, Glen Grey, Bisho Archives, Pretoria Archives, File 32/27, ref (32) N.11/1/2, 17 November 1958.

⁹² CMT(Mthatha) - Chief Native Commissioner (King William's Town), Bisho Archives, 16 January 1958.

⁹³ SNA - Chief Native Commissioner, Bisho Archives, 6 October 1958.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Tsotsi, "The Memoirs", pp.108-109.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ G. Dennie : "One King, Two Burials : The Politics of Funerals in South Africa's Transkei" A. Donaldson, J. Segar, R. Southall (eds) : "Undoing Independence : Regionalism And Reincorporation Of Transkei Into South Africa", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* Vol., 11, No.2 (1992), p. 77.

⁹⁸ Evans : *Bureaucracy And Race*, p. 254.

⁹⁹ SNA - Chief Native Commissioner, Pretoria Archives, ref No. 3/24/2/1, 29 May 1959.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ CNC - USNA, Pretoria Archives, ref No. 3/24/2/1, 21 July 1958.

¹⁰² Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICS OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFS PUNCTUATE TRANSKEI'S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE, c.1960-1976.

INTRODUCTION

The attainment of self-government by the Transkei in 1963 signalled, for the Matanzimas and their few allies, the territory's commitment to political independence. The route to self-government had re-orientated the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship within the context of factional politics of chiefs which generally prevailed in the Transkei territory in the early sixties. These politics were reflected in the incompatible political philosophies of the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP) and its counterpart, the Democratic Party (DP). It is against this background that this chapter discusses the consequences of the BAA, and the political environment that the NP created for the abaThembu chiefs' political activity. An analysis of party politics in pre-independence Transkei portrays Matanzima as a puppet for the Department of Bantu Affairs to use in the execution of the Governor-General's political objectives. The chapter presents Matanzima not only as a major actor on the road to the self-governing Transkei but also as an intermediary for both the Governor-General and other compliant chiefs.

The chapter reveals through the discussion of the interaction between the government and Matanzima that his political activities were circumscribed by the Governor-General's dictates. While the government officials regularly complimented Matanzima on his 'engineered' compliance and tractability, they also did not hesitate to hint that his power base was NP secured. The chapter describes the NP government as using the short-sighted upstart, Matanzima, in fulfilling their long-term objectives. Matanzima is further shown to be blindly manipulating situations, individuals and groups to outwit Sabata and to invalidate the inequality between them.

The chapter also reveals that by 1963 Matanzima's jurisdictional area had been extended widely enough to make the joint Young-Ramsay's recommendation to confer

regional chieftainship on him as being fair in the case of someone deserving of a reward. Against this background Sabata protested that since

the early '60s my close associates have been subjected to arbitrary action by the government. I have been persecuted for my political convictions ... and have been ridiculed and humiliated by junior chiefs who were government supporters. I became King of the Thembus with seven districts. Because of my uncompromising stand against apartheid, I have ended with only three.¹

are presented as justifiable and legitimate. The chapter shows Matanzima who could not, before 1963, get what he wanted without pleading, emerging from the self-governing Transkei an empowered chief minister *cum* victor. He is shown using his status to launch the self-governing Transkei on the road to independence.

The year 1963 is also depicted as a turning point in Matanzima's power contest with Sabata who loses all except his paramountcy title, while the challenge of Matanzima's application for a similar title still looms. Against this background Sabata is shown fighting a multi-frontal battle to preserve the "autonomic" image of his paramountcy against the reformist traditionalist, Matanzima. The chapter demonstrates that when Matanzima is finally made the paramount chief he becomes the first ever to carry that title from the RHH of Mthikrakra.

The chapter also demonstrates that Sabata's defence of the abaThembu paramountcy was motivated mainly by his interest in championing traditional rights. Against this background Sabata is shown drifting towards progressive movements in order to secure sufficient support to tackle Matanzima on both local and national fronts.

The chapter portrays political parties as platforms which enabled both Sabata and Matanzima to fight over the abaThembu paramountcy. In this context Matanzima is shown using the advantage of his bureaucratic status to pursue Sabata both as a political opponent and as a rival in the contest over the paramountcy. Consequently the abaThembu paramountcy is shaken to the core as the major force in it, Sabata, is forced to direct his attention to other issues that he believes have a bearing on it.

The chapter finally demonstrates that Matanzima's unsolicited initiatives are at all times nurtured by self-interest and this obliges Sabata to adopt new strategies or adjust the old ones in order to respond appropriately without losing sight of his primary objective. It also reveals, through the NP's political support for Matanzima's collaboration, the lengths to which the DNA officials are prepared to go in order to advance Afrikaner interests, to bring about the desired outcomes, to combat 'undesirable changes'² and to prohibit 'changes that would run counter to the white interests'.³

THE LEGACY OF THE BANTU AUTHORITIES ACT IN ABATHEMBULAND

The implementation of the BAA in abaThembuland was characterised by concurrent and consequential incidents that portrayed it as anathema to certain communities, factions of various political affiliations and also organisations that had stakes in the developments and activities of the communities. The relentless application of the act eventually brought to a climax the polarisation within the ranks of abaThembu chiefs and in the process aligned the splinter groups with either Matanzima or Sabata, the two most important chiefs in abaThembuland at the time.

It thus becomes clear that the implementation of the act in abaThembuland was influenced by issues such as which benefits would accrue to those who aspired to greatness, without making clear what additional value those who were already at the top of the indigenous hierarchy would acquire. In the ambiguity and lack of transparency in issues that were so pertinent to the question of the 'Authorities' and chieftainship generally was located a political instrument that would slowly paralyse and eventually undo the unity of abaThembu chiefdom. Delius's remark that the co-option of chiefs into the administrative ranks lessened their dependence on their subjects and strengthened the hand of the Governor-General to whom they had now become accountable⁴ is relevant here. It explains that power was able to determine the chiefs' attitudes, responses and relationships. The administration would employ the power factor to diminish Sabata's territorially-based political authority, and, in this way, punish him for stalling the implementation of the government's legislation.

It must be noted that even the banishment of Sabata's 'Royal Council' was counterproductive because the rift between Matanzima and Sabata continued to widen during the absence of Sabata's advisers. Meanwhile Matanzima was trying every way to make life impossible to bear for all those that were associated with Sabata.

An interesting development of the early sixties was the birth in August 1960 of a resistance movement that was linked to the activities in abaThembuland of the Liberal Party (LP). The inception of the abaThembu movement took place at a meeting that was chaired by Anderson Joyi which was attended by several abaThembu chiefs. Wilmot Joyi, a migrant worker in Cape Town, and Anderson were arrested soon after the meeting.⁵ Chief Zwelihle Silimela was also arrested for his outspokenness against BAA, and he spent 1961 to 1963 in the Fort Glamorgan Prison of East London.⁶ It was in the wake of these arrests that NP Minister of Bantu Administration, De Wet Nel's office issued the Proclamation R400 which placed the Transkei under the state of emergency⁷ obviously to muzzle, inter alia, the infant resistance movement. Joyi recounted how he, for once, evaded his arrest by two White policemen that Kaiser Matanzima had set on him in 1961. He jumped through the window of his rondavel and once outside walked straight towards the Bhaziya forest. He came across two abaThembu women who were gathering dry cow-dung. They not only had wrapped double doeks around their heads but also wore multiple layers of traditional skirts and wraparound pinafores:

Quick thinking made me ask for a wraparound from one of them while the other parted with one of her doeks. I did not have to bend regularly as if I was picking cowdung *nkosazana*, thanks to my clubfoot. Carrying a reed-basket alongside these women saved me from arrest as the policemen walked behind us without taking any notice that I was the Anderson they were looking for, *uDelagubhe ngokwakhe*, the real Delaghubhe.⁸

Despite Matanzima's exaggerated claims that his influence was far reaching in the Cofimvaba District, the years immediately following the installation of 'Authorities' in the Cofimvaba District were characterised by rural restlessness and protests. For this reason the magistrate alerted the chief magistrate to the need to protect the amaNdungwana chief, Ndarala, the amaGcaleka headman, A. Mfebe and K. Mgudlwa which was evidence that the BAA supporters' lives were threatened. Clearly resistance

to the BAA had also aligned Matanzima with the enemies of the people as against Sabata, who was gradually being identified with the popular struggle. Matanzima suddenly became a target of anti-government movements like *Pogo*. This development persuaded him to check the activities of organisations he perceived as obstacles to the good work that he was personally helping accomplish on behalf of the government.

The activities of the LP, a visible feature of abaThembu politics in the early sixties, helped consolidate the resistance to and rejection of the BAA. Against this background must be understood how Lewis Majija's affiliation with *Pogo* led to his attack not in Ngcobo, his home town, but in a Cape Town township. When he eventually arrived at the offices of the LP he reported the loss of his position as headman 'for failing to enforce the culling of cattle and the fencing of communal land, imposed by the Bantu Authorities system'.⁹ About the same time correspondence from the Transkei commanding officer to the chief Bantu Affairs commissioner (Mthatha) revealed that Gilbert Hani of Lower Sabalele Location, also linked to *Pogo* activities, had stirred up trouble in the Cofimvaba District and was also found guilty by Matanzima's court for insulting Chief Matanzima in Cape Town in 1959.¹⁰

It was significant that in his 'Confidential Minute' to chief magistrate Jordaan, the Bantu Affairs commissioner (BAC) subtly criticised Chief Matanzima for his overweening presumption which reduced his personal judgement in controversial situations. Jordaan's remark was in response to Matanzima's request for 'bodyguards' for the Comfimvaba headmen, Nqabisile Mnqanqeni, of Location No.1 Ndlunkulu, Sixaba Sabata of Location No.2 Qwebeqwebe, and Jonginamba Deliwe of Location 3 Qitsi who falsely claimed that their huts had been burnt on 17 May 1961.¹¹ Jordaan commented that 'Headmen who are ... just with their followers are popular and will be guarded as it should be by their own followers'.¹² It became clear from Jordaan's comment that, for the government, the devolution of authority implied the cutting of costs and was therefore not compatible with incurring expenses that were likely to come about if some community leaders were not tactful or just in the discharge of their duties. Even though the arson report was found to be a fabrication by the investigating sergeant, Opperman,

Matanzima insisted that it showed Sabata's hand as a primary instigator. He put forward jealousy of the 'trouble free and smooth operation of the BAA'¹³ in the two Emigrant abaThembuland districts under his own jurisdiction as the reason for Sabata's surreptitious action. He also claimed that his appointment as chairman of the Transkei Territorial Authority was, for Sabata, 'a bitter pill to swallow'.¹⁴ In an obvious attempt to make his accusation about Sabata credible and also to demonise and expose him as a financial liability, Matanzima stated that 'Chief Sabata is in debt to the extent of over R4,000 and , as his own people in Umtata are very reluctant to assist him in paying his debts, he is trying to collect money in this District through his agent Attorney Canca'.¹⁵ The fabricated arson incident had a bearing on the Matanzima-Sabata power struggle because some people in the affected villages of Cofimvaba went to consult with Sabata to make him aware that Matanzima was victimising them for refusing to toe his line: 'the people who are complaining and who went to consult [with] Paramount Chief Sabata are men convicted in the Chief's (KD's) court and [their conviction] arose from incidents at a meeting held by Chief Matanzima'.¹⁶ The power struggle was exacerbated by the PAC-Poqo instigated sporadic outbreaks of popular violence in the Cofimvaba District.¹⁷

Vigne has also reinforced the fact that 'there was a corresponding campaign in and around Cape Town, where migrant workers were keenly aware of the situation across the Kei River. *Maziphathe* (Bantu Authorities) was hated and rejected, and the Government's men, the Matanzimas most of all, seen as self-aggrandizing tyrants'.¹⁸ Jordaan hinted to the chief magistrate about Matanzima's vulnerability: 'the only person in this District who needed protection is Chief K. D. Matanzima in the sense that if he is killed his death would be of great propaganda value to the anti-chiefs and the anti-Bantu Authority section'.¹⁹ Whilst expressing a view that Matanzima's security was the responsibility of his subjects Jordaan still suggested that he be supplied with a few well-armed guards 'who should be with him wherever he goes'.²⁰ Jordaan's comment was also explicit about how Matanzima's enthusiastic initiatives had, and were, continuing to turn him into to a chief whose authority was only effective because it was backed by the government. The BAC stated boldly that:

the trouble Chief KD Matanzima had in these locations is due to his own fault as he held a meeting in this area on his own accord. If the Bantu Affairs Commissioner had been present it is doubtful whether there would have been any trouble---Chief Matanzima sometimes overlooks the fact the pedestal he sits on was created by the influence the Bantu Affairs Commissioner has in the District and when he loses that support he is as disliked by his people as any other Chief in the Territories.²¹

Matanzima's execution of the measures that were resisted by his people had inevitably provoked hatred and rejection of his person from every quarter. His best bet to counter such negativity was by aligning himself with the government. Jordaan's subtle condemnation of Matanzima's government-inclined chieftainship, even though it served the civil interests well is shown, below, in his preference for a popular chieftainship.

A chief is a personal property of the people and, if they value their Chief sufficiently, they will protect him. Naturally to gain the confidence and loyalty of the people the Chief must at all times rule his people firmly and justly and they in turn will see to his well-being. Once a Chief feels that he is not dependent on the loyalty and respect of the people because he feels secure in the protection given to him by paid guards he will soon overreach himself and become a despot.²²

An observation of Matanzima's methods of operation with the government revealed that before 1963 the real power remained with the South African government. The implementation of the stabilisation measures in the Cofimvaba District also revealed Sabata as both an 'anti-government' and an obstructive force there. Jordaan had earlier reported to the CBAC on the bad influence that Sabata was spreading in Cofimvaba:

You are aware of the fact that when Chief K.D. Matanzima and I decided to have the District stabilized we held meetings and the residents unanimously agreed to our plans. As soon as Paramount Chief Sabata was informed of the progressive steps contemplated in this District he sent messengers to stir up trouble in the Indlunkulu-Qwebeqwebe areas and before long the residents started agitating against stabilization and a crisis was only averted through prompt action taken by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner and Chief K. D. Matanzima.²³

It was evident that Matanzima had obviously taken advantage of his 'on-site' residence and his rapport with the magistrate's office by unilaterally endorsing the implementation of the Reclamation measures. Sabata's apparent intervention, regarded as interference by Jordaan and Matanzima, was in fact, more of an assertion of his authority in a district

where his power hung by a very thin thread. It is significant that with the support of the BAC Sabata's influence was eradicated, leading Jordaan to report boastfully that once Sabata's influence in the Cofimvaba District was eliminated, the people accepted the Reclamation and Rehabilitation with whole-hearted co-operation. This was their proof that the Paramount Chief's interference was divisive and that without it not only was compliance with Matanzima's orders restored, but also value was added to the legislation. The community's fear of reprisals by the local chief who, true to Delius's testimony, relied less on his subjects than on the White officials, especially before 1963, was an important factor in the vacillating attitudes of the people to the objectionable schemes.

The measures Matanzima used to coerce the Cofimvaba District to co-operate with him in the implementation of government plans were employed for personal political gain, and provide evidence of his misuse, and the political degeneration of the office of chieftainship. Maloka's claim that 'the position of individual chiefs and headmen was strengthened *vis-à-vis* that of commoner's"²⁴ also applies here. It also exposes the corrupting effect that Matanzima's desperate attachment to personal vanity had on indigenous protocol and thus on the relationships of the abaThembu chiefs. Also, his self-professed belief in traditional governance and Xhosa nationalism about which he personally claimed

I was swaddled in it since the day of my birth. It has become my appointed task to develop it and to sponsor and foster it ---- I subscribe to tribalism and I owe allegiance to a tribe, ----I favour tribalism, because I honestly believe it to be the conserving power of my people²⁵

had an inherent contradiction. His personal reliance on colonial bureaucracy for both the undoing of Sabata's influence and the support of his personal authority compromised the ethos of his ancestral right. This was manifested in his apparent readiness to sacrifice the sacrosanct institution of chieftainship on the bureaucratic altar for personal prestige and individual material benefit.

Lodge has confirmed that wherever the rehabilitation exercise was vehemently resisted the Bantu Authorities were greeted with disfavour. He has attributed the fact that

Sabata's region was barely touched by the Betterment Schemes by mid-1961 to the vociferous condemnation and rejection of these measures at a meeting held at the Bumbane Great Place in 1961. Contrary to the developments in Matanzima's Emigrant abaThembuland, most locations endorsed all the government schemes under duress. The implementation of the rehabilitation scheme with effect from 1962, the concentration of holdings into smaller economic units with its resultant removal of people from their familiar lands to make room for sample irrigation schemes was bound to reduce many to pathetic landlessness and inevitably push them towards migrant labour.²⁶ Herein is to be found some of the factors that accounted for Matanzima's unpopularity in his home base, where he was perceived as an accomplice in orchestrating the sufferings of those he was supposed to help salvage from an unpleasant situation. Sabata, who obstructed the government schemes, scored points as a true national father. Matanzima blamed his unpopularity on Sabata's bad influence in the Cofimvaba District. The truth contained in Lodge's comment in the above context must be understood as an endorsement of Ntsebeza and Ndletyana's claim. Lodge has unequivocally stated that

In Tembuland proper, opposition to Bantu Authorities was influenced by the rivalry between the Paramount Chief, Sabata, and Matanzima, the regional chief of the Emigrant Tembu. Matanzima had gained government patronage as a result of his support for Bantu Authorities and he was busy expanding his area of jurisdiction.-----His ascendancy was feared by Sabata and this helped colour his attitudes to Bantu Authorities."²⁷

Over and above this, it cannot be denied that there was an extent to which the two chiefs were to blame for their progressive split, either from Sabata's justifiable insecurity or Matanzima's unbridled ambition.

What can be debated is the extent to which the BAA indirectly complemented the primacy of 'popular legitimacy' which, (though inferior in status to its counterpart, the bureaucratic chieftainship), was a 'non-negotiable' for indigenous authority, and reinforced what Delius has described as "wider recognition, more power, and better pay",²⁸ (all of which were 'bureaucratic incentives' designed to embellish a new brand of chieftainship). Chiefs had the option of either to retain customary chieftainship which,

though it bore popular legitimacy, had a political infrastructure that had been negatively impacted upon by the reclamation measures, or to settle for the 'official' customary institution which had the advantage of strength deriving from its capacity to confer political and material power from the unlimited socio-political resources at the Governor-General's disposal. It was this that compromised the NP government's politically expedient 'buffer' chieftainship which was newly used to authorise the legitimacy of the 'give and take' between the chiefs and their so-called benefactor, the DNA.

It is in this context that Sabata's condemnation of BAA and all it stood for, must be understood. He personally viewed the act as a weapon that Matanzima readily used to veto his authority in Emigrant abaThembuland. Sabata's standpoint conferred on him the image of an untainted popular hero and it was probably this 'political halo' which endeared him to the anti-legislation group. In the light of the impact of the BAA on the relationships between abaThembu chiefs it is not surprising that these political organisations found favour among a disgruntled populace resentful of the reclamation schemes. Significantly, Jordaan again hinted at the urgent need to have Matanzima guarded during his visits to Queenstown. The chief was considered to be in danger as a result of reports of a violent confrontation between Poqo insurgents and some of his headmen on the boundary of St Marks and Xhalanga Districts.²⁹ The measurement of hostility against Matanzima could be gauged from the following excerpt :

Information to hand is that the organization called Poqo who sent the men to this District have all taken an oath that chief K.D. Matanzima and his family, come what may, must be killed before Christmas 1962.³⁰

Chief Matanzima did not seem to relent as evident in what Lodge has described as his super control of the Transkeian Government which he owed to his enhanced powers as the Territorial Chief.³¹ Against this background must be seen the surfacing of a document sub-titled 'The Transkei and the Western Cape are the battle fields' which was linked to the African National Congress (ANC). It contained statements like

we must fight the culling down of stock, rehabilitation, landlessness, forced removals of people from their generations old homes, the permanent state of emergency in the Transkei, the tyranny people suffer under Verwoedian chiefs like Matanzima and the mass starvation of country dwellers----. No stone must

be left unturned in the massive propaganda campaign. All these must be linked up with-----the Pass Laws and Bantu Authorities.³²

Another section clearly stated that the Bantu Authorities was one of the focal points of the struggle of the ANC.³³ It becomes apparent that Sabata was a popular advocate within the political organisations against Matanzima who was regarded as a general enemy of the people. Against this background must be understood the earlier reports of attempts on Matanzima's life being Poqo-related, as can be seen in an isolated fray between Poqo insurgents and the Queenstown police.³⁴

How incidents like the above aggravated the feud between Matanzima and Sabata need not be overemphasised. Matanzima emerged a passionate supporter of the government's brand of chieftainship which he viewed as both a defensive weapon and a means to help him rise above others. Sabata appeared to view the paramount chieftainship, his natural right, as an office which needed no artificial reinforcement from any quarter. It was simply a legitimate tool to sustain chieftainship for, and in, its own right, and to uphold popular causes and national interests within the limits prescribed by indigenous protocol.

The Matanzima-Sabata power-struggle could also be seen in the attitudinal variations to chieftaincy in Xhalanga. Ntsebeza has revealed that the expressed support for Sabata was merely a technical weapon to exclude the overly visible Matanzima rather an embrace of chieftainship,

We agreed here in Cala that we should support Sabata. We didn't support him because we wanted chieftanship. We supported him because we did not want Matanzima.³⁵

Ironically the amaMfengu aversion to Matanzima drew the government behind him as he recommended and sometimes authorised deportations of his and the government's opponents among them. One of the orders he issued authorised the removal of Eugenia and Abel Mavandla Ntwana

In terms of Regulation 12 (1) (a) of Proclamation No. R.400 of 1960 I have, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the said Proclamation, to order you to remove with members of your household, livestock and movable property from

Emnxe Location, Xalanga District, to Keilands Location in St Marks District and to remain in the last mentioned location for an unspecified period.³⁶

The case of Glen Grey District also proved to be an ironic spectacle in that the revival of chieftainship there defied Beinart's claim that chieftainship is 'the means for bolstering-ethnic identities.'³⁷ This was seen when Matanzima took the initiative to resuscitate the amaHala chieftainship and then included himself in order to exclude Sabata in the Glen Grey politics of chieftainship.

The controversy surrounding the amaGcina chieftainship also seemed to work in the favour of both Matanzima and the government. The amaGcina chieftainship was held by Ngqungqushe temporarily, but was contested by Gwebindlala Mhlontlo of *iXhiba* House against the identified candidature of Zwelixelile Mpangele. The perceived indifference of Sabata to the matter was conveniently blamed in some quarters. The Paramount Chief's remark that 'I am not blind to the fact that someone has come into your midst and sowed seeds of dispute [obviously referring, with good reason, to Matanzima]. The custom as I see it favours Mpangele'³⁸ was significant for the politics of chieftainship in the region because it hinted at the vulnerability of Sabata's paramountcy. Whilst Sabata's active input in the contested chieftainship was apparently desperately sought after, there is lack of clarity as to the genuine motives for wanting his involvement. It must be presumed that those factions who preferred Sabata wanted him to stamp his influence on the region and in this way outwit Matanzima who was determined to preempt his paramountcy on the basis of territorial aggrandisement. It is, however, doubtful if Matanzima would have promoted anyone whose prospective chieftainship was recommended by Sabata. It is also unlikely that the involvement of the legitimate paramountcy whose 'centrality' and universality were being challenged by Matanzima's application for the same status was drawn into the wrangle for the sake of observing protocol. Specific incidents and different strategies were used by parties on both sides to continue the power struggle for the mastery of Glen Grey. In the end Matanzima's manoeuvres yielded the desired result when the amaGcina supposedly voluntarily took up the question of identifying Zwelixelile Mpangele as the rightful chief for their sub-chiefdom. Though Zwelixelile's identification as the legitimate choice seemed to be quite

popular in certain circles, the fact that Ngqungqushe Vulindlela and Gwebindlala Mhlontlo were claimants to the same chieftainship complicated the problem and caused Sabata to shilly-shally.³⁹ Sabata's indecisiveness again gave Matanzima a golden opportunity to intervene as an interested arbiter in the resolution of the controversial chieftainship of the Glen Grey amaGcina. Zwelixelile's supporters perceived Sabata's stalling as evidence of weakness and political incompetence. This thinking, as inauspicious as it was for the political fortunes of Sabata later drew the amaGcina chief-in-waiting, Zwelixelile, to Matanzima's side. In his testimony Zwelixelile praised Matanzima for his decisiveness as he described him as a worthy overlord:

That I have seen with my own eyes that Chief KD Matanzima as he was installing Ngqungqushe he---is the right and proper Chief to install me and remove Ngqungqushe.----In consultation with my Headmen and people it was decided that I should come to the Chief in Qamata to take this matter up. Even before the eyes of the Government I know that Chief KD Matanzima is the proper Chief to take this matter up.---As I have seen with my own eyes that I should pay allegiance to Chief KD Matanzima I promise that I will still ever pay allegiance to Chief KD Matanzima.⁴⁰

Zwelihle's preference to have his chieftainship endorsed by Matanzima seemed to be a tacit acknowledgement of Matanzima's super autocratic power. Matanzima would have no difficulty in finding an excuse to challenge it, were it sanctioned by Sabata, his political rival in the Glen Grey District. Zwelihle could have known of Matanzima's potential to frustrate Ngqungqushe Vulindlela's removal should Matanzima not play a role sanctioning his chieftainship of the amaGcina.

Stewart Zote and William Mayongo also endorsed Chief Matanzima as 'a chief like Chief Jonguhlanga', saying, further, that they paid allegiance to Chief Matanzima.⁴¹ Mayongo's indication of their intention to approach the BAC of Lady Frere to clear the way for Matanzima's visit to their district⁴² was a promise of a free and safe passage for Matanzima and a slight to Sabata's paramountcy. Whilst Matanzima was not likely to lose anything, even if Ngqungqushe had continued as amaGcina chief, Zwelixelile's pledge implied a lifetime alliance with his prospective overlord. At the same time Zote's remark explicitly handed the paramountcy to Matanzima, while Mayongo's implied that, as residents of Glen Grey, their initiative would aid Matanzima in accessing the area.

Further, Mayongo suggested that the BAC's approval of Matanzima's visit implied that he was the dispenser of 'official customary law'⁴³ in the Lady Frere District.

DALIWONGA MATANZIMA APPLIES FOR PARAMOUNT CHIEFTAINSHIP

In April 1962 K.D. Matanzima submitted an application to the BAC for his recognition as paramount chief of Emigrant Thembuland. The Emigrant abaThembuland Regional Authority was said to have met and to have adopted a resolution which was subsequently endorsed on the same day by the Qamata Tribal Authority at its meeting. The resolution read:

This authority resolves that the Government be respectfully requested to appoint Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, Permanent Head of the Emigrant Tembula Regional Authority, as Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembula in terms of Section 102 of Proclamation No.180 of 1956, as amended.⁴⁴

Specific reasons were put forward in support of the application to divide the abaThembu paramountcy. The first of these related to the historical split of 1865 which was led by Rhaxothi, the first bearer of the Matanzima name. Another reason was to create a hierarchical gap between the Emigrant abaThembuland chieftainship's status and others considered junior to it. The proposal, if approved and executed, would rank Matanzima above the others and, in so doing, make him qualify for a title befitting a higher position, one that would equate him to, and therefore compete with, Sabata, the natural holder of the most senior chieftainship in all abaThembuland. Matanzima's case had no precedent in the history of the abaThembu chieftainship. The statement that it was not possible to distinguish the statuses of the chiefs Kaulele Mgudlwa and Zwelibanzi Ndarala from Daliwonga Matanzima's 'unless the status of the paramouncy is conferred upon Chief Matanzima'⁴⁵ did not in anyway address the question of distinguishing the status of paramount chief Sabata from that of his immediate subordinate, Matanzima. Matanzima's paramountcy would be a unique creation, one in which the paramountcy would be the symbolic pinnacle of a hierarchical structure, justifiable not on the basis of indigenous principles but rather by the artificial multiplication of junior chieftainships.

The tendency of undermining customary dictates was now becoming a dominant feature of the chieftainship among the abaThembu in the pre-independence Transkei: in the upgrading of a junior chief to the crown status there was concomitantly a belittling, a technical downgrading, of Sabata's paramountcy. The further reference to the 'diametrical opposition' to, and incompatibility of, the policy followed by Sabata with 'that followed by Matanzima and his people of Emigrant Tembuland in relation to the Government of the Republic of South Africa'"⁴⁶ was a very convenient argument for the advancement of the political and personal interests of both Matanzima and the government at that point in time. The government had to consider the possibility of the people of Emigrant Tembuland voluntarily opting out of the resolutions 'passed at Chief Sabata's meetings'.⁴⁷ The attitudes of Sabata and Matanzima, the way they both handled their chieftom's traditional affairs and their general social dispositions towards each other were also put forward as excuses for sub-dividing the abaThembu paramountcy for the good of the abaThembu nation. The resolution concluded by clearly stating that the execution of the recommendations of the signatories would be in accordance with the provisions of native laws and custom.

The timing of the petition for Matanzima's paramountcy was propitious when viewed from the perspective of the National Party government's plans for the reserves. Against this background must be understood the call, from a Matanzima-endorsed mThembu Chief, Manzezulu, to have the Glen Grey District included in the debates about the granting of self-government to the Transkei. The significance of this call from the Glen Grey District, a region where Matanzima had recently resuscitated the chieftainships of amaHala and amaGcina, was that it was an implicit rejection of Paramount Chief Sabata. The community thus technically accepted Matanzima and in so doing anticipated the evolution of a new brand of counter-paramountcy within the House of Mthikrakra.

ON THE EVE OF SELF - GOVERNMENT

The operation of the BAA in practice was reflected in a system of local government which culminated in a territorial authority 'with a measure of jurisdiction' over Transkei

as a whole. This was taken a step further with the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which provided the constitutional machinery for progress towards autonomy as a prelude to full independence.⁴⁸ In the context of the above developments Carter et al have emphasised the political importance of Maninjwa's unexpected and abrupt motion of April 1961. Maninjwa called upon the South African government to 'declare the Transkeian Territories as a whole a self-governing state under the control of the Bantu people'.⁴⁹ The motion, which came from the opposition benches, sparked a lively debate among chiefs and headmen of different political viewpoints. While they immediately pressurized the government into fulfilling its promise of politically advancing Blacks as a separate entity, it soon emerged that the participants in the debate interpreted the government's promises differently. Such expectations were peculiar to party political viewpoints. Sabata and Victor Poto, the paramount chiefs of the abaThembu and the western amaMpondo respectively, believed that an ideal freedom for the Transkeians would dispense with magisterial rule without necessarily endorsing the 'chief-centred' apartheid regime. This system to them would symbolize the 'devolution of genuine authority to Africans in the reserves'.⁵⁰

The government was less inclined to entertain any devolution of power that would compete with, rather than complement, apartheid. The fact that the political initiative had originated with the erstwhile opponents of the BAA seemed like a threat to the apartheid structure, the core of which was a chief-centred political dominance. The NP government needed time to speculate about the probable consequences of Maninjwa's motion because good news from the opponents' camp was not necessarily a guarantee of the success of its political plan for the Transkei. It is against this background that the debate was adjourned soon after an opportune conversation between Matanzima, Hans Abraham, the Mthatha ambassador of the Union Cabinet and two White Transkei government officials. The sequel to the well-timed conversation was that Matanzima, the presiding officer, adjourned the debate for an indefinite period. The appointment of a Recess Committee to study the implications of conferring 'self-government' on the Transkei must be seen as a political stratagem, the purpose of which was to plug the possible leaks in the envisaged devolution of such power to make sure that it would

endorse the 'unequivocal rejection of the policy of a multiracial society'.⁵¹ The adjournment and the Recess Committee had indeed served the purpose of 'cooking' the result to the satisfaction of the patrons of 'absolute' apartheid.

That the thinking of the NP government was largely about calming international animosity towards South Africa and creating compliant, dependent territories is implicit in Verwoerd's announcement of 1962:

This should strongly counteract the international animosity and suspicion which have such a detrimental effect on our economy. For this reason it will pay us to incur such expenditure. It is also worth a great deal to us if we can create for ourselves peaceful neighbours [obviously in the homelands]... who will not look to others for assistance.⁵²

Matanzima's steamrolling of the Committee's report through the Transkei Territorial Assembly must be understood against the background of Verwoerd's announcement and subsequent endorsement of 'an apartheid-style constitution which incorporated chieftaincy more firmly in the state apparatus while excluding multiracial citizenship for a self-governing Transkei'.⁵³ Popular rejection of the proposed constitution by the abaThembu and amaMpondo did not elicit any tolerance of their views.⁵⁴ The rejection of the proposed constitution by a faction that had Sabata at its centre portrayed the Transkei's road to self-government as an additional divisive factor in the Sabata-Matanzima power struggle. Self-government was subsequently conferred on the Transkei Territory in terms of the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963. At the time the Transkei consisted of nine regional authorities which included the Dalindyebo Regional Authority area. The Dalindyebo region in turn comprised the districts of Ngcobo, Mqanduli, Mthatha and the Emigrant abaThembuland Regional Authority which was made up of St. Marks and Xalanga. At this time Matanzima was merely a chairman of Emigrant abaThembuland, obviously waiting for the outcome of his application to be officially recognized as paramount chief of a subdivision of abaThembuland.⁵⁵

RESPONSES OF ABATHEMBU CHIEFS TO THE POLITICS OF TRANSKEI'S SELF-GOVERNMENT

As soon as the self-government of the Transkei was accomplished, certain issues surfaced and these further entrenched the division between Matanzima and Sabata. Questions of vital importance arose. These were related to the popular endorsement of the Transkei Territory's independence; the final verdict on the application for conferment of paramountcy on Matanzima; the determination of a 'legitimate' home for the Glen-Grey District abaThembu and Transkei's land consolidation'. Matanzima confirmed that the resolution of the land issue was a pre-condition to independence.

The formation of political parties, another feature of the political activity of the first twelve months in a self-governing Transkei, was characterised by dissension. The specific events around the formation of parties became pointers to Matanzima's evolving political career, albeit that it was in the context of chieftainship at the time. In this context must be understood the formation, on 7 February 1964, at Chief Victor Poto's initiative, of the Democratic Party (DP). The mission of this political party was to oppose the Matanzima government's⁵⁶ endorsement of separate development, and to campaign for a central role for chiefs in political affairs.⁵⁷ Seven days later Matanzima responded to Poto's political party with the formation of a government party, the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP). After the establishment of the parties, the DP's leadership, Poto, Sabata and Knowledge Guzana met with Steytler of the Progressive Party, and forged an understanding between the two parties. The Progressive Party's patronage of the DP⁵⁸ supplemented that of LP which had infiltrated Transkeian politics with Sabata's assistance. Vigne has confirmed that Sabata himself remained the LP's 'staunchest ally in four years of intense action that were to follow and the Party was, through Sabata, to play a major role in important [political] developments already beginning'⁵⁹ in the Transkei political landscape.

After self-government a critical issue was of the movement towards Transkeian independence. This would be determined logically by the votes received at the polls for the TNIP and its opposition during the first year of Transkei's self-government. As a

background to this was the aggressive and competitive campaigns of the party leaderships which became a visible feature of pre-independence politics. The ruling party's enthusiasm in the run-up to the elections was also evident between party leaders. Furthermore, the DP was receptive to the advice from the Progressives and the LP, as claimed by Carter.⁶⁰ This definitely posed a threat to the South African Government and the Transkei Chief Minister's authority, and in this way further prejudiced the DP's political image. The raid of temporary residence of Poto Ndamase's son, Chief Tutor Nyangilizwe in Langa Township, occurred in this context. The fact that the police sergeant apologised,⁶¹ after they had removed, and later returned, a copy of the Constitution of the DP,⁶² did not erase the perception that there was collusion between the TNIP's leader, Matanzima, and the apartheid government. Worse still, the home, car and offices of Guzana, the National Chairman of the DP, and the home of Alfeus Zulu, the Mthatha Anglican Bishop, had earlier been raided.⁶³ It thus became clear that opposition to Matanzima's political dispensation for the Transkei was regarded as resistance to the apartheid South Africa's bargaining strategy. Sabata's refusal to rally behind Matanzima portrayed him as his arch-rival. The disagreement between the two cousins on the future political status of the Transkei gave the chief minister an unfair advantage over Sabata. Matanzima's acquisition of a senior political position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, thanks to the Republican Government's support for his tactics, made it clear that he could use his political rank to manoeuvre and facilitate the upgrade of his junior chieftainship.

For the abaThembu chieftainship the implicit historical significance of this situation was that if Matanzima's gamble were to succeed he would have accumulated personal and official power as a political figure. He would, however, have lost, in return, a natural and vital element of abaThembu chiefly power which it was not his prerogative to dispose of. Sabata was thus forced to continue with his multi-frontal fight to prevent the decentralisation of his paramountcy office, and to forestall Matanzima's attempt to use his artificially inflated chieftainship as a generator to prop up his political rise in the Transkei's territorial politics. The rationale behind this preventive action was that, once

Matanzima's political rank was reinforced, it would be easy for him to authorise his paramountcy.

That justification for Sabata's concerns was also evidenced by the fact that the political activity of the DP was hampered by financial constraints.⁶⁴ Reverend Rajuili, the Johannesburg branch vice-chairman who already had strong links with the Transvaal executive committee of the Progressive Party⁶⁵ complained that '[w]e have to make all arrangements ourselves. Unlike the Transkeian Government, we do not have the backing of the South African Government.'⁶⁶

At this very time Matanzima was busy selling his 'Bantustan strategy' through his vocal appeals to the outside world not to condemn a system that would 'ultimately liberate the Bantu people of South Africa'.⁶⁷ Whilst he boasted that the Transkei had a constitution which had features of both 'traditional leadership and Western democracy' he also took a swipe at the so-called 'leftists' 'who appear to see nothing good in our own traditions [despite the fact that] we have been able to synchronise these two methods.'⁶⁸ The 'leftists' were of course the Progressives and Liberals, and Matanzima's remark explained the reasoning behind the financial squeeze on the opposition. He enticed the chiefs to buy into his scheme and criticised the leaders who wanted to remove the whole body of chiefs to the upper house (obviously alluding to Poto's senatorial idea) where they would not contribute to the legislative deliberations and measures. Matanzima overemphasised the role of chiefs in developing the political awareness of people and went so far as to say that 'once we are convinced that the people no more want their chiefs to occupy positions of leadership, we shall give way to the will of the people'.⁶⁹ He said, further, that in Transkei, 'we have avoided putting the cart before the horse',⁷⁰ implying that in entrusting the chiefs with leadership his government was adhering to the proper order of doing things. The fact that he had assumed the spokesman's prerogative and was prescribing the role of chiefs in the Transkei was a self-assumed position which automatically conferred on him a rank superior to that of Sabata, which would, in turn, enable him to be the architect of his personal brand of chieftainship.

Sabata, in his own way, did not make Matanzima's political life easy. He backed the LP's policy⁷¹ which reinforced his oppositional stand. He always appeared in the big city centres in the company of some Progressives and LP members. Vigne has alluded to a tumultuous welcome which Sabata received from abaThembu and other people in Johannesburg when he appeared with Ann Tobias of the LP. At the same meeting Sabata re-iterated thus his political principle on behalf of abaThembu '[we] seek freedom from laws which separate us from our fellow South Africans. We seek a state in which black and white can live and work together in mutual respect'.⁷² The *Star* reported that

Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, ruler of the large Tembu nation in the Transkei and a prominent figure in the Opposition Democratic Party, said today that the policy of the Liberal Party – one man, one vote – makes the most appeal to me and to many other Africans.⁷³

Sabata's comment was in response to a statement in which Sir de Villiers Graaff rejected with contempt 'one man, one vote – over our dead body'.⁷⁴ Sabata accused Sir de Villiers Graaff of having no ideas of his own, saying that he 'improved upon the ideas of the Nationalist Party'.⁷⁵ He summed up by saying 'Africans would continue to clamour for direct representation in Parliament and not representation by Europeans, as suggested by Sir de Villiers Graaff'.⁷⁶

The report about the plans of the DP leadership to address racially mixed gatherings in the large cities as a way of marketing their manifesto could only aggravate the party political tensions and provoke the Republican Government. The government viewed the tour as a threat to its interests, as it gave him an opportunity to connect with Liberals and the Progressives.⁷⁷ Verwoerd's threat that "it is no secret that the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party have a great deal to do with Paramount Chief Poto and his Party"⁷⁸ must be seen as evidence of the insecurities of the South African government and the TNIP. A few days later, Matanzima attributed peace and tranquillity in the Transkei territory to the advent of the policy of separate development which

the people of the Transkei accepted and requested that it be applied....the Republican Government never imposed it on us, we asked for it because it is the

only realistic way of bringing about equality among all races in South Africa on the basis of parallel development.⁷⁹

Earlier, a D.E. Mtsamane of Mqanduli District sent the LP's policy booklet entitled 'Non-racial Democracy' to J. B. Vorster. In a covering letter Mtsamane warned of the danger that the activities of the LP continued to pose to the South African government : 'your enemy is the Liberal Party which had made a strong attack to break down the Government in order to start its own government here.....the white agitators had combined with Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo'.⁸⁰

While Matanzima was at pains to counter Sabata's undesirable influence by endorsing the policy of 'separate' development there came an unexpected and, perhaps, ominous attack on his ill-conceived and blind compliance with NP stratagems. Ronald Nkopo, the TNIP's official 'ambassador' in Johannesburg made disparaging remarks about Matanzima, namely 'Chief Matanzima's not a politician but a Government employed chief. He prefers the people to respect him as a traditional chief than to fight and champion the causes of the 'underdog' or his electorate'.⁸¹ Nkopo was questioning the value that chieftainship, Matanzima's so-called 'sacred' base, was adding to the national struggle. His subtle condemnation of his party leader's political naivety was bound to fan the feuding in the ranks of abaThembu chiefs. It inadvertently portrayed Sabata as a political celebrity because of his political alignment with popular and national causes. It also discredited those who championed the idea of pledging more power to the chiefs if they backed the TNIP's leader in his crusade to promote traditional rather than popular 'sovereignty'. Nkopo further revealed the antipathy of Matanzima's presumed (Johannesburg) constituency to his ambassadorial mission, saying that 'the people will not support him because he is not interested in their struggles for human dignity'.⁸² He also gave an account of an instance when Matanzima, on a recent visit to sell his policy in Johannesburg privately 'asked him to warn people not to attempt to shake his hand because he would not reciprocate'.⁸³ Nkopo's remarks, especially his description of 'Black apartheid', indicated his support for the DP's policy of multi-racialism in Johannesburg, and in this way inevitably further pitted Matanzima against the Sabata-Poto's opposition party. Almost a month later the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that

Matanzima had sacked 'two party men on the Rand' and Nkopo was one of these. His major sin was his claim that urban dwellers 'were inclining towards the multiracial policy of Chief Victor Poto'.⁸⁴ Kotze has confirmed that 'repeated flouting of party directives by the Witwatersrand and Western Cape regional committees of the TNIP always led to the dismissal from office'⁸⁵ and cited Nkopo as one of the victims.⁸⁶

Nkopo's remarks had clearly provoked Matanzima. He struck back at the DP when his government introduced an 'emergency regulation' embodied in the Proclamation 400 of 1960. The DP complained, perhaps with good reason that, the emergency regulation was being used to break down their structures and efficacy since the passage of the law coincided with the DP Congress. When a protest about the Proclamation was made to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Matanzima justified it on the grounds that it was intended to 'protect the Transkei from the infiltration of agitators'.⁸⁷ The DP's claim that it was being victimised was proved correct in Matanzima's threats 'to ban the Democratic Party, and his allegations that it was a bedfellow of Communism'⁸⁸ all of which were perceived by the opposition members as intimidatory. Matanzima seemed to be echoing the claims of Greyling, a Ventersdorp MP, who condemned the LP's activity in the Transkei and stated further, that they were utilising the Communist weapons to undermine the regional authority of the Republican Government.⁸⁹ This was a subtle suggestion that a self-governing Transkei was no different from a South African colony.

Against the background of the threat that the Republican government and Matanzima perceived in the leftists' activities there surfaced a pressing need to fill-in the parliamentary seat of Salakuphathwa Sarhili.⁹⁰ The test of strength would be exhibited in the envisaged election of 25 November 1964 in Gcalekaland (Elliotdale, Willowvale, Centani and Dutywa).⁹¹ This, the first election since the formation of political parties, would gauge the political influence of party leadership in the region of the contested seat.⁹² The *RDM* report gave an idea of the political importance of the event, 'the Gcalekaland result can influence profoundly not only the future course of the Transkei but events in the Republic as a whole'.⁹³ This statement unequivocally demonstrated

the interconnectedness between the politics of the abaThembu chieftainships and that of the Republican government. The TNIP's victory would be a set-back for the DP and a rejection of the values of the LP whose operations in the Dalindyebo region had been sanctioned by Sabata in defiance of the political interests of both the South African Government and their middleman, Matanzima. Proof that the activities of the LP in the Transkei were anathema to Matanzima was evident in his remark that Vigne was 'a wolf in sheepskin...working for his own people who wish to maintain white domination over us on the pretext that he is working for equality in a multiracial state'.⁹⁴ The amaGcaleka's endorsement of either Poto's or Matanzima's territorial leadership through their votes would be a confirmation as to whether they wanted closer association, or not, with the 'white man', as reflected in the multiracialism policy championed by Poto who represented 'a platform that stood simply for democratic government, in which all the people of the Transkei-Black-White-Coloured groups would share'.⁹⁵ Sabata also endorsed the DP's political philosophy when he declared that 'we seek a state in which the colour of a man's skin plays no part in his civic rights'.⁹⁶

Matanzima's counterproposal was for an 'all-Black Transkei', in which Whites would not, at any point in future, be guaranteed rights of citizenship. He also consolidated the chiefs behind him and instilled in them the fear that a DP-led government would relegate them to political obscurity and ultimately destroy the institution of chieftainship.⁹⁷ The jockeying for dominance of the Transkeian political terrain between the Poto and Matanzima factions quickly translated into a Thembu versus Mpondo duel. Further, the prevailing tension within the ranks of abaThembu chiefs over the question of their paramountcy turned their kingdom into a powerhouse that fuelled the territorial political engagements. The packages that each party promised to deliver to the chiefs appeared to be a decisive factor in determining both the political leadership and future of Transkei governance. Matanzima's betting on chieftainship seemed to be the best option at a time when power hitherto vested in that institution could not compete with what the state conferred on ordinary citizens. Those chiefs who had survived the battering that came with the non-indigenous provisions of the BAA were poised to amass more political strength should they buy into Matanzima's latest personal strategy.

He appealed to individual chiefs' sentiments, and challenged and interrogated all personal ambitions other than his own. His repeated warnings in his election manifesto that in Poto's government 'the chiefs would be kicked out'⁹⁸ must be analysed within the context of Sabata becoming an indirect political threat if the DP won the majority seats in Gcalekaland.

The long-standing institutional problems that had been inherent feature in abaThembu chieftainship in pre-independence Transkei were suddenly exacerbated by a peripheral power struggle. The institutional chieftainship had hitherto been plagued by forces from without and within and now it found itself having to allow its members' to be informed by either their self-interest or pro-democratic viewpoints. Rider's explanation of the different approaches of Matanzima and Poto simplifies it all:

Matanzima went for the backing of the chiefs and entrenchment of their powers. The appeal of Poto, as the father figure and man of the people that his lieutenants represented him to be, was mainly to the elected representatives.⁹⁹

Matanzima, who had earlier predicted with confidence that the DP would lose the Gcalekaland by-election, had gone so far as to call 'on the party he thought would lose to resign because----it clearly did not enjoy the confidence of the people'.¹⁰⁰ He was, of course, proved wrong. The DP victory in the Gcalekaland elections gave Poto an opportunity to reformulate Matanzima's words by stating that the victory for the Democratic Party was 'clearly a vote of complete confidence in our policy of multi-racialism and democracy. By the same token, the by-election showed only too obviously that the people of the Transkei reject separate development and everything it stands for'.¹⁰¹

Hans Abraham found reasons for the DP's victory in Gcalekaland, in the 'leftists' exploitation of the 'Bantu's' antipathy towards the Government's policy of rehabilitation'.¹⁰² Clearly, the partisan role of the South African government was crucial in both the struggle for power within the House of Mthikrakra as well as in the territorial struggle for the leadership of the Transkei. Whilst the victory came as a blow to the TNIP leader¹⁰³ Carter confirmed that Poto's elation with the election results drove him

to pronounce his status as a political 'match *cum* equal' to his political rival. He called on Matanzima and his cabinet to resign as he reiterated that 'the election results will...also give the Democratic Party the impetus it needs to topple the Transkei Government if it fails to resign'.¹⁰⁴

Poto's order, coming as it did from the DP ranks of Sabata, and supposing it was to be obeyed by the Chief Minister, would place the abaThembu Paramount Chief in a position of great moral strength, and in that way possibly frustrate Matanzima's application for paramountcy. It thus emerged that with the outcome of the election, Gcalekaland had become a battleground of contending political factions, and thus indirectly a force in the issues that divided territorial chiefs, generally, and abaThembu chiefs, in particular, between the Matanzima and Sabata blocs.

To further entice the chiefs while consolidating his grip on them as his support base, Matanzima announced in December of 1964 'big salary increases for some chiefs and all headmen. These increases would also apply to chiefs who were not members of the Legislative Assembly'.¹⁰⁵ Herein one sees Matanzima's advantage over his political adversaries in the authority he was now exercising in the distribution of resources from the Governor-General's office. Four months later he received a pat on the back for his continuous good work for the government. This was when he was presented with a horse by De Wet Nel, at the occasion of the centenary celebrations marking the political transfer of the Glen Grey abaThembu to the Transkei. While making the presentation the minister acknowledged that he knew Chief Matanzima to be an excellent horseman'.¹⁰⁶ The horse was perhaps an appropriate gift for a 'political shepherd', Matanzima, who was engaged in herding the Glen Grey abaThembu back to their 'so-called' home. De Wet Nel also announced the government contribution of R400,000 towards the construction of Cofimvaba Hospital which would be run by the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk.¹⁰⁷ Gestures like this symbolized material resources that would continue to draw the Cofimvaba community closer and closer to Matanzima while crippling Sabata's national fatherhood.

Eight months later, however, Matanzima's efforts to guarantee himself the chiefs' votes were together with the amaGcalekaland defeat, politically challenged by TNIP losses in Mzimkhulu and amaMfenguland'.¹⁰⁸ The TNIP's vigorous election campaign which was not matched by campaigning of similar strength from the DP must be seen in the light of the above. The NP's partisanship of the Matanzima cause was evident in the provisions that were made to enable the 'thousands' of voters living far away from home to vote. Employers were asked to allow their voter-employees time off to vote at the Reef polling stations which were supposed to open from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. on 24 August. Government patronage of the kind mentioned above, gave credence to Rajuili's earlier complaint of the systematic exclusion of the DP from State benefits. Furthermore, Matanzima's insistence that the chiefs had him to thank for their enhanced political status which qualified them for seats in the Legislative House¹⁰⁹ flew in the face of his king and cousin, Sabata, who shared Poto's sentiments. In another context Kotze plays down Matanzima's self-praise in his claim that the chiefs would not dare contradict the South African government. It is obvious that their rallying behind Matanzima had more to do with their determination to bow to that government's interests than to reward him for the benefits he had secured for them, for 'this attitude [of avoiding the collision course with the government] accounted for some support from the chiefs for Matanzima who was regarded as pro-government in the mid-sixties'.¹¹⁰ True to Laurence's statement, the fact that the chiefs were paid by the government made them susceptible to its wishes because it had the power to depose them.¹¹¹ Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra has claimed that Sabata, whose accession to power had not been smooth and who did not have Matanzima's political leverage, spent many nights on *Intaba kaMantentente*—Mount Mantentente - in Tyhalarha. He had installed Chief Vululwandle Mthikrakra to act for him while he was actively involved in government politics.¹¹²

SELF-GOVERNING TRANSKEI SANCTIONS THE INAUGURATION OF A SECOND PARAMOUNTCY IN THE HOUSE OF MTHIKRAKRA

When Matanzima applied for recognition as paramount chief in April 1962 his original territory had already been augmented to include the whole of Cofimvaba and the

Xhalanga-Glen Grey districts. Matanzima's territory had been drastically increased and this eventually resulted in the re-demarcation and adjustment of Sabata's territorial boundaries. The timing of the application validates Mda's claim of a connection between territorial size and remuneration as complementary factors in Matanzima's ascendancy to paramountcy. The recommendations of Bruce Young which were in favour of granting Matanzima the status of paramountcy over Western abaThembuland comprising St. Marks and Xhalanga districts¹¹³ still applied in May 1965 when the paramountcy petition surfaced after three years' dormancy. The RDM correspondent reported thus:

A lifelong ambition of the Transkei Chief Minister, Kaiser Matanzima's ascendancy to paramount chieftainship is now almost certainly around the corner. The Transkei Legislative Assembly will be asked to confer on Chief Matanzima the title of Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembuland.¹¹⁴

Robert Msengana, an elected member from Emigrant abaThembuland, gave notice of a motion in terms of the Transkei Constitution Act, calling on the Legislative Assembly to create a paramount chieftaincy for Emigrant abaThembuland and recommended to the State President that the title be conferred on Chief Matanzima.¹¹⁵ The *Star* correspondent also reported on the circumstances surrounding the introduction of the motion:

by a Government representative, R. B. Msengana, of the Emigrant abaThembuland, a region ruled by the Chief Minister *cum* Minister of Finance, asking that the Paramount chieftainship and sub-chieftainship be conferred on the brothers, K.D. Matanzima and G.M.M. Matanzima respectively.¹¹⁶

Their motion sparked an unprecedented and heated debate because Matanzima's area of jurisdiction was a sub-region of Sabata's greater abaThembuland. The Deputy-Leader of the Opposition, K.N. Guzana, immediately moved an amendment saying that the designation of the Chief Minister as a Paramount Chief in his region, and the other designations mentioned in the motion, should be referred to Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of Tembuland.¹¹⁷ The controversy surrounding Matanzima's paramountcy as well as the subsequent debates about it tended to divide not only the abaThembu chieftainship but Transkeian territorial chieftainship generally. Chief D.D.P. Ndamase, an opposition party member from Western amaMpondoland (Ngqeleni District) warned that

bloodshed might follow the elevation of the Transkei Chief Minister....to the paramountcy over emigrant Tembuland unless the correct procedure was adoptedbecause it is against the procedure of African law and custom.....and it would establish a dangerous precedent and undermine the status of the other Transkei paramount chiefs. Tribal subordinates to the paramount chiefs would clamour for this elevated status. The Transkei constitution makes provision for the creation of paramount chieftainships and chieftainships. But the constitution also entrenches African law and custom. Is constitutional procedure going to negate what a nation considers its custom?¹¹⁸

Ndamase was clearly warning against the creation of a dangerous precedent which, he feared, would ruin the value that acknowledgement and recognition of the existence of hierarchy added to the institution of chieftainship. He was upholding the view that 'African law and custom' should take precedence over constitutional prescriptions of colonial origin.

Later the *RDM* reported on the walkout of opposition party members from the TLA on being asked to vote on a motion which sought to confer paramount chieftainship on Matanzima. This action was a clear endorsement of Ndamase's earlier remark about the cultural impropriety of overriding customary procedures. The walkout, a practical statement that the opposition would not participate in the voting process, came after Guzana's amendment, calling for consultation with Sabata, was outvoted by 52 votes to 37. The pro-government speakers insisted that Sabata's involvement was irrelevant because 'it was not a new paramountcy that was being sought, [but] merely recognition of one established 100 years ago. There was no obligation, legal or customary, on the Emigrant Tembus to have to approach Paramount Chief Sabata'.¹¹⁹ In July of the same year the *World* reported that 'Sabata's *inkundla* has rejected in uncompromising terms Chief Kaiser Matanzima's claim to the kingship of Emigrant Tembuland and has called on him to come to Sabata's headquarters here to answer for himself'.¹²⁰ The decision to reject Matanzima was taken by abaThembu from Mthatha, Mqanduli, Ngcobo and Lady Frere at a 'mammoth *indaba*' at Sabata's Bumbane Great Place. AbaThembu anger could not have been better expressed than in their shouts as they summoned the person of Daliwonga: 'Call Matanzima here. He has no respect for our King and it will not take us time to cross these rivers and invade his place if he does not stop his claim

... Sabata is accepted as the only king of Tembuland. To hell with Matanzima', was what they proclaimed.¹²¹

No amount of persuasion would make Matanzima slacken in his efforts to entice and rally the chiefs behind him as he cunningly and aggressively carved both his political and traditional ascent. A few weeks later he reiterated what he envisaged as the revived role of the 'chiefs-vested power' in the Transkei. During a parliamentary debate he stressed that 'the powers of the chiefs...would be increased and would never be reduced'.¹²² Matanzima's taking up cudgels for the chiefs while Sabata was, in Carter's words, regarded as 'the foremost opponent of the preponderance of chiefs in the TLA'¹²³ again reduced the politics of the self-governing Transkei into a battleground between the two men. The slightest differences in the political philosophies of the DP and the TNIP always degenerated into a self-sustaining struggle to preserve the centrality of abaThembu paramountcy against Matanzima's efforts to carve an independent counterpart, or to create one, in Emigrant abaThembuland. A new dimension in the DP's criticism of the Transkei Authorities Bill as 'undemocratic' was that it was mischievously interpreted by Matanzima as a rejection of chieftainship by the opposition. It became clear that Matanzima was determined to empower the chiefs enough to oblige them to vote him into a senior chieftainship when the time came. His recommendation of more powers for chiefs was meant to encourage compliance with the Government schemes and also outwit opposition to the realization of his ambitions in the TLA where chiefs were most powerful.

Poto had remarked earlier that he hoped

the chiefs on their side will understand that I have no wish to have them thrown outside, but if they are going to think only of their own interests, they will not be regarded as representatives of the people...I hope you will have no trouble and that you will realize you are lost if you stick to the policy of separate development.¹²⁴

Guzana echoed Poto's sentiments, declaring that '[c]hiefs who continued to support separate development were using a spade to dig their own gravesthose who did not represent the views of the people would lose the aura of chieftainship'.¹²⁵ When the

opposition argued that the Transkei Authorities Bill (TAB) would lead to a dictatorship by the chiefs, and also attacked it for being undemocratic, Matanzima stressed the administrative role of the chiefs in local and national affairs, as 'Transkei's people looked on the chiefs as the governors of the territory.'¹²⁶ Kotze has reiterated that the belief among many chiefs that only Matanzima's policy would be tolerated by the Republican Government gave him an added advantage.¹²⁷ He contended that the TAB was based on the tradition of rule by the chief and his councillors and further warned the opposition supporters that they 'must respect the traditional leaders. If you do not you will find yourself clashing with the people who pay allegiance to their traditional leaders.'¹²⁸

The K.D. Matanzima party's principle about the chiefs was further boosted when G. J. Grobler, a prominent Transkei Government official, told an audience of visiting chiefs from Zimbabwe that 'chiefs were elected by God'.¹²⁹ Grobler's testimony about the 'divine right' of chieftainship was historically significant for the brand of chieftainship that Matanzima was crafting for himself with the backing of the Nationalist government. In his address Grobler recommended the BAA on the basis that not only did it allow Blacks to control their own affairs but it also fitted in with their socio-political traditions in as much as it meant the 'restoration of traditional Bantu democracy'.¹³⁰ Grobler's controversial speech which emphasised the responsibility that God had prescribed for the chiefs: 'they dare not sit back....if they fail, they fail not only their own people but also the Almighty God'¹³¹ was bound to impact in one way or the other on the rift between Sabata and Matanzima. Whilst it upheld the 'divine mandate' of chiefs over their wards, and in this way appealed to Matanzima's thinking, it omitted the chiefs' obligation to take their cue from their paramount chief.

K.D. Matanzima benefitted from his use of chiefs to strengthen his political ascendancy and to eliminate the threat that the opposition, which cushioned Sabata, posed. This was confirmed in an article in the *Star* which reported that the support of the TNIP was visibly growing due to the influence of the Transkei's chiefs and headmen.¹³² Matanzima's brother, George Matanzima, also stood for election in Emigrant

abaThembuland while several minor chiefs offered themselves for election thereby obviously giving Matanzima added political advantage over Sabata. Hans Abraham also endorsed the legitimacy of chiefly rule when he asserted that chieftainship 'was not being foisted on the African people of Africa in general, and the Transkei in particular, but was a creation of the African spirit and mother Africa'.¹³³ He subsequently commented that 'having taken note of the wild schemes hatched by those protagonists of so-called democracy, I can understand why they condemn chieftainship, because their political creations are nothing but the handmaidens of communism, if not communism itself'.¹³⁴

Matanzima later took it upon himself personally to pledge support for the South African Government in the TNIP's election manifesto, promising that 'in the event of a communist or communist-inspired attack on South Africa, the TNIP would pledge its support to South Africa'.¹³⁵ It must be noted that at the time in which this pledge was made Matanzima had been officially appointed as paramount chief of Western abaThembuland, with effect from 1 April 1966.¹³⁶ Matanzima was someone not known for his compassion, so his subsequent invitation to Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo to install his (Matanzima's) son, Mtheth'uvumile (Mthetho), as a regional abaThembu chief¹³⁷ must be seen in the light of his aim to have strategic appointments in his now upgraded Emigrant abaThembuland 'kingdom'.

There does not seem to be consensus concerning whether or not Sabata actually installed Mthetho. If we accept the popular assumption that Sabata ignored the invitation, his disregard of this 'pseudo' honour was, and is, interesting, as regards the politics of the abaThembu chieftainship for a variety of reasons. For one thing, because of the Transkei government's non-recognition of Sabata's paramountcy in Emigrant abaThembuland such an installation would not validate the recognition of Mthetho. On the one hand, in issuing the invitation, Matanzima implicitly acknowledged Sabata's paramountcy. Furthermore, at the time of the proposed installation Sabata and Matanzima held equal rank in chieftainship, yet a regional chieftainship for Mthetho,

quite a huge leap, given the weighting of regional chieftainship in the traditional hierarchy, would imply that the abaThembu chieftainship in Western abaThembuland was a Matanzima affair. While it was not clear what Matanzima's motive was in inviting Sabata, the suggestion that 'if Chief Sabata declines the invitation, the Chief Minister will do it',¹³⁸ provided he went ahead and installed his son, would have been a political anomaly. A father was not supposed to invest his son with traditional authority while he himself was still an active chief. Further, Mthetho's chieftainship was not justifiable in the light of Mhlathi's contention that someone else held Matanzima's chieftainship during both his terms as premier and later president of the Transkei.¹³⁹ Ngangomhlaba has endorsed the above contention in his admission that his father, Headman Thambekile Matanzima, held Matanzima's chieftainship from 1963 to 1972 after which he (Ngangomhlaba) took over as acting paramount chief and ruled until 1986.¹⁴⁰ Mgudlwa's evidence that Mthetho was on the payroll as a chief who ruled until he died without having ever been installed¹⁴¹ poses grave questions about the customary validity of the current chieftainship of Mthetho's son. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that Matanzima's primary aim in pushing the appointment of his son as regional chief was a way of securing the Emigrant abaThembuland for the Matanzima dynasty.

A FAILED ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP SABATA

After the endorsement of Matanzima's paramountcy and in the midst of debates about the indispensability of chiefs in African governance there was a period when reports that detailed a plot to kill Matanzima proliferated. Bhekisizwe has given an account of the arrival of two White visitors at Sabata's Sithebe Great Place. The twosome, who were - it later transpired - policemen, met Nkosiyané, Sabata's former secretary. They informed Nkosiyané that they had come to advise Sabata of his unpopularity with the 'Matanzima government' and their plan to murder Matanzima. Nkosiyané immediately indicated an interest in the plan, not having noticed that the conversation was being recorded. The visitors later convinced Nkosiyané to call Sabata in order to arrange to talk to him face-to-face. On being told that Sabata was at Bumbane the policemen asked Nkosiyané to accompany them there. Sabata flatly refused even to see his 'visitors' and the consequence of his refusal was the arrest of Nkosiyané who spent six years in jail.¹⁴²

Sabata's refusal even to meet the provocateurs gives the impression that he either suspected a trap or simply did not want to be involved in any assassination attempt irrespective of whether or not the 'men under cover' were genuine or not.

Mthikrakra's narrative is echoed in the report that appeared in the *Rand Daily Mail* giving an account of the arrest under the Transkei's 'emergency regulations of 1960 -- which provide[d] for indefinite detention' - of five members of the DP. The five men, L. Z. Majija, Nkosiyan, C.N Nogcantsi, Cromwell Diko and Albert Raziya, were arrested in connection with an alleged conspiracy to murder. The key person in the extensive investigation was a suspected special agent who, it was claimed, 'had been seen frequently in the company of one of the detained men and [was reported] to have been present when the Security Branch took the men into custody'.¹⁴³ While it made sense to arrest the suspects - provided there was overwhelming evidence to justify it - with the existence of a probability that the plot could only have been hatched by pro-Matanzima government people, it remains to be asked whether there was a conspiracy to smear the opposition party so as to justify the detention of its members in order to eliminate it. A subsequent issue of the *RDM* gave details of how Nkosiyan and Nogcantsi solicited the advice of a certain White man as they plotted the death of Matanzima, which would pave the way for the election of someone from the DP to lead the Transkei government.¹⁴⁴ Kotze has also alluded to the High Court conviction of two DP members of the Assembly, Nkosiyan and Nogcantsi, on the grounds of their conspiring to kill the Chief Minister.¹⁴⁵ It must be noted that if these reports were found to be true, much to Matanzima's gratification, they would surely harm the reputation of Sabata in his capacity as a prominent member of the opposition.

THE POLITICAL PACT BETWEEN MATANZIMA AND BOTHA SIGCAU : WAS THE FARM GIFT A FACTOR?

The relationship of Matanzima with Botha Sigcau which had been in existence from the early sixties, became a decisive factor in tilting the balance of power in Transkeian politics in favour of Matanzima. In respect of these the Sigcau factor impacted on relations between abaThembu chiefs. Sigcau controlled four districts of Transkei, and

influenced chiefs far beyond his own borders. He had earlier cunningly declined Poto and Sabata permission to visit his Qawukeni region to speak about their manifestos.¹⁴⁶ It might have been thought that Botha would back Poto, not only because they were both amaMpondo, but also because Poto had supported Botha against his cousin Nelson Sigcau during the Mpondo succession crisis of 1939.¹⁴⁷ This 'royal' understanding, which seemed to complement the Sabata-Poto political affinity, also added value to Matanzima's efforts to establish a power base in Eastern amaMpondoland.

The key question is whether Botha Sigcau's support for Matanzima was in any way linked to the farm he coincidentally received from the South African Government. George Oliver, of the *RDM* reported the clinching of a land deal by the Transkei Government which saw the title of a 2,630 morgen farm near Lusikisiki being granted to Chief Sigcau and his successors. The controversial farm was valued by the Transkei Chief Agricultural Officer at R10 a Morgen, while an attorney claimed that the same farm would probably fetch about R25 a morgen or more if sold on the open market. Significantly, the donation occurred at the very time when media reports claimed that Botha held the balance of power between Poto and Matanzima prior to the advent of self-government in the Transkei.¹⁴⁸ The pact between Matanzima and Sigcau would eventually earn Matanzima enough votes to outwit Poto in 1963. Nonkonyana and Satula confirmed that in the mid-sixties Botha would be seen, especially in the evenings, in certain villages of Libode-Nggeleni districts which fell under Poto's jurisdiction, urging people to vote for Matanzima exhorting the "maMpondo! [to vote for Matanzima] votelan'uMatanzima'.¹⁴⁹ It was the same warm relationship between the two chiefs that is believed to have been behind the thwarting of the initiative to erect and unveil the tombstone of Ngoza, a scion from Mthembu's Great House through Mvelase, by the Qhudeni clans of the Mbambisa, Mangisa and Dlulane in 1963.¹⁵⁰ The land on which Ngoza's grave still stands, *kwesikaNgoza*, Ngoza's place, is in proximity to Sigcau's Great Place. This might explain the complex forces and factors that were involved in Sigcau's quick incorporation of the gravesite area into his farm as soon as

the Qhudeni clans watching the grave opened negotiations with the Matanzima government to erect and unveil the tombstone.

As had been mentioned earlier, Poto and the leading members of the DP were to be disappointed when Sigcau ditched them. The confirmation that Chief Botha Sigcau had accepted the government's gift of the Qaukeni Great Place Farm explained the rationale behind his equivocal support for Matanzima and the South African government, despite his assertion that there 'was no connection at all between the grant and my support for Chief Matanzima...In any case, it was long before the election'.¹⁵¹ It then transpired that the donation which was referred to in the 'documents that effected transfer to Chief Sigcawu and his successors in title'¹⁵² was, in fact authorised by De Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in his capacity as trustee of the South African Native Trust which had owned the land.¹⁵³ The report - to the effect that the government had been negotiating the gift for a considerable time before the transaction which was finally concluded on 24 July 1963¹⁵⁴ - seems to have paved the way for an extra-friendly pact between the Sabata-Poto counterparts.

One of the Sunday newspapers, whose chairman was Dr. Verwoerd, reported on Nel's resentment of the insinuation in the *RDM* that the Department of Bantu Administration (DBA) had 'bribed the Transkei Paramount Chief, Botha Sigcawu to support Chief Minister Matanzima in the 1963 electionPlans to make over the land to Paramount Chief Sigcau were made seven years before the election'.¹⁵⁵ Significantly, Nel's timeline coincided with the implementation of the BAA. Bruce Young's version that 'as long ago as 1956, the department had been negotiating with Chief Sigcawu to take over his tribe's traditional grazing land on the coast near Lusikisiki for experimental purposes'¹⁵⁶ was slightly different. 'It was thus in return for this proposal that Sigcau was given the 2,630 morgen that now forms his Great Place at Qaukeni, nine miles from Lusikisiki'.¹⁵⁷ Nel subsequently tried to prove that the 'Government officials' varied responses were based on valid reasons by remarking in an interview with a Sunday paper: 'making presents of farms to African chiefs was common practice and a custom that dated back to the days of the old Cape Government.'¹⁵⁸ Sigcau had earlier upheld this view when

he stated that grants of land had been made to other chiefs. The association of the two leaders was further consolidated by a short-lived marital union, between Sigcau's heir and one of Matanzima's daughters. The wedding was aptly described as 'one of the most important political ceremonies the country is likely to see in the 1970s, having cemented Chief Matanzima's ties with Chief Sigcawu, leader of the biggest political division in the territory'.¹⁵⁹ The apparent dynastic pact between the Western abaThembuland and Eastern amaMpondoland posed a potential threat to Chief Sabata but he had no way of countering it.

'MORE LAND OR WITHDRAWAL!!'. JONGUHLANGA BACKS THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DEMANDS ON CHIEF MATANZIMA

In 1972 Sabata made a revelation which was bound to aggravate the rift between him and Matanzima. He claimed to have attended a meeting which approved the Bantustan's ultimatum to the [South African] government for more land. The meeting, according to Sabata, was attended by about 50 TLA members from both the TNIP and the DP. He described the meeting as an informal gathering at which Matanzima presented a five-page memorandum containing an ultimatum to the government, which the opposition members termed 'a charge of political dynamite'. The memorandum was said to have contained a clause stating that 'unless the Transkei is granted the land it seeks it will abandon separate development and join the urban African in his fight for representation in the Cape Town Parliament'.¹⁶⁰ Kotze has also referred to the remark that Matanzima made about the land claims at the 1972 annual congress of the TNIP :

The land we claimwas unilaterally and cynically raped by the Union Government....We have as much right to land and financial expenditure as he[White person] has. It is the Black sweat which has given him a comfortable home while the Black man is living in filthy locations.It is the Black man that has contributed principally through his cheap labour to the wealth of the White men in South Africa.¹⁶¹

Sabata for his part called on Matanzima to expand upon this. He demanded that 'Chief Kaiser must tell us the full story. He promised that if the Government refused his claims for more land he would support the Democratic Party policy and seek full rights for Blacks in White South Africa'.¹⁶² He also claimed that it was at the same meeting that

the Chief Minister was given a mandate to go to Cape Town to force the land issue with the government after he had supposedly appealed, in vain, to the DP to sink their political differences and unite with the TNIP on the land demands. He also admitted that the DP's refusal was based on their principled rejection of the Bantustan concept.¹⁶³

A month later Sabata addressed a meeting in Soweto and repeated his revelations of Matanzima's threats to withdraw his support of the government's separate development policy, 'we were having tea together when he told me about his claims for more land for the Transkei'.¹⁶⁴ Sabata made his revelations in response to a question put to him by Lennox Mlonzi, the amaXhosa representative in the Soweto Urban Bantu Council (UBC). At the same time Sabata warned urban Africans not to accept ethnic grouping 'You are one nation, irrespective of your tribal affiliations. Whites in the South African Parliament are of different ethnic groups. Why should you allow yourselves to be split?'¹⁶⁵ he challenged them.

Without a doubt Transkeian politics in the early seventies were generally stormy and the tensions were often exaggerated by the verbal exchanges between the ruling party and its counterpart through Matanzima and Sabata. In the midst of Matanzima's efforts to have the world acknowledge and recognise Transkei's self-government, a *Sunday Times* reporter, Caroline Clark, quoted Guzana telling Matanzima to 'renounce the policy of separate development as unworkable or resign as Chief Minister'.¹⁶⁶ Guzana's challenge, which seemed to echo what Sabata had earlier told a Soweto audience, was made in the context of an interview that followed Prime Minister Vorster's offer of 'independence-without-consolidation of land'. Clark's report quoted Guzana as having said 'Chief Matanzima has failed in his land dispute with the government and has lost the faith of the Transkei....He has run up against a granite wall, the Nationalist Government, and only the Transkei can suffer. He used threats against the Republican Government, and his bluff has failed.'¹⁶⁷ Guzana further called upon Matanzima to put into practice his earlier threat of renouncing separate development if Transkeian land demands for 'White' areas were not met: 'although I doubt that he has the courage to do

so, I challenge the Paramount chief to stick to his ultimatum and renounce separate development as unworkable, or resign as Chief Minister'.¹⁶⁸

It must be noted, however, that the DP had neither agreed nor committed to joining with Matanzima in the demand for land. What Sabata wanted rather was that Matanzima should come clean about what he had stated in his ultimatum, and what he was going to do about it. Clark was later to report that while Matanzima indicated his commitment to putting pressure on the South African government until the disputed land –White' areas in the districts of Matatiele, Umzimkulu, Mount Currie (Kokstad) and Maclear and also the White enclave at Port St Johns – was restored, he later he conveniently denied the Transkeian opposition's allegations. He disassociated himself from the claim that, in a last ditch attempt to gain victory on the land dispute, he had issued an ultimatum to the South African Government threatening to renounce separate development : 'I was incorrectly interpreted by the Opposition. I made no such ultimatum and I have no intention of taking such a step',¹⁶⁹ he asserted. He coupled the issue of land with the question of repatriation as if to counter Sabata's earlier comment in his address at Soweto. Jonguhlanga had said that it was 'a lie that we want urban Transkeians to return to their homeland - we have no work or accommodation for you'.¹⁷⁰ Matanzima proposed a condition that 'unless we receive the disputed land — we will oppose the repatriation of our people outside the Transkei to our already overburdened country. They will become stateless'.¹⁷¹ Laurence has confirmed the disputed lands and added that Matanzima also demanded the amaXhosa take-over of the White towns that were excluded from Transkei control in the 1963 Constitution.¹⁷² Chief Mthetho had earlier also raised his voice alongside that of his father on the land issue. He referred to the much 'inflated' land dispute claims between the Transkei government and M.C.Botha, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and remarked that, 'M.C. thinks our Cabinet Ministers are his farmboys because he told the Press he was reprimanding the Chief Minister'.¹⁷³ Mthetho also insinuated that the apartheid government seemed to be reluctant to fulfill its earlier promises, for 'the Transkei has been at a constitutional standstill since the inception of self-government'.¹⁷⁴ Other than the father-son pact on

the land dispute against the South African government there was also the question of outwitting Sabata for his earlier call on Matanzima to execute his threats against SA.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ARRESTS AND THE ISOLATION OF SABATA

The attitude of the Transkei Government hardened towards the opposition as its nominal independence approached and this threatened both the existence and political activity of the only official opposition organization. The conflict between the ruling party and its opposition revolved around the acceptance or rejection of the notion of Bantustan independence. Matanzima, equivocated between what has been described by Streek and Wicksteed as the Matanzima brothers' 'United States of Southern Africa'.¹⁷⁵ Matanzima's critics, according to Kotze, argued that if his rather unrealistic land claims were acceded to they would strengthen his power on a tribal basis in the Legislative Assembly. In turn, the strengthening of Matanzima's tribal power would inadvertently impact on Sabata's political weight.

Matanzima's eventual opting for (nominal) independence in 1974 once more brought him back into the South African fold and thereby aligned his practical thinking with that of Pretoria. In it is to be found the germ that nurtured the events that precipitated Guzana's ousting from DP leadership on the grounds that he was upholding local sub-national politics.¹⁷⁶ Matanzima's stand, in an ironic twist of events, invited visible and radical opposition from Ncokazi, who identified the DP, with the 'Liberation Movements',¹⁷⁷ with which he hoped to forge links. Guzana was thus considered no match for Ncokazi whose professed aim was to boost the 'Black Consciousness' philosophy, much to Matanzima's chagrin. He called the TLA a pseudo-parliament and insisted that the DP yearned for 'freedom rather than multiracialism'.

Guzana had unwittingly tarnished his image in the eyes of his party membership. He had helped 'shepherd' the draft Transkei constitution through the assembly, interpreted with patience various sections and even moved for their approval,¹⁷⁸ this despite his initial support of the DP's rejection of the principle of independence. This could explain Matanzima's offer of a cabinet position to this 'erudite politician *cum* elitist debator'.

who apparently did not have it in his heart to uphold traditional politics and advance with enthusiasm the cause of centralised abaThembu paramountcy.¹⁷⁹ Matanzima's offer to Guzana was one way of paralysing the opposition at a time when its numerical weakness could well be an assurance to him that he was indeed the Transkei's lifetime 'Governor-General'. His subsequent warning to Guzana, whom he preferred as a leader of the opposition, to get rid of the dissidents in his party because they were 'communist fellow-travellers; was an outright expression of the rejection of Ncokazi. Any allusion to 'liberation' meant communism to Matanzima.' Therefore Sabata's association with Ncokazi was obviously perceived as an identification with the enemies of Transkei's imminent freedom.

Once the question of independence became an issue for debate, one Democratic Party member after another was arrested. A few months before independence the *Cape Times* flashed news of the arrest of a prominent DP politician, Ncokazi.¹⁸⁰ He was arrested in terms of proclamation R400 of the Transkei Emergency Regulations. Ncokazi was reported to have, *inter alia*, accused the 'Matanzima government' of trying to get rid of all effective opposition by detaining DP members.¹⁸¹ Kotze has, in Laurence, confirmed that Matanzima's TNIP did everything in its power to discredit the DP as an illegal party whose multi-racial slogan was a symbol of anti-government violence.¹⁸² The justification for the accusation and subsequent arrests was in Brigadier Mattheys' confirmation brief of the detention of L. Mpumlwana, I. Nomkruca, N. Nogcantsi and later S. A. Xobololo.¹⁸³ Xobololo was arrested on the eve of his moving an 'amendment rejecting independence because 1,5 million Transkei people living in urban areas in South Africa would become stateless on independence'.¹⁸⁴ It must be observed that Xobololo's statement echoed Sabata's sentiments to the effect that expatriates would be homeless and unemployed. The *Daily Dispatch* confirmed that the arrests of Xobololo and Chief L.L. Mgudlwa had left the DP with no representation in the Assembly. This was after the arrests of Nkosiyanane, who was the national chairman of the party, Miss F. Mangcotywa, the Secretary of the Dalindyebo region, and her assistant P. S Fadana.

In the midst of the arrests of the opposition members - a daily occurrence for as long as there were remaining party representatives – Matanzima engineered the approval by the TLA of the Transkei Bantustan's constitution within ten minutes. After calling for amendments to the draft and waiting a little in silence he declared the Transkeian Government's satisfaction with the draft in its present form and went on to say that it would 'now be put to the Transkeian Parliament for formal adoption after independence'.¹⁸⁵ Stultz has confirmed that at all the meetings that were held between 4th May and 27 July 1976 Matanzima excluded the possibility of discussing the principle of independence, arguing that, [that] opportunity had existed in March 1974'.¹⁸⁶ Two more DP leaders, O. Mpondo of Butterworth and W.D Pupuma of Ngqamakhwe, were later detained in addition to those who had been detained before they could be nominated for the general election which was yet to come.¹⁸⁷ Streek and Wicksteed have made a significant comment regarding the fact that the detained DP members were in the end released without being charged, despite the accusation levelled against the party as being Marxist. The detentions were indeed aimed at stifling the DP from operating as the official opposition, obviously because of the anathema that Ncokazi had become in the eyes of the Matanzima government. The other ulterior motive which informed the arrests was obviously to control at all costs the threat that the same government perceived Sabata to be.

Transkei politics of chieftainship generally seemed to be integrated with, and into, the swift increase in political activity that was witnessed in the territory during the weeks before independence. The RDM reported the uncovering of a 'Leftist' plot that had been hatched to disrupt the Transkei Territory's official independence celebrations scheduled to take place in the month of October. The plotters were reported to have received promises of support from anti-independence groups most likely the BCM and the Progressives who were operating in the Transkei.¹⁸⁸ It was obvious that these groups had the sympathy of Sabata for the reason that they, irrespective of their varied political goals, supported his crusade against the man whose political career constantly spelled disaster for the survival of his paramountcy. Laurence also reported on the arrest of the personal representative of Sabata Dalindyabo 'a staunch opponent of Transkei

independence'. This was Anderson Joyi, who was scheduled to stand as a candidate for the DP in the independence election. His brother, Bangilizwe Joyi was also detained. The detention of the Joyi brothers, who were eventually released after independence without ever having been charged, brought the number of DP detainees to 13. The next DP victim to be arrested was Rev S.K. Masela, after a fire had broken out at the Clarkebury Educational Institute where he was a warden.¹⁸⁹ A factor of great political significance for the abaThembu chieftainship and Transkei's political landscape prior to independence was that, with the latest detentions within the DP ranks, Sabata was left as the sole top 'DP man' free to raise his voice against the Transkei independence exercise.¹⁹⁰

Arbitrary arrests and other factors led to the drastic decline in DP numbers as the independence drew nigh and this was accompanied by a similar pattern in the majority seats that the party had boasted of in 1963. Tutor Ndamase's defection to the TNIP¹⁹¹ reinforced the strength of his latest political home. His defection obviously isolated Sabata whose only option was to be receptive to any school of thought or organization that was radical enough to stifle Matanzima's plans.

THE ROAD TO TRANSKEI 'INDEPENDENCE'

The factors that quickened the tempo of events towards independence provided the *RDM*, reporter, Laurence, with data that enabled him to write a book on what he called 'South Africa's incipient client state' whose road to independence he described as 'Transkei's evolution to pseudo-independence'.¹⁹² The reporter's portrayal of Matanzima as the central figure¹⁹³ in the book, however, is not a true reflection of the events that led to the rise to power of the upstart that Matanzima was. It also does not stress the impact of Matanzima's political manoeuvres on the unity of Transkei chieftainship generally, and the abaThembu paramountcy in particular. Ashford's description of Chief Daliwonga Matanzima as 'a tough, single-minded man who saw in South Africa's apartheid policy a means of achieving his own nationalist ambitions rather than resolving South Africa's racial problems'¹⁹⁴ appears to be a more pertinent comment. Laurence's book, however, remains an indictment of the South African government's

role in the further polarisation of the abaThembu Chieftainship and assault on Sabata's paramountcy.

Ten days before the Transkei hosted its independence celebrations Denis Herbststein reported on Matanzima's Transkei landslide victory at the Transkei polls. The detained DP members lost their deposits and/or were unable to contest the election because of their detention. These included no fewer than four abaThembu chiefs. When questioned on the possibility of a one-party state, Matanzima remarked that he would regret the extinction of the opposition, saying 'I am afraid the remaining Opposition members will probably join the Government, with one or two exceptions'.¹⁹⁵ One wonders if Matanzima did not imagine that Sabata would be one of these exceptions. Matanzima interpreted the election result as 'an unqualified victory for the independence of Transkei' and expected that it would cause the international community to rethink its attitude on recognising the Transkei.

The Johannesburg *Star* condemned the arrests of chiefs and DP members for having done irreparable damage to the image of the Transkei, and stated that such arrests were a bad omen for future democratic conduct in the new state.¹⁹⁶ Matanzima also made it clear that those DP leaders and their followers who were in detention under Proclamation 400 would not be released even after the elections.¹⁹⁷ He proclaimed his victory as an indisputable mandate for his party's decision to opt for independence under the separate development policy. He also emphasised the irrelevance of a referendum in a country where the leader, in this case himself, had the visible backing of the people for his independence option. Stultz's comment about Matanzima's manoeuvring singlehandedly Transkei's independence is of great significance in its endorsement of the accusation that he rammed the idea of separate development down the chiefs' throats and steamrolled the independence process on behalf of the Transkeian citizens. He also drew attention to the power that the chiefs had in 'Proclamation 400 - promulgated in 1960 to contain a peasant rebellion -which provided the chiefs with arbitrary powers',¹⁹⁸ over their wards. Matanzima obviously failed to admit that he had adopted the Proclamation as his personal weapon to enforce conformity

and keep tabs on his arch-rival, Sabata. The opposition's engineered failure, prompted Matanzima to say, obviously with gratification, that he regretted 'the extinction of the Opposition'.¹⁹⁹ He also hinted that his party's unity could only be tampered with by external forces: 'I cannot see any split in my party unless the English press interferes with my people. The English press hates the Matanzima brothers. I don't know why', he remarked.²⁰⁰ This was evidently an allusion to the press's condemnation of developments in the Transkei.

On 20 October 1976, Laurence wrote that Sigcau of Eastern amaMpondoland had been unanimously nominated as President of the Transkei by the TNIP.²⁰¹ It came as no surprise that Matanzima chose, as his state president, his partner in championing separate development, and one who had helped hoist him up the ladder of power in 1963. It was clear that Matanzima was at the apex of the territorial chieftainship a position that would enable him to reshape and mould the abaThembu chieftainship to his liking. Two days after Matanzima had responded to questions from Steve Kgame and Laurence of the *RDM* on how he would run his Transkei he learnt of the exodus of people from the newly acquired districts of Glen Grey and Herschel.²⁰² The exodus from Glen Grey was bound to impact negatively on his constituency because it was an historical home of the abaThembu. It was clear that the South African authorities' bid to assuage Matanzima's demands for land by granting him the recently annexed districts of Glen Grey and Herschel²⁰³ had been counterproductive. Matanzima's self-proclamation as an upholder of amaXhosa nationalist principles was far from reassuring to the inhabitants of the Transkei's latest territorial acquisitions.

The very celebration of 'independence' had seemed like a ceremony to further divide and mark the progressive split between Sabata and Matanzima. Sabata was reported to have questioned Matanzima's sincerity in calling for the release of Mandela at the time of the Transkei independence. The paramount chief argued that if Matanzima were genuine he would have made the Transkei experiential exercise an

all-Transkei affair and consulted Transkei leaders outside his ruling party.

Matanzima could not afford to agree to Mandela's return. If Mandela had returned to the Transkei, I'm sure there is nobody else we would be voting for, as Prime Minister or President.²⁰⁴

The irony of Sabata's observation was whether, in the event of Mandela's release and return to the Transkei, South Africa rather than Matanzima's Transkei would have attracted international recognition. While Sabata pledged that he would continue to fight Chief Matanzima, he noted that with his party members behind bars it would be hard to tackle Matanzima.²⁰⁵

TRANSKEI IS DECLARED 'INDEPENDENT'.

The day of reckoning eventually came when, to the roar of a gun salute and the crackle of fireworks, Transkei declared its independence. The new country's brown, white and green flag was raised in a stadium specially built for the occasion. Diederichs, the South African President, handed over a copy of the Transkei Act to the country's first Prime Minister, Paramount Chief Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima. Diederichs in this way formally divested South Africa of all sovereignty over Transkei and pronounced the territory to be a sovereign and independent state. Matanzima was presented with a decoration, the 'Order of Good Hope' as well as the golden pen with which the Transkei Act was signed.²⁰⁶

CONCLUSION

The chapter has exposed the forces and factors that made pre-independence Transkei politics complex and inflammable. In this context the interactive role between the Matanzima-Sabata tussle for supremacy in abaThembuland and the politics of territorial chieftainship generally has been analysed. The chapter has demonstrated that this interaction was the major force in the evolution of the dual supertribal power blocks in the Transkei. The impact of these power blocks on the unfolding abaThembu chieftainship and stability of the institutional paramountcy cannot be undermined. Whilst they purported to replace the historical Sabata 'Royal Council' of old their supertribal profile in the mid-sixties has been portrayed in the chapter as a national feature. The chapter has also portrayed the patronage of the Liberals and Progressives in pre-

independence Transkei as having added value to the Transkei Opposition politics and in that way internationalized the Sabata-Matanzima power struggle.

The chapter has revealed that it was the South African government which made the abaThembu chieftainship vulnerable from both within and on the chieftainship's periphery. The Nationalists' determination to preserve White minority rights by employing the services of the chiefs who were yearning for their long-lost power has been shown to have forged a double-edged sword. AbaThembu chiefs utilised this sword to achieve goals peculiar to their individual situations and inadvertently launched their national institution on the road to implosion.

The chapter has also demonstrated that chieftainship was very pliable but it would be this very attribute that would strip it of its ethos. Sabata has been portrayed in the chapter as someone whose standpoint cost him his national fatherhood of the abaThembu nation in the short term, in the same way that Matanzima's collaborative stand robbed the abaThembu polity of a custom legitimated paramountcy in the long term.

The chapter has identified a common factor in the progressive evolution of the two processes of compliance and non-compliance in abaThembuland. It has portrayed the way in which these incompatible processes shaped the politics of abaThembu chieftainship in the context of Transkei's political terrain a limiting factor in the case of collaborators. Their freedom will was hamstrung, as was evident in Matanzima's equivocation on land and other issues on the eve of independence.

¹ Dennie : "One King, Two burials," *Journal*, Vol 11, No.2 (1992), p.78.

²P. Nugent : *Africa Since Independence : A Comparative History* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.224.

³ Southall : *South Arica's Transkei*, , p. 36.

⁴ Delius : "*Traditional leaders, power and land rights*" , pp.229.

⁵ Vigne : *Liberals* , pp.166-167.

⁶ Z. Mthikrakra: Interviewed, 20 June, 2010.

⁷ Vigne : *Liberals* pp.166-167.

⁸ Anderson Joyi : interviewed, 6 April 2006.

⁹ Vigne : *Liberals* p. 165.

¹⁰ Officer Commanding S.A Police, Transkei Command – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha), TDC.49/1, C2/3, Cape Archives, 26 January, Confidential, 1961.

¹¹ Officer Commanding S.A Police, Transkei Command – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha), TDC.49/1, C2/3, Cape Archives, 26 January, Confidential, 1961.

¹² Magistrate (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha) Cape Archives, 19 May, 1961 .

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Magistrate / Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Umtata), Mthatha Archives, 29 May 1961.

¹⁷ T. Lodge ; *Black Politics In South Africa since 1945*, (Longmans, New York, 1983), p.285.

¹⁸ Vigne ; *Liberals* p. 174.

¹⁹ Magistrate (Cofimvaba)- Chief Magistrate (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 13 June 1961.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Magistrate & Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, 29 May 1961.

²² Magistrate & Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Umtata), Mthatha Archives, 29 May 1961.

²³ Bantu Affairs Commissioner(Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha) Mthatha Archives, N.1/1/3(1), 3rd May 1962.

²⁴ T. Maloka : “Populism and the Politics of Chieftaincy and Nation-Building in the New South Africa”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 14, 2, 1996, p. 174.

²⁵ The Political Correspondent- Rand Daily Mail (RDM) : “Why I am for apartheid – Matanzima” , 28 August, 1965.

²⁶ *Lodge*: *Black Politics*, p. 284.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

²⁸ Delius : *Traditional leaders* p. 229.

²⁹ Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, N.1/1/3(1), 4 January, 1963.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Lodge : *Black Politics* p. 286.

³² Transkei Government, C 2/3 : Confidential-Civil and Criminal Matters, issued by the African National Congress, Cape Archives, 1 May 1963.p.6.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) – Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, N.1/1/3(1), 13 December 1962.

³⁵ Ntsebeza : “Structures And Struggles ” , p. 246.

³⁶ K. D. Matanzima (Regional Chief of Emigrant abaThembuland, Qamata) – Abel Mavandla Ntwana and Eugenia Ntwana, Cape Archives, 42/27, 13 January 1961.

³⁷ Beinart : Chieftaincy, (Beinart and S.Dubow (eds) : *Segregation* , p. 223.

³⁸ A report on the meeting at Matyantya Great Place of amaGcina Chieftdom, Cape Archives, 16 March 1961.

³⁹ Chief Bantu Commissioner (King William’s Town) – Chief Bantu Commissioner (Mthatha), Bisho Archives, 22 February 1961.

⁴⁰ Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Lady Frere) - Chief Bantu Commissioner (Mthatha), Cape Archives, 13 February 1961.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Lady Frere), Cape Archives, 13 February 1961.

⁴⁴ K. D. Matanzima (Emigrant Tembuland Regional Authority, Qamata) – The Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) Cape Archives, File No. RA.9/2/1, 28 April 1962.

⁴⁵ Matanzima (Emigrant Tembuland Regional Authority, Qamata) – The Bantu Affairs Commissioner (Cofimvaba) Cape Archives, File No. RA.9/2/1, 28 April 1962.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The Republic of Transkei : Chris van Rensburg Publications (Pty) Ltd South Africa, 1976.

⁴⁹ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*,, p. 113.

⁵⁰ Southall ; *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 117..

⁵¹ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 114.

⁵² B. Rogers : South Africa : The “Bantu Homelands”, (International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1973), p. 5.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Southall : *South Africa's Transkei*, p.115.

⁵⁵ Nhlapo Commission - Determination On Matanzima and Dalindyebo Paramountcies (Succession to the Kingship of abaThembu), pp. 40-41.

⁵⁶ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 153.

⁵⁷ Southall : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 117.

⁵⁸ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 156.

⁵⁹ Vigne : *Liberals* , p. 167.

⁶⁰ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 156.

⁶¹ The Correspondent - Rand Daily Mail :” Police Raid Langa Home of Chief Poto’s son”, 4 September 1964.

⁶² Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 156.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Staff Reporter : Rand Daily Mail -“Poto will do tour of S. A”, 7 October, 1964.

⁶⁵ Carter et al : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 156.

⁶⁶ Staff Reporter : Rand Daily Mail -“Poto will do tour of S. A”, 7 October, 1964.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Vigne : *Liberals*, p. 176.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Correspondent : The Star – Transkei Chief backs the Liberals, 12 october 1964.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ RDM, (Verwoerd's Transvaler) in Own Correspondent : "Poto may be Facing a curb" 13 October, 1964.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Correspondent - The Star : "Unprecedented inTranskei – Minister praises Policy", 19 October 1964.

⁸⁰ Vigne : *Liberals* p. 177.

⁸¹ Correspondent – The Star : "Matanzima Rand envoy condemns boss", 25 October, 1964.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Correspondent – The Star : "Matanzima sacks two party men on the Rand", 23 November, 1964.

⁸⁵ Kotze : *African Politics*, p.139.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Correspondent : *Rand Daily Mail* – "Transkei is stifling freedom", 5 April, 1965.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Vigne : *Liberals* p. 177.

⁹⁰ Laurence : *The Transkei*, p. 74.

⁹¹ A. Rider : *Rand Daily Mail* (RDM) - "Vital Pointer to trends in the Transkei," 17 November, 1964.

⁹² Laurence : *The Transkei*, p. 74.

⁹³ Rider : *Rand Daily Mail* (RDM) - "Vital Pointer to trends in the Transkei," 17 November, 1964.

⁹⁴ Vigne : *Liberals* p. 175.

⁹⁵ Rider : RDM - "Vital Pointer to trends in the Transkei", 17 November, 1964.

⁹⁶ Laurence : *The Transkei*, p. 67.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Rider : RDM - "Vital Pointer to trends in the Transkei", 17 November, 1964.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Correspondent : Star - "Poto wants Matanzima to resign", 28 November, 1964.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Staff Reporter : Rand Daily Mail – "Poto will do the tour of S. A." , 29 November, 1964.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Correspondent : The Star - "Resign! Poto tells Matanzima," 29 November, 1964.

¹⁰⁵ Correspondent - Rand Daily Mail : "More Cash for Chiefs," 7 December, 1964.

¹⁰⁶ RDM : Horseman chief may not use his car , 20 April 1965.

¹⁰⁷ Correspondent – RDM : "Horseman chief may not use his car," 20 April 1965.

¹⁰⁸ Correspondent-The Star – " Kaiser's grip on chiefs at stake", 23 August, 1965.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Kotze : *African Politics*, p.139.

¹¹¹ Laurence : *Transkei*, p. 64.

¹¹² B. Mthikakra : "Ukumkani uSabata Dalindyebo," p.8

¹¹³ Nhlapo Commission : "Determination On Matanzima and Dalindyebo Paramountcies " p.33.

¹¹⁴ Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail –"Matanzima Nears His Ambition", 5 May, 1965.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Correspondent : "The Star – Debate on Chieftainship", 22 May 1965.

¹¹⁷ Correspondent : “The Star – Debate on Chieftainship”, 22 May 1965

¹¹⁸ Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail –“Transkei M.P. gives bloodshed warning”, 25 May, 1965.

¹¹⁹ Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail –“Walkout by 37 in Transkei Assembly”, 26 May 1965.

¹²⁰ Reporter : The World- “20,000 Tribesmen reject Matanzima”, 13 July 1965.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Correspondent : The Star-“ Matanzima : chiefs will keep power”, 9 June 1965.

¹²³ Carter *et al* : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 156.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 157.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 156.

¹²⁶ Correspondent : The Star-“ Matanzima : chiefs will keep power”, 9 June 1965

¹²⁷ Kotze : *African Politics*, p.45.

¹²⁸ Correspondent : The Star-“ Matanzima : chiefs will keep power”, 9 June 1965.

¹²⁹ Correspondent : The Star - “Heaven Picks Rulers” for Transkei, 2 July, 1965.

¹³⁰ Ibid. .

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Correspondent : The Star – “Party aims at firmer grip in Transkei”, 8 November 1965.

¹³³ Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail –“African chiefs here to stay”, 22 December, 1965.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ The Correspondent –The Star : “Transkei will stand by S.A.”, 29 September, 1968.

¹³⁶ Nhlapo Commission : “Determination On Matanzima and Dalindyebo Paramountcies” p.37.

¹³⁷ Staff Reporter – RDM : “Matanzima’s son to be a Chief”, 11 November, 1969.

¹³⁸ Ibid. .

¹³⁹ M.M. Mhlathi : Interviewed by D.S.Yekela, 3, April, 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Chief Ngangomhlaba : interviewed by D.S Yekela, 26 July 2009.

¹⁴¹ D. Mgudlwa :Interviewed by D.S.Yekela, 6 June, 2009

¹⁴² B. Mthikrakra :”Ukumkani uSabata Dalindyebo,” p.12.

¹⁴³ Own Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail – “Cloak And Dagger Probe Led To Arrests”, 28 February, 1966.

¹⁴⁴ Own Correspondent : Rand Daily Mail – Plan to murder Kaiser related in court, 22 May, 1966.

¹⁴⁵ Kotze : *African Politics*, p. 242.

¹⁴⁶ Carter *et al* : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 135.

¹⁴⁷ Z. Swana (Bhizana): Interviewed by D.S.Yekela, Fort Hare, 8 September, 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Political Correspondent –RDM : “Transkei man held balance of power”, 2 October 1965.

¹⁴⁹ J.N. Satula : interviewed by D. S. Yekela, 8 August 2006.

¹⁵⁰ B. B. Maphosa (endorsed Mbambisa's testimony) : interviewed by D. S. Yekela, 23 May, 2006.

¹⁵¹ Political Correspondent –RDM : “Transkei man held balance of power”, 2 October 1965.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Political Correspondent –RDM : “Minister speaks on farm gift”, 4 October 1965.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. .

¹⁵⁹ Own Correspondent – RDM : “Colourful Transkei Wedding”, 12 January 1970.

¹⁶⁰ Own Correspondent – RDM : “I was at secret meeting – Chief Sabata speaks out ”, 14 February 1972.

¹⁶¹ Kotze : *African Politics*, p. 215.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Staff Reporter – RDM : “ Matanzima made threat – Sabata” , 13 March, 1972.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Caroline Clark –Sunday Times : “Guzana Challenges Chief : Give up apartheid or resign” 23 April 1972.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Caroline Clark –Sunday Times : “Matanzima-Further Land Or No More Repatriates – Those on the outside will be stateless”, 23 April 1972.

¹⁷⁰ Staff Reporter – RDM : “ Matanzima made threat – Sabata” , 13 March, 1972.

¹⁷¹ Caroline Clark –Sunday Times : “Matanzima-Further Land or No More Repatriates – Those on the outside will be stateless”, 23 April 1972.

¹⁷² Laurence ; *The Transkei*, p. 79.

¹⁷³ Dennis Gordon – RDM : “Transkei Cabinet ‘Botha’s Herdboys’ “ , 29 April, 1971.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Streek & Wicksteed : *Render Unto Kaiser*, pp.193-194.

¹⁷⁶ Laurence : *The Transkei*, p.84.

¹⁷⁷ Southall : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 131.

¹⁷⁸ N.M. Stultz : *Transkei's Half Loaf*, (Cape Town, 1980), p. 69.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Cape Times – “Transkei Politician arrested” 28 July 1976.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Laurence : *The Transkei*, p.83.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Cape Times – “Transkei Politician arrested” 28 July 1976.

¹⁸⁵ Daily Dispatch – “DP leader arrested”, 28 July, 1976.

¹⁸⁶ Stultz : *Transkei's Half Loaf*, p. 69.

¹⁸⁷ The Star Correspondent – “Transkei jails more DP men”, 14 August 1976.

¹⁴⁵ The Star Correspondent – “Matanzima foils Revolt Plot”, 19 September, 1976.

¹⁸⁹ The Correspondent – RDM : “Transkei man held”, 22 September, 1976.

¹⁹⁰ The Correspondent – RDM : “Transkei detains another candidate”, 28 September, 1976.

¹⁹¹ Southall : *South Africa's Transkei*, p. 128.

¹⁹² The Correspondent – RDM : “Taking the lid off the Transkei”, 15 October, 1976.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ The Reporter - Nicholas Ashford-The Cape Times : “Xhosa Chief’s dream come true”, 26 October, 1976.

¹⁹⁵ The Political Correspondent – RDM : “Matanzima wins landslide victory in Transkei poll”, 16 October 1976.

¹⁹⁶ The Correspondent – The Cape Times : “Transkei leader wins landslide victory”, 16 October, 1976.

¹⁹⁷ The Correspondent – The Star : “ Transkei victory for Matanzima” , 16 October, 1976.

¹⁹⁸ Patrick Laurence : RDM-“Matanzima landslide victory leads to one-party state”, 16 October , 1976.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ RDM-“Botha Sigcau to be President of the Transkei”, 20 October, 1976.

²⁰² RDM-“The Transkei; unhappy news comes in threes for Matanzima”, 25 October, 1976.

²⁰³ Bruce Loudon : “Thousands Flee Xhosa Rule In Transkei” 25 October, 1976.

²⁰⁴ Patrick Laurence : RDM-“Matanzima ‘insincere’ over Mandela,” 22 October, 1976.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ The Reporter - Nicholas Ashford-The Cape Times : “Transkei is declared independent,” 26 October, 1976.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FIRST YEARS OF AN INDEPENDENT TRANSKEI: THE WANING FORTUNES OF JONGUHLANGA'S PARAMOUNTCY, 1976-1980.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the survival of abaThembu chieftainship during the Transkei's independence. The main focus is on how the local party politics spill over to the power struggle between Sabata and Matanzima and in the way in which that struggle dominated the independent Transkei as is seen in Matanzima's reactionary rule and its effect on the stability of Sabata's paramountcy.

The chapter analyses Matanzima's desperation to crush opposition to his government and demonstrates his determination to make security of life and freedom of movement impossible for Sabata and his party associates. It also interrogates the methods he used to keep Sabata under surveillance and to involve himself in his domestic affairs ostensibly for the good of the paramount chief's family.

The chapter exposes the inconsistencies in Matanzima's method of operation – like when he condemned Sabata's recommendation of Dumalisile's appointment as his deputy on the grounds he was not a Mthembu, but readily backed Bambilanga with whom Sabata was not on good terms-a strategy he adopted ostensibly to mould the Dalindyebo chieftainship, and to make it fall in line with abaThembu traditional procedures when he in fact was nurturing instability in the paramountcy.

Finally it shows that with Sabata's deposition and his eventual replacement by his brother Bambilanga Matanzima achieved his goal of destabilising the Jongilizwe paramountcy.

ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP IN THE EARLY YEARS OF TRANSKEI'S INDEPENDENCE: RESPONSES AND SURVIVAL

Daliwonga emerged from the Transkei independence celebrations probably little aware that he had unwittingly reduced the abaThembu chieftainship to an 'item on auction'. He had done this by his act of 'bartering' the abaThembu chieftainship's consolidated status for a personal title worth half its physical image.

The first challenge to Transkei's new statehood was the formation of the labour inclined Transkei People's Freedom Party (TPFP) the purpose of which, in the words of its leader,¹ Cromwell Diko, was 'to prevent Matanzima from becoming a dictator'.² A conspicuous feature of the newly formed party was its Transkei political image which was manifested in its bringing together Diko and S. Sinaba from the TNIP³ and Chiefs P. Z. Nkosiyan, B. Z. Bacela and D.S. Bacela from the DP.⁴

Diko immediately spelled out the difference between his infant party and the TNIP. The TNIP had proposed that half the Assembly seats should be reserved for traditional leaders and had endorsed a constitution without a bill of rights. Diko claimed that his party stood for the election of all National Assembly members, excluding the five paramount chiefs, and the inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution.⁵ Diko's remark that 'these [the chiefs] are the people we don't want in Parliament. They know they are protected here by being chiefs'⁶ proved that Matanzima's proximity to the chiefs and their politically-engineered support of him put them in a bad light. This view is endorsed by Oomen's statement that the role which the traditional leaders assumed in homeland politics, either enthusiastically or hesitantly, hardly led to an increase in their popularity with their subjects⁷. Evans has also subtly criticised the self-interest which influenced the chiefs' decisions and political choices in describing the newly independent Transkei as a 'rigged modern state [where] the dominance of chiefs was guaranteed'. Diko's castigation of the chiefs immediately drew a hostile response from one of the Mthikrakra chiefs who was obviously a beneficiary of the chiefs' dominated Parliament. Mthikrakra's eviction from parliament, to the clapping of the MPs⁸, can be seen as proof that not even Prime Minister Matanzima could protect the chiefs who thought that their


MP status in a chiefs' dominated House of Assembly entitled them to violate parliamentary ethics.

Hardly a month after the independence celebrations press reports confirmed that 'Chief Matanzima, a firm supporter of the tribal system of chieftainship, has also begun to wield the axe against the few fellow chiefs who support the DP'.⁹ As confirmation of these reports, the Matanzima government deposed, without giving reasons and by order of the South African state, Chief Mdanjelwa Mthikakra, a staunch supporter of the DP. It was clear that Matanzima's harassment of the opposition was a way of gunning for the soul of Sabata and also to deprive him of a base from which to challenge the government. The deposition and subsequent detention of Mdanjelwa meant that he had lost his seat in the Transkei Assembly. A comment that appeared alongside the report about Mdanjelwa read 'by his actions, Chief Matanzima has shown clearly that he intends to rule the Transkei with an iron hand and that he will not tolerate effective opposition'.¹⁰ Matanzima also threatened Sabata with loss of his parliamentary seat and termination of his chieftainship if he continued to absent himself from the National Assembly sessions. A stroke of the pen that confirmed attendance at parliamentary sittings was a criterion the Governor-General could use to rule on the competence of chiefs and/or to terminate legitimate chieftainships.

After the detention of his party members under Proclamation R400, Sabata claimed to have been threatened with deposition by Matanzima if he continued his association with the DP.¹¹ Matanzima's threat to strip Paramount Sabata of his indigenous status undermined even the little autonomy that the National Party had accorded the Transkei state. It gave credibility to Alexis de Tocqueville's comment that 'if men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in jeopardy'.¹² Matanzima capitalised on the fact that Sabata's status as a member of the House depended on his being 'sworn in'. He is supposed to have appealed to Sabata 'to spare at least five minutes to come to Parliament for the formal swearing in ceremony... [and] warned that his non-membership [of the parliament which was to be ratified by the swearing-in ceremony]

might have serious repercussions on his chieftainship'.¹³ Matanzima's claim that reports about Sabata's indisposition were without substance because 'he had frequently been seen in Umtata while Parliament was on'¹⁴ was evidence that he kept surveillance on Sabata whom he was seeking to nail down. Sabata on the other hand, by embarking on a cat and mouse game, willfully disregarded parliamentary procedures as a way of declaring his dissociation with Transkei's new status and its leadership.

Another incident that impacted negatively on Sabata's social image was his failure to observe customary protocol when he took his great wife, NoMoscow. Her father, Elfers Njokweni, subsequently complained to the dictatorial Matanzima who would always avail himself of an opportunity to meddle in affairs of any kind where Sabata was concerned. Matanzima projected himself ostensibly as a defender of the rights of NoMoscow's son, Buyelekhaya. He then urged his secretary to 'draw Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga's attention to the anomaly as 'it will be the issue when succession is considered by the Tembus'.¹⁵ In the light of the efforts to correct this cultural anomaly, must be understood Sabata's confirmation, as contained in Matanzima's letter to Njokweni, of the arrangements for a 'tribal marriage', *umdudo*, for the month of August 1971.¹⁶ Matanzima's treatment of Sabata's domestic affairs as state business portrayed Sabata as his ward as much as it afforded him the high ground of a moral victory.



It must be presumed that Matanzima's confirmation of the Christian rites of Sabata and NoMoscow and further, that the various houses 'of Sabata were allocated and given statuses in terms of custom by the Paramount Chief of Emigrant abaThembuland on 10 October 1975 at Bumbane'¹⁷ did not give him the impression that he was the 'kingmaker' in the House of Dalindyebo.

SABATA-MATANZIMA POWER STRUGGLE ESCALATES DURING TRANSKEI'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Even after Matanzima had achieved his dream of the independence of the Transkei, an exercise that had obviously added political value to his paramountcy by making him the head of state, it became clear that none of these accomplishments had given him the personal satisfaction of being superior to Sabata. Sabata also made it very clear, by word as well as by his actions, that he did not intend to subordinate himself to Prime Minister Matanzima. Matanzima's super administrative authority which he could use to compel his otherwise recalcitrant cousin to toe his political line proved to be powerless in the face of the innate 'checks and balances' that safeguarded the ritual element of the indigenous law. The declaration of war against the opposition as reflected in its gradual elimination through the arrests of its members must be seen as Matanzima's personal strategy to isolate and intimidate Sabata into endorsing the Transkei's independence.

Matanzima's thinking hinted at his subtle intention to make abaThembu chieftainship more adaptable to his interests. He presumed that Sabata needed a deputy to be able to execute his duties both as a chief and a parliamentarian. He thereupon recommended with a measure of subtle force, and with the magistrate's backing, that Sabata should appoint a deputy paramount chief to act in his capacity at eBhotwe (Bumbane Great Place) Tribal Authority to give himself time to attend to abaThembu business in his Mthatha town office.¹⁸ If were this were to transpire, Matanzima would be granted his wish to monitor Sabata's every move at close quarters and to negate any justification for Sabata's reported regular absenteeism from parliamentary sessions. He

would also be able to see for himself if Sabata were taking seriously Matanzima's warning to cut all association with the DP as a condition for retaining his chieftainship. It must be presumed that any appointee deputy for Sabata would require the premier's approval. Sabata's subsequent appointment of Chief Gangathile Dumalisile, a former head of the Cacadu Tribal Authority who was a non-Dalindyebo mThembu, seemed to correspond neatly with Matanzima's BAA era manoeuvres, when he would strategically place chiefs of abaThembu extraction over the non-abaThembu communities of St Marks and eventually absorb such communities into his amaHala unit. Here was now a non-Mthembu chief appointed over abaThembu. It must be presumed that Sabata's motive in appointing Dumalisile was to offset President Matanzima's schemes because Dumalisile was perceived as a person who had no connection with the premier. Once Qaba, a government clerk, confirmed the appointment of Dumalisile as Sabata's deputy and accordingly solicited the prime minister's approval, Matanzima immediately raised unwarranted concerns :

I am deeply concerned about the Tembu Paramountcy. The Deputy to the Paramount Chief should be a person (Chief or Headman) in the Dalindyebo Family in order to have the respect of the Tribe. Chief Gangathile Dumalisile will be in trouble and will quarrel with the members of the Dalindyebo family. We want peace at the Great Place and the Deputy of the Paramount Chief should assist him in maintaining that peace.¹⁹

Confirmation by Makohliso, secretary of the the Executive Committee of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority, of the recommendation made at a meeting of 13 September 1977 for the appointment of Dumalisile²⁰ proved Matanzima's fears unjustifiable. Matanzima's mischievous involvement was also suspected when a quarrel between Sabata and his brother, Bambilanga, led to a backlog in the trial of eBhotwe cases. Bambilanga had been, hitherto the Paramount Chief's deputy invested with civil and criminal jurisdiction to try cases at Sithebe Great Place on behalf of the Ebhotwe Tribal Authority. The failure to resolve this feud affected the functioning of the tribal court and thus discredited Sabata. An even more interesting development was the sudden resumption of duty by Bambilanga without any prompting from Sabata. It thus cannot be ruled out that Matanzima saw in the brothers' feuding an opportunity to fish in troubled waters by posing as interested arbiter, while tilting the scales in favour of his grand schemes.

There was thus a possibility that Sabata was dealing with a 'many-headed hydra' in his misunderstanding with Bambilanga.

Matanzima also willfully obstructed Sabata from sending his son, Buyelekhaya, then a minor, to a 'person unknown to the tribe and family in Botswana for upbringing', and the the Mthatha magistrate supported him in this.²¹ It must be noted that Matanzima already felt threatened by what he believed to be the effect on Sabata of 'communistic' thinking. It was therefore understandable why he was intolerant of the idea of a younger communist in the making, especially one whom he had recently endorsed as heir to Sabata and, in that role, Matanzima progeny's future counterpart. The reasons for Matanzima's fears of what challenges the 'communist contaminated' abaThembu chieftainship might pose for his 'so-called independent domain' must be understood in the light of what he had achieved for the NP government and for himself. He had effectively, under South Africa's patronage, shepherded the Transkei on its road to independence with incomparable dividends. It was therefore of cardinal importance to close ranks and shut out any threat of communist infiltration to avoid undermining what he had worked so hard to achieve. His pretended intention to 'format' Prince Buyelekhaya's thinking into his model abaThembu 'royal' by protecting him from political contamination had more to do with his aim of wanting to monitor both the father and son. Every effort had to be made to guard against putting the abaThembu chieftainship into enemy hands. Any chief who was like Matanzima would be amenable to the political interests of the NP. Should Buyelekhaya become such a chief then Matanzima would have re-invented a new amenable brand of chieftainship. Further, Buyelekhaya would be more than an appropriate heir for Sabata. The magistrate admitted to also having warned Sabata 'against the dangers of the young future Tembu Paramount chief one day returning to Transkei possibly as a terroristically indoctrinated young man with the evils of may-be even communism deeply rooted in his very existence: how could the powers-to-be then ever elevate such a young man to Paramount Chieftainship under such circumstances?'²² It was of great historical interest for the future relationship of Sabata and Bambilanga that the magistrate, by his own admission, saw fit to engage Sabata on the Buyelekhaya affair in the presence of the Matanzima-inclined Bambilanga.

Divisive Incidents like the above hinted at a bigger picture in the division of abaThembu chieftainships.

MANGCOTYWA TAKES UP THE CUDGELS FOR JONGUHLANGA

Sabata's refusal to co-operate with Matanzima drew George Matanzima even closer to his brother. Evidence that the Matanzima brothers continuously perceived Sabata as a threat was seen in the contents of a message from Prime Minister George Matanzima to the departmental secretary of the 'Accounts Section in the Transkei government. The premier's office instructed the Accounts' Section not to 'pay Paramount Chief Sabata subsistence and travelling allowance paid to Parliamentarians who attend sessions because he has not attended this session of Parliament'.²³ Whilst this message showed that Sabata was still the target of Matanzima's 'barbed shafts', it also confirmed the latter's determination to reduce his senior cousin to destitution by squeezing him financially. One can read in Matanzima's instruction his readiness to use his political position and power to coerce Sabata to endorse the *fait accompli*, Transkei independence and support it. A veteran civil servant confessed that he processed Sabata's MP allowances after discovering that the TNIP MPs were always paid their daily allowances irrespective of their attendance or non-attendance at parliamentary sessions.

Sabata, on the one hand, appeared not to recognise Matanzima's newly acquired political honours as symbols of equality between them. He instead expressed in unequivocal terms his determination to challenge Matanzima's conservative policies, but admitted that such a task would be handicapped by the inadequate human resources of his party. Laurence quoted Sabata as saying 'we are still going to fight, though I don't know how because most of our people have been detained.'²⁴ The justification for his claims was in a letter written by the publicity secretary of the national executive of the DP, Florence Mangcotywa, who remarked thus in her letter :

The political set-up of the Transkei is based on chieftainship. Chiefs are not only legislators but also administrators in the rural areas, a system that was never employed anywhere according to recorded history. Chiefs are compelled to support the Government if not they will find themselves subjected to severe reprisals by the Government.²⁵

Mangcotywa substantiated her claims by enumerating the victimization of the abaThembu chiefs (Bangilizwe and Anderson Joyi, and Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra). They ended up either in exile, as in the case of Mdanjelwa who sought political asylum in King William's Town, or were banished, as was the fate of the Joyi brothers, who were banished to Qumbu and Cofimvaba respectively for refusing to toe the Matanzima line. Mangcotywa charged further, with justification, that 'the Government says it is boosting chieftainship when in actual fact they are consolidating the position of the TNIP'²⁶ the party whose apparent purpose was to advance Matanzima's interests. In a desperate tone of someone who was disgusted with the tyranny that confronted the opposition party members at every turn, and presumably as an apology for Sabata's vain struggle against Matanzima, Mangcotywa further remarked that

The people are not prepared to accept bluff because they know who their leaders are. We wholeheartedly agree with Paramount Chief Sabata that he was robbed of his land because of his political convictions. As the King of the Tembus he has jurisdiction civil and criminal over all the Tembu districts stretching from Umtata to Lady Frere and Elliotdale.²⁷

It is clear from Mangcotywa's statements that the victimisation of the DP members had hardened them to the extent of making them unafraid of all reprisals. Mangcotywa's popular reinforcement of the legitimacy of Sabata's leadership over the whole of abaThembuland was evidently provocative and a slight to Matanzima. It was also clear from her speech that the fight to establish who was superior, Matanzima or Sabata, was far from being over and that it would continue for as long as the issues that undermined Sabata's authority and leadership were not addressed and resolved satisfactorily. The immediacy of reaction to Mangcotywa's press statement confirmed the seriousness with which the prime minister and the Transkei security police viewed her remarks 'Miss Mangcotywa is misleading the nation by giving them distorted facts'²⁸ was the response from M. Z. Ngceba's office which purported to set the record straight about the chiefs referred to as victims in a media statement. He also remarked in a letter to the premier's secretary, M. Lujabe, that 'I would be very grateful if your Department which keeps records of Chiefs will rebut the statement made by Miss Mangcotywa which to me has a tinge of incitement'.²⁹ The prime minister's office was accordingly

called upon to prove that Chief Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra 'was never appointed as a chief but acted for his brother...was found guilty on a criminal charge ...was never charged for political offences.'³⁰ The office was further called upon to prove that "Anderson Joyi was never appointed as a chief at any given time'.³¹ The testimony from Lujabe's office with regard to Bangilizwe Joyi was that no person by the name of Marelane (Bangilizwe) has ever been designated or even recognized as chief'.³² The report was also emphatic about Mangcotywa's misrepresentation of Chief Sabata's jurisdictional rights as 'Chief Sabata Dalindyebo could never have jurisdiction over Lady Frere which has recently been incorporated to Transkei. It is a blatant lie that he has been robbed of Elliotdale. Elliotdale falls under Paramount Chief Xolilizwe Sigcau'.³³

Needless to say Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra and the Joyi brothers were chiefs by birth because they were descendants of King Ngubengcuka.³⁴ The repudiation of Sabata's territorial and political claims was based on the grounds explained by Lujabe thus:

the region at present known as Western Tembuland has its own paramountcy since the pre-independence era.-----The paramountcy over Emigrant Tembuland (and subsequently over Western Tembuland) was created at the request of the said regional authority and was recommended by the then Legislative Assembly in terms of section 45(2) of the repealed Constitution Act No. 48 of 1963.³⁵

While Mangcotywa's descriptive demarcation of Sabata's original territory was a true historical representation of events there was irony in the government's perhaps inadvertent endorsement of the claim. The government paradoxically confirmed Sabata's submissions even though they did not own up to tampering with historical tradition to achieve specific objectives or attain the desired result. The security police's reaction and the response from the premier's office confirmed the situation as it was at the time of the press statement, but did not justify Mangcotywa's remarks based as they were both on the situation and what had caused it.

Mangcotywa's remarks on Sabata's claims of authority over certain districts of abaThembuland brought forth a response from President Matanzima who addressed a letter to the Prime Minister. The President stated :

I have to direct that you instruct Paramount Chief Dalindyebo to stop causing intertribal disturbances by making false claims over the Districts of Xhora, Cofimvaba, Cala and Lady Frere *vide* Imvo Transkei dated 3rd March, 1979. His assertions that he fears nobody are noted as a matter of insubordination against the President. Cabinet should at once put him in his place by redefining and gazetting Sabata's area of jurisdiction of 3 districts of the Dalindyebo region only namely Engcobo, Mqanduli and Umtata. I will sign the gazette.³⁶

It must be noted that Sabata's persistent claims and reference to the land demarcation and delimitation of the compound abaThembu paramountcy was a historical fact. Unfortunately Matanzima viewed it as a personal affront both to his paramountcy status and to all that had justified its invention by the South African government.

Matanzima was particularly irked by Sabata's claims to territorial jurisdiction over an area which included Emigrant abaThembuland. The remarks belittled his paramountcy by portraying him as a chief whose domain corresponded to the level of a district chief. What Sabata perceived as historical reality was seen by Matanzima as an interrogation of the legitimacy of his paramountcy and therefore as a slight to the person of the president. While Sabata drew no parallel between his paramountcy and Matanzima's presidential status, it suited Matanzima to factor- in his politico-civil status of Governor-Generalship because it allowed him to be both a pilot and a passenger. It is interesting to note that even this latter political advantage which enabled Matanzima to shift positions for his convenience did not seem to give him spiritual contentment and ritual security as a natural chief. This was the reason he set the Cabinet, over which he had absolute control, to fight his otherwise extra-parliamentary battles with Sabata. Obviously Matanzima continued to perceive him as a threat because Sabata's territorial claims were substantiated by history, a factual reality that Matanzima and his NP benefactors could neither reverse, modify, nor re-invent. Streek and Wicksteed have claimed that it was both the numerical strength of Sabata's chieftom and his popularity with his people that pushed Matanzima to try 'to win abaThembu chiefs and headmen into his camp, and to wipe out the threat posed by those who refuse to come willingly to his side'.³⁷

SABATA JONGUHLANGA ON THE PATH TO DEPOSITION

A new factor in the ongoing tension between Matanzima and Sabata emerged from a rather unexpected quarter. An invitation to Sabata from Caledon Mda of the Transkei National Progressive Party (TNPP) to attend a meeting in Qumbu exacerbated the tension between the two chiefs. This invitation came after Sabata's attendance of another meeting in Manzana Location of the Ngcobo District. His attendance here was, to the pleasure of his apolitical councillors, uneventful. It had become obvious, however, that the harassment of the opposition party members and their allies would be a principal item of discussion at the Qumbu rally. Against this background must be understood why some of Sabata's councillors, including his trusted one, Bhedla kaMpulane, advised him not to attend the Qumbu meeting, while others encouraged him to attend. In the end Bhedla could only advise his paramount chief against speaking at the meeting. Sabata attended the meeting which was held in Mdeni Village in the company of leading oppositionists, Pikashe, Xobololo, Anderson.Joyi and Kati (Chamehashini). On the day after the meeting the *Daily Dispatch* reported on Sabata's speech at the meeting and showed pictures of the paramount chief hoisting his fist among, and with the crowds as they proclaimed 'amandla ngawethu/ power belongs to us'.³⁸ The speech, according to the subsequent judgement sheet was made in *isiXhosa* on 30 June 1979 and 'recorded on a tape recorder by one Xobololo, a member of the accused's political party'.³⁹ Sabata was alleged to have stated that

may it be remembered that he [Matanzima] had declared [that] the Chiefs are the cornerstone of his Government but the mystery of it today is that he being fully my junior in lineage is not ashamed to set me at loggerheads with my brother Bambilanga, in his desire that my Paramount Chieftaincy be transferred to him.⁴⁰

He was reported to have also remarked that the 'Transkeian Government is a Government that revels in provocations about trifles and that it instigates its people to be at loggerheads one with the other'.⁴¹ Sabata also reiterated that he was the 'Paramount Chief of Matanzima, having been born his senior, and will forever remain so'.⁴² According to the report Sabata also claimed that the 'President visited Pretoria at the instance of the White Boers and accepted independence on terms dictated by them'.⁴³ He was obviously alluding to Daliwonga's exchanging the citizenship rights of

the Transkei body politic as well as trading off Sabata's all-embracing abaThembu paramountcy for personal political gain. Sabata's statement to the effect that Transkei people were not free and that 'they do not have either freedom or independence; that Transkeian passports are valueless documents'⁴⁴ was an indictment of South Africa's grant to Matanzima of a *carte blanche* to wield his authority in a way that would secure his political persona. It was also a censure of Matanzima's readiness to facilitate the NP *divide et impera* exercise irrespective of whether he was the only beneficiary. Sabata elaborated thus in his speech 'The freedom we have today is the freedom of *Nkululekweni* (Mthatha ministerial complex), --- where the Ministers and the State President reside. ---I am personally not free. Of course we love this independence yet it is independence of *Nkululekweni*'.⁴⁵

On the claim of the uselessness of passports he was reported to have called on passport holders 'to hand this useless document back to the Government.----When I was in Johannesburg recently for health reasons I intended going to Malawi to get treatment from a specialist and I was told by a Pretoria official that Transkei passport holders are not allowed entry into Malawi.'⁴⁶ Sabata based his description of the Transkei passports as useless on his personal experiences, declaring that 'I call upon all Transkei passport holders to accompany me and I will lead them to surrender this invalid document to the Government.'⁴⁷ Mthikakra has also made mention of Sabata's never-realised intention to attend a meeting in Malawi in 1979 in the company of a politicised herbalist Frank Sithole.⁴⁸

Sabata's comments were unpalatable to Matanzima who probably perceived them for what they implied, an assault on his presidential dignity. That the remarks provoked Matanzima's vengeance was evident in the successive orders which originated from the offices of one or the other of the Matanzima brothers. The president's directive instruction to the premier which had been provoked by Mangcotywa's claims about Sabata's land rights was followed by a similar directive, expressing the presidential sentiments but this time from the premier to Paramount Chief J.S. Dalindyebo. It was clear that persecution of Sabata, for whatever reason, was the brothers' mission and

their strategic administrative positions were strong enough to help them accomplish their desired objective. Sabata's attention was drawn to the 'Republic of Transkei Constitution Act No.15 of 1976 wherein your area of jurisdiction is defined as comprising the districts of Engcobo, Mqanduli and Umtata'.⁴⁹ This had clearly become a desperate battle waged by the Matanzimas to retain what had been conferred on them by the NP without Sabata's approval.

The wrangle over the areas of jurisdiction of the two abaThembu paramount chiefs between the presidential office and Paramount Chief Sabata assumed new proportions after Sabata's utterances at the Qumbu meeting. Against this background must be understood the events leading to the raid of Sabata's Great Place and his subsequent arrest. The ostensible reason for the arrest was obviously the speech that he had made at the Qumbu rally. Although these remarks were serious in their own right, the reaction of the Matanzima government was shaped less by the remarks themselves than by the history of the conflict between the K.D. Matanzima and Sabata. The conflict was a mere symptom and for this reason a lesser problem than its deeper irreversible causes the nature of which obviously irked president Matanzima. William Nelani, one of Sabata's councillors confirmed the detention of Sabata following a raid on his Great Place, this to the denial of Colonel Ngceba who was recognized as the President's close confidante.⁵⁰ The nature of the dispute between Sabata and Matanzima, the incompatibility of the offices they held at the time, all presented a situation which seemed at best to interrogate the cultural impropriety of the marriage between the bureaucratic and traditional offices and at worst to indict the architects of apartheid for ever conceiving this trick on the 'homeland'.

The arrest of Sabata took place on 26 July 1979⁵¹ at about 17h00 according to Chief Bhekisizwe Mthikrakra.⁵² The detention was the culmination of a systematic and methodical silencing of the opposition party which had slowly but surely punctuated Transkeian political activity since the eve of the conferment of the self-government. Bhekisizwe has confirmed that Sabata never resisted the arrest except to ask if he could bring his own blankets to which question he was told there were enough blankets

where he was going. Sabata's popularity was reflected in the way in which his subjects charged at the police and soldiers who were engaging with their natural leader as they prepared to arrest him.⁵³ Streek and Wicksteed have confirmed the reports of abaThembu anger at the detention of their paramount chief. They explain Ngceba's denial of knowledge about the arrest and Keswa's denial of military involvement in the detention. The fact that Brigadier Cwele, a mThembu and the first Transkei commissioner of police, was retired for having refused to effect the initial arrest on the explicit orders of President Kaiser Matanzima⁵⁴ is evidence of how strong the determination of some individuals to support the Sabata cause was. Proof that those who executed the arrest were acting only in the discharge of their duties was the fact that they told Sabata in no uncertain terms that 'they had been sent by Ngceba to fetch him'.⁵⁵ Sabata was placed in Mthatha cells and soon transferred to Sterkspruit prison.⁵⁶

Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have appropriately described the arrest and sentencing of Paramount Chief Sabata as one event that sounded the death knell for opposition politics in the Transkei bantustan.⁵⁷ The above claim finds full justification in Streek and Wicksteed's association of the timing of Sabata's arrest with his new Democratic Progressive Party's success in forging unity between abaThembu East and amaMpondo West. That the Matanzima brothers, who both held mutually complementary positions in the Transkei government perceived the new 'intertribal' alliance as an historical threat brings to mind the earlier Kaiser Matanzima-Botha Sigcau understanding. It is also a strong possibility that they saw it as thwarting the Transkei Government's apparent plan to bring Sabata down. What the Matanzima brothers did not know was that by arresting Sabata they had committed an unforgivable act of injustice which focused the public eye on the victim and once more invited the interrogation of the merits and demerits of 'homeland independence'. The president and the prime minister may have successfully eliminated the threat that the opposition posed in the House of Assembly, but the public outcry was indisputable proof that Sabata had popular backing that transcended the confines of the composite abaThembuland.

Charges against Sabata proved that he was punished more for contesting power sharing with Matanzima on an indigenous platform and in a traditional setting than for absenteeism from parliamentary sessions. Sabata's land claims, particularly over Emigrant abaThembuland, violated the president's dignity while his rejection of independence was interpreted as subverting and/or interfering with the state authority⁵⁸ which was wielded by the president through his brother, the premier. It is not clear whether Sabata's utterances would have been given the same weight if they had come before Matanzima had succeeded to the presidency. The question of whether Matanzima would have had the audacity to challenge Sabata's remarks if he had remained an ordinary state ordained paramount chief also arises here.

On 7 August 1979, 12 days after his arrest, Sabata was released on bail of R1000.⁵⁹ It was evident that the tempo of events was quickening from a letter that recommended the suspension of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo 'in terms of section 47(1) of the Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 which was subsequently approved by the Prime Minister'.⁶⁰ It was confirmed in the same letter that Sabata was being charged with the offence of contravening the provisions of section 71 of the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act, No. 15 of 1976. He was also being charged for contravening section 3 of the Public Security Act.⁶¹ Another letter which soon followed from the premier to the Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga read thus 'I hereby suspend you from office in terms of section 47(1) (b) of the Transkei Authorities Act No.4 of 1965 with effect from 26 July 1979 pending the outcome of the charges laid against you'.⁶² It must be noted that when Sabata was served with a suspension letter he was effectively not functioning in his capacity as paramount because he was being held as a prisoner in Sterkspruit.⁶³ On the day after the suspension the premier's office issued an order to the office of the Accountant to 'stop payment of [Jonguhlanga's] salary with effect from 26/7/1979. Suspension'.⁶⁴

The inflexibility of the Matanzimas towards Sabata confronts the reader of a letter dated 31 July 1979 which Sabata wrote to the state president from his prison cell. In the letter Sabata addresses his junior cousin, the man he salutes as *Mhlekaazi* /Sir, as follows:

I arrived here on the night of 26/7/79. On that very night elders paid me a visit and advised that I should come to you.

I beg you Sir to allow me to come and personally express these words of a humble apology to you after which I will come back here.

I hereby punish myself, and I acknowledge receipt of the Premier's letter, (most likely the suspension letter) about which I do not complain.

I trust that my request will be acceptable to the chief

Yours humbly

J.S. Dalindyebo

*Ah! Daliwonga*⁶⁵

There is no record of a response from President Matanzima to this humble letter which was obviously written under the most humiliating conditions. It must be presumed that it fell on deaf ears. Sabata probably knew that his cause was forever lost but decided to bow to advice from the elders. The visit of the grey-haired councillors or elders, and the advice they gave to Sabata serves as a confirmation of the kind of disbelief that Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have claimed to have gripped the abaThembu when they heard of their paramount chief's arrest. It also shows that Matanzima had gone too far in his vindictiveness and determination to bend Sabata's thinking and make him comply. The letter itself serves as an indictment on Matanzima's stoneheartedness.

Lujabe wrote at the same time to the District Police Commissioner, informing him of the suspension of Paramount Chief J. S. Dalindyebo. He also directed him to convene a meeting of the members of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority to designate 'an acting paramount chief during the period of suspension of Paramount Chief JS Dalindyebo'.⁶⁶

The suspension of Sabata was immediately followed by the confirmation, in terms of section 66(1) of the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act, 1976 (Act No.15 of 1976 (as amended), of the designation of Albert Bambilanga Dalindyebo as acting paramount chief of abaThembu chiefdom resident within the area of jurisdiction of the Dalindyebo Region. The designation had been confirmed by the state president and the Dalindyebo Regional Authority.⁶⁷ Subsequent correspondence from the Lujabe informed Chief Bambilanga of his new status as Acting Paramount Chief.⁶⁸ The district commissioner was also advised to see to it that the designation of the acting paramount chief was

brought to the notice of the public soon,⁶⁹ a step that was possibly calculated to gauge the popular reaction to any appointment in Sabata's position.

Matanzima's vindictiveness to Sabata is revealed in the instruction to pay Sabata for only twenty-six days in July and effect payment for Bambilanga from 3 August 1979: a mean saving of seven days' pay! He could at least have authorised Sabata's payment for the whole month of July.⁷⁰ The next step that was authorised by the secretary for the Department of Justice was the conferment of civil and criminal jurisdiction on the acting paramount chief in respect of his area of jurisdiction.⁷¹ Bambilanga, in turn, appointed Chief C. Z. Sangoni to be his parliamentary representative⁷² and this contradicted Matanzima's earlier recommendation to Sabata whom he had advised to appoint a deputy paramount chief so as to give himself time for his parliamentary duties. It must be presumed that this change of practice was one way of monitoring closely the activities at the Great Place, especially in the aftermath of Sabata's arrest.

The trial of Sabata was conducted on 1 April 1980, in Port St Johns, to avoid a recurrence of public demonstration such as had characterised his arrest⁷³. Later that month, after his trial and subsequent conviction, the prime minister's office received a letter from attorney Mxenge's Durban office in which the attorney argued for the urgent re-instatement of Sabata.⁷⁴ The premier's office told Mxenge in no uncertain terms that because the criminal conviction was *prima facie* proof of misconduct, re-instatement of his client was not automatic. The attorney was further advised that in terms of the Transkei Authorities Act the matter of Sabata's suspension had to be referred to the Regional Authority for consideration for punitive measures. In addition Mxenge's attention was drawn to provisions of various sections of the Transkei Authorities Act, 1965 (Act No. 4 of 1965) in terms of which it was pertinent for the premier to consider the matter in the light of section 46(1). An important aspect of the response was the one where the plaintiff's attorney was advised that the record of the case had first to be made available to enable the prime minister to consider the matter.⁷⁵ Subsequent communication from the district commissioner confirmed that the paramount chief was

charged with the offence of contravening section 71 of Act 15 of 1976 in that during the period 30 June to 14 July 1979 and at or near the Mdeni Administrative Area in the district of Qumbu, and in Umtata the accused did wrongfully and unlawfully commit acts which were calculated to violate the dignity or injure the reputation of the President of Transkei.

He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 'a fine of R700.00 or eighteen months imprisonment of which R200.00 or six months are suspended for three years on condition that during that period the accused does not commit a contravention of section 71 of Act 15 of 1976.'⁷⁶

While the legal fine must be seen as a sign that the Matanzima brothers were not relenting it must be presumed that they also had a hand in the Dalindyebo Regional Authority's resolution to fine Sabata for misconduct.⁷⁷ The cabinet resolved, as a matter of procedure, to refer the matter back to the Dalindyebo Regional Authority after its findings that the fine of R100.00 was inappropriate for the nature of the serious offence committed by Sabata.⁷⁸

The Dalindyebo Regional Authority subsequently resolved at a meeting of 1 August 1980 that

Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyebo be suspended from office without salary or other remuneration for a period of two years. There were 17 votes in support of the resolution. A second motion – that Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga Sabata Dalindyebo be dismissed or deposed obtained 3 votes. There were three abstentions.⁷⁹

The chiefs Gangathile Dumalisile, Zululiyazongoma Mngqanqeni and Zwelidumile Joyi (Bangilizwe's brother), were very vocal in their recommendations that Paramount Chief Jonguhlanga be permanently deposed. The three were later rewarded with headships of tribal authorities by the Transkei government.⁸⁰

Of interest in examining the relationship between the Matanzima brothers and Sabata was the way in which the state laws were crafted so as to make it easy for them to do with Sabata as they pleased. Paragraph 6 in a memorandum to the cabinet, which was qualified 'SECRET', stipulated that

Any punishment by the Regional Authority is, in terms of section 46(4) (a) of the Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 subject to confirmation by the Cabinet. Any such punishment may, however, in terms of section 46(5) of the same Act, be confirmed or referred back by the Cabinet at its discretion, to the authority concerned for further consideration.⁸¹

In the light of the above stipulation must be understood the cabinet meeting of 4 August 1979 and its vociferous feeling about the inadequacy, as a form of punishment, of the two year suspension of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo as well as its subsequent resolution

in terms of section 46(6) of the Transkei Authorities Act No.4 of 1965 that the Paramount Chief be dismissed. Ministers have the honour to recommend that it may please His Excellency, the President to confirm in terms of section 46(6) of the Transkei Authorities Act No. 4 of 1965 the dismissal of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo from office with effect from 4 August 1980.⁸²

The above developments smacked of KD's influence and also give credibility to Bangilizwe's claim as to his ability to exploit family differences, to turn family against family and to divide a family.

The Matanzima brothers went further in building a strong case against Sabata. A report that appeared in *Daily Dispatch*, purporting to be an account of Sabata's 'short life history' as given by George Matanzima, gave the impression that Sabata's 'disrespect' towards Kaiser Matanzima dated from the latter's becoming a head of state

This attitude has resulted in the insults Chief Sabata has directed against the State President which have amounted to a treasonable act. As a normal consequence to this conduct it has been decided that Chief Sabata cannot hold a seat of leadership to people under the head of state and thus has had to be deposed from paramountcy.⁸³

Matanzima was obviously uneasy and guilty about the harassment of Sabata as evidenced by the following remark that 'Chief Sabata's conduct would have deserved the same consequence even if the State President were a different person from Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima'.⁸⁴ Of the many claims that Sabata dismissed in his so-called 'short life history' as presented by George, was that he denied ever sending his son to Botswana for terrorist training 'how could I send a 14 year old to be trained as a terrorist'? he is said to have asked? ⁸⁵He also denied, with full justification, that

Matanzima's father, Mhlobo, was ever a paramount chief. While he admitted having been dismissed from Bensonvale for misconduct, he at the same time revealed that the reason he was not admitted at Lovedale, was not because of misconduct at the previous school he attended, as George Matanzima claimed, but that Kaiser Matanzima had not fulfilled his responsibility of applying for his admission at the said school.⁸⁶ It thus became evident that George Matanzima had indeed taken the opportunity to announce the deposition of Sabata to demonise him.

On 6 August 1980 Sabata signed his receipt of his deposition letter that had been written and signed by the prime minister. The actual act of deposition of Sabata 'from your office as paramount chief of the Tembu Tribe, with effect from 8 August 1980'⁸⁷ had been ratified by State President Matanzima 'under powers vested in him by section 46(6) of the Transkei Authorities Act, 1965 (Act No. 4 of 1965), after consideration of the recommendation by the Dalindyebo Regional Authority'.⁸⁸ The deposition letter bore the stamp of the district commissioner as well.⁸⁹ The letter was to be delivered to Sabata 'in the event of his not being there, kindly serve to the spouse or whoever is present and report back what you have done'.⁹⁰

JONGUHLANGA'S DISAPPEARANCE ENTRENCHES THE PARAMOUNTCY OF BAMBILANGA.

When it became obvious that Sabata's lot was to be harassment, after his conviction and deposition as a paramount chief, he fled his fatherland. There is more than one version about the circumstances surrounding Sabata's flight. The common factor in all the versions – which could be mutually complementary- is that Sabata escaped from Bumbane in a bakery truck⁹¹ which, according to some informants, carried hot bread under which the paramount chief hid. When the driver was stopped at a road block, he hastened to open the back while remarking that all he was 'carrying here is nice smelling bread'.⁹² Sabata is supposed to have alluded to the road block incident with great relief once he was outside South African soil. 'Yho! I can't explain how anxious I was, I couldn't tell whether my sweating was from hot bread that was packed over me or from apprehension'⁹³, he declared. Nyoka, a Sithebe trader, gives a different account in

which Sabata's councillors prevailed upon him to disguise as a commoner, after which he stealthily left Bumbane on foot, evading the police who were looking for him. He is supposed to have crossed the rivulet on his Tyhalarha farm and proceeded to climb a rather slippery mountain until he found shelter at the home of C.T. Bhinase, a son-in-law of Chief Mnqanqeni, one of his councillors. Certain abaThembu and DPP notables quickly arranged for the covert transportation of Sabata to Mqanduli from where he would be helped to escape.⁹⁴ This latter part of Nyoka's version fits in well with Ntsebeza and Ndletyana's narrative of events the credibility of which derives in part from their informant's physical involvement in the act. In this version Sabata is supposed to have asked Bhinase to notify Kati and Xobololo about all that had happened.⁹⁵

In Mthikrakra's version of events, Sabata visited King Sobhuza of Swaziland soon after his conviction. Zilumkele of the *Qadi* clan from Darhabe and a certain Linda Yekani transported the paramount chief on this trip which was intended to afford him an opportunity to meet exiled politicians.⁹⁶ It must be assumed that as in his final disappearance, arrangements for such a visit were conducted in utmost secrecy.

Once it became public knowledge that Jonguhlanga had disappeared, the greatest concern from some quarters was for his safety. Chief Ngangomhlaba Matanzima confirmed in an interview that it was important to establish his whereabouts after he had been missing for twenty-four hours.⁹⁷ At the instance of the prime minister, the Dalindyebo Regional Authority was instructed through its secretary to nominate, 'strictly subject to Government's approval' a new paramount chief.⁹⁸ Against this background must be contextualized the meeting of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority in September.⁹⁹ Ngangomhlaba reiterated that it was customary for the Rhode (Emigrant) abaThembu to attend the meetings of their kin, just as it was also a tradition for the abaThembu bakaDalindyebo to preside at important meetings of their Western abaThembuland kin. In this light must be understood Ngangomhlaba's claim that he led a delegation, of abaThembu baseRhode which did not include the president and **the** prime minister, who were presumed to be pre-occupied with government affairs. The

debate became heated, with some attendees recommending that Bambilanga be made a permanent paramount chief while others disagreed. Ngangomhlaba has confirmed that there was no direct answer to Chief Vulindlela Mthikrakra's question:

Is Bambilanga indeed going to rule? How is his right to rule justified legally and customarily in view of the fact that Jonguhlanga whose disappearance is regarded as abdication has sons one of whom, Buyelekaya, was identified as his heir.¹⁰⁰

It soon transpired that the question of the appointment of Bambilanga as paramount chief had been caucused and a decision reached in his favour. It was at this point that Ngangomhlaba expressed shock and dismay at 'abaThembu's willful decision to appoint a permanent king while Sabata was still alive because he had not been reported dead'.¹⁰¹ Ngangomhlaba has confirmed that his argument was based on the principle that it was irregular and against the abaThembu custom to meddle with the abaThembu line of succession in any Great House. He also acknowledged that before he left the heated meeting he uttered a warning, saying 'I hope that what you are saying here today you will never at any time, possibly in future deny'.¹⁰² In a recent interview with this researcher he remarked that 'I wonder what those very people are saying today seeing that Buyelekaya is in his father's position',¹⁰³ as if to confirm that the wheels of history have rotated full circle.

The prime minister's instruction to nominate a paramount chief had not fallen on deaf ears. In September Makohliso confirmed in a letter that 'at its meeting held on 24 September, 1980, the Dalindyebo Regional Authority designated Chief Albert Bambilanga Dalindyebo to be paramount chief over the Tembu tribe residing within the area of the Dalindyebo Region'.¹⁰⁴ A letter from the district commissioner which was addressed to the prime minister's secretary confirmed the designation of Bambilanga as the Dalindyebo abaThembu paramount chief and had a rider which read thus 'Chief J. S. Dalindyebo, half brother of paramount chief designate has been deposed and his son Buyelekaya is reported to be in military training with terrorists. The designation of Chief Bambilanga is recommended'.¹⁰⁵ Indeed paramount chief Sabata was, in time, joined in exile by some members of his family, including one of his wives, noCanada, and son.¹⁰⁶ For security reasons, Prince Buyelekaya was urged to relate as a stranger to his father,

as was the father to son.¹⁰⁷ Jonginyaniso has confirmed Joyi-Notununu's version and added that on being asked why he chose noCanada above his other wives, his response was 'I thought it wise and diplomatic to have her, being the youngest of my wives, by my side because I feared that back at home she would not be able to withstand the pressure and thus it would be hard to restrain her from telling all'.¹⁰⁸

Ntsebeza and Ndletyana have revealed that the ANC had long anticipated that Sabata would eventually flee from South Africa. In the latter context the organisational operative Ndimma 'China' Saliwa, and Kati, attended a meeting that was scheduled to discuss Sabata's likely escape out of the country to Lesotho. Sabata was eventually sprung from South Africa by the ANC to Lesotho where he was received by Chris Hani in whose house he lived.¹⁰⁹ Mthikrakra claims that for reasons of security, Sabata, who time and again in the course of the trip was moved from car to car, crossed the Telle River on foot in the company of Xobololo and Kati.¹¹⁰ Qangule, a one time praise singer for Sabata, has claimed that in Lesotho the abaThembu paramount chief was welcomed by Shakes Phoswa, with whose family he lived under the protection of the Lesotho Government. Moshoeshoe II is reported to have wanted Sabata to stay close to his palace for his protection and security, even arranging with the local Christian missionaries to accommodate the abaThembu paramount chief. He also personally visited Sabata regularly at the missionaries' residence. Qangule has claimed further that Moshoeshoe subsequently invited Sabata to look after the abaThembu community in the Quthing area. While Sabata welcomed the offer he declined to take it up on the grounds that 'his primary commitment then was for the freedom of the people of South Africa because Chieftdoms and Kingdoms could only flourish when human dwellings were free'.¹¹¹ While in exile Sabata lived in different neighbouring countries that were in sympathy with the liberation struggle. Qangule claims that when King Sobhuza heard about the plight of Sabata he had a special guest house built as a gift to the 'King of the Thembus'.¹¹² His final destination was Zambia¹¹³, the country where the ANC headquarters were established.

THE INSTALLATION OF BAMBILANGA AND ITS IMPACT ON ABATHEMBU CHIEFTAINSHIP

The recommendation and subsequent designation of Bambilanga as paramount chief was immediately followed by the announcement of the date of his installation. This was 'fixed by His excellency the President as 12 December 1980'.¹¹⁴ In Makohliso's letter mention is made of a meeting, to be attended on invitation by heads of tribal authorities and selected civil servants, on 3 October 1980 to make arrangements for the installation.¹¹⁵ The fast-tracking of events suggests a panic and a desire to erase the Sabata line of rulers as a way of making sure that even if he returned it would not be to a vacant paramountcy seat. The evolution of Bambilanga's paramountcy, on the other hand, a civil affair, defied custom because it reversed the decisions of abaThembu elders that had excluded him from being heir in 1928. This development of events revealed the strength of the power that Matanzima had at his disposal as President and his determination to invest his, and his brother's powers in their crusade to finish off the Sabata dynasty.

As if to re-invent the Dalindyebo paramountcy and make everything new, Bambilanga would operate from the Sithebe Great Place as confirmed by the secretary's instruction to deliver the table and a revolving chair to Sithebe.¹¹⁶ It was significant that the Great Place was now being relocated to Sithebe, from where Bambilanga had previously operated as Sabata's deputy paramount chief. Anderson Joyi confirmed that Bambilanga threatened with arrest anyone who asked about, or commented on, Sabata's disappearance.¹¹⁷ At the formal installation of Bambilanga, Matanzima stated that Bambilanga's mother, noNciba, was Jongilizwe's first wife. This was a way of emphasising to the audience the legitimacy of Bambilanga's paramount chieftainship. Matanzima addressed Bambilanga and stated authoritatively that 'you are the abaThembu King. Your heir will inherit the kingdom'.¹¹⁸ This arrangement purported to be a solution when in fact it was a crisis of the first magnitude. The fact that Matanzima reiterated the statement that Bambilanga's 'heir will inherit the kingdom' portrayed him as a self-made abaThembu king-maker. Seemingly of little concern to Bambilanga was the fact that he was given his paramountcy by the grace of his Emigrant

abaThembuland counterpart, and was thus of a lower status than Matanzima's. General Holomisa has confirmed that Matanzima's enthronement of Bambilanga divided the House of Jongilizwe Dalindyebo locally and the abaThembu on a national level.¹¹⁹ Now at the stroke of a pen, and to satisfy Matanzima's wishes, tradition was turned upside down, and the decisions and precedents of abaThembu elders were thrown overboard as if they had added no value to custom.

In his acceptance speech Bambilanga re-endorsed his benefactor, Matanzima's, claim that he was not acting and that he was never going to give up the paramountcy and the throne either to Sabata or his heir. Bambilanga's rule was perceived by some to have been imposed upon them even though they dared not resist his authority.¹²⁰ The erstwhile supporters of Sabata, who were themselves descendants of Ngubengcuka through Chief Gobinamba and Zwelibhangile Joyi, were oncemore banished from their familiar environments. Bangilizwe was sent to Mthingwevu in the Cofimvaba District presumably to be under the strict surveillance of Kaiser Matanzima while Anderson was initially banished to Mahlungulu Village of Qumbu District, in Chief Majeke's territory and later transferred to Banzi Location in Cofimvaba District. To remove all inducements to their ever returning to their homes possibly to incite the Dalindyebo abaThembu against Bambilanga their kraals were burnt down and homes bulldozed.¹²¹ Bangilizwe's daughter returned from Fort Hare in 1980 to find ruins where their home had been. They could not even go to their uncle Zwelidumile's homestead, because Matanzima had turned Zwelidumile against Bangilizwe.¹²²

Subsequent correspondence revealed the premier's approval of the appointment of Headman Mdanjelwa Mthikrakra, a one-time victim, as deputy paramount chief in respect of Ebhotwe Tribal Authority (Bumbane).¹²³ This arrangement meant that Matanzima was strategically absorbing and winning over the ex-opposition wounded lions into his party ranks.

Soon after Bambilanga was designated as abaThembu paramount chief he applied for the employment of five policemen and six guards to guard the Sithebe Great Place, his Xugxwala residence and his house on Payne's farm, as he had been warned that it was not safe for him to leave Sithebe Great Place unguarded.¹²⁴ The subsequent undertaking by the district commissioner to arrange for the employment of guards¹²⁵ could be construed as proof that the Matanzima government were aware of the irregularities attendant upon the dismissal of Sabata and especially the rushed designation of Bambilanga as paramount chief.

An interesting development was the subsequent appointment of Acting Chief Mveleli Mthikrakra as Bambilanga's deputy to try Regional Authority cases at the Sithebe Great Place.¹²⁶ Chief Gangathile Dumalisile, who had earlier been turned down as a deputy paramount chief for Sabata, was later recommended by Bambilanga as his parliamentary representative.¹²⁷ This move could be construed as the TNIP strategy to appease and win over those that were previously favoured by the now convicted Jonguhlanga. Three months later Bambilanga's son, Zondwa Mthikrakra, was appointed as deputy to his father in respect of the area of jurisdiction of the Dalindyebo Regional Authority in Mthatha.¹²⁸

CONCLUSION

The narrative of the independent Transkei has reflected both the climax of the feud between Sabata and Matanzima as well as the unilateral resolution of the contest the build-up to which had been continually re-surfacing in the earlier chapters of this study. An interesting aspect which has emerged from the chapter is Matanzima's ability to co-ordinate all state functionaries and engineer the desired outcome. Prior to his 'inherited Governor-Generalship' he depended on the South African government for this kind of support.

The chapter has shown Matanzima to be an unrelenting dictator in his pursuit and harassment of Sabata and those that associated with him. It has demonstrated that

Matanzima's exaggerated aversion to communism was aimed at canvassing self-security than alerting the state to the potential for danger that Sabata was as a result of his association with the so-called communists. In the above context this chapter has revealed that Matanzima's desperation to nail down Sabata was also evidence of his personal uneasiness. His efforts to squeeze Sabata financially were meant to make Sabata back down and bow down to him.

The chapter has shown that Matanzima's readiness to intervene in the Njokweni-Dalindyebo families' marital issue was primarily motivated by a desire to win a moral victory and positive publicity at Sabata's expense.

The chapter has also demonstrated that Matanzima's endorsement of Bambilanga as deputy for Sabata was aimed at destabilising the Dalindyebo paramountcy. This would afford him an opportunity to infiltrate and dominate it. It is therefore obvious that what pushed Sabata away brought luck to Matanzima, but only for a short time. The chapter has further revealed that both the unorthodox invention of the Bambilanga line of rulers and the fateful demise of Sabata's dynasty symbolised Matanzima's biased autocracy at its best. Both processes however, crowned Matanzima a hero of the moment. This was evidenced by the fact that his own paramountcy never enjoyed perfect stability, even in his lifetime, because it was not possible to dismiss Sabata's paramountcy as part of a mythical past.

The chapter has revealed that the power that favoured Matanzima when he pursued Sabata was inherent in the political environment of the time. In the same context the chapter has demonstrated that Sabata's refusal to succumb to Matanzima and his subsequent flight was what shook the victor's pedestal, albeit that he hushed it all up by prevailing on Bambilanga to buy into his scheme.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored a 20th century paramountcy that endured and survived despite the fact that it interacted with parties and forces whose interests and goals were very different from its own. The interaction of the above forces revolved mostly around the instrumentality of power as an important weapon in politics of both the South African state and abaThembu chieftainship. This study has analysed the way the South African government interfered in abaThembu affairs, and how it used power as a bargaining instrument. The interaction of the above parties in a bureaucratic context, and in some cases the absence of reciprocity among them, helped create dissonance that is still a visible feature of the contemporary abaThembu chieftainship. The study has revealed that the South African government was not always consistent in making policy, and was often indecisive. This study has shown that these equivocal tendencies nurtured contradictory procedures and inconsistent practices which resulted in ambivalence. The end result was that the neglect of customary protocol in the implementation of policies sent mixed signals to the subjects at a time when the institution of chieftainship was generally in a state of flux.

Almost all literature on abaThembu history has praised Dalindyebo, the great son of King Ngangelizwe as a model chief. Through the analysis of situations in which Dalindyebo shilly-shallied, the study has revealed that he was inhibited more by the fear of forfeiting personal benefits than of any reprisals as a result of his challenging the system which impacted negatively on, and affected, traditional governance and popular interests. Further, it is proposed that his inability to sustain his grip on any party or organisation that wanted to enlist his support turned him into a pawn in the game of power politics between the government and the opponents of its policies. Against the background described above Dalindyebo's position has been represented as one that absorbed the tension and inevitably gave the bureaucratisation and resultant marginalisation of chieftaincy the opportunity to take place.

Evidence in the study has shown that Paramount Chief Dalindyebo left behind a paramountcy that was relatively stable. However, that very stability had been achieved

at a great political cost. Through an interrogation of the problems that surfaced in the wake of Chief Dalindyebo's death and the way in which these were resolved, the study has demonstrated that the abaThembu chiefs were not prevented by a lack of precedents from tackling the least anticipated crises. They did not hesitate, either, to manipulate indigenous law or to transform it into an ideal instrument that would be equipped to deal with unprecedented challenges. The minority of Dalindyebo's son in 1920 was quickly resolved in the seeming unbiased exclusion of David Jongintaba on the basis of both his junior status and his unacceptability to Nohajisi, the heir's mother.

The study has demonstrated through the regency of Silimela Ngangelizwe¹²⁹ the utility of the *Qadi* house in any royal household. It has shown that Silimela's voluntary announcement of his readiness to surrender the paramountcy to Jongilizwe was commendable. It indeed proved that the *Qadi* house had a traditionally established function in the Great House of any chief's household in the course of whose execution it also served as a guarantee of a threat-free environment.

This study has revealed that the pre-mature death of Sampu Jongilizwe Dalindyebo probably robbed abaThembu nation of a progressive leader, judging from the fact that this former Lovedale activist had, on accession, vowed to improve the image of abaThembu governance. The study has revealed that Jongilizwe's death before the birth of his heir was both peculiar and unprecedented in the history of the abaThembu paramountcy, and also historically significant in the long delay it pre-empted before the paramountcy office could be returned to its legitimate home. This study has argued that a lengthy regency was both necessary and justifiable, but that there was no guarantee that political imperatives would assure those anxious to secure the paramountcy for the House of Dalindyebo.

The study has also shown that the abaThembu elders had neither guidelines nor regulated procedures to systematise and standardise the nomination and subsequent appointment of chiefs or regents under the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The study has located the evidence of the inconsistencies of abaThembu legal system and the

loopholes in the 1920 NAA in the election to regency of David *Daweti* Jongintaba after the death of Jongilizwe at a time when his most vocal opponent, Nohajisi had died.

How the identification of the great wife dovetailed with the nomination of the heir has informed the conclusion that the status of the one prescribed the rank of the other. The study has also shown that Jongintaba's accession to regency, itself a reflection of the powerful voice of Gadla Mandela which flew in the face of the socio-political and cultural grounds for his earlier exclusion, had the potential to generate justifiable insecurity and fears in the Great House. It is also argued that Mandela inadvertently facilitated the government's tampering with customary law in his emphasis of Jongintaba's education as a factor that counted in his favour in the selection process.

What has also come out in this study is the apparent inapplicability of Comaroff's warning that 'the heir must be the eldest son of his father's principal wife', ¹³⁰ in a case where there was no principal wife at the time of the chief's death. The study has also shown that Nonesi's earlier formula of importing Mthikrakra from a junior house to provide Ngubengcuka's great house with an heir did not qualify to serve as a precedent in this case. The analysis of *modus operandi* in the case at hand has confirmed the abaThembu elders' reshuffling and manipulation of procedures and customary practices. Their exclusion of the first three of Jongilizwe's wives, No-Ashiya, NoNciba and NoKapa, until Novoti Gwadiso, the youngest and the last to be married, had given birth violated the primacy of nominating the great wife prior to the nomination of the successor. An interesting discovery which surfaced in the study was that the 'about to give birth status' of Novoti suddenly became factor in the grading of the wives which forced the rescheduling of the meeting until she had given birth. The dramatic turn of events that was brought about by the birth of a baby boy, whose mother's name became Sabata, has been noted as of great politico-historical significance for the future of the abaThembu paramountcy

Certain aspects of Jongintaba's regency likely to promote insecurity have been identified in the study. The fact that Chief Jongintaba's Mqhekezweni homestead

became a provisional great place was unprecedented, because it actually created the concept of a portable great place. This has further informed the conclusion that Jongintaba's action symbolised a gross neglect of ritual by the very custodians of hereditary chieftainship who were known to believe strongly in ancestral immobility. The culture of a mobile great place was not likely to enhance the dignity of the heir's home at a time when Sabata, an heir who had never known his father's face, needed to be given a sense of belonging.

The study has portrayed the accession of Dabulamanzi to the regency amid disagreements about his eligibility for the position as factor that converted the paramountcy into a contested prize rather than an object of preservation for the abaThembu nation. This study has consistently identified the subsequent appointment of Dabulamanzi who was Dalindyebo's son from the RHH as the germ for the progressive weakening of the already political fragile abaThembu paramountcy. It has also revealed that the abaThembu chiefs who objected to Dabulamanzi's appointment were primarily concerned with securing the rights of the great house, that is, the abaThembu paramountcy, over the likely pretensions of the RHH rather than querying the correctness of the appointment of the regent.

The study has exposed the intrinsic strength of the traditional political system that was demonstrated in the 'off saddle/*yihl'ehashini*' instruction as well as in Dabulamanzi's immediate co-operation with the abaThembu elders' dethronement order. Whilst the study has identified a weakening and destabilising factor in the quarter century regency period it has also conveyed the idea that the customary deposition of Dabulamanzi in September 1949,¹³¹ five years before Sabata succeeded Jongilizwe tells a tale about the fragility and vulnerability of abaThembu paramountcy from the beginning to the end of the period under investigation. Also argued in this thesis is that the complaint attributed to Sabata about the neglect of the Bumbane Great Place reflected badly on Dabulamanzi whose makeshift palace was the Sithebe Great Place. The dilapidated condition of Sabata's home was bound to slowly eventually obliterate the Great House

of Jongilizwe at a time when there was an urgent need for a constant reminder that the regency was a temporary stop-gap.

The study has revealed that Sabata and the elderly custodians of the abaThembu paramountcy resented Dabulamanzi's closeness to the magistrate, and his readiness to communicate and execute his instructions which subtly reinforced government-informed conditions for Sabata's accession. It has been argued that Dabulamanzi's seeming enthusiasm for the government's pre-conditions for Sabata's assumption of the paramountcy portrayed him as someone with an ill-conceived self-interest in the office which he was expected to help secure as a core institution of the abaThembu nation.

It has also emerged that during the quarter century regency little if anything in the consolidation of abaThembu paramountcy was witnessed. This was evident in the way the two successive regents invested their energies more in entrenching their personal authorities than in securing the national paramountcy for the House of Jongilizwe. Consequential upon the complexity of problems associated with the last years of the regency, particularly those that coincided with Dabulamanzi's term and its rather unceremonious ending, the environment surrounding Sabata's accession was turbulent and administratively laden. He stepped into a paramountcy that had a fundamentally weak infrastructure in a traditional sense, and much was expected of him. However, Sabata had little knowledge of how the latest legislative pieces had corrupted the indigenous chieftainship he was intent on resuscitating. What little mentoring he had had was what he acquired from the Mgudlwa home. It certainly appears that neither Jongintaba nor Dabulamanzi ever claimed to have brought the heir closer to the business of governance. This is not to downplay the mentoring exercise undertaken by the Mgudlwa home which was historically regarded as the 'amaDlomo college' for mentoring young royals, but rather to highlight the value that hands-on exposure would add to the restoration of a paramountcy that had been dormant for a long period.

In the light of the above arguments and comments there might be some logic in concluding that the rationale for Sabata's resistance to the BAA, is to be found, inter

alia, in the failure of both Jongintaba and Dabulamanzi in their primary responsibilities, as well as the defectiveness of the BAA. This legislative instrument was meant to be an improvement on the bureaucratic deficiency of the NAA of 1927. Whilst the act was designed to transform and/or mould chieftainship, where it existed, to the shape that was preferred, and revive and/or invent traditional rule where chieftainship had become passive and/or extinct, it is significant that none of these provisions accommodated the restoration and revamping of a paramountcy long lost to those for whom it was a natural right.

This study has revealed that the first challenge the government faced were the different responses of abaThembu chiefs to the implementation of the BAA. It has shown that the BAA did not, per se, precipitate the divisions among abaThembu chiefs, but rather reinforced them. The study has demonstrated that the vicissitudes of abaThembu paramountcy over a sixty year period were a public spectacle that obviously attracted the attention of its patrons and interested prophets of doom. Dabulamanzi's desire to be posted to Lady Frere, which seemed to have Sabata's encouragement, and Matanzima's subsequent and systematic thwarting of the proposal generated questions. Matanzima probably realised that facilitating Dabulamanzi's entry into the Glen Grey politics of chieftainship would help resolve the problems of the abaThembu paramountcy and complicate his plan of carving his slice from it. The ingenious Matanzima obviously realised that because Dabulamanzi's RHH background was aligned to the great house of Mthikrakra through Ngangelizwe, it conferred on the ex-chief regent a seniority which would obscure his own GHH status which was aligned with the RHH of Mthikrakra through Rhaxothi Matanzima. If such an arrangement were allowed, and provided Dabulamanzi would uphold the historical paramountcy, the history of abaThembu paramount chieftainship would probably have taken a different course. Matanzima's attitude to the paramountcy was later to precipitate a long drawn-out feud between the Great (Sabata) and Right Hand (KD) houses of Mthikrakra, and it had a lot to do with the factors that informed factional and individual responses to the Authorities. It is argued that Sabata possibly suspected that the BAA would interfere with the abaThembu paramountcy, his natural and national right by the grace of

abaThembu nation, as opposed to Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima, whose embrace of the act portrayed him as both a tool and a beneficiary of the act.

The study has demonstrated that the BAA in the end became an instrument with which the Transkei was pushed through self-government to independence. Though initially party politics were dominated by Matanzima and Poto, in time it became clear that for Matanzima, his real target in the DP was, Sabata. The study shows that the BAA was an instrument purportedly designed to consolidate the ill-conceived paramountcy of K.D. Matanzima in the context of the South African government's schemes which he had facilitated. It has also emerged that the celebration of the Transkei homeland's 'independence' seemed like a ceremony to mark the climax of the split between Sabata and Matanzima, as is shown in the analysis of incidents that culminated in the events of 26 October 1976. It is argued that Matanzima's post-independence prosecution of Sabata, which culminated in the crowning of Albert Bambilanga as paramount chief of *abaThembu bakaDalindyabo*, was aimed at forging alliances within the House of Jongilizwe. This divide et impera strategy, which saw the splitting of the House of Jongilizwe, was calculated, inter alia, to divert Sabata's focus from K.D. Matanzima's manoeuvres, as much as it was also Matanzima's way of sustaining and consolidating his fake half-paramountcy.

It has also emerged that the traditional rulers who rose to positions of civil authority knew how to wield their double-edged sword to paralyse those whose only recourse was to customary instruments. True to Mamdani's contention, under the new DNA's dispensation the traditional institutions were subservient to the state¹³² and it appears that sometimes the civil power was poised to modify them, in the true practice of 'employing selective norms' to enforce subordination and conformity. In the study the Matanzima brothers emerge as accomplices in the government's assault on their birthright. The subsequent appointment of Bambilanga's eldest son, Zondwa, as his father's deputy definitely tilted the scales in favour of the House of Bambilanga to retain the Dalindyabo paramountcy.¹³³ The study presents the appointment of Zondwa as a clear indication that the line of rulers had been diverted from the great house of

Jongilizwe and this was tantamount to claiming, retrospectively, that Sabata's rule had been illegitimate. Whatever unprecedented, though customarily rationalized guidelines, that were followed before Sabata was nominated as heir in 1928 were nullified 52 years later by one stroke of the pen in an action that appeared, to echo Evans's expression, about the 'bastardization' of Sabata's paramountcy.

The survival of the abaThembu chieftainship under the House of Bambilanga has been analysed in order to trace the origin of, as well as identify, the forces that led to the two burials of a man whose deposition and replacement were claimed to have been sanctioned by his erstwhile Dalindyebo Regional Authority.¹³⁴

The events around the return of Sabata's body to his motherland, the military atmosphere pervading the funeral of this popular and long lost abaThembu monarch particularly the disregard of the customary practices in his burial, were all events fraught with many ironies. It was the most dishonourable state funeral in its failure to demonstrate the honour usually characteristic of such burials, The disregard of the customary ritual and sentiments of the family who would never have entrusted the funeral arrangements with the dead man's arch-rival all turned an otherwise mourning event into one of inexplicable tension by the attendees and by-standers. It also showed that K.D. Matanzima, in his invertebrate hatred for Sabata, embraced with a confident sense of victory the moment of gloating over the corpse of a man whose spirit he could never crush in his life time. There was another irony in Matanzima's show of might and his wilful violation of indigenous abaThembu rituals. This action hurt the living and filled them with disgust and also portrayed Matanzima as a sacrilegious dictator who readily used his political position to assail the national rites, as if to interrogate them for failing to facilitate his acquisition of what he desperately sought to usurp from Sabata.

The active role of the abaThembu chiefs in the events that led to the exhumation of Sabata's remains on 26 September¹³⁵ 'from a commoner's grave',¹³⁶ and the reburial, on 1 October 1989, of 'the Comrade King' at the 'biggest funeral in Transkei's history'¹³⁷ both of which fall outside the scope of this study has been briefly alluded to.

The unnatural impression created by the exhumation exercise on the traditionally-minded has been noted because it implied the extent to which the Matanzima-led government had gone to ridicule even the basic customary rituals attendant upon 'King' Jonguhlanga's first burial. The fact that Anderson Joyi, the acting as abaThembu Paramount Chief, had first to appease the amaDlomo ancestors before the digging began was evidence that the abaThembu were aware of how wrong it was to bury King Jonguhlanga among women and how ritualistically important it was to rectify a deliberate cultural error.

An examination of the political and emotional impact on the abaThembu chieftainship and Transkei chieftainship generally of Sabata's reburial has not been exhausted because the whole question of deposition, death in exile, posthumous return, burial, exhumation and reburial had a lot to do with processes that would be better reversed if the abaThembu elders are realistic about the future of their ethnic group and the unity of its chieftainship. Unhappiness over the double kingship of the abaThembu does not seem to be lessening in its intensity, judging from the recent incidents of flare-ups between King Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi and his now deceased Qamata counterpart, Chief Lwandile Zwelenkosi Matanzima. Buyelekhaya's statement on 9 July 2007 to the effect that the Matanzimas 'were not kings but ordinary traditional leaders'¹³⁸ was endorsed by Mandla Mandela when he affirmed that 'the abaThembu have only got one king and that is Zwelibanzi (*Buyelekhaya*). We pay allegiance to Zwelibanzi and not to any other person.'¹³⁹ Also, the remark made by Buyelekhaya at Qhumanco(Ngcobo)- where he had been invited to conduct an installation- to the effect that he would be 'downgrading' himself if he ever asked for permission from Lwandile Matanzima to visit abaThembu traditional leaders¹⁴⁰ in that village was very pertinent for the way forward of the abaThembu chieftainship. It also sounds as a call to the democratic government to fulfill its pledge to undo the repugnant aspects of colonial and apartheid chieftainship.

The study has on the whole furnished no evidence that the abaThembu paramountcy has ever been stable in the 20th century. An analysis of Dalindyebo's paramountcy has

demonstrated that it was his quiet diplomacy which made him appear amenable to the bureaucratic schemes which endeared his paramountcy to colonial and post-colonial governments. Silimela, regent following Dalindyebo's death, was acknowledged for his natural wisdom which helped neutralise the stigma that was associated with the unprogressive paramountcy of his predecessor. Silimela's accession and peaceful exit after just four years of rule is presumed to have endowed the position with the dignity it deserved.

The study has shown that Matanzima's enthusiastic embrace of the BAA without Sabata's sanction could only have been motivated by the hope that the paramountcy was on the verge of collapse. The study has revealed that the abolition of Sabata's paramountcy created an invisible vacuum, for Bambilanga, Matanzima's BAA paramount chief was not, and could not, be the son of Novoti, Jongilizwe's great wife without reversing history. The study has depicted Bambilanga's parallel paramountcy as being simply written off with the posthumous restoration of Sabata's office.

Almost twenty years after the restoration of Sabata's paramountcy the Nhlapho Commission endorsed the fact that abaThembu historically have one paramountcy, that of Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi Dalindyebo who was appointed on 1 July 1992¹⁴¹: 'the abaThembu kingship exists under the lineage of the Dalindyebo royal house'.¹⁴²

This study has clearly generated more questions than answers as to what would possibly shed light on the fractures that exist in the present day abaThembu chieftaincy. The primary problem is the urgency and imperativeness of the restoration of co-operation between the Bumbane-Sithebe paramountcy and its Qamata satellite centre of authority. This should, of necessity be preceded by the practical implementation of the findings of the Nhlapho Commission which, as we have noted above, nullified the legitimacy of the paramountcy of the house of Kaiser Matanzima.

¹ Southall : *South Africa's Transkei*, p.257.

² Patrick Laurence - Rand Daily Mail (RDM) : "New Transkeian Opposition is born", 29 October, 1976.

³ Kotze: *African Politics*, p.147.

⁴ Laurence - Rand Daily Mail (RDM) : "New Transkeian Opposition is born", 29 October, 1976.

⁵ Own Correspondent – Cape Times : "Transkei MP crosses floor", 29 October, 1976.

⁶ Reporter – Cape Times : "Transkei MP's see chief ejected at spearpoint", 2 November 1976.

⁷ Oomen : *Chiefs*, p.44

⁸ Reporter – Cape Times : "Transkei MP's see chief ejected at spearpoint", 2 November 1976.

⁹ Political Correspondent – The Star ; "Matanzima cracks the whip of power", 11 November, 1976.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Marcus Ngani – The World : "Sabata may lose his seat", 14 November, 1976.

¹² C. Young : In Search of Civil Society in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, ed. J. W. Harbeson, D. Rothchild, N. Chazan (*Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994*), p. 35.

¹³ Marcus Ngani – The World : "Sabata may lose his seat", 14 November, 1976.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Chief Minister – The Secretary (Department of the Chief Minister, Mthatha Archives, 30 October, 1970..

¹⁶ K.D. Matanzima – E.B. Njokweni, Mthatha Archives , 22 July, 1971.

¹⁷ Chief Sabata Dalindyebo FAMILY TREE, Ah !! Jonguhlanga by K.D. Matanzima, K.D. Matanzima – The Secretary (Chief Minister's Office) Mthatha Archives, C10/023/4/1, 14 October, 1975.

¹⁸ Magistrate (De Beer) – Secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister, Mthatha Archives, No.10/18/2-1, 21 September, 1977.

¹⁹ Prime Minister – Secretary, Mthatha Archives, PM 13/023/3/1, 10/18/2-1 of 21 September 1977, F248, 20 October, 1977.

²⁰ Secretary (Dalindyebo Regional Authority) – The Magistrate (Mthatha), Mthatha Archives, Folio 246, PM 13/023/3/1, 22 October, 1977.

²¹ Prime Minister, K.D. Matanzima - Secretary (Department of Prime Minister), No.13/023/3/1, Mthatha Archives, Folio 258, PM 13/023/3/1, 13 January 1978.

²² CMT – Secretary to the Department of Prime Minister, No.10 10/18/2-1, Mthatha Archives, 25 January, 1978.

²³ Prime Minister – Secretary (Accounts Section), Mthatha Archives, Folio 243, C10/023/4/1, 12 November, 1976.

²⁴ P. Laurence(RDM) : “Matanzima ‘insincere’ over Mandela” (statement released by the National Executive of the Democratic Party, Florence Mangcotywa) Mthatha Archives, Folio 259, 22 October 1976.

²⁵ Imvo Transkei : “TNIP Discriminates against DP Chiefs”, 11 November 1978, p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ M. Z. Ngceba (Transkei Security Police – The Secretary(Prime Minister), Mthatha Archives, Folio 260, TPS 1/34, 16 November 1978.

²⁹ M. Z. Ngceba (Transkei Security Police – The Secretary(Prime Minister), Mthatha Archives, Folio 260, TPS 1/34, 16 November 1978.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Secretary to the Prime Minister – Col M. Z. Ngceba, Mthatha Archives, Folio 262, TPS 1/34, 27 November 1978.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Cingo : *Ibali*, p.31.

³⁵ Secretary to the Prime Minister – Col M. Z. Ngceba, Mthatha Archives, Folio 262, TPS 1/34, 27 November 1978.

³⁶ State President Republic of Transkei – The Honourable Prime Minister, Mthatha Archives, File No.2/1/8, 5 March 1979.

³⁷ Streek and Wicksteed : *Render Unto Kaiser*, p.309.

³⁸ B. Mthikrakra : “UKumkani uSabata”, pp.13-14.

³⁹ District Commissioner - (Case Record : The State versus Paramount Chief J.S. Dalindyebo ; Case No. 276/790, 9 June 1980) – The Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mthatha Archives, PM 13/023/3/1, p. 2.

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